Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security
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Youth and Violence in Freetown: The Transmission of a Culture of Violence in Post-War Sierra Leone

By Elisa Dari*

The exposure to extreme violence during prolonged armed conflicts creates a ‘culture of violence’ in which violence becomes embedded in the values system of the society and is therefore permitted and condoned, making violence resilient to peace-building efforts and therefore likely to recur. This article aims to understand how a ‘culture of violence’ persists long after the official end of war by exploring the phenomenon of transmission of a ‘culture of violence’ focusing on youth and using Sierra Leone as case study. Four factors of transmission constitute the analytical framework: poverty, family, peers and social groups. As a result of the fieldwork political factionalism was added as a fifth factor. The analysis of the fieldwork material revealed how the different factors are inextricably connected with one another and how they support each other while creating a network of forces that supports and perpetuates the transmission of a ‘culture of violence’.

Keywords: Culture of violence, transmission, youth, Sierra Leone, post-war society.

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Introduction

War exerts an undeniably significant influence on the values, norms, behaviour and attitudes which constitute the culture shared within a society. During prolonged armed conflicts the continual exposure to extreme violence is responsible for the creation of a ‘culture of violence’: the embedding of violence into the values system of the society, so that it is therefore permitted and condoned, making violence resilient to peace-building efforts and any conflicts likely to re-escalate into armed conflict. In order to understand how a ‘culture of violence’ persists long after the official end of war, it is necessary to understand how it is transmitted to younger generations and how it is produced and reproduced within society. This article aims to explore and understand the phenomenon of the transmission of a ‘culture of violence’ focusing on youths as carriers and simultaneously recipients of such transmission. Sierra Leone is used as the case study for this article. The prolonged conflict that plagued the country left deep wounds both in individuals and in the society as a whole.

The framework used to analyse the phenomenon of transmission of a culture of violence is constituted by several factors that catalyse transmission processes. These factors have emerged from preliminary research of existing literature from various disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and social psychology among others. These factors include: Family, peers and social groups that have been identified as categories of social relationships within which ideas, values and norms are transmitted. Distinct from social relationships, poverty emerged as a structural factor that fosters the transmission of norms and behaviours. The analytical framework was then utilised during fieldwork in order to identify the relevance of each factor as well as the interactions between them. As a result of the fieldwork, political factionalism was added to the analytical framework as an additional catalysing factor that can influence which values and norms are transmitted. The case of Sierra Leone shows how; family, peers, social groups, poverty and political factionalism are inextricably connected with one another and how they support each other while creating a network of forces that supports and perpetuates (the transmission of) a ‘culture of violence’.

1. This article results from a thesis project where the topic was discussed in more detail and length. As a consequence the analytical framework was adjusted to the length of this article. In particular peers and social groups were initially divided but within the limits of this article the separation lost its significance. Hence peers and social groups will be discussed together.
The Transmission of a Culture of Violence

A ‘culture of violence’ refers to “the system of norms, values or attitudes which allow, make possible or even stimulate the use of violence to resolve any conflict or relation with another person”.  

Through the use of this concept, I want to put the focus on the normalisation of violence and its acceptability in the everyday functioning of a community. Violence is not perceived as extreme or extraordinary behaviour any more, but becomes part of the everyday experience of the individual within the society. During violent conflict, violence is normalised through continuous, daily exposure, to the point of being accepted or even expected. This process of normalisation is not only passively received by the members of society but, normalisation of violence is acted, created, transformed and transmitted by them. Once normalised, the violence-based behavioural system becomes so internalised as to be acted upon and reproduced automatically. Violence enters socialisation dynamics and becomes entrenched in the individual’s understanding of self, the other and the world. However, as culture is learned and therefore ‘taught’, a culture of violence is also ‘taught’ or rather transmitted, especially to the next generation, and in this way it persists as part of the system of meanings shared by the community.

The impact of war on children is particularly devastating because of the increasingly blurred boundaries between combatants and civilians. Children are displaced, separated from their families, and are psychologically and physically wounded. They are abducted and trained as fighters and become directly involved in armed struggles, they are abused and raped and killed. Children and youth in modern conflicts are both victims and perpetrators. In general, continual exposure of children and youth to the extreme violence of war and armed conflict is responsible for the internalisation of a ‘culture of violence’ in which “Images and practices of violence among both perpetrators and victims (especially when young) become part of a new habitus of violence – an internalised mental response pattern anchored in behavioural routines – and also a template in the collective memory of a society”. But what happens to that ‘culture of violence’ internalised during the war when the fighting ceases? When and how do values, attitudes and forms of behaviour based on the normalisation of violence and aggression survive in the society under reconstruction? Is a ‘culture of violence’ transmitted by those children and youths who experienced the war, and if yes, how? Throughout this article I explore these questions focusing on the micro mechanisms that underpin the process of transmission within communities and among individuals.

In general, literature about the process of transmission of violence is scarce. When the variable ‘youth’ is added, then the existing literature diminishes further. Each discipline looks at a small aspect of the transmission of violence, but a more integrative account of the

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3. On the concept of a ‘culture of violence’ see also Peter Waldmann, ‘Is there a Culture of Violence in Colombia?’
processes is hard to find. This study wants to contribute to filling this gap in the research of the persistence of violence in post-war societies.

**Analytical Framework and Research Methods**

There is no existing comprehensive theoretical framework that can account for the complexity of the phenomenon of transmission of violence. Consequently the analytical framework for this study was built on existing literature from various disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, and social psychology among others, to identify the possible factors which contribute to transmission. These factors are: family, peers and social groups, poverty and political factionalism. This analytical framework acted as a guiding structure within which to explore the process at work in post-war Sierra Leone and I expand on its development below.

Psychologists focus on the consequences of trauma and its transmission between generations, mainly between parents and their offspring. However, the medicalised concept of trauma has been criticised as being ethnocentric, and of limited relevance to non-western contexts. Secondly, social groups and social identity also influence how and which values and norms are transmitted. The concept of social identity is defined by Tajfel as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”. A culture of violence can survive as the distinct element around which the group, and a sense of belonging and identity as a member of the group, are constructed. As explained in the case of Mozambique and South African youth as well as in many cases of youth soldiers, the systems of meaning and templates of socialisation constructed during the time of war become inextricably part of the way in which youth read and understand the world and social relations. In this way violence comes to sit at the core of youth identity, defining who they are in relation to others and the outside world. Within this discussion peer groups in particular represent a social space in which attitudes, beliefs, values and norms are created, recreated and transmitted. Sociologists focus on violent behaviour mainly in Western societies and even more specifically on metropolitan suburbs which do not share the same traumatic experience of post-war societies. Nevertheless some interesting insights

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7. The concept of the self, the mind and trauma, and its effects on the mental health of the individual are very much entrenched in Western psychology which in turn stems from a very specific understanding of the individual which are not necessarily shared by other cultures. See Jo Boyden and Sara Gibbs, *Children of War*.


9. Antoinette Errante, ‘Peace work as grief work in Mozambique and South Africa’.

about peer relations can be drawn from these studies. Another factor influencing transmission dynamics is to be found in the context of poverty, lack of opportunities and marginalisation. The economic and political stagnation that often follow long-lasting wars can support the perpetuation of violence as the only means of survival. Studies have demonstrated how a lack of job opportunities, education and access to basic services can be the reason why many youth engage in illegal activities and petty crimes to provide for themselves and their families. As such, violence becomes a survival mechanism.  

An additional factor was added as a result of fieldwork, namely the role of political factionalism in the process of transmission. Almost every interviewee brought up this dimension of a culture of violence within Sierra Leonean society and especially how youth are involved and in some cases manipulated in the political ‘game’ of the two opposing parties. Also political elites are considered responsible for condoning violence, hence legitimising and promoting it. This attitude towards violence of the highest political elites influence the way youth perceive violence as acceptable behaviour.

Poverty, family, peers and social groups, and political factionalism all catalyse the transmission of culture. The borders between these factors are blurred and, at times, they overlap. The distinction between one another is maintained artificially by the researcher however, it is in their overlapping areas that the interaction among the factors is revealed. 

During fieldwork, which was carried out in Freetown in spring 2010, I conducted 33 semi-structured interviews and 8 group interviews with two target groups: a) government officials from the Ministry of Youth and Sport, personnel from UN agencies and INGOs, local NGOs and organisations, community associations and charities whose projects target youth and youth-related issues; b) youths (18 years and above) who took part or still take part in such projects, youth groups, student associations, and street youth. The former group was selected as witnesses of the process of the transmission of violence and its mechanisms. Working in direct contact with youth, and having engaged with them over a period of time from the end of the war up to today, enables them to describe the dynamics and forces at work among youths as groups and individuals. The second group, youths of 18 years or older, is likely to have been part of the process of transmission, albeit unconsciously. Since violence is often normalised and internalised by those who experience it during and after the time of armed conflict, the interviewee might not be aware of surviving elements of violence in their personal attitudes, beliefs and even behaviours. This lack of awareness does not mean, however, that they cannot give important insights about the persistence of violence in their society and in their daily life. On the contrary their perception and understanding of violence and its manifestations are the main interest of this research project. This variety of sources enabled me to meet with youths at different levels in society which allowed a wide


12. From this geographical limit a specific focus on the urban youth population was derived which excluded the situation and realities of young people in the rural areas.
assessment of the perpetuation of violence in their everyday life. It is thanks to this wide range of sources that political factionalism emerged as a crucial factor in the transmission of a culture of violence.

Findings: Youth and Violence in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone experienced a 10-year civil war that devastated both the material and human capital of the country. A heated debate has evolved around the nature of the Sierra Leonean war; however, the crucial role of youth as stakeholders in the armed conflict seems to be a common element in many of the different perspectives proposed by scholars on the causes and dynamics of the war. An estimate of the number of individuals under 18 years of age participating in the fighting during the 10-year civil war is placed at 40,000. In post-war Sierra Leone youth have been formally recognised as a priority for intervention and legislative reforms, both by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). In 2003 the Sierra Leone government released the National Youth Policy that has been designed “to mainstream Youth activities and contributions and to highlight Youth concern as critical input in the development process.”

But who are these ‘youth’? The notion of youth transcends the mere age categorisation, especially in developing countries, including African countries, family, employment or the completion of a cultural rite of passage are the major factors that define a person as a youth or as an adult, both for males and females. In this system marriage, or entering the workforce, can represent rites of passage for young people, so that a young 14 year old girl who gets married is not considered a child or a youth anymore, while a 30 year old unemployed single man is still called a youth and is treated as such. In the specific case of post-war Sierra Leone the government defined youth as being between the ages of 15 and 35 because of the delay in education and employment caused by the war, accounting for 60 per cent of the total population.

Today, 10 years after the signing of the peace agreement, Sierra Leone remains a country with high levels of violence. According to the World Health Organisation the homicide rate for the year 2004 was 34 people per 100,000. Also in the ‘Sierra Leone 2009 Crime and Safety Report’ it was stated that “Within the capital city of Freetown, night-time robberies,

14. Richard Maclure and Myriam Devon, “I didn’t want to die so I joined them”, 2.
assaults, petty street crime and home invasions are common." Domestic and sexual violence also remain widespread, however victims seldom report to the police preferring to refer to the family or the community to mediate between themselves and the perpetrator(s).

**Poverty**

Poverty and marginalisation have been previously recognised as major factors in the persistence of violence in post-war societies. Limited employment opportunities and access to education were among the main grievances that mobilised youth during the war in Sierra Leone in the first place. The 11 years of civil war aggravated the situation, leaving Sierra Leone among the poorest countries in the world. For the youth of Sierra Leone this meant even higher levels of unemployment and lack of education than before. Today the unemployment rate remains extremely high, especially among youth who were not able to gain either an education or job skills during the long war. To date policies for job creation remain political rhetoric leaving young people with no real prospects for the future. Many interviewees used an expression to describe the link between unemployment, lack of education and violence: “idle hands will do the devil’s work” referring to the coping mechanisms that youth have to put in place to survive everyday life. Violence becomes the way to access resources. With no education and no jobs, violence is seen by many youth as the only way of achieving something in life. “The only way of fulfilling their aspirations is through crimes and informal economy. There is no hope so youth find a space of personal development in the violence of the street life.”

Soon after the end of the war poverty started creating distortions among youth which resulted in the reproduction of violent identities. During fieldwork it emerged how the DDR policies had created a division among youth, between ex-child soldiers and those who were witnesses and victims of the war. According to the interviewees “DDR programmes were not sustainable because the skills training was not properly focused resulting in no job placement which in turn resulted in new vulnerabilities for the youth. Ex-combatants are everywhere, poor and unemployed and hungry which make them dangerous.” A university student at Fourah Bay College explained to me that the way of life that characterised the war has transmigrated into the post-war setting, “The culture of ‘I take what I want with violence’ coming from the war is still spread today especially among ex-combatants”, so that still today youth with no job opportunities and no education re-enact the same way of life of wartime down the streets of Freetown where “you need to be strong so that nobody will mess with you.”

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21. Local NGO Officer 1, Freetown, 23 March 2010, personal interview.
22. Local NGO Officer 2, Freetown, 30 March 2010, personal interview.
23. Youth 2, Fourah Bay College, 1 April 2010, group interview.
24. Youth 1, Base, Aberdeen, 7 April 2010, group interview.
Psychologically, the youth interviewed expressed feelings of depression and hopelessness caused by the uncertainties and hardships of poverty and marginalisation. Many street youth told me that the ghetto\textsuperscript{25} with its alcohol and marijuana is often the way to forget the struggle of everyday life. The youth of the Black Street Family, a renowned gang occupying a territory next to the national stadium, were smoking marijuana and drinking pojo (palm wine) while talking to me, and they explained that “We drink pojo and smoke marijuana to forget about our stress and frustration because we are screwed. The car wash is all we do and we do it with no good equipment not even running water, we are paid pittance and the police come every day to try and kick us out of here. There is nothing for us, this is what we will do until we die.”\textsuperscript{26}

Poverty represents the fundamental condition in which a culture of violence can breed and perpetuate itself. The experience of the frailty and insecurity of their very existence exacerbates the frustration of youth. They compete every day with each other for the limited resources available and any means that ensure survival are acceptable. In the end it is a matter of life or death. The situation is aggravated by the relatively easy access to alcohol and drugs. Many ex-child soldiers were drug addicts by the end of the war. In most cases the addiction has continued until today. Drugs and alcohol were used during the war to increase bravery and the proneness to violence. In peace time drugs and alcohol are still used by youth to make them ‘bold’ and able to carry out whatever is necessary to survive for another day. However, youth are increasingly using drugs and alcohol to numb themselves, to evade the daily reality of their desperate living conditions and lack of hope.

The condition of poverty interacts with all the other factors of transmission and in a way underpins all other dynamics. Poverty erodes the integrity of the family as an institution, forcing so many children and youths onto the streets where they are vulnerable to exploitation and violence. To survive they steal, rob, pickpocket, sell drugs, and smuggle goods. When girls find themselves on the streets begging for money or food, they become targets for sexual exploitation and often become prostitutes. The incredibly harsh living conditions of so many youths make them vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation by the richer and more powerful strata of the population, such as political élites as well as educated peers\textsuperscript{27}. In general poverty provides the wider context and structure in which the use of violence remains possible. It is in this sense that poverty should be understood as a structural factor of transmission.

**Family**

It is important to point out the complete lack of studies about the transmission of trauma from one generation to the next in Sierra Leone. The dynamics of the relationship between

\begin{itemize}
  \item The term ‘ghetto’ refers to spaces in Freetown’s neighbourhoods where marginalised and unemployed youth socialised, smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol. Increasingly students and politically active youth started to meet in the ghetto as well.
  \item Youth 3, Black Street Family, 7 April 2010, group interview.
  \item University students are highly respected in their communities and by other youth and as a consequence they exert great influence on less well educated youth and children.
\end{itemize}
parent and child have also generally not been explored. Hence, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to comment about the impact of psychological trauma related to the war within the family realm in the Sierra Leonean case. Nevertheless the family was often recognised by the interviewees as holding responsibilities for the transmission of violence and was described as a highly violent environment. “There is a lot of violence within the household between the parents and the children learn from the parents arguing with each other and abusing each other.”

The war legacy manifests itself in high levels of domestic violence: “the father is angry for what happened during the war, the children are angry as well without knowing for what reason.” This resembles the loss of the natural generational dynamics within the society that Prager calls “lost childhood and lost generations”. The experiences of one generation become those of the following, obliterating the capacity for change and social dynamism. The trauma of the war becomes crystallised across generations. However, high levels of domestic violence are not new to Sierra Leonean society as it was part of the male-female dynamics and elders-youth dynamics within the Sierra Leonean society also before the war. Domestic violence is still rampant today despite the social campaigns and the dedicated police task force.

As Punamaki pointed out, the social learning approach to aggression is not on its own enough to explain the involvement of youth in violent behaviours and activities; the participants in this study seemed to agree that exposure to domestic violence, however important in the everyday life of youth and children, is not in itself enough to account for the process of transmission of a culture of violence in Sierra Leonean society. Instead, domestic violence is one major reason for children and youngsters to leave the household preferring to live on the street.

Attributed to the war is the breakdown of the family as a social institution. In fact throughout the war, or because of the war, the family as an institution has been profoundly transformed. “Before the society was like a whole big family. Everybody took care of the children. Now the family has become modular and only the parents are responsible for the children. The culture of upbringing has been distorted.” Families were divided, parents were lost, children were lost and family bonds were destroyed. As a consequence today many children live on their own down the streets of Freetown. A considerable number of interviewees recognised in these changes a reason for the perpetuation of violence. The consequence of the change in family dynamics is the lack of control and authority that the parents have on their children which results in the incapacity of the family to pass on values and norms to the offspring. An interviewee explained to me that “As parents lose the grasp on the children the norms and

32. INGO officer 4, Freetown, 1 April 2010, personal interview.
33. UNICEF officer, Freetown, 23 March 2010, personal interview.
values which were traditional of the Sierra Leonean culture are not forced on the kids anymore. Youth think they can do anything and there are no consequences. Old social structures are eroded but no new structures are put in place that fit the society.”

In the case of Sierra Leone the family cannot be understood solely as a category of social relationships that acts as a vehicle for the transmission of values and ideas supporting violence. The breakdown of the family plays a central role in creating the context or the conditions within which children and youth are initiated into violent practices and in creating the ground where violence is acted out and re-enacted in everyday life. In this sense the family is also a structural factor that allows the transmission of violence. If the family does not offer positive role models to children the result is a vacuum that needs to be filled. Often what fills the void is characterised by violence as a normal way of life. However, the family has the potential to restrain the transmission of violence; when the structure and institution of the family is not eroded, it can act as a positive guide for children and youth.

**Peers and Social Groups**

A theme that emerged strongly from the fieldwork is that of social groups, identity and belonging, and how a society that traditionally tends to organise itself into groups, such as secret societies, creates a space for violence and for the transmission of violence. “It’s part of the characteristics of Sierra Leonean society to organise in groups and identify oneself with the group. It is a matter of identity. Some of these groups advocate and preach violence.”

The literature that explores the phenomenon of secret societies in Sierra Leone is scarce. Richard Fanthorpe describes Sierra Leonean secret societies as crucial, although quiet, players in the country’s political realm. They are also educational institutions initiating boys and girls to society’s accepted norms for sexual and social conduct. Secret societies are of ancient origin in all of West Africa and there are such associations dedicated to both sexes. Membership is ensured through initiation rituals which demarcate the passage from adolescence into adulthood. In the history of Sierra Leone, secret societies have been central to societal life, they have been the locus of decision making, and today still have significant political roles. In general secret societies are considered vehicles for the transmission of traditional culture and political identities. At the same time the diffusion of secret societies is also “on its own a platform for violence because the different views are not respected/accepted.” When youth form groups outside these traditional structures, they tend to reproduce the violence that characterises the secret societies, for example by using the same violent methods of initiation: “If you want to be a member you have to go through a violent process, this is true for the secret societies as well as the university groups.”

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34. INGO officer 3, Freetown, 24 March 2010, personal interview.
35. local NGO officer 5, Freetown, 26 March 2010, personal interview.
37. INGO officer 6, 8 April 2010, personal interview.
38. INGO officer 7, 12 April 2010, personal interview.
With regard to university groups, and especially the two ‘camps’ as they are commonly called, the overlaps with the traditional secret societies have become evident as “The hierarchy of the black camp is the same as that of the Poro society.” The White and Black camps are not merely social groups, they are organisations with layered structures and numerous subgroups, female wings and even militant wings which are dedicated to the perpetration of violence, as the same member told me: “White and Black camps have militant groups which fight and take up arms,” [...], “The militant group of the Black call themselves Bakassi Boys after a militant group of youth in Nigeria which is an extremely violent group that kills and use extreme violence. The militant group of the Black camp wants to be associated with them.”

The situation in the university institutions, and particularly at Fourah Bay College, has been recurrently reported as extremely serious with regard to violence. “By the end of the war the White/Black camp differentiation came up. These are the most powerful and dangerous groups and they are widespread also in secondary and primary schools. You have to go through an initiation process that involves a lot of violence and creates a lot of troubles to the point that people die during it or some women came out pregnant from it without knowing who the father was. These two groups have infiltrated student union politics. The two groups are increasingly regionalised; Black from the south and White in the north and the rivalry between the two groups is very strong. Student union elections involved as much violence as the general elections.”

University students involved in the dualistic system of the White and Black camps spread the tentacles of a culture of violence into the rest of society through their links with their communities of origin. “Youth in university are networked with street youth who can be their brothers or community friends. The street youth are the ready battalion for the university students.” Considering the violent nature of the rivalry between the two camps and the consequences of the animosity between their members, it becomes clear which values and ideas underpin the two groups, and thus what form of role model university students are for the younger ones.

Among street youth the societal group is represented mainly by the gang which recreates the structures that were in place during war time “Groups/gangs are in the schools, in communities, in university. ‘Five stars’ is the general; everybody wants to be the general, the more you are violent the more people respect you; each gang has a ‘five stars’ that rules.” Within gangs violence is appreciated and rewarded and the names of the gangs are written

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39. There are two main fraternities in Sierra Leonean university institutions, the Whites and the Blacks. They are particularly strong in Fourah Bay College and they are politically active both in University politics and in national politics. Interviewees stressed to me how affiliation with the two camps is increasingly based along regional (hence ethnic) lines.

