FILM REVIEW
The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey
By Esra Çolak
A Multinational, Global Think-tank
For

“ADVANCING DIVERSITY”

CESRAN International ranked world’s #143 think tank by the University of Pennsylvania Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program.
Contents

008 - 010........ French Intervention In Mali: Implications And Consequences
By Mehmet Özkan

012 - 017........ Turkey and Peacebuilding in Africa: leadership, youth and conflict transformation
By Prof. Dr. Alpaslan Özerdem

020 - 023........ The Dynamics And The Roots of The France’s Security Policy Towards Africa
By Dr. Abdurrahim Sıradag

024 - 032........ Entrepreneurship Insecurity, Smuggling and Cross-border Dynamics in Central Africa
By Hans De Marie Heungoup
and Isidore Collins Ngueuleu Djeuga

034 - 043........ Are Local Government Authorities Sleeping Over Chinese Involvement In Small Scale Mining In Ghana?
By Hamza Bukari Zakaria

046 - 050........ Why did Algeria not know its own Arab Spring?
The Islamic hypothesis
By Mehdi Lazar
and Sidi-Mohammed Nehad

FILM REVIEW

054 - 056........ The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey
By Esra Çolak
Editor-in-Chief:
Ozgur TUFECI | Cesran International, UK

Executive Editor:
Husrev TABAK | Cesran International, UK

Managing Editors:
Birgit BRAUER, Dr. | Cesran International, UK
Annett RICHTER | Cesran International, UK

Book Review Editor:
Kadri Kaan RENDA, Dr. | Cesran International, UK

Associate Editors:
Can ERBIL, Assoc. Prof. | Boston College, USA
Bayram GUNGOR, Prof. | Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey
Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Assist. Prof. | Florida International University, USA

Assistant Editor:
Sasa CVRLJAK | Cesran International, UK

Editorial Board:
- Sener AKTURK, Dr. Harvard University, USA
- William BAIN, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK
- Alexander BELLAMY, Prof. Uni. of Queensland, Australia
- Richard BELLAMY, Prof. University College London, UK
- Andreas BIELER, Prof. University of Nottingham, UK
- Pınar BILGIN, Assoc. Prof. Bilkent University, Turkey
- Ken BOOTH, Prof. Aberystwyth University, UK
- Stephen CHAN, Prof. SOAS, University of London, UK
- Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof. MIT, USA
- John M. DUNN, Prof. University of Cambridge, UK
- Kevin DUNN, Prof. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA
- Mine EDER, Prof. Bogazici University, Turkey
- Ertan EFEGIL, Assoc. Prof. Sakarya University, Turkey
- Ayla GOL, Dr. Aberystwyth University, UK
- Stefano GUZZINI, Prof. Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
- Elif I. HAFALIR, Assist. Prof. Carnegie Mellon University, USA
- David HELD, Prof. London School of Economics, LSE, UK
- Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK
- Naim KAPUCU, Assoc. Prof. University of Central Florida, USA
- Fahri KARAKAYA, Prof. Uni. of Massachusetts Dartmouth, USA
- Abdulhamit KIRMIZI, Dr. SOAS, University of London, UK
- Cécile LABORDE, Prof. University College London, UK
- Ziya ONIS, Prof. Koc University, Turkey
- Alp OZERDEM, Prof. Coventry University, Turkey
- Oliver RICHMOND, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK
- Ian TAYLOR, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK
- Murat TUMAY, Dr. Selcuk University, Turkey
- Talat ULUSSEVER, Assist. Prof. King Fahd Uni., S. Arabia
- Ali WATSON, Prof. University of St Andrews, UK
- Stefan WOLFF, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK

International Advisory Board:
- Yasemin AKBABA, Assist. Prof. Gettysburg College, USA
- Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. Kadir Has University, Turkey
- Ian BACHE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK
- Mark BASSIN, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK
- Mehmet DEMIRBAG, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK
- Stephen Van EVERA, Prof. MIT, USA
- John GLASSFORD, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA
- Bulent GOKAY, Prof. Keele University, UK
- Burak GURBUZ, Assoc. Prof. Galatasaray University, Turkey
- Tony HERON, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK
- John M. HOBSON, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK
- Jamal HUSEIN, Assist. Prof. Angelo State University, USA
- Murat S. KARA, Assoc. Prof. Angelo State University, USA
- Michael KENNY, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK
- Gamze G. KONA, Dr. Foreign Policy Analyst, Turkey
- Scott LUCAS, Prof. University of Birmingham, UK
- Christoph MEYER, Dr. King’s College London, UK
- Kalypso NICOLAILDIS, Prof. University of Oxford, UK
- Bill PARK, Mr. King’s College London, UK
- Jenik RADON, Prof. Columbia University, USA
- Ibrahim SIRKECI, Prof. Regent’s College London, UK
- Claire THOMAS, Dr. University of Sheffield, UK
- Brian WHITE, Prof. University of Sheffield, UK
- M. Hakan YAVUZ, Assoc. Prof. University of Utah, USA
- Birol YESILADA, Prof. Portland State University, USA
“ADVANCING DIVERSITY”