40. On the Poro secret society please see Little, K., ‘The Political Function of the Poro, Part 1’.

41. Amin, Freetown, 10 April 2010, Personal interview.

42. Amin, Freetown, 10 April 2010, Personal interview.

43. Local NGO officer 8, Freetown, 26 March 2010, personal interview.

44. INGO officer 9, Freetown, 13 April 2010, personal interview.

45. Local NGO officer 10, Freetown, 31 March 2010, personal interview.
on every wall around Freetown, some of the names being ‘Prison thug’, ‘Skull gang’, ‘Freetown gangstas’, ‘Thug money’, ‘Evil squad’, ‘Rambo’, and ‘Devil sons’. As an interviewee pointed out, in this environment respect is strongly associated with fear as it was during war time, “People fearing you is respect, fear is respect as during the war.”

The sense of belonging and violence seem to reinforce each other in the group system as a young activist explained to me: “It is an element of belonging to the groups, I’m part of the group so I’m violent: I’m violent therefore I’m part of the group.” Meanings are formed and shared through these structures; the process of group creation and membership entails the sharing of values and norms among the members, which means that violence can travel through this system and as a result can be transmitted through it. Moreover inherent in the construction of groups is the demarcation of the in-group in opposition to an out-group. The identification with a group is always matched with the attribution of positive values to one’s own group, in contrast with negative values attached to other groups. This contraposition lays the ground for the creation of rivalries and possibly violence between different groups. The interviews highlighted that increasingly, one of the required elements for membership in the group is the readiness to take up violence. This is especially true for street gangs but also more and more for school cliques and university camps.

In fact gangstarism also spills over to primary and secondary schools where pupils belonging to rival cliques bring stones and knives to school to pick fights. After the war there has been a mushrooming of social groups and cliques within the schools. “Gangstarism is very spread in schools, the mentors are the bad boys, those who use violence and abusive language.” In addition to gangs, there are other types of ‘social groups’. Some are based on the hip-hop culture and imitate the life-style preached by Western hip-hop stars. “After the war young people have been creating groups and cliques imitating gang culture of hip-hop stars, imitating the life-style of gang groups. They get to stab each other especially among students but also at the community level.”

The role of peers’ influence in the transmission of violence was often repeated during the interviews, especially the extent of peer influence in contrast to family influence: “Children, even if they come from a good family and they behave nicely at home then once they go out they are more influenced by the peers.” The interviewees seemed to agree that the strong influence of peers cut across the social strata, being a common feature of youth both on the street and in the schools or universities.

In the process of socialisation with their peers, youth are forced to adopt the norms and behaviours of the group, otherwise they are treated as outsiders: “Youths consider you old-

46. INGO officer 7, Freetown, 12 April 2010, personal interview.
47. local NGO officer 10, Freetown, 31 March 2010, personal interview.
48. Henri Tajfel, Differentiation between social groups, 63.
49. Rahim, Freetown, 18 March 2010, Personal interview.
50. local NGO officer 11, Freetown, 12 April 2010, personal interview.
51. local NGO officer 2, Freetown, 6 April 2010, personal interview.
52. INGO officer 12, Freetown, 6 April 2010, personal interview.
fashioned if you don’t smoke marijuana.” This mechanism is known as ‘means control’ which Campbell explains as the use of shame and applause by the peer group “to mediate goals which are important to its members.” Unaccepted youth, outcasts in their own community, can further exacerbate violence-based conflict and behaviours. At the same time resorting to violent and aggressive behaviour can ensure the recognition and respect of the peer group. Sharing norms and values based on a template of socialisation for aggression can bring social status to young people. “The school kids see violence in their own communities and take it back to the schools. If you are the bad guy, taking drugs, you are cool, you have something to be proud of.” Violence seems to be deeply entrenched in peer relations and socialisation dynamics. Among peers, and elsewhere, there seems to be a distortion of the value attributed to violence. Violent behaviours and attitudes are perceived as normal, if not as positive and revered.

Another important aspect of the perpetuation of a culture of violence is the impact of the reintegration of ex-child/youth soldiers in society. Ex-child soldiers were reintroduced within the communities at different levels. “A lot of ex-combatants or even just the young kids who helped the fighting factions, during the rehabilitation process they were put back in school sometimes in primary school and there they socialise with the younger kids and with their behaviour and attitudes they teach to the smaller kids.” Through this interaction between children, the rules and dynamics that characterised the war enter society, influencing the youngest and creating a continuum between the war, the present, and – importantly - the future. Again, “Sometimes ex-combatants who cannot go back to school, they end up being the caretakers of the younger kids and pass a culture of violence to them.” These findings resonate particularly with the study of youth in Mozambique and South Africa conducted by Antoinette Errante (1999). Her analysis of youth through the lens of socialisation theory reveals how the context of violence and war creates templates of socialisation based on vilification and dehumanisation of the outsider and violent responses to conflict. The templates created by children and youth during the time of war survive after the end of fighting and define the way in which youth interact and read the world around them and experience human relations. This is possible because, in general, templates that were formed during war time tend to elevate those values, norms and forms of behaviour that dignify aggression and violence. The survival of the socialisation of aggression is possible because during a protracted armed conflict the social bond and social capital of the community is broken down, resulting in a lack of sources for the guidance and protection of children and youth. An example of this continuum in Sierra Leone can be seen at sport events where youth are literally mimicking/staging the violence of the war, reproducing the gestures, the actions

53. INGO officer 13, Freetown, 12 April 2010, personal interview.
56. local NGO officer 14, Freetown, 6 April 2010, personal interview.
57. local NGO officer 2, Freetown, 30 March 2010, personal interview.
58. local NGO officer 2, Freetown, 30 March 2010, personal interview.
that were part of everyday life during the time of war: “During sport events you see gangs of youth literally mimicking with fake, or sometimes real, weapons what was happening during the war.”

Youth groups, whether among street youth, school youth or university students, share an underlying rationale that can be summed up in the explanation of an interviewee: “You have to belong to a group to get someone to respect you/to fear you, the group is the only way to achieve something”, [...], “There is a strong need to have something to identify themselves with and the groups are that something. It’s about superiority, my group is better than the others.”

The case of Sierra Leone shows how social relations such as within social groups and among peers can be vehicles for the perpetuation of violence. In this sense social relationships have emerged as a factor in itself for the transmission of ideas, values and behaviours fostering violence.

**Political Factionalism**

As previously mentioned the political element was not initially considered as part of the analytical framework. However during the interviews the role of political factionalism in the transmission of violence recurred on many occasions.

The connection between the political system and youth emerged mainly at two different levels, with street youth and with university associations, but it was also often stressed, more in general, that “Elders take advantage of the vote/political power of youth because they are the largest bulk of votes.” In fact, “The relevance of youth comes out only for political reasons before the elections when they are manipulated by the political parties.”

Another element that repeatedly came up during the interviews was the link between the two university camps and the national political system. “The politicians are deeply involved with the two university camps. Student union politics became involved with the state politics. The politicians support also financially these groups. This reality is becoming a threat to the stability of the country.” A graduate student explained to me that “Black and White camps are highly political; they play in miniature what happens in national politics. The two groups are affiliated with the two political parties, the White with All Peoples Congress and the Black with Sierra Leone People’s Party.” Politicians are involved in university politics and in the two-camps division to the point that “Politicians participate in the initiation rituals.”

Politicians all have interests in influencing the politics of the university and in encouraging
university students to enter this oppositional system since in the process the two parties create a reservoir of party loyalists, future cadres and voters. This link in turn creates a continuum between the violent practices of the university camps and the violent rivalry that characterises their relations and the political arena, and the practices of political actors on a national level. Furthermore, university students represent the future élites of the country, suggesting that the practices that become normal within the university structure will impact on the culture of the future ruling class, which in turn impact acceptable use of violence in the future.

Street youth, in contrast, are of importance for politicians in carrying out the ‘dirty work’. For example, street youth are recruited to commit acts of violence against the opposing party. “During elections’ campaigns politicians use the need of youth of food and drugs to mobilise them against the opposition party.” The thug-culture introduced during the 1970s has not yet disappeared. On the contrary politicians count on the desperation of large cohorts of youth who are unemployed and uneducated. The struggle for survival makes these youth vulnerable to the manipulation of those with power and economic means. For example “There are still politicians who are giving alcohol, drugs and money to youths to mobilise them.” The violence that the country experiences before both national and local elections testifies to this system. The level of violence preceding elections has been increasing significantly since the end of the war, which is the result of the normalisation of the use of violent practices for political reasons. One interviewee stated, due to the poor living conditions of the youth, “It’s cheap for the politicians to have followers ready to start the violence. For last year’s riots against the opposition party’s offices the youth were paid just 5000 Le [1$] each.” A young man I interviewed in a community candidly told me how “Politicians come to the Ghetto to take us to fight for them.” With this in mind, concerns were widely expressed during the interviews for the next national elections in November 2012. The level of violence perpetrated by street youth recruited by the political élite is incredibly high, and includes physical assault, looting, beating, burning buildings and houses, and rape. Rape appears to occur every time there is civil unrest, riots or mayhem. Some consider it a left-over from the practice of rape as a weapon of war. More generally the levels of rape in Freetown are extremely high, which appears to be connected to the concept of masculinity related to the wartime that is still entrenched in the common mentality, especially of young men.

Violence is stripped of its gravity and, thus, condoned at the highest political level which naturally influences the way youth perceive violence. “The culture of violence has not been sincerely addressed by the state. People who have been perpetrating violence in the past become heroes of the state, are admired and they have been rewarded by becoming presidential guards. This is condoning violence, they become role models.” The example

66. INGO officer 4, Freetown, 1 April 2010, personal interview.
67. local NGO officer 5, Freetown, 26 March 2010, personal interview.
68. Interview with UN officer, Freetown, 8 April 2010, personal interview.
69. Youth 4, Base, Aberdeen, 7 April 2010, Personal interview.
70. INGO officer 16, Freetown, 1 April 2010, personal interview.
that was given to me of this phenomenon relates to the permanence of ex-combatants and child soldiers in high positions within the establishment such as the presidential guard, “Presidential guards are often ex-combatants, this gives a bad message about what violence means and makes violence look cool for the kids so they want to imitate these people and they admire them.” The presence of these individuals in the presidential guard sends a clear message to young people about the consequences of using violence: few if any consequences. Moreover, the presidential guard has been witnessed to promote and organise violent attacks against the opposition party and to rally street youth to carry out riots and create mayhem: “During the attacks to the opposition party offices few months ago those same presidential guards were leading gangs of boys to loot, destroy, set on fire, beat people and women were raped during it too.”

The endorsement of violence at the highest political levels provides additional legitimacy for violent attitudes and behaviours as well as institutionalising violence and the transmission of values and norms supporting it.

Conclusions

The resilience of violence in post-war societies poses a serious challenge for the implementation of peace accords and the construction of a sustainable peace. The experience of war leaves marks both on society and on individuals which last for a long time after the official end of the war. This ‘legacy of war’, as Steenkamp called it, is often characterised by the persistence of high levels of violence after the signing of peace accords. The transmission of a ‘culture of violence’ explains how high levels of violence can still be found in post-war societies. The process of transmission is a complex and multilayered phenomenon that cannot be understood from a single perspective. In this article, four factors of transmission were considered: poverty, family, peers and social groups; political factionalism was added as a fifth factor following its recurrence in the interviews undertaken during fieldwork.

In the case of post-war Sierra Leone, a ‘culture of violence’ reaches all layers of society and characterises values systems, social relations as well as institutional structures. The

71. UN officer, Freetown, 30 March 2010, personal interview.
72. Attacks to the SLPP supporters, offices and headquarters have been reported throughout 2009 and at the beginning of 2010. A Freedom House report on Sierra Leone reported that the attacks mentioned by the interviewee in the quote “caused serious injuries and damage to SLPP offices and city council buildings...[and] included vehicle arson and alleged acts of sexual violence”, also a country report published by the Australian Government reported that on those same events “the Independent Review Panel named senior APC members as key organisers of the attacks against the SLPP. Included in this list were President Koroma’s brother, the Mayor of the Freetown Municipality and the Close Protection Guard of the President.” For a full assessment on the attacks and riots against political parties of Sierra Leone see Australian Government – Refugee Review Tribunal, Country Advise Sierra Leone, 14 July 2010
73. INGO officer 16, Freetown, 1 April 2010, personal interview.
74. Christina Steenkamp, The Legacy of War,.
interactions among the various factors of transmission create a network of forces that perpetuates those practices and ideas that promote, legitimise and condone violence. The phenomenon of transmission of a culture of violence emerged as a system that spreads its tentacles to numerous layers of society. In this system youth are at the centre. They act and re-enact violent behaviours and attitudes, hence simultaneously transmitting the ideas, values and norms that support violent practices. They pass on a culture of violence to other youth and children, and by embracing that culture as their own set of values, they crystallise them, and normalise them. Violence is becoming more and more the *leitmotif* that regulates relations within Sierra Leonean society and therefore it is increasingly difficult to eradicate it, especially since the younger generations are already deeply involved in the perpetuation of violence. This situation was described by many interviewees during the fieldwork as a ‘ticking bomb’, especially in view of the coming national elections in November 2012. The mix of acts of direct violence as perpetrated on the streets or during initiation rituals, and cultural violence entrenched in the system of social groups and political factionalism, together with poverty and marginalisation, has much potential for creating future cycles of violence.

The phenomenon explored in this article explains how violence survives in post-war Sierra Leone, but if some elements are specific and unique to Sierra Leone, wider lessons can be applied elsewhere in post-war societies. In fact, the way poverty supports the use of violence as a means to ensure survival extends beyond the case of Sierra Leone. In the same way the destruction of the societal systems occurs in most post-war societies and in many cases the vacuum of values that is created can free the ground for violent practices and behaviours to spread. The norms and values that constitute a ‘culture of violence’ are deeply entrenched in society and reveal themselves in different shapes according to the context in which they are found. The omnipresence of the phenomenon represents a serious risk for the stability of a post-war society. This is especially so when children and youth play such a crucial role in the perpetuation of a ‘culture of violence’. Beyond the case of Sierra Leone, the potential consequences of the transmission of a culture of violence resulting from a prolonged war can only really be grasped through the consideration of all the loci in which the process takes place. What can be drawn from this study is that in order to restrain the transmission of a culture of violence, special attention should be paid to the role of youth and children. Moreover to address the process of transmission, a holistic and multilayered approach should be adopted that understands the multifaceted nature of the phenomenon.

As a final point, this article discusses violent elements in Sierra Leonean society. However, it is not my intention to ‘pathologise’ Sierra Leonean society as a place where only violence rules or where violence is overpowering. During the fieldwork, I encountered numerous positive examples of youth who refused to use violence, who recognised how violence is entrenched in the way society operates, and who took a stand against it, youth who got out of street gangs and helped their former gang mates to find alternative ways of living; and youth who helped fellow youth to find their voices to escape marginalisation and disempowerment. These examples should not be forgotten. However, the efforts of those refusing violence as an accepted behaviour and fighting against it might go in vain if the various factors supporting violence are not addressed.
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State-Building in Kosovo: ‘Stuck in the Mud’

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Abstract

This paper argues that the state-building process in Kosovo does not resemble a Weberian model, rather it can be characterized as having multiple centres of authority and personalized institutions which derive their legitimacy from patron-client relationships. The paper argues that as a consequence apparently formal Western-type institutions are in fact a façade as political functioning continues to extensively differ from Western models. The paper concludes that the current arrangements for governance in Kosovo have to develop a ‘bottom up’ approach and without a broad societal consensus, inner political cohesion, judicial sovereignty, a free and fair market economy, impersonal loyalty to institutions and internal party democracy, the Kosovo state is challenged to remain - ‘stuck in the mud’.

Key words: state-building; twilight institutions; informal economy; (un) regulated society.

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Introduction

Almost eleven years have passed since NATO troops were deployed in Kosovo during 1999 to halt conflict and restore peace. Following this event, and as a result of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo became an internationally administered territory although no clear-cut goal was identified with regard to its final status. Indeed from 1999, until it declared independence in February 2008, Kosovo was in a state of 'limbo', with no prospect of agreement in relation to its final political status. During this period the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was authorized by the United Nations Security Council to be deployed in order to establish provisional self-governing institutions and provide conditions for a peaceful life for the population that addressed the aftermath of the brutal terror campaign, carried out by Yugoslavia under the late President Slobodan Milošević, against Kosovo’s Albanian majority. However, as this paper will argue, it is during this period of prolonged administration that state building in Kosovo has become increasingly 'stuck in the mud'.

In 2007, some eight years after the initial conflict and following fifteen months of unsuccessful United Nations sponsored negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo that aimed to reach a political settlement about the status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, prepared the “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” (known as the Ahtisaari Plan). His proposals recommended a form of supervised independence for Kosovo. Whilst approved by the UN Secretary General, neither the Security Council nor Serbia accepted the plan as a way forward. Subsequently, discussions between the Albanian and Serbian political leadership took place in order to unlock the process. However, six months of renewed negotiations did not yield any result, and Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008. Since then, Kosovo has been recognized by 91 of the 193 UN countries and by 22 of the 27 of EU countries. Much of the states efforts have been directed towards building diplomatic relations and lobbying for more recognition from African, Latin American and Asian countries. Crucially, whilst considerable energy has been directed toward the recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign nation, Kosovo still faces tremendous difficulties in constructing its statehood on the ground.

1. The author would like to thank Richard Slade, Rand Engel and one anonymous reviewer for their valuable help and comments in finalizing this article.
These difficulties are evident in three phenomena that have accompanied the state-building enterprise in Kosovo. Firstly, a climate of parallel structures, lawlessness and inter-ethnic tensions, secondly the underdevelopment of formal economic systems accompanied by a pervasive informal economy, and thirdly shortcomings with regards to the institutionalization of government structures in Kosovo society. This paper addresses these phenomena through the lens of models of hybrid state building, democratic consolidation and state-building processes in Kosovo by taking into account the performance of informal structures since 1999, when the United Nations Interim Administration Mission was deployed to halt conflict and restore peace, after the collapse of former Yugoslavia. The paper sets out the ground for this discussion by exploring a range of theory relevant to contemporary state hybridity.

Theorizing Hybrid State-building

Arguably, cardinal issues concerning the philosophy and ethics of government raised by Hobbes and Locke in the 17th century continue to have an impact on political and sociological discourses of state-building. For example state-building theorists such as Weber, Durkheim, Holsti, Fukuyama, Huntington, Richmond, and Chesterman have deconstructed the work of Hobbes and Locke to describe the realities of contemporary international state-building in war-torn societies from Cambodia to Sierra Leone, including Kosovo. Broadly speaking, these authors conclude that the relationship between state and society is of paramount importance in understanding the theoretical paradigmatic shift from a ‘coercive’ Hobbesian to ‘consensual’ Lockean political order.

Post-enlightenment development of this ‘shift’ was developed by Weber and Durkheim. Lemay-Hebert argues that Weber pursues an approach that emphasizes the importance of institutional reconstruction and that state-building activities “…do not necessarily require a concomitant nation-building effort.” In his view this contrasts with Durkheim’s approach that is more sensitive to socio-political cohesion as important in the consolidation of state institutions.3 This paper argues that it is Weber’s paradigm imposed by external agencies, rather than Durkheim’s more consensual approach, that is most clearly evident in state building activity in Kosovo.

Weber defined the state as “…a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”4 This definition has been considered for some time as both non-contextual and universally applicable. Following in the Weberian intuitionalist tradition, Darden defines the state as a “…compulsory rule-making organization that is sustained through extraction of wealth from within its territorial domain.”5 Fukuyama considers the state as “…the creation of new government institutions

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and the strengthening of existing ones,” and Mann describes the state as an organization of power “…that engages in centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social relations.” According to Hameiri, neo-Weberian institutionalism theories are ‘abstract’ regarding concepts of the state. Buzan and Holsti pursue a neo-Weberian path arguing that the state is not an absolute entity separated from society.\textsuperscript{8} Buzan conceptualizes the state through three components: One, the idea of the state; two, the physical basis of the state; and three, the institutional expression of the state. Holsti argues that the capacity of the state to command loyalty is of significant importance in extracting resources to rule and provide services. Rather than over-emphasizing the ‘coercive’ aspects of state-building, both Buzan and Holsti focuses on the ‘consent’ qualities of state-building such as loyalty, legitimacy and consensus as key components in guaranteeing the fate of the state.

Even though, for some, a clear concept of state-building remains elusive, a 2010 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has described the process as purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state through negotiating mutual demands between state and societal groups.\textsuperscript{9} Indeed, when considering conflict and state fragility the report argues that, contrary to Weber’s assumptions, formal political authority would supersede informal forms of authority. However this paper suggests that in Kosovo the opposite is the case and that informal and traditional forms of authority have, and continue to play, a fundamental and significant role in how authority is shaped and power is distributed. Moreover a further OECD report indicated that while in a Western state model corruption and patronage are negatively perceived phenomena that undermine the legitimacy of institutions, in hybrid political orders such forces act as informal forms of authority that can provide input and output legitimacy and maintain social stability.\textsuperscript{10} Arguably this assessment accurately reflects the situation found in a significant number of post-communist countries.

The Weberian state-centric approach presupposes a model with impersonal, rule-based institutions, and a stable hierarchy of functions, including loyalty, within the bureaucracy. However, most emerging states in the post-communist world do not resemble this model and can be characterised instead as having multiple centres of authority with personalised institutions that derive their legitimacy through patron-client relationships. Grzymala-Buse and Loung have described the key features of post-communist state-building. They find: “...this process is (1) rapid, taking place over decades rather than centuries, and, as yet, has not reached a stable outcome; (2) [is] dominated as much by informal structures and practices as by formal institutions, which are used to varying degrees by both actors seeking to establish

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8. Hameiri, Capacity and its Fallacies. 60.
their authority and those seeking to resist this authority; and (3) [is] influenced by unique international pressures, such as the pull of the European Union and the demands of globalization.”

A number of commentators have recognised that most post-communist states have yet to develop and consolidate all the typical features of contemporary statehood and do not possess a monopoly of force. Given this, Fukuyama has asked: “Can informal institutions embedded within social norms [or ‘hybrid institutions’] be made to work more effectively for development outcomes in the absence of a functioning Weberian state system?” Hollander has questioned the state-centric approach, suggesting that state-building should be understood instead as non-linear process that includes, "...the interaction of culturally embedded institutions with the weak state [that] results in ‘hybrid state-building’, ‘shadow states’ or ‘twilight institutions.”

Boege et al have used the term “hybrid” to characterize these political orders because:

- “…it is broad enough to encompass a variety of non-state forms of order and governance on the customary side (from neo-) patrimonial to acephalous);
- it focuses on the combination of elements that stem from genuinely different societal sources which follow different logics;
- it affirms that these spheres do not exist in isolation from each other, but permeate each other and, consequently, give rise to a different and genuine political order.”

Given these theoretical perspectives, this paper argues that the state-building process in Kosovo does not resemble the Weberian model because it is characterized as having multiple centres of authority, and personalized institutions which derive their legitimacy from patron-client relationships. Consequently, as this paper will reflect, apparently formal Western-type institutions are in fact a façade as political functioning continues to differ extensively from Western models. The Kosovo political order is considered in this paper as hybrid with, as yet, no supreme sovereignty, nor a genuine and standardized formal bureaucracy. Three elements of governance have been hybridized in Kosovo. Firstly, sovereignty and the monopoly of legitimate force are characterized as having multiple centres of authority. Secondly, a feature of the economy in Kosovo is the coexistence of a free market-oriented economy, and a large informal and grey economy; and thirdly Kosovo society is not yet institutionalized - consequently legitimacy rests with political leaders, not with state authorities.

For state building in Kosovo the issue is how to combine the strengths of both modern and customary systems in order to generate trust, order and security. Clements et al believe that neither the Weberian state, nor informal traditional mechanisms, can guarantee individual security. They argue that most contemporary developing states are ‘hybrid’ political orders.

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13. Hollader, Gender Equality and the Hybrid Reality. 5.
14. Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States. 10.
and that ‘...the challenge facing policy makers is not so much the goals of state capabilities, effectiveness and legitimacy as what constitutes appropriate means to achieve these ends.’\textsuperscript{15}

For these scholars, ignoring hybridity is not an option as this might cause tremendous difficulties in generating effective and legitimate systems. Rather, recognizing hybridity should be the starting point.

Set against this background this paper argues that a Western concept of the state presupposes the idea of a relatively autonomous apparatus of state and clear distinctions between private and public spheres. However, Non-western States are not driven by this paradigm and the Western Weberian statehood suggested by Western state-builders can lack local relevance. Bliesemann finds that, even though ‘...under the influence of international institutional norms, states all over the world increasingly built a formal façade of Western-type institutions, however, their social functioning continues to differ, more or less widely from Western model.’\textsuperscript{16} Ginty\textsuperscript{17} and Boege et al\textsuperscript{18} reach similar conclusions. These authors have found that the political order in non-Western states, rather than working within a standardized formal bureaucracy, operates within patronage networks where the state is perceived as an alien external force.

From Kosovo to East Timor, state-building is perceived as a technical enterprise exercised by the Western state-builders with the Weberian Western state being delivered, like a product, to local people. Consequently, there has been insufficient understanding of local power constellations and traditional networks, including clans and extended families, which have played, and continue to play, a significant role in providing legitimacy to institutions. State building in Kosovo serves as an example of this conclusion. Given that newly established provisional institutions have proved incapable of providing basic services, people have instead relied on traditional societal structures such as clans or extended families. When state agencies were not operating on the ground, people usually placed their confidence ‘in their community and its leaders’, rather than in the state. Boege et al argue that in hybrid political orders the state is just one actor amongst many others on the ground, all of whom have the capacity to deliver services that people obey the rules of their group rather than of the state and that ‘...legitimacy rests with leaders of that group, not with state authorities.’\textsuperscript{19}

The following discussion of the extent to which state building in Kosovo has been undermined by parallel structures, inter-ethnic tensions, the informal economy and the challenges of institutionalising government structures provide an apposite illustration of Boege et al’s assessment.

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\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{15} Clements et al., ibid. 48.  
\textsuperscript{16} Bliesemann de Guevara, Introduction: The Limits of State building and the Analysis of State-Formation. 115. 
\textsuperscript{17} MacGinty, “State-building, Peacebuilding and Hybridity.” 4. 
\textsuperscript{18} Boege et al. ibid, 9.  
\textsuperscript{19} Boege et al. ibid .10.}
\end{flushright}
Parallel structures and inter-ethnic tensions

The pressures arising from lawlessness and tensions placed a significant strain on Kosovo state building and are usefully understood through the role played by twilight Serbian institutions. Such institutions, described by Lund as bodies “...who are not the state but exercise public authority”\(^{20}\), can be seen to have paralleled attempts to build the Kosovo state, and in doing so realised a relationship between these Serbian entities and ethnic violence. However these phenomena did not erupt overnight and need to be seen in the context of events since intervention by the international community.

The NATO intervention of 1999 led to the suspension of the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo. UNMIK was charged, in line with UN Security Council resolution 1244, with maintaining civil law and order, the demilitarization of society, and supporting the consolidation of provisional institutions in Kosovo.\(^{21}\) In order to achieve these objectives UNMIK was given the “...monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”\(^{22}\) Consequently, Kosovo Serbs who contested the presence of this monopoly created ‘twilight institutions’ which were not bound by the acceptance of formal rules.

The term “Serb parallel structure” has been used to define such institutions - “...bodies that have been or are operational in Kosovo after 10 June 1999 and that are not mandated for under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.”\(^{23}\) Ever since 1999, these parallel structures have continued to grow in strength and to compete with the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo (PISG), established under UNMIK regulation 2001/9. These Serbian parallel structures have a significant level of state-like characteristics and replicate local government institutions in charge of education, health and justice. They are, in the terminology of Helmke and Levitsky, informal competing institutions, acting in ways that contradict each other and are incompatible with the formal rules set forth by UN Resolution 1244, Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework and the PISG. Partly as a consequence of the existence of these structures Kosovo Serbs have refused to recognize Kosovo institutions and many boycotted “...parliamentary elections which were held in 2001, 2004 and 2007, as well as local elections in 2007.”\(^{24}\) As a result, there has been no mutual accommodation of UNMIK activity and these ‘twilight’ Serbian parallel institutions.

These parallel structures emerged in 1999 as a result of the lack of existing formal institutions. However as time went by these arrangements grew in strength due to the weakness of Kosovo institutions. Following Kosovo independence in 2008, when almost full authority and responsibilities were transferred from the omnipotent UNMIK to the impotent Kosovo institutions, these informal Serbian structures were partially dissolved through the

\(^{22}\) Weber, ibid, 78
\(^{25}\) Montanaro, *Administration and Governance in Kosovo*. 5.
decentralization of power based on Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Plan on Kosovo Status Settlement (The Ahtisaari Plan). Yet in north Mitrovica, bordered by Serbia, the very same structures were empowered as a means of post-independence bargaining between Kosovo and Serbia.

The dynamic of formal-informal institutions quickly changed after Kosovo declared its independence. Serbian parallel structures all over Kosovo, and especially those in north Mitrovica, that had until then distanced themselves from and ignored UNMIK, now began to rely on UNMIK and “quickly hosted UN flags.” This new position drew on UNMIK’s ‘status neutral’ policy on post-independence Kosovo that was reframed by Serbs as legitimizing discourses that Kosovo’s status was unresolved, arguably with the objective of advancing the goal of making Kosovo a failed enterprise of international state-building and postponing international recognition of Kosovo.

Evidence to support this analysis emerged in May 2008 when Serbia organized local elections “...for the first time since 1996 in 23 out of 30 municipalities where Kosovo Serbs live.” Despite being labelled as illegal by UNMIK, this apparent violation of the internationally recognized sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kosovo saw Serbia establish its own four ‘municipalities’ in northern Kosovo, including north Mitrovica, Zvecan, Leposovic and Zubin Potok, that were “...in direct competition with official Kosovo municipal structures.”

However following the elections the new position became increasingly fragmented with a clear distinction between Serb parallel structures in the northern and southern parts of Kosovo. In the four northern Serbian parallel municipalities, the Kosovo state was barely present, while in the southern part the parallel municipalities were less visible and unable to function independently. Set against this fragmentation the prospects of state building were further undermined when Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, asked Kosovo Serbs to end their cooperation with Kosovo institutions.

In short, after independence Kosovo Serbs living in northern Kosovo, bordered by Serbia, chose to pursue an approach based on parallel structures, while Kosovo Serbs in southern Kosovo, surrounded by their Albanian neighbours, chose a more pragmatic approach in terms of cooperation towards Kosovo’s institutions. Given these competing structures it is not surprising that attempts at dialogue to reach agreement about Kosovo’s final status not only became increasingly deadlocked, but that maintaining the status quo seemed an increasingly attractive option for securing and maintaining stability.

29. ICG, “North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in Practice.”
Attractiveness of the status quo

Following international intervention Kosovo Serbs rejected the letter and the spirit of the formal institutions set forth by UNSC Resolution 1244, which, whilst not establishing any clear end solution, did anticipate that Kosovo’s final status would eventually be resolved. However after almost a decade of international administration during which talks on Kosovo’s final status had made hardly any progress, Kosovo Serbs began to draw on Resolution 1244, an approach described by Ignatieff as a “political science fiction.” This strategy can be seen as a way of delaying progress which played into the wider agenda of the international administration. Throughout the years of international administration, Kosovo’s final status remained effectively in limbo, with stability being provided through a maintaining the status quo. Belloni supports such a conclusion, arguing that “...international intervention is led by the stability paradigm and is focused more on maintaining the status quo rather than the needs of the people.”

Despite the aim of this status quo policy appearing to be one of isolating Kosovo Serbs from the rest of Kosovo society’s institutions by strengthening the parallel structures, these latter bodies have not been efficient or sufficiently legitimate to meet the needs of the Kosovo Serbs. A report published by the International Crisis Group (ICG) demonstrated that they rely heavily on Serbia’s state services whereas Serbs in the south of Kosovo, who have pursued a pragmatic approach by engaging with Kosovo institutions, have found such a strategy better served their interests. Despite this, parallel structures, especially in the north, have continued to be resilient, stable and resistant to integration into Kosovo’s institutions. Helmke and Levitsky have argued that top-down informal institutions change slowly and maintain stability through relying on a small number of actors who control these institutions in a centralized manner. A local commentator in Kosovo has emphasized that Serbian structures in the north are “...the result of deliberate action by Belgrade to create a ‘frozen conflict’ type situation, similar to that found in the Caucasus, as part of a policy of contesting Kosovo’s statehood and independence.” Indeed, in order to prevent Kosovo Serbs from integrating into Kosovo’s post-independence institutions, Serbia has funded parallel structures since 1999 and has appealed to the local Serbs to boycott Kosovo institutions, labelling those who continue to cooperate as “Enemies of the State.” Arguably a ‘sweetener’ for this approach is evident in arrangements that see Serbs in the north pay for no utilities provided by Kosovo government resulting in the Kosovo Energy Corporation losing €20 million in revenue per year. Even today, twelve years after the beginning of the international administration, local Serbs who cooperated with Kosovo institutions experience intimidation and attacks.

30. OSCE, ibid.
32. Roberto Belloni, State building and International Intervention in Bosnia, 5.
34. Helmke et al., Informal Institutions & Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, 22.
35. Veton Surroi, “The Unfinished State(s) in Balkans and the EU: the next wave”, 113.
Given this situation the North of Kosovo remains outside the authority of the Kosovo state. The border between Serbia and Kosovo, especially border Gates 1 and 31, has long been considered a source of crime and insecurity\(^\text{38}\), with increased lawlessness emerging in the aftermath of Kosovo’s independence. Although UNMIK intelligence service informed the UNMIK Mitrovica regional administrator about the potential of violent action at the Gates 1 and 31 this information was ignored. Orchestrated by Serbia, customs Gates 1 and 31 were burned. Consequently, Kosovo’s economy has lost in the region of €3 million on a monthly basis, significantly undermining an already poor economy.

**Bridge-watchers and lawlessness**

The relationship between parallel structures, and ethnic hostility became evident immediately following the aftermath of the 1999 conflict. Known as the ‘Bridge Watchers’, a group of local Serbs at the Ibar Bridge, established themselves as a formal security organization with three main functions: to prevent Kosovo Albanians from entering the north of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica; to gather information on Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) and UNMIK Police; and to gather information on any Kosovo Albanian living in the north.”\(^\text{39}\)

During the conflict, Albanians from Mitrovica were expelled and their homes were burned by Serbian forces. When they returned from the refugee camps in Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro following the deployment of NATO troops, many were prevented by the Serbian Bridge Watchers from gaining access to their homes in the north of Mitrovica.\(^\text{40}\) Even those few who managed to reoccupy their homes were expelled again in the aftermath of NATO deployment in Kosovo. An ICG report recorded that members of the Bridge Watcher group were paid by the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP), in “...direct violation of UNSCR 1244.”\(^\text{41}\)

In order to understand the significance of Serb parallel structures and specifically the Bridge Watchers, two important events need to be highlighted. Firstly KFOR temporarily cordoned off north Mitrovica in 1999, aiming to protect local Serbs from potential revenge from Kosovo Albanians and secondly the institutional vacuum which arose in the aftermath of the conflict: UNMIK deployed its staff in late October by which time informal parallel structures were already organized.\(^\text{42}\)

Bridge Watchers set up illegal checkpoints and restricted the freedom of movement between the two sides of the bridge.\(^\text{13}\) In addition to being financially supported by Serbia’s Ministry of Interior (MUP) and having police-like characteristics, the Bridge Watchers supplemented their funds “…through organized crime including smuggling and prostitution” and “intimidate[d]
those who cooperate with and work for UNMIK..."\(^{44}\) and Kosovo institutions. In doing so it appears that the motives of organised crime, rather than Serb nationalism became paramount since the group cooperated with local Kosovo Albanians in the south in carrying out illicit activities such as smuggling petrol and other goods, “…while maintaining a political and social environment that made it taboo for ordinary citizens to work together.”\(^{45}\)

Set against this background it is easy to see how the implementation of the rule of law as an essential ingredient of state building became seriously, if not thoroughly, undermined. Whilst the apparatus and deployment of the law is a universal tool for preventing arbitrary behaviours by officials and other individuals\(^{46}\), with no effective criminal justice in the north, ordinary Serbs have repeatedly faced the capricious decisions of the Bridge Watchers and the leaders who control them.

The Ahtisaari Plan recognised the need to deal with this situation. The Mitrovica municipality was intended to be separated into two new municipalities: Mitrovica North and Mitrovica South - both responsible to a joint board charged with managing 'functional cooperation' (Ahtisaari Plan: Annex III). However, the establishment of the municipality of Mitrovica North is to date yet to be realized as the Serbs boycotted the November 2009 Kosovo local elections through which 5 new Serb municipalities were established. However, as a result of this resistance, Kosovo authorities have been hesitant to establish their authority and enforce the rule of law as part of the sovereignty. Sovereignty implies constitutional independence and legal autonomy.\(^{47}\) Both of these aspects of Kosovo sovereignty have been violated by Serbia’s government through their direct support of the parallel structures in the north.

The outlook is pessimistic. Zaum argues that stability in the north of Kosovo was maintained by the international community through a tacit recognition of informal structures that have links with criminality.\(^{48}\) His critique of this approach emphasizes that these structures hinder the legitimacy and capacity of the state and serve as an instrument of instability, making it hard for the international community to leave Kosovo because their presence has become a necessity in order to maintain peace and stability. As this situation has become more embedded, a range of informal economic systems have sprung up which have further undermined the viability of Kosovo state-building.

Underdevelopment of formal economic systems

Kosovo, as an autonomous pokrajina (region) of the former Yugoslavia, was part of the so-called Yugoslavian self-management socialist economy with a centralized economy relying

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44. ICG, “UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross: Tackling Division in Mitrovica”, 13.
46. Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq, 73.
mainly on socially owned enterprises (SOE). The domestic economic model was sui generis as SOE were not meant to be controlled by the state or by private actors, but through worker’s councils in charge of running the enterprises in terms of production, expansion and trade.\textsuperscript{49}

With the deployment of the international administration in Kosovo, SOE’s were officially supposed to be managed and controlled by UNMIK. Indeed, the UNMIK administration was mandated not only to manage the transition from a war-torn society to a peace-driven society - and from an undemocratic regime to a democracy - but simultaneously to manage the transition from a socialist regime to a free market economy.\textsuperscript{50} The question was how to deal with the sui generis status of SOE’s? It took time for the UNMIK administration to understand the applicable Serbian legal framework (‘Markovic Laws’ of 1989) and the local epistemic practices related to SOE’s before undertaking a process of privatization which aimed to achieve a shift from the socialist paradigm to liberal free-market economy.

Set against the dissonance created by a post-war situation the complexities of dismantling state structures and underpinning drivers of economic insecurity, it became common for people to engage in different illicit economic activities. Wennmann highlights this outcome as a result of citizens having to rely on a parallel economy when the state is dysfunctional.\textsuperscript{51}

Given the legal vacuum in Kosovo after 1999, where there was no state but rather an international administration charged with playing the role of a state, people from all communities began to engage in different economic activities to support their families.

Initially, some of these illicit activities were the legacy of war and involved importing and retailing products such as sugar, oil, cigarettes and flour. Significantly these products were tax-free, there being no tax collection system in place, resulting in lost revenue that could have contributed to the nascent state-building processes. However the informal economy became increasingly nourished by institutional weakness and the lack of ability of political leadership to create incentives for an inclusive economy. Moreover, as political leadership interests were inextricably linked with the informal economy, addressing the phenomena at the political level was almost impossible. Institutions charged with handling the informal economy repeatedly supported the campaigns of political parties. As a consequence both parties and institutions had a mutual interest in maintaining this situation. This consensus between the political leadership and informal economy structures is described by Glasius and Kotovicova, as maintaining the state’s weakness “without destroying the state altogether.”\textsuperscript{52}

Maintaining and exacerbating this weakness has been evident in the activities of economic actors who control millions of Euros and - in cooperation with key politicians - escape registration and regulation of their activities, whilst importing goods such as petrol, cigarettes


\textsuperscript{50} Zaum, Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International State building, 153.

\textsuperscript{51} Wennmann, “Resourcing the Recurrence of Intrastate Conflict: Parallel Economies and Their Implications for Peacebuilding”, 480.

and meat. Moreover, agriculture activities in Kosovo remain entirely “...outside the cash economy.” As a result, an International Labor Organization (ILO) survey has estimated that 49% of the total persons employed in Kosovo were employed informally. In fact tax evasion is one of the most significant factors undermining efforts to build a viable Kosovo state.

As a consumption and export-driven society, Kosovo’s budget is mainly funded from taxes gathered at the border custom points. In 2010, 51 per cent of all revenue gathered by the Tax Administration of Kosovo comprised value added tax (VAT). A further 16.4 percent was derived from corporate tax, 15.2 per cent from withholding tax, and 11.6 per cent from business tax on individuals. Despite some progress in recent years the percentage of taxes gathered from businesses remains low. Kosovo’s tax administration is newly established and lacks the surveillance capacity to monitor businesses at the local and national level. In 2005, there were 300 tax inspectors to inspect and collect taxes from 48,000 registered enterprises and, disproportionally, only 1 inspector was in charge of 160 enterprises. Most of these latter enterprises carried out economic activities with cash and without using financial/banking institutions. As a result tax evasion was estimated to be 50 per cent. Parallel to this, less than 10 per cent of Kosovo diaspora remittances – a significant feature of the economy contributing approximately 13-15 per cent of Kosovo’s overall GDP - are sent though bank institutions. 90 per cent of diaspora remittances is in the form of cash or sent through private transfer organizations such as Western Union even though this method is more expensive than banking facilities.

Informality’ continues to be a central feature of the economy. Whilst the overall formal business environment has deteriorated in tandem with the post-2008 global recession, the informal economy continues to flourish. In 2011, there were 1300 individual business which closed in Kosovo to avoid taxation. There are two reasons for such a large tax evasion: a) država – the continuing impact of the historical Serbian state - and b) institutional weakness. This situation has its roots in the legacy of the relationship between the 1990’s Serbian state in Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians. The former was characterized as brutal, authoritarian and violent in its dealings with Albanians who were struggling, initially peacefully, for increased human rights and self-government. Serbian authorities in Kosovo responded to this situation by intimidating, harassing, and arresting Albanians who, as a consequence, organized a self-help economy separate from the Serbian state and boycotted Serbian institutions. During this period, avoiding the payment of taxation to the Serbia’s država was considered a patriotic act, whilst conversely paying taxes was tantamount to supporting brutal Serbian institutions.

54. BSBK, “The Informal Economy in Kosovo: Which Role for the Trade Unions?” AKB, “Ekonomia Informale dhe tranzicioni drejt ekonomise se tregut. II. Rruget e reduktimit te ekonomise informale dhe perfitimet e biznesit.”
56. BSBK, “The Informal Economy in Kosovo: Which Role for the Trade Unions?”
Following the NATO intervention, and even though Kosovo Albanians supported the UN mission, the lack of agreement surrounding Kosovo’s final status impeded building normal relationships with the provisional institutions of Kosovo established to provide governance, which were seen by the population as having no competencies or responsibilities to govern Kosovo. This lack of relationship building is related to a third factor that has limited state building in Kosovo: significant shortcomings with regard to the institutionalization of government structures.

The institutionalization of government structures

The withdrawal of the Serbian administration from Kosovo in 1999 left a legal vacuum in the political and social environment. This administrative void was filled by different informal structures. Typically, order and security were provided by clans, extended families, the former Kosovo Liberation Army members, and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) party’s structures. The establishment of the UNMIK administration in Kosovo acted as a challenge to these informal structures that saw a threat from this externally imposed governance to the status of their groups. In order to impose its authority Kosovo-wide, UNMIK attempted to strategically involve all informal actors in a joint “quasi government” structure.60 UNMIK created interim administrative structures to govern Kosovo territory through the JIAS (Joint Interim Administrative Structure) Agreement.61 As part of this agreement an interim joint structure was established, the Interim Administrative Council (IAC). The IAC comprised the four key political leaders in Kosovo. The UNMIK rationale behind establishing the IAC was gaining legitimacy from the local population, and in doing so to deliver its responsibilities through the co-option of political leaders in Kosovo.62

Brand’s analysis of the development of state-building institutions in Kosovo has shed important light upon the hybrid character of the political order established by UNMIK. Through deconstructing the JIAS agreement, he identified text which stated that current Kosovo structures (executive, legislative and juridical) “...shall be transformed and progressively integrated, to the extent possible and in conformity with this agreement, into the Joint Interim Administrative Structures.”63 Consequently, as UNMIK delayed in establishing and exercising its authority, Kosovo Albanians who were dismissed by Serbian authorities from their jobs during the 1990s, took matters into their own hands as they returned home, filling the local municipal structures and starting to provide administrative services. The situation was further complicated by some municipalities in Kosovo, who had the support of Kosovo Liberation Army, and who became actively engaged in the war, being managed by self-appointed mayors.