www.cesran.org

info@cesran.org
After pressure on the Provisional Government of Mali and the United Nations for a military intervention, France has started a military operation called Operation Serval in the north of Mali in January 2013. Operation Serval is much more serving in the interest of France than many pronounced interest of international community. This operation has huge risks for variety of reasons in the region and beyond. The information and news about the operation is not only quite common but also mostly manipulated through the French media outlets. Especially, the lack of information about the human tragedy is striking as it carries the risk of damaging the image of operation.

Looking at roughly to the issue, there are three international actors in this conflict. First one is France and its supporters in the European countries. Second key actor is African countries. Although the issue seems to be related to the West Africa, the conflict in Mali has repercussion for the whole Africa both for its results and the way the resolution of conflict is dealt with. Third actor is the Islamic world in general as the both parties in the conflict are Muslims.

Since the revolution in Libya, military intervention led by individual states is becoming more frequent in international politics. The latest one is the case of Mali. Although many people debated the French intervention in Mali from economic, political and terrorism threat perspective, the biggest loser in this case has been both the west and Africa.
Since the early 2000s, there has been huge African ownership and agency to solve the problems of Africa by Africans. The motto of ‘African solutions for African problems’ have been talked in almost every meeting. This created a moment of golden diplomacy in Africa, where African leaders assumed the leadership and tried hard to solve problems in the continent. They re-structured the Organization of African Unity in a new form and re-named it as African Union in 2002. They articulated an economic strategy for the development of the continent, NEPAD, and they succeeded to get the support of international community. Africa has occupied and important agenda at G-8, G-20 and other international forums.

Conflict resolution measures of the Africans were much more impressive. The African Union organized mediations in Ivory Coast, Burundi, Congo, Somalia and many other conflict areas; and in support of this, the African Union sent peacekeeping missions to various places. Looked from now, one cannot really argue that all the initiatives of Africans were successful, but the point is that they were eager and willing to take the continental ownership and took measures to...
create a conflict-free continent. Although most of the time, they have financial and structural difficulties to support their good intentions. French military intervention in Mali should be seen as an indication of the end of this golden period in African agency and ownership in the continent. The fact that regional organization ECOWAS and UN was supportive of intervention does not change this. Africans have failed to take the initiative to solve their own crisis. Even it would have been easier for Africans this time because the case in Mali has an international dimension due to security threat. This would even created a momentum to get both financial and training support of the international community. Africa is not the only loser in this case in the long run. The international community or the west is also a loser. International community neither has resources nor willingness to involve in every problem in Africa. Having an adequate African agency/leadership in the continent and supporting it is always the best solution for both side. Apparently, this opportunity has lost with the case of Mali intervention. The conflict in Mali is also related to the overall Muslim world, not only to Africa. The West (especially France) evaluates the situation from its own perspective and considers this as the issue security and the national interest, therefore, Paris continues to insist on the military intervention as the only solution. It is clear that the military intervention will result the loss of many lives and a deepening refugee crisis. This crisis in Mali should be taken up as serious matter and investigated by the institutions and organizations in the Islamic world. Especially the religious and ethnic dimensions of the crisis require a special attention and the International Cooperation Organization should send observes to see what is happening on the ground and report it. As we proceed with the conflict and intervention, there is an urgency to call all armed parties for calmness and dialogue. Refugee crisis is deepening and moving from Mauritania, Niger, and Burkina Faso to the south of Mali. In these areas, state support is not sufficient and there is a huge role for the NGOs. Health and educational activities are also urgently needed in these areas. However, the biggest question now is about how to build a momentum for an Africa-driven agenda on the continent in coming years.

NOTE:
* Mehmet Ozkan is a Researcher at SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research.
CESRAN is a think-tank specialising on international relations in general, and global peace, conflict and development related issues and challenges.

The main business objective/function is that we provide expertise at an international level to a wide range of policy making actors such as national governments and international organisations. CESRAN with its provisions of academic and semi-academic publications, journals and a fully-functioning website has already become a focal point of expertise on strategic research and analysis with regards to global security and peace. The Centre is particularly unique in being able to bring together wide variety of expertise from different countries and academic disciplines.

The main activities that CESRAN undertakes are providing consultancy services and advice to public and private enterprises, organising international conferences and publishing academic material.