60. Simon Chesterman, Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance, 133.
61. Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and Reconstruction, 93; Dobbins et al., ibid, 121.
63. Brand, “The Development of Kosovo Institutions and the Transition of Authority from UNMIK to Local Self-Government.”
These circumstances produced a tense political environment when UNMIK asked that these structures end their activities and come within the remit of the UNMIK administration deployed at local municipalities – in line with UNMIK Regulation number 1999/14, which required the administration to appoint regional and municipal administrators in five regions of Kosovo. The political tensions were addressed through elections to interim institutions organised within the auspices of the UNMIK administrations. In October 2000, the first local elections were held and the self-appointed structures were substituted by the newly elected municipal representatives. Further attempts at state building were apparent in May 2001, when the Constitutional Framework for Self-Government in Kosovo was promulgated by UNMIK, and PISG institutions were established. The preamble of the Constitutional Framework stated that: “...the gradual transfer of responsibilities to Provisional Institutions of Self-Government will, through parliamentary democracy, enhance democratic governance and respect for the rule of law in Kosovo.”

However between 2002 and 2005, the democracy promoted by UNMIK became increasingly moribund - ‘stuck in the mud’. This period saw the international community trying to invest resources to empower local institutions, whilst at the same time retaining their ‘reserved powers’, especially those related to statehood and minorities. One of the most sensitive issues raised throughout this period was the issue of the undetermined eventual political status of Kosovo. UNMIK and UNSC Resolution 1244 had a clearly limited mandate, which meant that the provisional self-governing institutions in Kosovo would enjoy substantial autonomy, while waiting for final status to be resolved in the future. However as discussion dragged on the process of UNMIK administration became inconsistent with its ends. The lack of agreement on a solution to Kosovo’s final status continually hindered the establishment of a mature, democratically oriented political leadership in Kosovo.

A ‘top down’ approach was evident in the extent to which institution building in Kosovo, in terms of UNMIK discourses, was a task to be performed by foreign consultants rather than Kosovo’s provisional structures. Millions of Euros have been spent on international consultants, paid to train local administrators in institutional building - one Kosovo newspaper reports that during 2012, the Government of Kosovo had spent nineteen million Euros on consultancy. King and Mason argue that this external involvement was further complicated by the complexity of UNMIK as a UN organization comprising four bodies (UN, UNHCR, OSCE and EU) and its effectiveness “...suffered from having too many masters.” As Kosovo’s provisional institutions were rarely consulted with regard to key decisions made by

these groups, the legitimacy of provisional institutions was rapidly eroded. As a result Kosovan institutions lacked the capacity to meet their citizen’s needs and to attract international donors to invest in a country with an unpredictable status. Arguably, by the time Kosovo, in cooperation with its western partners, declared independence in 2008, UNMIK had sacrificed the possibility of long-term durable peace and a sustainable economy for short-term stability.68 A significant casualty of this state of affairs was the development of a robust and healthy political system.

Political Parties
Freidenberg and Levitsky argue that informally institutionalized parties are those where “formal structures are weak but informal structures are well established.”69 These scholars emphasise that a consequence of ‘informal organization’ is that the funds of the political parties are not transparent. This view has been confirmed by Transparency International that has classified political parties in Kosovo as the most corrupt organizations in the country.70 In the context of the patron-client environment in Kosovo, and the fact that government is the biggest public investor, the ruling parties have been continually supported by businesses that have subsequently been rewarded with project grants, or commissioned as contractors or subcontractors in government projects led initiated by political parties. Consequently, the private sector has hesitated to support any opposition parties that hold power, as this might have a direct impact on their businesses activities. Even though political parties are legally required to report on funds provided by public and private funds, they have ignored this requirement of the Central Election Commission, for example failing to declare the total amount of money spent throughout during election campaigns.

King and Mason have argued that Kosovo’s political parties are not groups of civic minded people bounded by ideological principles, but rather “personality driven patronage networks.”71 Kosovo’s daily newspaper Zeri has observed that the extraordinary power of party leaders derives from the lack of internal democracy in parties and the fact that leaders see their parties as if they were their personal property - underpinned by the extent to which the main political parties were established by their leaders rather than being based upon any series of political principles.72

Yet the picture is not completely bleak and there is genuine interest amongst the population in developing more accountable and democratic systems. The Proportional representation (PR) electoral system in Kosovo has promoted a genuine consensus, through a model of consociational democracy, defined by the Dutch political scientist Lijphart as “…government by an elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with fragmented political culture into a stable

71. King et al., ibid, 244.
democracy.” – Or in other words the involvement of representatives of respective communal groups who employ co-decision-making at the executive level.

However this system has lead to a fragmented culture in the political landscape, evidenced by the number of political parties’ that increases each year. In Kosovo’s 2000 local elections 49 political parties were registered; in the 2009 local elections the Central Election Commission certified 74 political groups. Since most of these political parties were not in a position to attract sufficient votes enabling them to lead the country, political coalitions were established which saw institutions being led by the major political parties: LDK (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës), PDK (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës) or AAK (Aleanca për Ardhmerinë Kosovës). However these post-war coalitions between, LDK, PDK and AAK drew their legitimacy from a platform of independence rhetoric. As a consequence there has been no space for real political rivalry and, as a consequence, no power shift or any political contestation, which in Dahl’s understanding is the very core of democracy.

The role played by UNMIK, as it established its authority and control over Kosovo, has not helped the development of any fledging political system. UNMIK found that the easiest way of imposing its remit was through cooperation with the pre-war and wartime political leadership, who had enjoyed considerable support from the majority of the population, based on the rationale that this would allow stability to be more easily maintained. However, whilst developing a western style democratic system, UNMIK also wanted to retain control of the outcome of implementing such a system and was interested only in empowering political leaders who were considered to be moderate. This was evidenced during the 2001 national elections when the PDK leader Thaçi was vetoed by UNMIK for the position of prime minister due to his perceived hard-line stance and ex-KLA doctor and soldier from Mitrovica, Bajram Rexhepi, was to the office instead.

**Administration and Institutions**

Alongside transparent and robust political systems, the capacity of institutions to effectively meet citizens’ needs is essential in developing and improving the legitimacy of the state. However, contrary to a Weberian perspective of bureaucracy, administrative bodies in Kosovo, tend not to be based on merit hiring, professionalism and impersonality. There is no clear-cut distinction between the civil service and political institutions. UN Special Envoy Kai Eide, when assessing the overall political landscape and progress made by Kosovo institutions, emphasised that appointments in the civil service are made on “the basis of political or clan affiliation rather than competences”, which has directly affected the development of a stable administration.

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73. Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, 216.
74. ICG, “Collapse in Kosovo”, 8.
76. Oisin Tansey, *Regime-building: Democratization and International Administration*, 120.
O’Dwyer argues that when party building and state-building become intertwined, a “...runaway state-building...” emerges, characterized by patronage politics and ineffective institutions. This has been the case in Kosovo where party affiliated partisans were rewarded for their support of political parties, through employment in Kosovo’s public administration. European Commission (EC) Kosovo’s Progress Reports published between 2005 and 2011 have consistently urged that Kosovo’s government should reform public administration as a key priority for developing European Partnership arrangements. The EC Kosovo Progress Report of 2010 highlighted that public administration remains “...extremely weak, insufficient and overstaffed.” Since this aspect of governance is a critical resource, it is difficult to see how state building efforts can successfully progress - and how Kosovo can be levered from its current position.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the hybrid state-building enterprise in Kosovo is characterized by the co-existence of powerful and dynamic constellations of ‘twilight’ Serbian parallel institutions and Kosovo’s provisional institutions. Three further phenomena can be observed that have accompanied the state-building enterprise in Kosovo: a climate of lawlessness and inter-ethnic tensions, underdeveloped economic systems accompanied by a pervasive informal economy, and shortcomings with regards to the institutionalization of governance in Kosovo society. These phenomena have undermined genuine democratic consolidation and the rule of law. Crucially, this paper has argued that ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use physical force’ as a substrata of the Kosovo state is continually violated by ‘Serbian parallel structures’ and the direct interference of the Serbian state - even when Kosovo declared itself to be and was recognized as, an independent state.

The paper has further argued that the lack of an equitable balance of power and division of responsibilities between local and international actors, crucial to strengthening state capacity, has harmed the process of building democratic institutions resulting in the empowerment of informal institutions in Kosovo. The informal economy in Kosovo after 1999 has been nourished by institutional weakness and the lack of ability of political leadership to create incentives for an inclusive economy. Parallel to this, the paper has argued that Kosovo’s political leadership interests have been inextricably linked with the informal economy, making the task of addressing the phenomena at the political level almost impossible. Moreover, it is argued here that the legacy of the 90s, when the Serbian state in Kosovo was been aptly characterised as brutal, authoritarian and violent, when combined with a lack of clarity regarding Kosovo’s final status, has fundamentally shaped the relationship between formal and informal systems in Kosovo, including tax evasion.

The lack of institutionalization of Kosovo society has further amplified the hybrid character of the newly established institutions. Political parties remain weak and ineffective with no inner party democracy. The easiest way for UNMIK to control and establish its authority has been through cooperation with pre-war and wartime political leadership who enjoyed considerable support from the majority in Kosovo. Consequently, there has no power shift as well and little political contestation, essential prerequisites for a genuine democracy. Party members, with a lack of appropriate professional backgrounds and skills, continue to occupy the public administration; appointments in the civil service are made on the basis of political or clan affiliation, which has resulted with patronage politics and ineffective institutions.

Current arrangements for developing governance in Kosovo need to be thoroughly re-evaluated. The culture of patron-client relationships within the Kosovo political environment has to be eliminated. For Kosovo to become a modern Western state - if that is the objective - it needs to be capable of meeting the needs of all its citizens and this will require significantly more comprehensive and robust regulation. Furthermore, rather than focusing on the coercive aspects of state building, international agencies and Kosovan institutions need to be more focused on securing the consent of citizens to their activities. This will require an approach that promotes loyalty, legitimacy and consensus as key components determining the future of the state. Without a broad societal consensus, political cohesion, greater internal party democracy, judicial independence and a regulated free and fair market economy, Kosovo state building is likely to remain 'stuck in the mud'.
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Sex and (In)Security: 
The Dialectic of Gender in the Making of India’s National Security Policy

By Ainab Rahman*

Abstract
The gendered nature of national security policymaking has direct consequences on the state of human security on a grassroots level. The adverse effects of gendered policies and paradigms are exemplified through a case study of India’s national security policies, and specifically, of its implementation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.

Key words: India, Gender, National Security, Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

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The paradigms, policies and practices of national security-making have long been dominated by masculinist ideology and institutions. Gender is seldom utilized as a category of analysis for understanding the implications of security policy, despite the adverse gendered impacts, on theoretical and practical levels, of the study and practice of security. This has led to the failure of the field to account for the condition of women in its understanding of security as well as insecurity. The traditional framework of international security is crafted upon phallocentric definitions and conceptions of power, and reinforces a strong reliance on institutions of hegemonic masculinity as the primary means to achieving power in the political arena. Within the current system of international relations, the means of achieving state-centric power and subsequently, security, is based heavily on the masculinization and militarization of the state; the implications of such a security agenda, however, do the very opposite of ensuring security for the majority of the population.

The insufficiency of the current discourse in its ability and willingness to encapsulate the experience and needs of women not only results in a systematic exclusion of women from the field of security, but also a denial of their agency in establishing a framework of security and security based needs outside of the mandate of a phallic strategic culture. The utilization of gender as a category of analysis on a theoretical level would thus acknowledge the gender disparity in traditional conceptualizations and policies of security, while also providing the field of security with a more comprehensive and democratic understanding of both micro and macro levels of security. This may also serve to enhance collective security, by allowing states to acknowledge the transnational nature of modern security threats. Gender based analyses would also allow for the deconstruction of the instrumental usage of gendered rhetoric in the practice of security, facilitating women’s political participation on all sides of the policymaking process and increasing their agency and status across societies.

The postcolonial era has witnessed the increasing emergence of masculinization in the security agendas of ‘third world’ countries in their attempt to catch up with the strategic accomplishments of more developed countries. Following independence, many national governments legislated for rapid militarization policies, in conformity with traditional concepts of power and security, as the first and foremost means to heighten their security status. And while such actions may earn third world states a certain level of prestige and power on an international level, it may come at the cost of increased conflict, violence and insecurity on a domestic level.

1. Thomas, “What is Third World Security?”, 206
The masculinization of the Indian state – and specifically its national security policy of rapid militarization – illustrates the problematic nature of security in the modern age, wherein the state’s pursuit of traditional guarantors of security have rendered its population, especially its women, more insecure. India’s pursuit of its strategic agenda has not only affected the (in)security of women on domestic and regional levels, but has also violated basic democratic provisions of security in its implementation of strategic goals. Additionally, given its rapid ascension to a position of global leadership and power, India’s reification of masculinist doctrine in the crafting of its national security policies may be adopted by other third world states looking to determine a similar path to power, thus increasing women’s insecurity in various third world societies.

The Limitations of the Literature: The Handmaid’s Tale… Pen is Envy?

National security as a field has been traditionally owned by men and masculine thought, whose “systemic factors of patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity continue to discredit women’s voices in the national security debate.” Tickner further describes how women’s contributions to national security have gone largely unobserved – whether it is their effort in war, intervention or diplomacy, women have constantly been denied the right to be an agent of national security. However, it is important to note the emergence of feminist scholarship within the field, even though they have largely been ignored or discredited by the International Relations community. Women have had little opportunity to shape the perspective of national security, which gives rise to the next limitation of the literature – the insufficiencies of classical security conceptions and theories to encapsulate the wider security issues of both men and women.

Classical approaches utilized in the field of international relations and particularly important in the construction of national security policy, such as realism and liberalism, are highly engendered and based solely on the experience of elite white men. On this issue, Tickner discusses how these approaches are not sufficient in understanding or evaluating the international system, as it “depends on a partial representation of human behavior associated with a stereotypical hegemonic masculinity.” Realism, succinctly defined by Kronsell as “the perspective of elite white men and the ideal of the glorified male warrior [as a] projection onto the behavior of states,” is perceived as hyper-masculine in its ideals of “autonomy, self-help and power” (which are all associated with a Western conception of masculinity), as well as its emphasis on competition and military. Liberalism on the other

2. Charlotte Hooper, “Masculinist Practices and Gender Politics”.
5. Annica Kronsell. “Gender Analysis in Institutions of Hegemonic Masculinity”.
7. Kronsell, “Gender Analysis”. 111
8. J. Ann Tickner. “Man, the State and War: Gendered Perspectives on National Security”.

hand, though not hyper-masculinized, embodies a “new world order masculinity” that emerged in American society shortly after the Vietnam War. Though not as ‘macho’ as realism, liberalism is just as committed to patriarchal norms in its presupposition of a universal morality, which is defined by masculine thought. Its eagerness to intervene militarily is perceived by Weber to be “the ultimate affirmation of manhood in regard to sovereign nation-states”. Because these approaches do not integrate feminist conceptions of the state or of security, they reinforce their exclusion from the wider debate of national security in international relations.

National security has not only remained gendered because of the hegemonic masculinity and the lack of female input in the field, but also because much of its structural conceptions and terms have been constructed and defined in the masculine viewpoint; as stated by Stern, “seemingly gender neutral basic grammar of modern political imaginaries masks gendered workings of power, which cast masculine as the norm.” Thus said, one of the major difficulties associated with feminist approaches to national security is the masculinization of language and terminology within the dialogue, which serve to provide barriers to the integration and application of gender-balanced thought in the evolution of politics and policy. Terms that are widely used in the discourse, such as ‘state’, ‘power’, ‘security’, ‘citizenship’, have all been crafted on the basis of a masculine viewpoint, and reflect an inherent gender bias in the language of the discourse. This can be observed in implications of gendered terms such as the ‘nation’ or the ‘state’; the nation has been used to denote the female, emphasizing its embodiment of culture, values, tradition and motherhood, while the state has been used to denote the masculine with its emphasis as its role as protector of the nation. As stated by Fruzzetti and Perez, “to liberate [or protect] the motherland is tantamount to protecting women’s purity”. Other definitions, such as that of citizenship, rely on this gendered nature of terminology; citizenship in particular has been imbued with a masculine identity, as historically, only males were citizens. This historical legacy in the development of the concept still continues, in that the highest exemplar of citizenship (and subsequently patriotism) is perceived to be the protection of the nation, or in other words, in military duty. This is especially relevant in India, where the myth of the male warrior has been central to the mobilization of the Hindu nationalist movement (or Hindutva movement), and was instrumentally used by the BJP in its incitement of communalism in the early 1990s.

The gendered dimension of language limits the ways in which women and other minorities can be active agents and participants in national security and its discourse, as it depends on categorizing women as weak and/or victimized and preserves stereotypical viewpoints on gender in the international relations and national security fields. However, feminist scholarship on the issue has been actively working to change this by emphasizing the importance of redefining traditional notions of security.

10. Maria Stern. “Racism, Sexism, Classism and Much More”, 177
11. Marian Sawyer. “Gender, Metaphor and the State”.
12. Lina Fruzzetti and Rosa Maria Perez. “The Gender of the Nation”.
13. Sikata Banarjee, “Gender and Nationalism”

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Another limitation of the literature is an underlying assumption of Amero-centrism and/or Western-centrism in both the national security debate and the International Relations field. Cross-cultural perspectives that span regional, racial/ethnic, religious and class lines are a minority within the literature, both in terms of scholarship on international relations and feminist approaches. This results in a lack of the multidimensional aspect that is needed to fully comprehend the situation of women in terms of security on a global scale. Certain authors however, have acknowledged the inability of western conceptual frameworks to encapsulate modern security issues, especially in relation to regional contexts of security. Kumar describes the inability of state-centric views to understand the postcolonial experience and its relationship to national security, as traditional models of security do not account for the transnational spillover of conflict in decolonized states (i.e., a violent act by Muslims on Hindus in Bangladesh in retaliation for an attack on Muslims by Hindus in India). There are, however, few analyses of security in which feminist methodologies and subaltern studies are utilized in conjunction within the mainstream discourse of international relations to enable a comprehensive understanding of the interlocking issues in the arena of third world security. Such approaches can be used to better understand the context of norms and rules within which security is crafted in the Subcontinent, as there are historical differences in motivations for security policies in non-Western countries. For instance, many of India’s security policies, especially in regards to masculinization, are a result of socio-political and historical circumstances, such as colonization, that may not be comprehensively understood or reflected in the Western literature, analysis and discourse of security.

Gender has been a widely ignored factor in the international system as a determinant of national security, (especially in the case of India); this, however, does not mean that the study of feminist approaches is not relevant. Some scholars posit that the acceptance of “gender differences as natural or inevitable and for these reasons, not amenable to political analysis” has underpinned the international relations community lack of gender analysis within security. Despite the reluctance to acknowledge feminist approaches, Zalewski states the importance of doing so in order to seek a new means of analyzing international relations, in order to better evaluate and address challenges to security. Increasing doubt over the applicability of classical theories, evidenced by scholars questioning whether classical prescriptions are antithetical to establishing security, posits the importance of establishing a feminist approach to both international relations and national security.

In addition to this, we must take into account that in order to adapt to the evolution of the international system -particularly in light of globalization and technological change-, there must be a reassessment of conventional definitions of security to encompass the security concerns of the majority, rather than those envisioned by the elite. Unlike classical theories and more traditional conceptions, feminist approaches can be utilized to analyze perceptions of threat from various facets, such as social, political and economic, in its multidimensional analysis and understanding of security and peace. The changing nature of threats also

requires new mechanisms to respond to and re-evaluate security in terms of such changes; classical theories lack applicability in this arena in particular, as they were crafted in response to external threat by states. Modern threats of internal issues such as ethnic/tribal warfare, governmental repression, state-sanctioned genocide, transnational diseases, biological warfare, terrorism and the threat from non-state actors are not addressed by traditional theories, which leave a gap in the literature for a new and more comprehensive level of analysis to emerge.

Historical Context: The Second Sex

The extent of historical dependence of security paradigms, practices and policies on gender is reflected in the history of India, dating back to the governance of the British Raj. Historically, the British Empire utilized gender as a means of ‘Othering’ Indian men. Colonial powers propagandized the lack of martial skills and martial organization of sub-Continental peoples to assert the supposed femininity and emasculation of Indian men, thereby gaining control by categorizing them as too weak to govern themselves. The ethos of colonization was thus justified because the “European masculine hero [was needed to] conquer and create order out of the feminized chaos” in the region. Additionally, the status of the sub-continental subaltern was reinforced by their history of having been conquered, which allowed for the construction of their identity as based on “values associated with hegemonic femininity – lacking muscularity, aggressiveness and militarism”\(^\text{16}\). Given this, a large part of the anti-colonialist and nationalist movement that had materialized in the late 1800s was characterized by the emergence of protest masculinities, which often evolve as a responsive mechanism to undergoing oppression or being involved in conflict. This served to reaffirm the masculinity of sub-continental men in retaliation to the ‘Othering’, emasculating, practices of the colonial power and system through the strengthening of masculinist ideology and virtues.

Like most national movements, sub-continental nationalism utilized the dominant “constructions of masculinity and femininity to shape female and male participation in nation building”\(^\text{17}\) wherein women were representations of the nation and men were protectorates of the nation and correspondingly, women. Given this narrative, the highest and most honorable form of political participation and citizenship was embodied in the becoming of a warrior, a status that was reserved only for men. The national icon of the aggressive male warrior and protector thus became an integral part of the imagination and collective memory of the Indian nation; the myth of the warrior continues to be utilized today as a means of garnering public support for specific security goals such as militarization and nuclearization.

While the nation is characterized by femininity, the definition of a state has been historically imbued with a masculine nature. The identity of the state is shaped by certain policies and practices that elevate the national identity to a certain level of manhood through the emasculation (or “othering”) of other nation-states.\(^\text{18}\) The nature of gender is such that it

\(^\text{16}\). Banarjee, “Gender and Nationalism”, 170
\(^\text{17}\). Ibid., 167
\(^\text{18}\). Runa Das, “Postcolonial (In)Securities, the BJP and the Politics of Hindutva”,
requires the other – the masculine needs the feminine in order to exist, and vice versa – consequently the definition of one is dependent on the definition of the “other”. Historically, this has manifested itself in the subjugation and oppression of the feminine in order to prove a society or state’s manhood or manliness – thus said, the domination of one society is proved by the emasculation or the feminization of the “other”. The greater paradigm of Othering in the creation of identity and conflict is one in which the characterization of the Other as savage, weak and/or uncivilized; in the context of gender, the term feminine is used to encapsulate all of these sentiments. During Partition in 1947, gendering became implicit in the ethno-national construction of both the Pakistani and Indian state, with each nation creating itself in relation to the Other, and undertaking strategies to emasculate the other in order to attain legitimacy of their own nation as well as security in their own state.

Influenced by Gandhi’s policy of non-violence, the years after Partition reflected the nation’s desire for peace -both negative and positive- and security, achieved without the means of the military. In accordance with this culture, Nehru had established the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), attempting to create “global influence without military power”. Nehruvian strategic culture “focused on problems of world peace, anti colonialism and anti-racism”, and emphasized cooperation and “peaceful co-existence as a pillar of Indian policy.” However, Nehru abandoned the structure of his security policies shortly after the 1962 Sino-Indian War, where the inadequacy of India’s military was highlighted as a result of their embarrassing defeat at the hands of the Chinese. In 1963, Nehru implemented drastic reforms to his foreign policy and security agendas, launching a plan to rapidly militarize the Indian state; since then, the “preoccupation with enhancing and expanding India’s military might has continued to be the primary objective of Indian leadership”.

Today, India has the third largest standing army in the world, with approximately 1.34 million active duty personnel and 2.14 million in reserve. India also has an extensive paramilitary force, with over one million active personnel. Since 2007, India has been the number one recipient of arms, having been in the top five arms purchasers for several decades. It has the world’s tenth largest defense budget estimated at 3% of total GDP the equivalent of 35 billion USD. However, this is considered to be an under-representation of the real figure. India is also undertaking efforts to continue expansion and development of its military industrial complex.

**Masculinization of the Indian State**

The masculinization of its nation-state and its strategic culture has allowed for India to gain regional power with the “demonstration of dominance through the use of military

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19. A.Z. Hilali, “India’s Strategic Thinking”.
20. Ibid., 739
force”\textsuperscript{24}, as well as with the adoption of militaristic values and attitudes. The militarization of the state has also been marked by the “excessive allocation of national resources to defense needs, compared with social requisites such as health and education”\textsuperscript{25} and the “military formations and ideologies premised on arrangements of [patriarchal] and coercive power”\textsuperscript{26}. Through the process of militarization, constructions of gender and gender performance become deeply entrenched in the national psyche, in order to “make the masculine operational”\textsuperscript{27}.

The militarization of the Indian state is reflected in the three main aspects of its strategic culture: its (1) “coercive power structures, practices, hierarchies and discipline”\textsuperscript{28}, (2) its prevalent assumption and acceptance of military approaches to conflict and (3) its ideology of warrior dominance, or the privileging of belligerence. Institutionalized militancy as sanctioned by the state for security purposes has grave consequences on the theoretical and practical/realized security of women. As aforementioned, militarization fosters masculinist biases within state institutions and structures, perpetuated by the militarily entrenched gender-based order of society in which men are protectors and women are victims. Not only is this antithetical to the fulfillment of authentic democratic principles, norms and values, it is also antithetical to the enablement of state security. Institutionalized militancy often leads to increased instability and conflict, as opposed to acting as a gateway to peace. While traditional concepts characterize peace as the absence of war, modern concepts of security distinguish between negative and positive peace, where the former is defined as the absence of war, and the latter is defined as the absence of war in conjunction with other guarantees of peace\textsuperscript{29}. Though militancy may be able to guarantee negative peace in some circumstances, militancy adversely affects the prospects for positive peace and subsequently, security on a grassroots level. “In the absence of human security which includes physical, political, economic or cultural security, women are the first and most severe victims”\textsuperscript{30}. Militarization may also exacerbate pre-existing internal and external conflicts, instead of mitigating them\textsuperscript{31}, as well as attempt to further control gender norms during conflict situations to maintain the purity of the nation. Similarly, increased levels of militarization are correlated with increased levels of domestic abuse against women.

The militarization of the Indian state is best exemplified by the ongoing maintenance of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958. The AFSPA was originally enacted to maintain stability and combat insurgency in ‘disturbed areas’, comprised of the Northeastern states of Assam, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland and Jammu.

\textsuperscript{25} Yasmin Tambiah, “Turncoat Bodies: Sexuality and Sex Work Under Militarization in Sri Lanka”, 244
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Rita Manchanda, “Redefining and Feminizing Security”, 4103
\textsuperscript{29} Bernedette Muthien, “Human Security Paradigms through a Gendered Lens”, 49
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 51
\textsuperscript{31} Rita Manchanda, “Redefining and Feminizing Security”, 4101
and Kashmir. Ethnic groups in these areas have been striving for increased political representation in the Indian government, as well as protesting against their treatment as second-class citizens. Some insurgent groups have launched separatist movements based on alignment with the aforementioned goals of political representation and recognition, while other insurgent groups have launched independence movements based on historical claims. To date, insurgent activity exists in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura; however, many insurgents in these areas have entered suspension of operation pacts in compliance with government demands.

The provisions of the Armed Forces Act, meant to empower the state to use armed forces when necessary to aid civil power, have instead served to worsen conditions of security for both male and female residents of the aforementioned states. The stipulations of this Act, as well as its political and legal significance, have functioned to not only narrow the channels of political participation and limit access to the democratic system, but have also served to impose oppressive and coercive structures. With the Act still in place, there can be no provision of either positive or negative peace. Negative peace, or the absence of war, cannot truly exist in a region that is heavily militarized and controlled by the Armed Forces; likewise, positive peace, and other guarantees of security cannot be provided so long as the Armed Forces have special powers.

The AFSPA essentially enforces a state of emergency in ‘disturbed areas’, legislating martial law, wherein the paramilitary forces are allowed to assert full power and control over inhabitants. Amongst other powers, the Armed Forces governing these conflict areas are given free reign to “arrest without a warrant someone who has or is about to commit a cognizable offense provided there is reasonable suspicion” (wherein the term ‘reasonable suspicion’ is to the discretion and opinion of the officer) and is also given free reign to “use force even to the causing of death against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order if it is necessary for the maintenance of public order”. Here again, ‘necessary’ is per the discretion and opinion of the officer. Both of these allowances are not only unconstitutional according to Indian law, but they allow the armed forces to enjoy a climate of impunity and unrestricted and arbitrary powers, protected by law from any charges of criminal conduct as “civilians are debarred from instituting legal proceedings against guilty gunmen without prior sanction of the central government”. In all of the ‘disturbed’ areas, the Armed Forces have been accused by international organizations of: “abduction, killing at will, fake encounter killings, raping women, torturing, keeping of arrested persons in custody without just reason, indiscriminate use of bombs and land mines, engagement in

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34. The extrajudicial killing of a suspect in custody when paramilitary forces did not have enough evidence to ensure conviction of said suspect, whose death is passed off as having been a result of an armed struggle/crossfire.
forced recruitment and conduction of widespread extortion”\textsuperscript{35}, subjecting civilians to state sanctioned terrorism at the hands of their hypothetical protectors.

In 2004, the state of Manipur gained national attention as a result of the rape and extrajudicial killing of Manorama Devi, and ensuing protests: the most famous of which was the naked protest led by women. The Assam Rifles (the paramilitary forces of Manipur) claimed she was a member of an armed group, despite the fact that at the time of her arrest no weapons were found on her person. In response, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh set up the Justice BP Jeevan Reddy Committee to review the AFSPA. In 2006, the committee submitted a report to the Indian government, recommending the repeal of the Act. The government however, refused to do so because of opposition from the Armed Forces. The government had undertaken a similar stance in the mid 1990s, prior to the creation of the Jeevan Reddy Committee, when Nagaland had attempted to set up an inquiry commission in response to the army attacks on civilians; this was challenged by the Ministry of Defense on the basis that “Nagaland did not have the power to order such a probe”\textsuperscript{36}. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Ministry of Defense, stating that “no state government can intervene in matters of naval, military or air forces, and any other armed forces of the Union”\textsuperscript{37}. As a result of the government’s repeated unwillingness to hold the Armed Forces responsible for the perpetuation and intensification of injustice and insecurity, many civilians sought protection under insurgent groups, thus strengthening the insurgency movement in certain areas. The role that the military played in maintaining the enforcement of the AFSPA demonstrates the prioritization of the military institution by the Indian government over the democratic claims of its citizens. It also implicitly portrays the increased value and security of the male soldier in comparison to that of someone from a ‘disturbed area’.

The Indian government has consistently refused to repeal the AFSPA despite international and national pressure; as noted by many international organizations, the Act is not only unconstitutional, but also violates a number of UN Covenants signed by the state such as: the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination of all forms Against Women; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. The Indian government continues to implement the Act, maintaining that it is imperative to the security of the state, and refusing to acknowledge that the costs of securitizing the state in this manner have been paid by the minorities, and especially women in disturbed areas who are continually subjected to grave insecurity.

Furthermore, the Indian government’s continued support of the AFSPA, as well as its allowance of impunity for the armed forces, as opposed to addressing the actual security


\textsuperscript{36} “Usurpation of State’s Powers”, 853

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
concerns of its people, shows the lack of an authentically democratic agenda wherein basic rights are guaranteed to all. The masculinization and militarization of security and security imperatives in the Indian political framework and strategic culture portrays the extent to which security, democracy and the deliverance of basic rights and public goods, is constrained by gendered norms.

The inability of the AFSPA to provide security on a grassroots level also reflects the inadequacies of Indian strategic culture and its state-centric approaches. Indigenous civil rights movements such as the ones occurring in India’s Northeastern states are perceived as “law and order problems requiring police action”\(^{38}\) instead of requiring multidimensional strategies that address the root causes of such issues. The government’s utilization of military power as the primary means of framing and containing domestic conflicts has worsened the situation of human security in the state. Furthermore, the failure of such policies to resolve these conflicts has further fueled public discontent, pushing underprivileged populations towards more radical movements, such as Naxalism, as well as perpetuating a cycle of violence.

Conclusion

The field of security today continues to remain highly gendered, reliant upon mythologies of masculinity and femininity to order, define and conceptualize power and security in the international relations system. The domination of the security arena by masculinist and militaristic ideologies, institutions, norms and values works to counter its own goals of state-centric security. These masculinist paradigms have resulted in greater insecurity and instability on a grassroots level, slowing state development and growth as well as altering state alliances. Additionally, studies have shown that increased defense spending has lead to greater social inequality\(^{39}\), which in turn is a factor in perpetuating domestic instability, violence and conflict.

The reification of institutions of hegemonic masculinity within the security discourse and dictate will continue to occur so long as the participation and experience of the Other, whether female or another minority, is systematically excluded from the crafting of strategic policy as well as from the consideration of consequences of a strategic policy. The case of Indian national security imperatives portrays the extent to which masculinity informs state-centric perceptions and frameworks of identity, statehood and security, as well as the ways in which the state’s national security policies engender insecurity instead of security on both domestic and systemic levels. An explicit example of this is the government’s prioritization of military development over the provision of domestic human security.


\(^{39}\) Hamid E. Ali et al., “Military Spending and Inequality”.
Despite its economic advancement, the masculinist and militant nature of the Indian state has challenged its ability to address modern security and development issues. Their state-centric conceptualization of security as well as their definition of peace solely as the absence of war, or negative peace, has allowed for gross inadequacies in the provision of security. While some more developed countries have begun to integrate policies related to positive peace in their national security plan, as opposed to just negative peace emerging countries such as India have yet to broaden their concept and understanding of peace and security. For India, as well as for less developed countries that may follow its path, the state-centric and traditional view of security will continue to hinder its social and political development unless the country is able to adopt a more people-centric view, and recognize human security issues as imperative to national security.
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Defeat the Tweet?
Social Media, Grassroots Dissent, and Authoritarian Co-optation

By Matthew Crosston*

Abstract

This analysis argues why social media like Facebook and Twitter are in fact relatively resistant to authoritarian co-optation and are perhaps uniquely structured to be only an effective grassroots tool for social disruption and civil disobedience. They are poor tools for hindering protest because of the structural nature of both social media and authoritarian government. While these instruments of new information and communication technology indeed seem capable of inspiring and impacting international and transnational affairs (i.e. the Arab Spring), it will be argued how these technologies have certain limitations, not only in terms of governmental use but also in terms of protest. Indeed, social media tools are best when considered only facilitators of dissent and mobilization but not guarantors of political results or systemic change. As such, opponents and proponents of the political power of social media are often overstating their respective cases.

Key words: Social media, Arab Spring, Grassroots dissent, Authoritarian regimes, China.

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Governments, regardless of regime type, have famously always tried to co-opt and ultimately adopt advancements and evolutions in technology, especially in terms of media. Newspapers, radio, and television have long been appropriated in order to influence, massage, and outright manipulate messages and events important to the national interest. Often the question is not so much whether said regime engages in such activity but rather how explicit and open will it engage (from a softer, less visible approach in democratic states to a harder, more obvious method employed by authoritarian states). This paper will argue why social media like Facebook and Twitter are in fact resistant to authoritarian co-optation and are uniquely structured to be only an effective grassroots tool for social disruption and civil disobedience. They are poor tools for hindering mobilization because of the structural nature of both social media and authoritarian government.

Social media can be a mind-numbingly broad and all-encompassing term. For this article social media is defined as web-based and mobile-based tools that not only mediate human communication but turn that communication into an interactive and dynamic dialogue. This definition is fully in line with the formal conceptualizations of respected figures like Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein. More importantly, this work focuses mostly on the most ubiquitous and powerful social media symbols, Facebook and Twitter. While these instruments of new information and communication technology indeed seem capable of inspiring and impacting recent international and transnational affairs (i.e. the Arab Spring), it will be shown how these technologies have certain limitations, not only in terms of governmental use but also in terms of protest. Indeed, it will be argued that social media tools are best when considered only as facilitators of dissent and mobilization but not as guarantors of political results or systemic change. As such, it must be concluded that the opponents and proponents alike of social media’s political power are often overstating their respective cases.

The Critics of Social Media

While there is still much hope and promise from the protest movements and revolutions known as the Arab Spring, enough time has passed to allow a fascinating and quite vigorous debate to emerge as to the true causes of these movements. On the one hand, we have a group of respected and thoughtful opponents of social media’s power, like Evgenii Morozov, Richard Haas, Clay Shirky, and Blake Hounshell. Some of the arguments focus on the political inequities and economic disparities intrinsic to the states involved. Factors like rising food prices, decrepit infrastructure, failing schools, and widespread oppression and corruption are
considered much more powerful explanatory variables as to why the citizens of the Middle
East and North Africa rose up and sought to overthrow their native regimes.¹

Other arguments focus more on limiting what they consider to be the hyper-exuberance over
social media’s power. In this case the logic emphasizes the inability to evaluate social media’s
long-term contribution to the cause of democracy because such evaluation has to be
measured out over the course of years and decades and not weeks and months. The same
arguments also point to the non-preordained nature of social media tools: they declare social
media to be simply an instrument available for the use of any and all sides, good and bad.²
Therefore, attempts to glorify social media as an inevitable instrument of democracy creation
is considered rash and inaccurate.

Perhaps the most vocal and critical voice protesting the relevance and impact of social media
and its ability to create democracy belongs to Morozov. When discussing the so-called Iranian
Twitter revolution he said:

“Whether technology was actually driving the protests remains a big unknown. It is
certainly a theory that many in the West find endearing: who would’ve expected that
after decades of blasting propaganda from dedicated radio and television channels,
Americans would be able to support democracy in Iran via blogs and social networks?
Nice theory, but it has very little basis in reality.”³

He goes on to say:

“Plenty of skeptics think it was just a myth, dreamed up and advanced by cyber –
uputopian Western commentators, who finally got a chance to prove that the billions of
hours that humanity wastes on Twitter and Facebook are not spent in vain. Critics
counter that the failure of the Twitter revolution doesn't mean that new media didn't
play an important role in it. By bashing Twitter, we are blinding ourselves to the
looming age of cheap and effective Internet protests that will soon extirpate all forms
of authoritarianism.”⁴

Taken in total these arguments offer important intellectual brakes to what was indeed an
almost hyper excitement over the role social media could and would play in new revolutions.
This article agrees with the general supposition that pre-existing structural conditions
involving economics, politics, and social disenfranchisement were crucially important factors
that set the stage for general popular rage. However, this article finds fault with the more
strident arguments that seem to aim at removing the relevance of social media altogether.

It is not true, as evidence suggests strongly to the contrary, that Facebook/Twitter revolutions
are possible only where regimes remain utterly ignorant of the Internet and have no virtual
capacity of their own.⁵ Ironically, these same arguments will often highlight how many
authoritarian governments are becoming adept at utilizing the various forms of social media
to further their own systems of oppression. They apparently ignore how they are
simultaneously emasculating and invigorating the political relevance of social media within
the same case studies.

4. Ibid, 11.
5. Ibid, 12.
This article emphasizes the need to carve out a more modest but still important path for social media when it comes to revolution, dissent, and potential democratic transition: it is true that social media does not answer everything as to why modern revolutions take place. However, it is also true that social media is the best facilitator for such uprisings because of the structural nature of not only social media but also because of the structural nature of authoritarian governments themselves and how that structure inevitably seems to constrain the manner in which they use social media like Facebook and Twitter. These contradicting structures will be elaborated in full later on in the article with a new contribution to the discussion called the antithesis matrix.

Social media is at its most powerful and most compelling when it is seen purely as a facilitator of popular mobilization. When that power is expanded to try and make social media a guarantor of results and the consolidator of new democracy, then the arguments have gone too far and make promises that reality is not able to keep. The present work, therefore, does not just show the antithetical structural nature of authoritarian government and its use of social media, it also criticizes the somewhat unconscious positioning of social media as an end goal-producing outcome, rather than as an open-ended process. Process does not and cannot independently guarantee outcome. Therefore, both the critics and supporters of social media’s power have been judging and lauding for their respective camps unrealistically: the facilitator of protest mobilization should not be condemned or praised for how large, how fair, how complete, or how quick democratic end results emerge from said mobilization.

In other words, asking if social media can be responsible for leading to consolidated democracy is asking the wrong question. And this entreaty for more modest expectations/evaluations should not be considered ammunition to be used exclusively against social media critics: it is also appropriate to chastise its more rabid supporters. Social media certainly has the capability to be channels through which protestors can identify goals, build solidarity, and organize demonstrations. The problem is with those who wish to turn these channels of high-efficiency mobilization into a firm democratic foundation from which new consolidated democracies spring. The social media alone cannot accomplish this task.

This is an important distinction not often made in the debate at present: if the young, emerging democracies in Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt do not in fact blossom into legitimate additions to the cradle of democracy, then this is most likely caused by the failure to build the institutions necessary to truly solidify the revolution into an actual democratic regime. It will not be because social media somehow failed its mandate and did not live up to its billing. Once again, process does not guarantee outcome. Social media in and of itself cannot build these institutions. It only facilitates the communication and mobilization of those who would.

In fact, what this work finds so fascinating is to see how social media tends to be over-hyped both as a process (by authoritarian regimes) and as an outcome (by grassroots organizations): the former stubbornly thinks it can meld the process to its own dictates and objectives while the latter wants to believe outcomes can be nigh guaranteed if said tools are simply deployed into the situation. The present analysis only just begins to highlight this discrepancy and makes more explicit these structural tendencies. Hopefully it can ultimately be a first bridge for future analyses to continue the findings empirically, thereby adding more data and more evidence to its theoretical relevance and overall reach.
The Sledgehammer: How Authoritarian Governments Relate to Social Media

While this article puts down an argument that renders the power of social media more modest, it is clear that the perception of its possible power to incite and inspire makes most authoritarian governments relatively uneasy and uncomfortable with this new virtual age. Indeed, social media in its most positive form is meant to inspire connections, facilitate discussions, and create interactions across groups and boundaries regardless of class, sex, and location. Its ability to be a builder of bridges amongst people who have no personal lines of connectivity has been seen by authoritarian regimes as a great danger to the established social order. Clearly, authoritarian regimes have no interest in allowing unfettered access to all forms of social media. But this article takes issue with a common perception in the literature (both journalism and academia) that is so pervasive it is nearly a platitude: authoritarian rulers are growing ever more effective in controlling the Internet. This is of course the goal of authoritarian governments. That premise is not challenged. What is contested is the idea that they are in fact growing more sophisticated in their efforts to control the virtual commons. On the contrary, most of the empirical evidence indicates that the most common strategy for combating social media remains one resembling a political sledgehammer:

- Burma cut off all access to the global Internet for several days in 2007 after the violent crackdown on peaceful protests in the Saffron Revolution.
- At least 25 countries conduct something called technical filtering. Technical filtering prevents access to specific content posted online or to broad swaths of information at the level of the Internet service provider.\(^6\)
- Russia and other states are known to use human sensors to monitor and manually remove blog posts. They also shut down discussion forums that address forbidden subjects, such as human rights violations or governmental corruption.
- Many authoritarian regimes use laws against all forms of media in order to protect themselves against insult, blasphemy, and revealing state secrets in order to be able to openly punish online dissidents. The states that once made up the Soviet Union and many of the Arab states in the Gulf region are well-known to employ such legal manoeuvring.
- Outright physical intimidation of bloggers and online journalists has reached disconcerting proportions in many countries. This intimidation can include 24-hour surveillance, harassment, arbitrary arrest, and even torture. This has been documented in parts of Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia just to name a few impactful regions.\(^7\)
- Iran has accused Facebook and Twitter of being hidden enemies of the country and tools of Western intelligence agencies to recruit new members inside Iran. It also believes social media tools are involved in a Western-led psy-ops war specifically launched against Iran.\(^8\)

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This anecdotal list affirms that the structural nature of authoritarian regimes makes them disinclined to use social media legitimately: authoritarian bureaucracy attempts to control all within its circle of influence and force people to adjust, adapt, and mold themselves to the rules of said bureaucracy. The above list makes it clear that the preference of such governments remains the bludgeoning and curtailing of social media, to attempt to bend it to the will of the repressive regime. Not surprisingly, these sledgehammer moments more often than not leave governments looking clumsy, awkward, and at times even laughable. When it comes to social media and authoritarian governance, it is simply a clash of two antithetical structures: the latter gives you rigidity, hierarchy, and formality, while the former gives you spontaneity, adaptability, and informality. This article believes this fact to be immutable.

Most importantly, there is ample evidence indicating that despite government censorship and surveillance, citizens around the globe still manage to find creative and inventive ways to circumvent the restrictions and spread new information. This might include sharing files through P2P networks or overseas file transfer protocol sites, for example. In a bit of brilliant creative anarchry, people have avoided government filters by deliberately misspelling keywords that trigger censors. They have also gone back to the use of allegory to criticize government oppression and avoid virtual protocols put in place to identify dissidents.  