Some of CESRAN’s current publications are (www.cesran.org):

- **Journal of Global Analysis** (biannual, peer reviewed)
- **Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security** (biannual, peer reviewed)
- **Journal of Eurasian Politics & Society** (biannual, peer reviewed)
- **Political Reflection Magazine** (quarterly news-magazine)
- **CESRAN Papers**
- **Turkey Focus Policy Brief**
- **CESRAN Policy Brief**
- **China Focus Network**
Turkey’s position bridging Europe, the Middle East and Asia, and its growing economic and political power, make it an increasingly important regional and international actor in terms of security, leadership and governance. Within this context, a particular trend over the last decade has been the increasing leadership role of Turkey in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in such African contexts as Somalia and Libya. Compared to a number of other actors such as Western powers, the US and China, Turkey is relatively new in African politics and trade circles. However, it has already expanded its area of influence in the continent by linking its soft power tools of transportation links, trade and education closely with its foreign policy.

In its most generalized and simplified terms, the process might proceed as follows: once an African country is identified as a strategic foreign policy priority and the Turkish Foreign Ministry establishes its diplomatic presence there, it is very likely that Turkish Airlines would soon launch a flight destination in that country. This would be followed by increasing economic links formed by a wide range of globally active Turkish companies. Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministry would probably sign an agreement to ease the existing visa regime between Turkey and that country to increase the level of interaction in the realms of commerce, academia and culture. A number of Turkish schools from the kindergarten to high school levels in the country concerned would also be likely to play an active role in consolidating...
such diplomatic and trade relations. These private schools are highly sought after by local communities in their particular contexts, as they provide top level education. Finally, the Turkish government may provide scholarship opportunities to graduates of these schools in order to take a university degree in Turkey.

In a wide range of African countries, from Senegal and Niger to Gabon and Cameroon, such a foreign policy strategy has proved to be successful, with fast growing partnerships in the economic and political spheres. Moreover, in war-torn countries like Somalia, Turkey has become one of the most active actors in the humanitarian and peacebuilding contexts. In August 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accompanied with his family, a number of ministers and a large group of Turkish business people and celebrities travelled to Somalia to raise awareness to the ongoing conflict and famine in the country. Prime Minister Erdoğan was the first non-African leader visiting Somalia over the last two decades. There have been a number of Somalia peace talk initiatives organized by Turkey acting as an independent third party respected by almost all conflicting sides in Somalia. Turkish Airlines provides the only international gateway for Mogadishu, while Turkish aid organizations and the Turkish bilateral development agency TIKA are highly active in a wide range of infrastructure, welfare and service sector programmes in the country. Also, a substantial number of university students from Somalia have already been provided with scholarships to study in Turkey.

In other words, Turkey as a rising power is no longer a shy actor of international relations and is steadily showing its presence in most parts of Africa. In keeping with the growing Turkish proclivity for developing its relations with African countries in commerce, trade, education and culture, there are likely to be other similar cases to Somalia where Turkey would again provide its diplomatic, financial and humanitarian assistance to those African countries torn apart by armed conflict. However, if this is a likely scenario for Turkey in Africa, what should be the main cornerstones of its approach to peacebuilding in the continent so that it could avoid mistakes made by other external actors? Also, considering that Turkey claims its increasing interest and influence in Africa is nothing to do with the exploitation of the rich natural resources of the continent as might be the case for other external actors, and on the contrary, is all about to work with African...
countries as equal partners, how could and should its approach differ, and how can it develop its own trademark approach in assisting those countries in the enormous challenge of building peace? We recommend the strategy of ‘conflict transformation’ with a specific emphasis on the role of ‘youth’ in peacebuilding.

**TRANSFORMING CONFLICT AND BUILDING FUTURE PEACE WITH YOUTH**

The complex and multifaceted nature of human insecurity is intrinsically linked to shortcomings in governance and poor leadership in a world characterised by globalised conflict and general insecurity. In other words, war and conflict arise from an interconnected set of causal factors, but foremost amongst them are weak or repressive governments and lack of effective political leadership. The many conflicts occurring and recurring in Africa and recent events across the Arab world have demonstrated this in visceral terms.

These regions are critical for global security, particularly because of their rich natural resources. They are also some of the most troubled parts of the world because of their protracted political crises and governance challenges, and the influence of international vested interests. These challenges to longstanding regimes have created an environment of uncertainty for the future of their populations and international relations. A number of countries in the context of the so called ‘Arab Spring’ such as Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and currently Syria have been experiencing violent clashes as a result of popular uprisings.