In one important way this could be analogous to the more fundamental debate in cyber deterrence: the axiom that offensive aggression will always trump defensive protection. In the realm of cyber deterrence this carries great importance because it indicates the futility of those trying to not only keep up with but also overcome cyber hackers and cyber-attacks. In this analogy, authoritarian censorship and efforts to constrict and restrain social media is very much like those striving to deter cyber-attacks: the desire for openness, for freedom of information, for access to connect and interact with others, is the offensive aggression, while authoritarian regimes seek to play defensive protection by enacting supposedly perfect measures of restrictions and repression that will control the virtual commons and those who wish to use it. In some ways, the latter quest is even more quixotic than those attempting to build a better cyber deterrence mouse trap: since authoritarian governments still seem stuck on heavy-handed bully tactics and social media’s true power lies in the mobilization of dissent, then they are more often than not igniting the very spark they seek to extinguish.

**Democracy and Social Media: Do the Good Guys Do it Any Better?**

In the post-9/11 world some believe the effort to constrain freedom of speech and to violate citizen rights to privacy are not limited to authoritarian governments. This article, however, is not a debate about the positives or negatives of the Patriot Act, nor is it a discussion about whether or not George Bush tried to undermine American virtual freedom with the global war on terror or whether Barack Obama has succeeded in remanding those initiatives or has in fact only continued them. Instead this article takes as a given that democratic regimes, even their intelligence agencies, on the whole do not seek to flagrantly violate the intrinsic freedoms and constitutional rights of their citizens. Nevertheless, democratic regimes are just as concerned with national security as authoritarian ones and their intelligence agencies are as interested in utilizing every possible tool available to protect those national interests.

However, democratic regimes tend to utilize social media in relatively passive and inert ways, namely for research and what can be loosely considered popular culture purposes. The CIA recognized the value of social media sites like Facebook as far back as 2006 when it began recruiting candidates for the agency there. It also created in 2009 an intelligence-sharing resource called Intellipedia. The service is basically a classified version of Wikipedia and has grown to over one million pages of data. The Intelligence Community in the United States and Google both back technology that allows them to monitor the web in real time so as to possibly predict future conflict events. Called Recorded Future, it looks over tens of thousands of websites, blogs, and Twitter accounts in an effort to find relationships and trends between people, organizations, actions, and incidents. The company lauds its temporal analytics engine as something that goes beyond the general search of a normal user and finds the hidden, almost subconscious, links between people, documents, and declarations.

All of these efforts are not attempts to violate personal space and freedom (conspiracy theorists notwithstanding), but rather a reaction to what is a potential treasure trove of open source intelligence. After all, social media is basically the wilful publishing of personal private information into the public sphere. Beyond that there is the cascade of newspaper articles, journals, blogs, videos, and radio reports that now fill the virtual realm, opening up to intelligence agencies innumerable data-mining opportunities. Therefore, in democratic countries, governmental utilization of social media in its most serious form tends to be more passive and inert, ultimately resulting in the production of research data.

While it is understandable that some citizens can be unnerved by these efforts, they are still a far cry from the blatant attempts of authoritarian governments to invade, censor, and curtail access and virtual freedom. Regardless of this difference, there does seem to be a commonality with authoritarian governments in that the true power of social media is not effectively and compellingly used. This is further affirmation of the idea that the structural nature of social media cannot be maximized by any government at all. Less effectively by authoritarian governments than democratic ones certainly, but democratic regimes are weak users also. The tools of social media apparently bloom best only in the grassroots.

The other area mentioned for democratic usage of social media was in regards to raising popularity profiles. The term ‘popular culture’ is used loosely here, in the sense that the top governmental projects tend to be built and structured around relatively benign and somewhat inane purposes: popularity contests, photo albums, joke cabinets, and the like. For example, the following were taken from an official list at Informationweek and were lauded as the best governmental social media initiatives:

- The New York City mayor’s office has one of the city’s most active Twitter feeds.
- The White House holds an annual competition called the SAVE award which lets federal employees submit ideas on how the government can save money and also allows them to then vote on those ideas.
- The US Marine Corps has the most popular government Facebook page by far. With more than 1.85 million “likes,” the page is been liked almost 700,000 more times than its closest competitor, the Army. It is currently engaged in a campaign to reach 2 million followers.
NASA is the most popular federal agency on Twitter, regularly followed, it is believed, for its amazing photographs of outer space and the earth from space.

The Library of Congress has a Flicker stream that is considered one of the best in the government. It includes thousands of images, including high-quality photographs of Pres. Abraham Lincoln, pictures of jazz musicians, news from the early 20th century, colour photographs of the Great Depression, and more.

These examples are not given to make light of the United States government and are not a parody of democratic regimes and their use of social media. Rather they are highlighted to show that there is a commonality across governments, regardless of regime type, that indicates a strong discomfort, awkwardness, and unfamiliarity with social media. This is at least in comparison with the manner in which it is utilized by the public at large for grassroots uprisings. This lack of comfort with social media does not improve when considering the military. In a recent article, the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006 was analyzed from the perspective of social media utilization. Most fascinating to note was how the article missed the important structural explanation available from the empirical evidence:

“In the summer of 2006, Hezbollah effectively integrated information operations, including social media, into their tactical operations to fight the Israelis. Hezbollah embedded photographs and videos into blocks and YouTube to promote a positive self-image and to highlight negative perceptions of Israeli operations. Hezbollah used information effectively to limit Israel’s strategic options. After 33 days of fighting, a cease-fire was declared and Hezbollah claimed victory. The organization was able to create a perception of failure for Israel.”

What is most important to notice is how the government is not as fluent in the proper use of social media’s power as Hezbollah. Hezbollah is much closer to a rebel insurgent group than a formal governmental entity. In essence, in the conflict above, it was Hezbollah creating the civil unrest through social media and Israel looking to constrain it. This article has been arguing throughout that there are structural advantages in such conflicts that will always make the grassroots groups more able to maximize the power of social media over governmental ones. This point is only more vividly made when considering the prescriptive advice of the military on how to properly organize a strategy for social media:

- Social media should have the support and interest of the commander and key members of his staff and should be formalized into a program with responsibilities assigned to members of the command staff.
- The commander should state his intent for information affects, explicitly noting the role social media should play. That allows his staff to generate options much the same way as is done for other combat multipliers. A pro-active engagement with social media incorporated into the commander’s operational planning would provide the best results.

10. Thomas Mayfield, A Commander’s Strategy for Social Media, 80.
Create a social media monitoring team to act as the eyes and ears of the strategy team. It may be viewed as social media scouts, collecting information on the state of the online community.  

Social media does not excel in the hands of authoritarian government because of how systematic, formalized, rigid, and fearful of free-flowing exchange it is. Yet the above bullet points show that even democratic governments have trouble coping with the speed, nakedness, and spontaneity of social media information flow. As a result, they try to force social media into their own familiar structure, just as authoritarian regimes do. The end result of these similar efforts is the same – neither effectively utilizes social media as well as groups who organize for dissent.

Recall, of course, the formal definition and parameters established at the beginning of this piece: the following table is not attempting to encapsulate or encompass any and all forms of possible social media. Rather, it is an evaluation of how Facebook and Twitter seem to operate, both in general and in the specific context of being used for political unrest/civil disruption and for counter-measures undertaken by opponent regimes. The table tries to break down in simple but relevant categorizations how much the structure of social media can influence its proper execution. It seems clear from the broad anecdotal evidence above that contemporary governments, whether democratic or non-democratic, have not ceded the effectiveness and appropriateness of social media exclusively to the grassroots. Some analysts may feel this should be considered an axiom but it does not seem that states have conceded defeat just yet on the issue. Perhaps the ‘antithesis matrix’ below will be a first step in making explicit how potentially axiomatic the argument could be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categorization</th>
<th>SOCIAL MEDIA</th>
<th>AUTHORITARIAN GOVT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEMPO</td>
<td>Fast-paced</td>
<td>Glacial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACTION TO STIMULI</td>
<td>Malleable, Adaptable</td>
<td>Rigid, Intractable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL ETHOS</td>
<td>Creatively disorganized</td>
<td>Bureaucratically hyper-organized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEF TARGET AUDIENCE</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>Old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTITUDE TO NEW INFO</td>
<td>Impressionable</td>
<td>Reluctant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUTIOUSNESS</td>
<td>‘Riskophile’</td>
<td>‘Riskophobe’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY</td>
<td>Agile</td>
<td>Clumsy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL STRUCTURE</td>
<td>Anarchical</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STYLE</td>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEAL PURPOSE</td>
<td>FOMENT DISSENT</td>
<td>PRESERVE STATUS QUO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Ibid, 83.
**Tempo**

Tempo refers to the pace in which operations take place and decisions are made within social media and authoritarian government. Social media prides itself on being an incredibly fast-paced environment. Authoritarian government, on the other hand, is almost glacial in its decision-making simply because change is not usually looked upon as a positive sign of progress. Change is the nature of social media's existence.

**Reaction to Stimuli**

In the same light as tempo, social media reacts to outside or external stimuli in a highly adaptable and malleable way. Because both the structure and contents of social media are so ever-changing there is no sense of displacement or perceived threat when exposed to foreign or unfamiliar entities. This is the exact opposite of how authoritarian governments deal with external and foreign stimuli. Intractable rigidity is the inevitable reaction from authoritarian governments because external agents not of the power structures have to be considered a threat by their very nature. Authoritarian governments seek to crush and eliminate that which they do not know or understand. Social media willingly and passionately embraces it.

**Organizational Ethos**

Urban legends abound when it comes to the organizational ethos of social media. Whether it is rollerblading down the corridors of Google or riding a Segway across the Microsoft campus, social media organizations have always been infatuated by creative disorganization. This lack of order is not only meant to inspire, but is considered the only viable method to produce innovation. Innovation is the temple at which all of social media worships. Contrast this with the organizational ethic of authoritarian governments, which on the best of days can only be considered bureaucratically hyper-organized. This is largely because innovation in a repressive environment, just like foreign stimuli, must be considered a threat. Authoritarian governments worship only at the temple of their own bureaucracy.

**Chief Target Audience**

This category is likely the easiest to assess. Social media has been, is, and likely forever will be the domain of the young. This is not to say that only people who are biologically young can be adept with all of its potential applications. Rather, it is the mentality of social media's target audience that primarily skews young. In the same manner, that is, not just biologically considering age but mentally considering a person's attitude and approach, authoritarian regimes have a chief target audience that is undoubtedly old, if not often decrepit.

**Attitude to New Information**

Attitude to new information is an important category in the structure of both social media and authoritarian government: new information represents the ability to learn, to evolve, and to grow beyond original parameters. Social media is impressionable in this category in the sense that new information literally makes a lasting impression upon it. Some would say that
social media is forever changing because of this openness to embracing new information. Authoritarian government and repressive regimes will usually accept new information only when it is clear there is no alternative.

**Cautiousness**

Social media loves risk. There is relatively little in the expansion of social media into people’s lives that does not involve risk in some form. It is in this way that social media is considered a “riskophile:” it not only does not shy away from risk it openly embraces it. Risk in the world of social media is what inevitably leads to reward. Authoritarian governments are clearly “riskophobes:” risk equates to danger. Danger is nothing more than a threat to the order of things. As such risk must be avoided at all times. There have been numerous works documenting how often paranoia and fear dominate the atmosphere of a repressive regime. Such paranoia and fear lead to institutional paralysis. It leads to a working environment populated exclusively by those who would rather do nothing than innovate.

**Operational Capability**

Social media is agile. There is really no other way for social media to be, when you take into consideration its tempo, reaction to stimuli, and cautiousness factor. There is no fear within the system of social media that could cause paralysis or uncertainty because mistakes are not considered, well, mistakes: they are new ventures exposing new paths. This could be one of the main reasons authoritarian governments are so clumsy in their operational capabilities: mistakes are dreadful things with horribly detrimental consequences to those who commit them.

**General Structure**

The general structure of social media is anarchical. This is not meant as an insult or a compliment, though those who praise social media the most clearly revel in what they consider to be inspired anarchy. The anarchical nature of social media is simply a structure that does not lend itself to any permanent overarching governing bodies. There may be moments and time periods where there is general organization and consensus but all in all social media runs best when it is run by no one at all. Clearly, authoritarian governments find such anarchy anathema. Hierarchy rules in repressive regimes: how well you rise or how far you fall within them often depends on how well you are able to function within that hierarchy.

**Style**

Given all of the previous categories elaborated up to now, it is obvious that social media and authoritarian government are polar opposites in terms of style: the former is defiantly informal while the latter is maniacally formal. Social media prides itself on creating an environment where one does not have to worry about rules, about offending, or about maintaining proper etiquette. Many in democratic societies actually somewhat lament this...
fact of social media life and wish a little bit more decorum could be imposed. But this will
never happen for it is against the nature of what social media is. Authoritarian governments
are just as committed to the formality of their style and can do just as little about altering it.

Ideal Purpose

The final conclusion is perhaps where the Antithesis matrix causes its biggest controversy. For
the first time an attempt has been made to definitively categorize and conceptualize the
structure of social media with the distinct purpose of comparing it to the structure of
authoritarian government. Having gone through nine explicit categories that encompass their
structural natures, it becomes clear that the ideal purpose suited for social media is to
foment dissent while the ideal purpose suited for authoritarian government is to preserve
the status quo.

The nature of social media is in antithesis to the nature of authoritarian government. Civil
disobedience, dissent, protest, social mobilization, all aiming to enact change and fight the
system, are perfectly facilitated within the structures of social media. Efforts to counteract
such movements require an opposing structure. As such, using social media to undermine or
constrain dissent facilitated by social media is simply the wrong tool for the wrong job. At
their very mildest, authoritarian regimes are simply bureaucracies run amok. They are
bureaucracies that live to ensure the survival of their own bureaucracies. They are status quo
machines. As such, authoritarian regimes would be able to effectively maximize the power of
social media only if they altered their very structure and nature. This article simply makes
explicit what should be common sense: such change will not occur. What's left to discuss is
the future relevance and possible applicability of the Antithesis matrix using China as a critical
case example.

Conclusion: China and Prospects for a Social Media Revolution - Not as Bleak as Predicted

Earlier in this work the camp in opposition to social media as a democratic transformation
machine was highlighted and undermined. This camp overemphasized one particular point
for effect, namely that social media not only could not launch new democratic revolutions
but could also not lead said societies into new democratic consolidated regimes. It is very
true that social media was not the initial cause fuelling popular anger when it came to the
Arab Spring: pervasive government corruption and repression, chronic unemployment, and
rising food prices clearly fuelled the initial popular dissatisfaction. It is also true that social
media did not in the aftermath of these revolutions build new democratic polities: the
countries that blossomed in the international limelight of the Arab Spring have not yet
succeeded in establishing new united governments with effective leadership and there are
many signs to cause worry that old elements of the past can still emerge to block their
democratic transitions.

Those who would scoff at the power of social media point to these empirical facts as proof
that new technology is in fact relatively impotent. What this article has tried to establish is a

March 2011.
new frame of reference in which to analyze and understand the impact of social media: that being as a true mobilization facilitator, but one that carries with it no guarantee of democratic consolidation. In addition, that facilitation is markedly favoured towards civilian grassroots purposes and is not deftly utilized by repressive regimes. Therefore, comments about China having bleak prospects for social revolution and framing China as the ultimate challenge for cyber-utopians are misplaced and overstated, especially when analyzing the native social media structures presently in China today through the framework presented in this article.

There has been much written about the restrictions placed by the Chinese government on foreign websites and social media. However, as is often the case, innovation and creativity emerges where there is a lack of freedom. Social media in fact flourishes in China. But it flourishes through a home-grown, state-approved ecosystem in which Chinese-owned properties thrive. By some measures, Chinese social media use is some of the most intense in the world:

- A Boston Consulting Group study found that Chinese Internet users are online for an average of 2.7 hours per day, considerably more than other developing countries and more on par with usage patterns in Japan and the United States.
- A 2008 MTV survey found that young people across Asia have made a similar number of friends online and offline. Only in China, however, did young people actually have more friends online than offline.
- Chinese citizens use online video platforms quite differently from how Americans use YouTube: rather than short videos of cute animals or silly domestic mishaps that may be popular, the Chinese versions of YouTube are filled with longer form content, up to 70% of which is professionally produced.¹³

Indeed, as can be seen below, China has domestically produced an equivalent version of nearly every form of social media that exists in the West today. While it is true that attempts by the state to control most of these domestic versions is constant and aggressive, there are many signs of promise that even the mighty Chinese bureaucracy is not stronger than the structural nature of social media in today's world.

For example, a protest by 20,000 people against the construction of a chemical factory in Xiamen in 2007 was organized through mobile phone text messages. The following year, citizens spread news and expressed intense dissatisfaction on Internet bulletin board systems concerning a tainted baby formula scandal and also about unsafe school construction that was believed to be responsible for many preventable deaths in the Sichuan earthquake. Finally, the pro-democracy manifesto ‘Charter 08’ was posted and circulated online, where it garnered more than 7000 signatures, even though officially it had been censored by the state.¹⁴

The temptation is to dismiss these acts of civil disobedience because they are not purely political manifestations, but rather geared more toward the environmental and health protection of the populace, two areas that the authoritarian regime in China would likely

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¹³. Thomas Crampton, Social Media in China: The Same, but Different, 29.
¹⁴. Daniel Calingaert, Authoritarianism vs. the Internet, 67.
have an interest in properly maintaining. The problem with this temptation is that it is once again confusing results with process. Social media is a process, a social mobilization facilitator. As such, most important in determining an area’s suitability to create civil unrest and disobedience is not to question what people actually protest in the present day, but rather ascertaining whether the necessary structures are in place to facilitate any protests at all. It is clear from the evidence documented above that China not only has the structures in place but the structures are in fact home-grown to the potential protesters who would use them. This is important because while most of the social media structures in China today are predominantly used for business and economic properties, the only thing required to make those same structures useful instead for civil disobedience is a slight negative shift in popular satisfaction and the people’s general sense of well-being.

Most analyses focus either on the absence of Western technology or the total control of the Chinese state over technology. These arguments are overplayed. The antithesis matrix exposes that the mere presence of social media technology allows such structures to potentially become facilitators of dissent, though they are not the initial spark to ignite anger or a guarantee for the emergence of a Chinese democracy. Certain aspects of this potentiality are seen in the work of Larry Diamond, where he considered so-called liberation technology in China:
“Such quasi-Orwellian control of cyberspace is only part of the story, however. There is simply too much communication and networking online for the state to monitor and censor it all. Moreover, ‘Chinese netizens’—particularly the young who are growing up immersed in this technology—are inventive, determined, and cynical about official orthodoxy. Many constantly search for better techniques to circumvent cyber-censorship, and they quickly share what they learn. If most of China’s younger Internet users are apolitical and cautious, they are also alienated from political authority and eagerly embrace modest forms of defiance, often turning on wordplay.”

The views expressed above fuse perfectly with the antithesis matrix and combine further with part of the original argument used by the opposition camp to detract from social media’s relevance in fomenting revolutions across the Middle East and North Africa. The emphasis there was placed on economic impoverishment and rising food prices. This is relevant because there is an entire field of experts today focusing on the hidden economic stress within China once you move away from the prosperous coastal regions. The numbers themselves are stark and telling: even if China was successful in creating a prosperous middle-class the size of the entire United States, this would still leave more than one billion people struggling and likely resentful of their coastal brethren. Under such conditions it is not utopianism at all to envision the possibility that all of those social media structures presently used in China purely for economic purposes could suddenly be used for altogether more political and non-state-approved objectives. Such a vision, in fact, would not be utopianism but perfectly rational realism.

In conclusion, this article will once again lean on the brilliant work of Professor Diamond concerning liberation technology and authoritarian governments:

“Even in the freest environments, the new digital means of information and communication have important limits and costs. There are fine lines between pluralism and cacophony, between advocacy and intolerance, and between the expansion of the public sphere and its hopeless fragmentation. As the sheer number of media portals has multiplied, more voices have become empowered, but they are hardly all rational and civil. The proliferation of online media has not uniformly improved the quality of public deliberation, but rather has given rise to an echo chamber of the ideologically like-minded egging each other on. And open access facilitates much worse: hate-mongering, pornography, terrorism, digital crime, online espionage, and cyber warfare. These are real challenges, and they require careful analysis—prior to regulation and legislation—to determine how democracies can balance the great possibilities for expanding human freedom, knowledge, and capacity with the dangers that these technologies may pose for individual and collective security alike.”

The antithesis matrix is not a predictor of where revolutions will happen. It is a reminder that societies embedded with multiple forms of social media have the potential to facilitate protest and civil disobedience if other factors on the ground warrant such behaviour. It is also a reminder that those regimes where it is likely to have those motivating factors in place should not feel too overconfident in their ability to constrain or co-opt social media-inspired

15. Larry Diamond, Liberation Technology, 74.
16. Ibid, 80.
mobilization: the matrix shows that the general population in authoritarian states tends to be much more adaptable, energetic, creative, agile, and not unnerved by social chaos and temporary anarchy. In other words, managing the process is much more difficult than it might seem because of the structure of such regimes. What’s more, while social media cannot be a guarantor of democratic consolidation, and its supporters sometimes over-hype its causal impact, its presence does guarantee the opportunity for citizens in authoritarian regimes to mobilize more effectively and steadfastly for democracy. And this, more often than not, is a most crucial first step. The outcome of long-term democratic success or failure depends upon them, not upon the process. To paraphrase Steve Jobs: it should not be about faith in technology, but about faith in the people using the technology. And that, more than anything else, is why it is so hard to defeat the tweet.
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Abstract

People-centered human security has recently gained more importance for global public opinion, with climate change becoming one of the major concerns regarding the well-being of citizens at the global as well as local levels. This paper examines transatlantic public opinion in general, and with a specific focus on Turkey, about environmental concerns, particularly climate change, and questions to what extent Turkish public opinion shares global concerns. It first looks at the evolution of global awareness of climate change as a factor in environmental and human security. Second, it examines the brief conceptual debate. Third, it analyses Turkish and transatlantic public opinion on climate change using the Transatlantic Trends Survey (2009) data, which includes specific measures about climate change, including (i) the level of concern about climate change, (ii) preferences about trade-offs between economic concerns and environmental concerns and (iii) responsibility of different actors concerning climate change. This paper not only introduces detailed insights into Turkish public opinion but also compares it with transatlantic opinion, in order to contribute to the underdeveloped literature on public opinion on climate change.

Key words: Public opinion, climate change, Human insecurity.

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Introduction

People-centred human security has recently gained more importance for global public opinion, with climate change becoming one of the major concerns regarding the well-being of citizens at the global as well as local levels. Climate change has been recognized as one of the major human security issues that pose serious global challenges. It is a challenge that not only affects different domains, from human beings to the economy and the environment, but also intensifies competition over access to natural resources, which is already a major reason for conflicts and wars in human history.¹

As climate change poses both chronic (at the global scale through ozone depletion, greenhouse gases and declining biodiversity) and sudden (at a more individual level through reduced nutrition, the health effects of ultraviolet exposure, and water shortages) challenges to human security, fighting climate change requires a global understanding of the shared responsibility of both non-governmental and governmental actors. On various occasions, transatlantic leaders have mutually highlighted the emergence of climate change as one of the top priorities on the global agenda. In April 2007, at the annual US–EU summit in Washington, American and European leaders sought to demonstrate improved relations at a working level with agreements on economic cooperation and climate change. While George W. Bush created a global controversy in 2001 by withdrawing from the Kyoto negotiations, in part for economic reasons and a refusal to comply with international climate change regulations, President Obama has strongly emphasized the need for a global response to climate change, which is a matter of ‘security and stability’.² The German Chancellor Angela Merkel on various occasions has showed her determination to take the lead on climate change.³ Likewise, John Ashton, the UK Foreign Secretary’s Special Representative for Climate Change, argued that ‘Climate change is a security issue because if we don’t deal with it, people will die and states will fail.’⁴ The global campaign of Al Gore, founder of the Climate Reality Project, reminded the international community that the challenge is real, claiming that ‘The climate crisis knows no political boundaries.’⁵

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2. ‘Obama’s Speech on Climate Change’.
3. Altinay, ‘Merkel Leads on Climate Change’.
In its simplest form, climate change can be defined as regional- or global-scale changes in historical climate patterns because of either natural or human-made factors. It involves interconnections between the security of natural resources, nation-states and the transnational system. Its challenge lies in the political implications of insecurity in the form of policy impacts, such as the need for the institutionalization of environmental security to prevent conflicts, from the global down to the regional, national, local or individual levels.

The risks and challenges inherent in climate change are closely interrelated with human security. Ogata and Sen define human security as the protection of ‘the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillment’. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report (1994), human security has two aspects. The first relates to human protection from chronic diseases and hunger. The second aspect is protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in daily life. Concerning different dimensions of human security as defined by this report, climate change has become one of the major concerns regarding the well-being of citizens. Scientists, policy-makers and experts share the view that climate change is a global challenge, and that it should be mitigated at the national as well as the international level.

The solution to environmental problems in general lies in the public’s willingness to bear the costs and to mitigate future ecological impacts of climate change. In democracies, it is the public that will ultimately determine certain policies, such as how much mitigation takes place, what foreign policy decisions need to be prioritized, and to what extent trade-off between economic losses and environmental security will be tolerated. Opinion polls delve into the question of climate change in terms of perceived challenges, risks, and policy preferences at the mass public level. Despite the decades-long history of the scientific evolution of climate change studies and the global response to climate change, the public-opinion dimension of the link between climate change and human security has been neglected. An interest in climate change has been stimulated by media coverage of the scientific aspects of warming and debates in the public sphere about the impact of climate change, as well as by the catastrophic ice-age scenarios depicted in Hollywood movies, such as *The Day After Tomorrow* (2004). All these developments have contributed to some increase – albeit not very high – in public attention to the issue of climate change.

‘Although scientific knowledge is essential to global environmental problem identification and to solution design,’ as Corfee-Morlot et al. argue, understanding dynamics and concerns at the mass public level in democracies also matters immensely, as they function as an ‘essential domino’ in decision-making in liberal democracies. Therefore, this chapter examines transatlantic public opinion about climate change in general, and with a specific focus on Turkey in order to question to what extent Turkish public opinion shares global concerns. The premise central to this study is that climate change plays an explicit role in human security.

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5. ‘Gore Takes on Climate Deniers’.
10. Klarevas, “‘Essential Domino’”.
studies climate change as one of the major human security concerns affecting the well-being of citizens at global and local levels. It first looks at the evolution of global awareness of climate change as a factor in human security. Then it analyses Turkish and transatlantic public opinion on climate change using the Transatlantic Trends Survey (2009) data, which includes specific measures about climate change, including the level of concern about climate change, preferences about trade-offs between economic concerns and environmental concerns, burden-sharing concerning climate change, and socio-demographic determinants of climate concern. This chapter therefore provides a detailed insight into Turkish public opinion and compares it with transatlantic opinion, in order to contribute to the presently underdeveloped literature on public opinion about climate change.

Synopsis of Global Awareness of Climate Change

Since the early discoveries about climate change that date back to the eighteenth century, scientific concerns have paved the way for growing climate pessimism among social science scholars. Climate change also moved on from being a purely scientific issue to the area of development policies and strategies. As the Human Development Report 2007/2008: Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World stated, climate change not only threatened progress towards development, but also challenged human development and human security. Although Corfee-Morlot et al. argued that ‘Despite the prescient nature of these findings, neither the broader scientific community nor the public at large had much interest in the greenhouse effect at this time’, the report was evidence of the emergence of a public sphere on global warming.

Scientific discoveries not only demonstrated the need for close collaboration between scientific experts and policymakers, but also generated international public awareness and interest as the emergence of international environmentalism in the 1960s clearly showed. Its rise as a mass social movement, especially in the USA, showed the emergence of global warming as an issue in the public sphere. Besides growing media coverage of the issue of global warming, increasing use of visual media and heuristics, such as images and metaphors (e.g. melting glaciers, stranded polar bears, heat waves and hurricanes), sub-political networks also played a fundamental role raising the salience of global warming and the global and local politics of climate change.

The literature on public opinion on climate change may well have originated in nineteenth-century social and political theory, which emerged as a reaction to the positivist approach to

12. Corfee-Morlot et al., ‘Global Warming in the Public Sphere’, p. 2746 (emphasis added by me).
16. Carvalho and Burgess, ‘Cultural Circuits of Climate Change’.
17. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean; Haas, ‘When does Power Listen to Truth?’. 
science and society. According to positivists who argued that science as the source of truth informs policy makers, environmental policies are determined by science, which influences public perceptions about climate change in the form of providing support for or opposition to government policies (especially concerning taxation and subsidies). Contrarily, constructivist social thinkers believe there is a direct relationship between society and the environment. They argue that the social and cultural struggle together with expert knowledge shapes environmental decision making. As Leiserowitz argues, ‘public interpretations of dangerous climate change are important components of the policymaking process . . . . Public risk perceptions can fundamentally compel or constrain political, economic, and social action to address particular risks.’

Contemporary research on public opinion has systematically focused on climate change over the past thirty years. Scholars have covered the issue across a range of themes, including public awareness, knowledge of climate change, risk assessments and perceived immediacy of risks, readiness for trade-offs for environmental protection, and public support for specific environmental policies. Though much of the empirical public opinion research on climate change has focused on American public opinion, recently, comparative studies have focused on public opinion in the developed world.

Data and Methodology
This chapter utilizes data from the Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS) (2009) that explores public attitudes towards climate change in Turkey, the USA and eleven European countries. It includes questions that deal with various aspects of climate change as a source of human insecurity.

20. Fischer and Forester (eds), Argumentative Turn; Hajer and Wagenaar (eds), Deliberative Policy Analysis; Jasanoff and Martello (eds), Earthly Politics; Wynne, ‘Seasick on the Third Wave’.
22. Gilroy and Shapiro, ‘The Polls: Environmental Protection’.
23. Ladd, ‘What Do Americans Really Think?’.
24. Krosnick et al., ‘Origins and Consequences’.
26. Ladd, ‘What Do Americans Really Think?’.
27. Bord et al., Public Perceptions of Global Warming; Downing and Ballantyne, Tipping Point or Turning Point?; Lorenzoni et al., ‘Cross-national Comparisons; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, ‘Public Views on Climate Change’; Nisbet and Myers, ‘Polls Trends’.
29. Malka et al., ‘Association of Knowledge’; Schuld et al., “‘Global Warming’ or ‘Climate Change’?”.
30. The TTS 2009 study included public opinion in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Romania. The data were weighted on the basis of the size of the adult population in each country. ‘Don’t know’s and refusals are excluded from the analysis. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the sponsor of the original study bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here. The data are available at www.gmfus.org.
insecurity. First, it carries out a cross-country contextual descriptive examination with 2009 survey data. Second, it undertakes a detailed quantitative analysis covering transatlantic climate concern patterns. The selected measures analyse public attitudes in the USA, Europe and Turkey on climate change with special focus on (i) the level of concern about climate change, (ii) responsibility of different actors concerning climate change, and (iii) preferences about trade-offs between economic concerns and climate concerns.\footnote{The TTS 2009 study contained only two measures of soft security, namely the economic security and climate security issues. Although the analysis would be expanded with other human security concerns, due to limits inherent in the dataset empirical analysis in this study concentrates only on the comparison of climate-security-related concerns with economic concerns.}

The dependent variable in this analysis is ‘public concern about climate change’. To operationalize it, we use the TTS question: ‘To what extent are you concerned about climate change?’ This is an ordinal categorical variable that is modelled as a true Likert scale, increasing in positivity from ‘not at all concerned’ (4), indicating that climate change is not a source of insecurity, to ‘not very concerned’ (3), indicating ‘indifference toward climate change’, to ‘somewhat concerned’ (2) to ‘very concerned’ (1), indicating that climate change is a source of human insecurity.

**Empirical Analysis: Transatlantic Public Opinion and Climate Change**

The starting point for the investigation is an observation about climate change as a priority issue. The TTS in 2009 asked transatlantic publics about issue-specific foreign policy priorities. As Table 1 shows, managing international economic problems was the most important issue for transatlantic public opinion. This was unsurprising, given that in 2009 the global economy suffered its worst downturn since the Great Depression. Responding to climate change (15\%) on average was the third-most important priority needing special attention. The results revealed both a transatlantic and intra-European variation. While climate change was a high-priority issue for old Europeans, new Europeans, such as Bulgarians, Romanians, Slovaks and Poles, joined the Americans in assigning a much lower priority to solving climate-related problems.\footnote{Yeager et al., ‘Measuring Americans’ Issue Priorities’, p. 126.} The rank order for Turkish public opinion differed slightly from the transatlantic average. A large majority of Turkish citizens (43\%) listed fighting international terror as the most urgent issue that the Turkish government should deal with.\footnote{For a detailed discussion of reasons for Turkish public opinion on terror see Canan-Sokullu, ‘Climate Change as a Source of Human Insecurity’.} The second-highest priority according to Turkish public opinion was the management of international economic problems in an era of ongoing global economic crisis.
Table 1. Issue priorities of transatlantic public opinion (%) (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Managing international economic problems</th>
<th>Fighting international terrorism</th>
<th>Fighting climate change</th>
<th>Easing tensions in the Middle East</th>
<th>Managing relations with Russia</th>
<th>Stabilizing Afghanistan</th>
<th>Managing relations with Iran</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question wording: Which among the following tasks should be the top priority for the American president and European leaders? (a) Managing international economic problems (b) Fighting international terrorism (c) Fighting climate change (d) Working to ease tensions in the Middle East (e) Managing relations with Russia (f) Stabilizing Afghanistan (g) Managing relations with Iran

Note: Row percentages add up to 100 per cent.

Recent research has generated predictions about how utilitarian calculations shape public opinion. Sociotropic (macroeconomic) and egocentric (microeconomic) utilitarianism share the assumption that individuals are rational actors who make cost/benefit calculations when making decisions. Individuals are capable of understanding what options are available to them; they can put these options in an order from most to least beneficial; and they prefer the option with the most advantages. Based on the utilitarian premises, as Figure 1 shows, transatlantic public opinion was less concerned about climate change than the economic crisis. As the difference between the levels of concern regarding these two issues was rather small (4 percentage points) it would be safe – though premature – to point to a transatlantic climate consciousness, which is rather a recent development compared to awareness of the economic crisis as a global risk. As climate change affects individual socio-economic well-being as well as the country’s demographic structure, Turkish public opinion was almost as

worried by climate change and the economy as the average transatlantic citizen. As Figure 1 shows, Turks expressed more concern about the international economic crisis (85%) than about climate change (81%).

**Figure 1. Concern about climate change and the economic crisis (%) (2009)**

*Question wording:* To what extent are you concerned about climate change?
*Question wording:* To what extent are you concerned about the international economic crisis?
*Response categories comprised (1) Very concerned (2) Somewhat concerned (3) Not very concerned (4) Not at all concerned. These categories are collapsed into two categories as ‘concerned’ and ‘not concerned’. Only ‘concerned’ percentages are represented here.

TTS 2009 asked about the trade-off between economic growth and fighting climate change to measure how much transatlantic public opinion was willing to ‘pay the price’. As Figure 2 shows, on being exposed to two apparently contradictory goals, namely the maximization of economic growth at the expense of efforts to combat climate change versus fighting climate change even if it slows economic growth, seven out of ten people opted for the latter. However, 26% said that societies should do everything possible to maximize economic growth, even if it hurt efforts to combat climate change.

The highest level of willingness to protect the climate was found in European countries like France, Italy and Portugal, whose economies rely to a large extent on agriculture, and where green economic models have been adopted to a larger extent. Majorities of people in these countries believed that every possible measure should be taken to fight climate change, even if it slowed down economic growth. Despite being one of the Mediterranean hubs of agricultural production, a boom in industrial production has resulted in higher levels of
pollution and greater risks to Turkey’s environment.\footnote{United States Energy Information Administration, ‘Turkey: Environmental Issues’.} Turkey is thus one of the countries particularly vulnerable to environmental challenges because of its developing economy, growing population and location.\footnote{See the Fourth Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for an assessment of Turkey’s environmental and climate protection policy records.} Keeping in mind that there is a greater imperative to fight visible challenges of water scarcity or deteriorating natural resources, Turkish public opinion shared the average transatlantic preference about stopping climate change even if it jeopardizes the economic development of the country. Two-thirds of Turks favoured fighting climate change at the expense of economic growth (Figure 2).

**Figure 2. Trading off: economic growth vs. combating climate change? (%) (2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Economic growth at the expense of climate change</th>
<th>Fight climate change at the expense of economic growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Question wording:* Some people say that we should do everything possible to fight climate change, even if it slows economic growth. Others say that we should do everything possible to maximize economic growth, even if it hurts efforts to combat climate change. Which view comes closer to your own? (1) We should fight climate change even if it slows economic growth (2) We should maximize economic growth even if it hurts efforts to stop climate change.

As far as the mechanisms to fight this challenge were concerned, transatlantic public opinion shared the view that it was first of all individuals (87%) who should stop climate change (Table 2). Secondly, supporters of the internationalization of climate change management strongly believed that climate change could only be addressed effectively at the international level (80%). Turkish public opinion showed a similar sense of responsibility for stopping
climate change, with 84% of Turks calling for both individual action and international responsibility. Turkey’s management of issues related to climate change such as encouraging mitigation and adaptation, and actively participating in the international post-Kyoto process, reflects itself in a public-level response to the internationalization of efforts to stop climate change. Yet they expressed the highest wish, 78%, to see their government placing a high priority on dealing with climate change issues, which was far higher than the transatlantic average of 58%.

Table 2. Who is responsible for stopping climate change? (%) (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Individuals a</th>
<th>Industry b</th>
<th>Government c</th>
<th>International d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question wording: To what extent do you agree with the following statements about climate change?

a The personal actions that we take to fight climate change can make a difference
b It is companies and industries, not citizens, that have to change their behaviour
c It is governments, not citizens, that are primarily responsible for dealing with climate change
d Climate change can only be addressed effectively at the international level

Response categories to these four questions comprised (1) Agree strongly (2) Agree somewhat (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree strongly. These categories are collapsed into two categories as ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’. Results reflect the ‘agree’ responses to each question.

The associations between public concern about climate change and the potential impacts of age, gender, ideological self-placement, education, level of political awareness and nationality are examined through ordinal logistic regression analysis. We chose these


variables as the literature on public opinion claims that they affect political attitudes.\textsuperscript{41} We chose not to hold the country of origin of respondents constant as it accounts for the cross-national variance of opinion.\textsuperscript{42} To detect the ordinal categorical distribution and to calculate the effects of the independent variables we design the ordinal logistic regression model as

\[
\text{Logit (concern about climate change)} = f(\text{political awareness}, \text{gender}, \text{age}, \text{education}, \text{country of origin}).
\]

Concern about climate change has a natural ordering from ‘lack of concern’ to a ‘considerable level of concern’. To predict the value associated with the low- and high-concern categories, we reconceptualised the problem of climate change concern as an attempt to predict the probability that an individual is either extremely indifferent or extremely concerned. The parameter estimates can be interpreted as representing the impact of the independent variables on the likelihood that an individual falls into a higher category of concern about climate change, all else being equal. Thus, negative coefficients are associated with lower scores regarding level of concern, while positive coefficients are associated with higher scores of concern.\textsuperscript{43}

Table 3 presents the results of the ordinal logistic regression model for perception of climate change as a matter of concern. Adults are less likely to be concerned than younger respondents. A one-unit increase in the level of education from elementary to high school was associated with a higher level of concern about climate change. Left-wing ideological self-placement had the most significant impact on the log-odds of a strong concern about climate change. Leftists were the most concerned about climate change. These results show that young and educated individuals, as well as leftists, are more likely to worry about climate change. Finally, the more individuals talk about political matters with friends, the more they are concerned.

\textsuperscript{41} Gabel, ‘Public Support for European Integration’.
\textsuperscript{42} Each nationality was computed as a dummy variable (1) against the USA (0).
\textsuperscript{43} Norušis, \textit{SPSS 14.0 Advanced Statistical Procedures}, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{44} Since it is the logit, I interpreted the coefficients instead of the odds ratio in the results. See Norušis, \textit{SPSS 14.0 Advanced Statistical Procedures}, p. 73; Gelpi et al., ‘Success Matters’, p. 32.
Table 3. Ordinal logistic regression of public opinion on climate change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Coefficient (standard errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.341*** (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18–24 years</td>
<td>.153* (.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–34 years</td>
<td>.231*** (.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–44 years</td>
<td>-.261*** (.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45–54 years</td>
<td>-.165** (.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55–64 years</td>
<td>-.095 (.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
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<td>Post-graduate</td>
<td>.196 (.171)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequency of political discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>.237*** (.063)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occasional</td>
<td>-.038 (.052)</td>
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<td>Extreme left</td>
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<td>Centre</td>
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<td>Centre right</td>
<td>.053 (.102)</td>
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<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke $R^2$</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dependent variable is ‘concern about climate change: (4) not at all concerned, (3) not very concerned, (2) somewhat concerned, (1) very concerned’.

* All model chi-squares are statistically significant at p > .001

Note 1: Estimates of cut points are available from the author upon request.

Note 2: Dummies for nationality are not reported in Table 3 to make the interpretation of the table easier. Results are available from the author upon request.

* p < .001, ** p < .01, *** p < .05
Discussion and Conclusion

Global climate change challenges collective awareness and soft security perceptions all over the world. Not only have unsustainable and unequal development patterns in the global south and north jeopardized human livings, but also local and regional conflicts driven by resource scarcity are likely to threaten stability and security at global, regional and local levels. The global north should take the lead in avoiding global warming and climate change, and above all to provide environmental security.

A rapidly developing country of the twenty-first century, Turkey’s climate change policies have rather remained on the back burner of the country’s political agenda. Nevertheless, it can be argued that global trends and the EU regulations in the negotiation process give Turkey the opportunity to adapt itself to these trends and regulations in terms of how global climate change is perceived as part of the greater human security agenda and environmental considerations are incorporated into other human-security-related policy areas in the country. Turkey is a party to both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol on which the international climate regime is based. These venues provide a forum for cooperation in dealing with complex soft security threats in the world. Thus, as a party to the international climate regime, looking at climate change in terms of human security and ecological integrity would likely lessen the challenge of overprioritization of economic risks and threats in Turkey.

This study showed that transatlantic public opinion was less concerned about climate change than the challenge of the economic crisis as a global risk, and Turkish public opinion was no different from transatlantic opinion patterns in this regard. The transatlantic convergence was to favour fighting climate change at the expense of economic growth. Turkish public opinion shared the average transatlantic opinion, and preferred stopping climate change even if it jeopardized the economic development of the country. While majorities on both sides of the Atlantic believed that climate change was stoppable if collective action is taken, Turkish citizens were the most skeptical. As far as burden-sharing was concerned, individual responsibility was most favoured for stopping climate change, whereas management of climate change at the governmental level received the lowest support from the transatlantic public. The study also found that young and educated individuals, as well as leftists, were more likely to worry about climate change. Moreover, politically aware people tended to be more climate-concerned.

In conclusion, this study contributed to the literature on public opinion on climate change as a source of human insecurity. Despite the lack of comparative and insightful data on climate change and human security since surveys do not ask multifaceted questions, and they lack trend questions, we are satisfied that this study offered a preliminary comparative insight into the state of public views on immediate security concerns emanating from climate change. The general implication of this study is as straightforward as it is important, which is that, despite some differences, overall there is transatlantic agreement about the importance of individual and internationalized efforts to stop climate change. What is more, increasing the level of political awareness brings about an increase in climate consciousness.
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Putting the word ‘understanding’ in front of the subject matter in the title of a book is always a bold move. However, when it comes to conflict resolution, if someone is to do so and get away with it is Peter Wallensteen. A Professor of Peace studies and Conflict Research in both Uppsala University in Sweden and the University of Notre Dame in the US, the author proves once again that he has provided the definitive textbook on this thorny field. Ten years after the original text was published, the 3rd edition of ‘Understanding Conflict Resolution’ still delivers on its basic promise; to guide the reader through the meanders of theorising and analysing the resolution of conflicts at intra-state, inter state and regional levels.

The book, which is divided in three parts, follows a quite straightforward structure. Part I deals with the fundamentals of the (relatively recent concept that is) the subject area of the book, and puts forth well thought arguments on how to define and approach it, as well as on how to analyse its different types. After a useful exploration of the literature, Wallensteen identifies the focal points in the central issues of contention, or incompatibilities, the very process of reaching an agreement, and finally the interconnections between conflicts, without, however, failing to take into account the role of the international community. In particular, he stresses the importance of the three components of incompatibility, action, and actors, to reach the definition of conflict resolution as “a social situation where the armed conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to live peacefully with - and/or dissolve – their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against each other” (p. 50).

Quite important is also the proposition of the seven distinct ways in which the parties can deal with these incompatibilities, namely a) shifting one’s priorities, b) finding a point at which resources can be divided, c) horse-trading, d) sharing control, e) leaving control to someone else, f) resorting to conflict resolution mechanisms, and g) leaving issues to later or even to oblivion.

Part II is the largest part of the book and focuses on the basics of the field, providing a theoretical background and a study of various cases of the resolution of conflicts between states, conflict resolution in civil wars, and the resolution of state formation conflicts. Using the latest stages of the Cold War as historical background, and citing more recent examples from all continents, Wallenstein provides a lucid explanation of each type of conflict resolution. In particular, he divides interstate conflicts into the four categories of Geopolitik, Realpolitik, Idealpolitik, Kapitalpolitik, according to the issue to which prime importance is attached. In the chapter dedicated to this type, the author notes that “issues of territory and power remain the most frequent ones,” with questions of ideology and economy gaining
significance, and concludes that, as a result, “peace agreements have to find ways of dealing primarily with territorial and power considerations” (p. 127). As regards civil wars, Wallensteen observes that most intra-state conflicts concerning government are taking place in classical Third World countries, and identifies intra-state security dilemma as a major issue for their origin. In order to manage the security dilemma, he writes, peace agreements take five different measures: a) a general demilitarization and creation of a unified army; b) specific guarantees for leaders; c) international presence; d) transitory power-sharing, and e) amnesty to leaders, officers and agents.

The final part of the book is dedicated to the role of conflict complexes, which include factors such as regional, the UN, and the international community. In dismantling regional conflict complexes, Wallensteen draws a distinction between a gradual, conflict-by-conflict, approach and a bolder one, whereby the most difficult conflict is tackled first. After clarifying the role of major powers in conflict resolution, as well as its global dimensions, the author of ‘Understanding Conflict Resolution’ throws light on ‘the prime international body for peace and security’ that is the United Nations. In relation to the Security Council, in particular, Wallenstein reaches the conclusion that it “gets motivated to act in a conflict when it is urgent to find a solution and when parties are willing to let that happen” (p. 254). What is markedly interesting is also his thesis that the world presently has three geographically distinct systems for handling international conflict: a) a UN regional security system, concentrating on Europe, Africa and the Middle East, where the UN is highly involved; b) the inter-American system, with few and minor conflicts, with the USA as the paramount actor, and c) the Asian ‘non-system’, where each state is left on its own.

All in all, the third edition of this well established textbook serves its stated main purpose, that is to be ‘the most lucid and engaging book available’ on the subject. The author does not fail to utilize, once again, mainly the findings of the prestigious Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which collects information on a large number of aspects of armed violence (and of which he is the Program Director), and that, in conjunction with the reference to a plethora of case studies, adds to the value of the text. In terms of new material for this edition, one should highlight the updated coverage of the ‘war on terror’ throughout the book, the reference to recent and on-going conflicts and negotiations (including aspects of the ‘Arab Spring’), and, finally, the exploration of the actions of the Obama administration.

The presentation is highly efficient, as well, with the presence of explanatory figures and ‘further reading’ boxes for every chapter, making ‘Understanding Conflict Resolution’ the ideal textbook for the subject. However, I believe that Wallensteen’s book would greatly benefit from the addition of a few pages at the end, as it seems to lack a proper conclusion that would bring together all the notions and aspects of conflict resolution examined and would point to what conflict resolution would consist of in the future; the very last section of the book refers to a ‘new world order’, with elements of a Pax Americana, but takes up only two pages. In conclusion, ‘Understanding Conflict Resolution’ remains useful to a large audience of students, lecturers and researchers of peace and conflict resolution in international relations, history, global politics and political science.
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Mélanie Torrent

*Diplomacy and Nation-building in Africa: Franco-British Relations and Cameroon at the End of Empire*


The decolonization and reunification of British Cameroons and French Cameroun, 1960-1961, and the impact of Anglo-French interests in the process make for fascinating reading. In this 409-page *Diplomacy and Nation-Building in Africa: Franco-British Relations and Cameroon at the End of Empire* (2012), Mélanie Torrent discusses this process within the context of cold war politics, the importance of safeguarding Anglo-French relations while ignoring the long-term interests of ex-French Cameroun and ex-British Cameroons. In this five-chapter book with an introduction, conclusion, maps, tables, index and a very rich bibliography, Torrent has made excellent use of some hitherto unavailable official correspondences between London and Paris, between British Foreign and Colonial Office officials as well as between French Foreign and Colonial Office officials.

The Introduction briefly examines the thrust of Anglo-French relations and Anglo-French relations with Cameroon. It highlights the importance of the “pledge” made by Ahmadou Ahidjo and John Ngu Foncha in *Southern Cameroons Plebiscite 1961: The Two Alternatives* in the promotion of Cameroon’s bilingualism. Chapter One discusses Franco–British negotiations that led to the independence and reunification of British and French Cameroons while Chapter Two, treats Cameroon’s non-participation in the Commonwealth. Chapters Three and Four examine British and French post-independent African policies: the British hands-off policy in the internal management of the affairs of ex-British colonies while protecting and promoting British global interests; Ahidjo’s pragmatic handling of Africa’s, and Cameroon’s, criticism and condemnation of the British sluggish decolonization process in British African colonies after 1961; Ahidjo’s gradual acceptance of the concept of Francophonie and the dismantling of the federal system in favour of a unitary system (state). The changes in Franco-Cameroon relations and the low rating of Cameroon “in FCO priorities” (p. 225) is handled in Chapter Five as it discusses multilateralism in Cameroon’s policy.

There are, however, some minor lapses which could be addressed in a subsequent revised edition. For instance, the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) did not exist in 1951 as implied on p. 17 rather it was the KUNC—a pressure group led by Dibonge; the KNC was created in 1953. Secondly, the UPC meeting in 1951 was in Kumba in Chief Abel Mukete’s residence. The UPC two-man delegation comprised Abel Kingue and Ernest Ouandie and met with N.N. Mbiie and R. J. K. Dibongue not with Dr. E.M.L. Endeley as alluded to on p. 17. A typographical error must have led to Paul Kale being referred to as Peter Kale (p. 46). Finally, in 1960, the KPP, which later merged with the KNC to form the CPNC, had four seats in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly (p. 46). These minor lapses do not affect the tremendous wealth of the author’s work.

A well-researched and up-to-date publication on the decolonization of Cameroon, the author has successfully achieved her goal. This is the premier history of the territory’s quest for independence viewed from the role played by Anglo-French diplomacy while safeguarding Anglo-French global interests. As a historian, this valuable document is a most appreciated...
book and should be of immense relief to scholars and students of international politics as well as all those interested in the role of European powers in the decolonization drama in Africa. It provides a vivid insight into the thinking and working of the minds of the ex-colonial powers.

Victor Julius Ngoh

University of Buea, Cameroon
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Lam Peng Er’s book is a very straightforward, remarkably argued publication on Japan’s emerging and strategic political role in Asia and the world. The author argues that in contrast to previous fundamental pillars of Tokyo’s foreign policy - either as a non-interventionist state and or an aggressive militaristic imperial regime - Tokyo pushes an active peacebuilding role in international affairs. In limiting peacebuilding’s definition, the author focuses on diplomatic and humanitarian efforts by Japan to end ethnic and class conflict, as well as to pursue post-conflict and peace building activities, in five different cases.

Two theoretical points were made. First, the author engages in literature on Tokyo’s foreign policy, as a gradual movement away from previously established doctrines. As previous authors have coined, Tokyo’s post-war grand strategy is the Yoshida doctrine, otherwise known as absolute pacifism. The doctrine is characterised by Japan’s societal consensus and constitutional limitations, slowly maneuvering towards international prestige by focusing on non-controversial issues. The Yoshida doctrine eventually became the Fukuda doctrine during the Cold War Period, which posited that Tokyo’s path towards preeminence is through sincere engagement with Southeast Asian countries by acting as a bridge for reconciliation between the democratic and communist blocs in Southeast Asia.

Second, the author argues that what makes this approach so special is its difference to the United States, the European Union, and the United Nation’s peace keeping paradigms - particularly, the absolute refusal to send in troops and engage in military operations. Due to its inability and unwillingness to send troops to engage in combat, even in extreme circumstances, Tokyo was able to maintain its neutrality in the eyes of the conflicting parties. Tokyo, then, was able to talk to, and negotiate with, conflicting parties in intra-state conflicts due to its credibility in non-engagement. This capacity to access the most important actors in conflicts was a problem for most major powers, whose reputations were tarnished by their willingness and option to engage in military activities. These can be seen in the case of the United States in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the EU in the Balkans; and the UN in Africa show the existing military component of peace building operations.

However, several points of contention are open for review. I divide these comments into two sections—those that deal with the internal consistency and a critique in relation to the book’s argument in Japan’s evolving political strategy in Asia. Some intra-state conflicts are not represented accurately. For example, the author categorises Mindanao as an ethnic conflict because of disputes amongst different ethnicities. Although this definition fits in the ethnic conflict literature, this categorisation of Mindanao is still debatable and does not sit well with some specific historical and cultural works in the area. Mindanao’s rebellion, even though it could be seen as ethnic conflict from the rivalries of many ethnicities in the area, which represent different armed groups, cannot not be easily categorised identical to ethnic issues in Europe or in other countries. The case of Mindanao is very class-based as well, as the island has been and continues to be the poorest region in the Philippines since the country’s
independence.\textsuperscript{1} As such, this intractable ethnic conflict has been a host to many overlapping alliances among the Christians and Muslims of the region, fighting for plunder, wealth, and control, instead of an ideological and ethnic rift found in fixed categories of ethnicity, religion, or language. Mainstream political parties and armed rebellion have ethnic dimensions, but their allegiances and pacts continue to be very flexible.

Second, although the author believes that Japan has contributed to peacebuilding processes in many countries, there are many occasions that Japan played negative roles. Tokyo’s insistence on selective economic assistance to finance neoliberal policies and its historical issues continue to dampen efforts to build stronger regional ties with East and Southeast Asian neighbors. The role of the Asian Development Bank, along with JICA, in reinforcing, pushing, and institutionalising corporate-led growth in different parts of the world, has, as some civil society actors argue, furthered class rift and poverty. In historical issues, the inconsistency of Tokyo’s position in accepting alternative historiographies of comfort camps and unblemished brutality has deepened the rift with some Southeast Asian countries. The author could have been more convincing if he engaged these issues in his book, and reconciled his argument with alternative perceptions. Although this does nothing to break the shield of his idea, as Tokyo’s fundamentality in peace building could exist independent of the perception of these actors, the comments could put doubt on the stability of Tokyo’s role. With China’s ineluctable rise, its nearest and most critical neighbors to foreign policy are its East and Southeast Asian counterparts.

Overall, this is a very well argued and structured book, particularly the coherence of the theoretical point and empirical examples, which makes it a must read for anyone working on Japanese foreign policy. Most especially with the growing Chinese territorial interests, this is a very timely book on a very important actor in Southeast and East Asia.

\textbf{Alvin Almendrala Camba}

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\textsuperscript{1} While Mindanao could be labeled as an ethnic conflict, there is no consensus on what its extent and form. The category is still up for debate. See also Jorge Tigno ‘Migration and Violent Conflict in Mindanao, \textit{Population Review}, 45, (1): 2006 and Fay-Cooper Cole, ‘The Wild Tribes of Davao District, Mindanao,’ \textit{Fieldiana, Anthropology}, 12, (2):2010
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The oldest stunt in every politician’s playbook when one encounters a crisis is to create a commission. The conventional view of commissions is well captured in a joke Tama shares (p.4). The joke by Lloyd Cutler, who was advisor to Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton goes something like this:

“A retiring president leaves his successor three envelopes to be opened in sequence, to learn what to do each time he faces a serious crisis. The first envelope says, ‘Blame your predecessor.’ The second says, ‘Appoint a commission.’ The third says, ‘Prepare three envelopes.’”

The joke succinctly captures the widespread perception of commissions; that they are created for purposes other than creating results and most do not produce results. It is this conventional view of conventions that Tama sets out to challenge and manages to unsettle with a great deal of success.¹

The book originates out of Tama’s doctoral thesis at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. This in itself holds several valuable lessons for readers and students of national security which is an issue I will deal with a little later in the review.

Firstly, the book is divided into three parts. The first part outlines the research questions and delineates the existing body of knowledge and the conventional view of commissions. This is followed by outlining the central argument and the method of testing the argument. The next section titled ‘Patterns of Commission Influence’ has two chapters wherein Tama outlines a Theory of Commission Influence and the Impact that National Security Commissions. This section tries to identify the focal points and tries to identify under what circumstances commissions are able to exert the maximum influence. This is followed by the third part titled ‘Commissions and Counterterrorism Policy’ which comprises of detailed case-studies of several blue-ribbon, executive commissions beginning with the Long Commission to the 9/11 Commission and Intelligence Reform.

Tama makes use of an interesting yet effective combination of quantitative and case-study approach to studying an issue at hand. This is a useful template for carrying out research for students of the area. Tama analyses (Chapter 3) an original data set (which is a modification of the data shared by Prof. Zergard) of fifty-one national security commissions between the beginning of the Reagan administration and the end of 2006. This data set includes information on numerous variables that contribute to commission outcomes as well as two original measures of commission impact. Analysing the impact that these commissions have had Tama conducts a quantitative analysis focussed on the conditions under which the commissions have been created, their type, scope and internal characteristics. The section and the book at large is benefited as a result of the 209 odd interviews Tama has conducted with individuals who have served in executive or congressional commissions in some capacity

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The interviews and the insights they have provided to the author is very apparent by the depth and dexterity with which Tama handles the subject at large.

A very important reason why the book should be read by students of national security is due to the fine template it provides for developing an excellent research design. One of the great strengths of the book is that the author takes on the significant methodological challenges head on and addresses them early in the book and does so very clearly and cogently. One of the first challenges was defining a commission. Tama defines a commission as “a temporary panel of two or more people – including at least one private citizen – created by an act of Congress or executive branch directive, which has only advisory powers and which is mandated to produce a report within four years” (p. 5).

To assess the effectiveness of commissions, Tama divides commissions into agenda commissions and crisis commissions. He describes the former as those which are established either by the Congress or the President with an aim to shift the status quo. Crisis commissions on the other hand are set up to divert political pressure during crises like that of a situation marked by disaster or government scandal. He however, goes on to concede that the changes are less likely to occur as a result of agenda commissions. Interestingly, though Tama accedes that crisis commissions are formed to divert political pressure, he also states that because of the ensuing disaster, a window of opportunity opens up briefly, which allows such commissions to often play a role in changing the existing policy.

Further, Tama also measures the impact that commissions creates by taking into account as to whether they have been set up by the Executive or by the Congress. Tama states that executive commissions have a greater impact because they can be appointed relatively faster. Additionally, executive commissions are likely to be less politically polarized and thus can reach consensus decisions much easier. They can therefore complete their work before the window of opportunity created by the crisis closes. Tama also states that the success of a commission is also influenced by its mandate. A narrow mandate allows the commission to carry out its work more quickly. The focus of the commission’s attention around a narrow set of issues results in a situation which is conducive for consensus among the members of the commission on the larger issues.

Tama also elucidates three characteristics which greatly contribute to the ability of commissions to get their recommendations adopted. First is the political credibility of the members of the commission. Related to this is the second characteristic which is the importance of unanimity and the absence of dissent in formulating its policy recommendations. Both these raises the commission’s public acceptability and as a result its success.

Another factor that contributes to a commission’s success is its willingness and ability to engage in advocacy and follow-up activities after its recommendations are released. This is brought to the forefront by the difference in the approaches of the Aspin-Brown Commission and the Kean (9/11) Commission. The 9/11 Commission hogged the limelight both during and following the submission of the report. On the other hand, the Aspin-Brown Commission members did not push the recommendations made in their report once it had been submitted (p. 39). However, the commission did have considerable influence in the internal workings of intelligence agencies.² It is interesting to note that despite this, the Aspin-Brown

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Commission scores only 2.78 as compared to say Paul Bremer’s Commission on Terrorism which scores 3.08. This could be because of the fact that Tama assigns these points on the basis of the interviews he has conducted. The responses provided by the interviewers therefore could skew the points assigned to measure the commission’s influence. The measuring of commission influence is one area where more work needs to be done and where others could take Tama’s work forward.

Another way in which Tama’s work could be developed further is to study the manner in which the recommendations made by the commissions get implemented in the real world. The implementation of the recommendation by the 9/11 Commission for the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) at the apex of the US Intelligence Community (IC) is a case in point. Though the idea behind creating the DNI was to bring more cohesion and coordination amongst the IC, opposition to the DNI resulted in the creation of a institution without much budgetary and personnel powers. Without these powers, the DNI was severely challenged to carry out the mandate for which it was established. Therefore, measuring the follow-through in terms of the actual implementation of the commissions’ recommendations becomes equally important.

Given that Tama’s work solely looks at US national security commissions and terrorism, the real success of Tama’s work would be if the framework he provides is used to carry out analyses of national security reforms in other countries. This would be of immense value to the existing knowledge base in the area.

Jordan Tama has produced an exceptional work which should be read by all those interested in national security policy and reform. The underlying thread of the book - crises beget opportunities for change - is an interesting one which challenges many pre-conceived notions. The take away from the book is that there is a silver lining in every crisis, which should be made use of by the decision-makers to push for reform.

Arun Vishwanathan
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India suffers dreadfully from terrorism. It is host to an enormous number of separate organisations: indigenous, foreign state-sponsored and global terrorist groups are all active. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) are the country’s two most prominent counterterrorist agencies, and thus receive most criticism when atrocities are committed. Being such an extremely complex country, with multi-layered political and social forces at work in all spheres of life, any binary evaluations of India’s security apparatus are bound to be short-sighted and simplistic.

Mahadevan is an ideal candidate to write this extremely detailed and informative contribution to the security studies field. A native Indian, educated at King’s College London, and a senior researcher at Zurich’s Center for Security Studies, he combines extremely rigorous conceptual scholarship with an in-depth empirical knowledge of India’s security apparatus and political environment. Such a work is well overdue and fills a gap in the literature addressing South Asia’s insecurity, and is strengthened by the author’s analysis of sensitive data and materials that a foreign researcher would in a weaker position to examine. In the wake of India’s worst terrorist attack, Mumbai 2008, this is a highly relevant work, as the conclusions he draws have significant implications for security in neighbouring states, and globally. He employs meticulous and original analyses of three Indian counterterrorism operations responding to: Kashmiri separatism, Sikh separatism (Khalistan) and pan-Islamist organisations. However, in-depth knowledge of India or its conflicts is not necessary to benefit from this comprehensive book and it is accessible for the general reader.

The book helpfully starts with a timeline of significant events and explanations of key terms, and in several respects, the author has endeavoured to make his work comprehensible and readable for a non-specialist, dense though it is. His use of quantitative data is excellent but he wisely employs it to support his qualitative analysis rather than making it the focus. Security agencies are by nature opaque and disclosure of intelligence can endanger operations and assist terrorists, rendering data collection for such a work reliant on open sources. The scope and insights of this work are a testament to his phenomenal labour and knowledge transfer efforts, commendably bringing Western studies of intelligence and security to the Indian context.

Contemporary studies of terrorism have mostly focussed on its genesis, mobilisation of terrorists, their ideologies and structural causes. The inverse of this, the ‘response side’ has not been adequately analysed, including the impacts of counterterrorism strategies, government policies and security forces’ strengths and weaknesses. Mahadevan unpacks the multiplicity of factors hindering India’s counterterrorism efforts, of which decision making apparatus within government emerges as one of the key variables. Whereas standard assessments of security failures have tended to emphasise blaming individuals or agencies, Mahadevan here suggests they are the result of inadequately defined mandates and lack of clarity over what is best counterterrorist practice: repeated attrition of terrorist groups or threat-reactive responses. He identifies four major shortcomings affecting on Indian counterterrorist efforts: political consistency, political consensus, operational capacity and operational coordination.
India’s counterterrorism experiences suggest that many ‘intelligence failures’ would be more accurately called ‘action failures’, whereby the political decision makers misread the strategic environment and undertake counterproductive activities. Mahadevan’s insight is that intelligence ‘consumers’ (security forces and policy makers) only use what intelligence agencies supply to them. An important distinction is drawn between ‘strategic’ intelligence (long term threat assessments for policy makers) and ‘tactical’ (short term information for security forces’ consumption). The consumers assume that intelligence agencies will make use of tactical intelligence instead of accepting it is the responsibility of security forces. The author concludes that this dissonance means that a terrorist threat warning does not automatically lead to preventative actions being taken, and is thus the major weakness limiting India’s counterterrorism activities.

What emerges in the book is a systematic exoneration of India’s security agencies: “at no point did intelligence agencies fail in predicting major shifts in terrorist strategy” (p.182), but that they are weaker at developing actionable warnings. STRATFOR, the American private security company, declared India’s Intelligence Bureau to be one of the world’s top five intelligence agencies. The weakest point however is the policy makers’ lack of comprehensive response to strategic assessments. Mahadevan identifies the reason for this to be the excessive expectations placed on intelligence agencies, as they have responsibility for both tactical and strategic analyses. They have finite resources, and if they prioritise counterterrorist operations and tactical intelligence as demanded by policy makers, they cannot simultaneously provide in-depth strategic insights. The author suggests that investing intelligence agencies with arrest powers would greatly strengthen their capacity to autonomously employ both strategic and tactical intelligence, without relying on decision makers, which adds an additional level of organisational complexity and takes more time. This conclusion can be summarised into the vast differences between intelligence collection failures, and failures to act effectively on receiving this intelligence. Mahadevan’s conclusion is that “action taken on strategic intelligence is more important than the quality of the intelligence itself” (p.13).

The analysis would have benefitted from including the security dimensions and state responses to the Naxalite insurgency, which the Prime Minister labelled India’s “biggest internal security threat”. The Naxalites are listed as a terrorist organisation in India and thus their inclusion in this analysis would have made the book more comprehensive. Another minor criticism is slight repetition of examples from the three case studies, meaning the book is not always as succinct as it could be.

This book is highly recommended to anyone interested in counterterrorism and security studies. An interested reader will not find a more comprehensive investigation; this work is a major contribution to the field and breaks new ground in the analysis of organisational and security failures. It highlights vital considerations for security policy, and most importantly, that increased funding and capabilities for intelligence agencies will not necessarily lead to improved counterterrorism efforts. One point that comes across very convincingly, in an objective and dispassionate way, is the extent that Pakistan, through its ISI (Inter Services Intelligence), is responsible for attacks on Indian civilians, and the restraint that New Delhi demonstrates in its diplomatic communications with Islamabad.

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