The lack of means and methods of peaceful conflict transformation in most of these countries has resulted in a high number of deaths and widespread destruction. In other words, such experiences show that peacebuilding, conflict transformation and non-violence are increasingly important as political tools for societies affected by violent conflict and revolutions, both to reduce the likelihood of violence and prevent return to open hostilities. For post-conflict transformation efforts and peacebuilding to be implemented successfully, more training and dissemination on the appropriate political tools are required. Moreover, leadership plays a vital role in effecting conflict transformation, but is frequently examined merely at the ‘macro’ level of state government and international organisations.

Following Lederach, we propose a more comprehensive analysis of leadership that is not limited to events, processes and personalities at the macro level. There is a need to explore features, challenges and opportunities for leadership at several levels, combining macro (governmental institutions, political leadership) with ‘meso’ (NGOs, religious groups, academics) and ‘micro’ (civil society organisations, youth groups, women’s organisations).

The field of conflict transformation and peacebuilding would benefit greatly from a deeper understanding of interactions between different levels of leadership, with particular reference to the different roles, mechanisms and tools that can be identified at each level. Analysis from multiple levels provides a broader explanation of conflict dynamics and helps to fit ‘localised’ conflict transformation methods into wider structures at national or regional levels.
Adopting this broader approach to the role of leadership in peacebuilding helps to identify critical processes and individuals who are strategically placed within structures that connect the macro, meso and micro levels. This connection of bottom-up and top-down leadership structures more accurately reflects dynamics and relationships at play in conflict transformation efforts.

Another critical issue to be considered in the context of conflict transformation in Africa is the challenge of youth bulges. Both Middle East and North African contexts and Sub-Saharan African contexts have a young population, and in the recent political uprising in the Middle East and North Africa the youth has played a prominent role. From an academic perspective youth as a conceptual category are ‘othered’ in the discourse on peace and conflict; they are created as potentially dangerous ‘subjects’ and policy approaches often regard them as ‘a problem.’ Much writing on youth and conflict tends to be overly negative, focusing on the dangers posed by disaffected youth as evident in negative connotations of the “youth bulge” or ‘at risk youth’. The presence of large youth cohorts is also seen as making a country susceptible to political violence and crime. Such a pejorative image is further compounded by an equally thin focus on youth’s positive role in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in communities of return and resettlement.

In peacebuilding responses by the majority of actors in Africa, there is a lack of focus on the role of youth in both conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, suggesting a serious deficiency in our understanding of the processes whereby societies emerge from violent conflict.
This, in turn, raises questions about our understanding of the sustainability of peacebuilding, particularly with regards to post-accord violence prevention and societal reconciliation and reconstruction. It represents an important knowledge gap which calls us to look more carefully at the possibilities of harnessing the energies of youth for peacebuilding. This is a critical niche area that could form a significant aspect of Turkish policy for peacebuilding in Africa. Turkey’s existing joined-up foreign policy with the components of laying sound foundations for trade, education and culture means that there could be many meaningful opportunities for working with youth in peacebuilding responses. Turkey should support initiatives that would enable youth to become peacebuilders within their own immediate communities. This would require capacity building programmes with an emphasis on not only education and training, but also on creating access to means for securing livelihoods and employment.

In such environments of conflict transformation, it is clear that key factors such as youth bulges, an increasingly educated middle class, and greater access to the media and new means of communication have played a significant role. However, it is critical to understand how these factors would have a long-lasting impact on wider political transformation mechanisms at societal and institutional levels and incorporate them in the design of peacebuilding strategies. To investigate how different conflict transformation strategies would be applied in different circumstances in relation to culture, socio-economic development and political freedom is a significant starting point for the development of comprehensive and in-depth analysis. This is particularly important considering that the current knowledge on conflicts in Africa is often derived from conflict management and resolution perspectives based on a realist approach to conflict. Such a perspective marginalizes the significant role of communities in social, political and conflict transformations, and their prospective contributions in identifying solutions to contemporary human security challenges in the region. This has led to a disconnection between governing elites and people, and equally led to a biased approach by the West, which solely
communicates with ruling elites to the exclusion of ordinary people’s concerns, needs and aspirations. This lack of popular engagement on the part of existing external actors provides Turkey with an opportunity to conceptualise its peacebuilding strategy for Africa in a way that it would act as a catalyst to provide linkages between different levels of leadership and ordinary people.

To address such a critical shortcoming in our understanding of the conflict and political violence in Africa, it is imperative that there should be a community-centred perspective which questions the use of western-centric and technocratic conflict resolution methods. We believe that there is a wealth of experience in conflict transformation in the day-to-day lives of many people in Africa, and therefore that it is essential to give a voice and recognition to how these local mechanisms work. Moreover, there is a need to question why communities often find themselves amid violence that is the result of external interference. It is also important that the approach to local means of conflict transformation is not based on an over-simplification of a binary type relationship in terms of traditional versus western-centric.

**Conclusion**

Turkey is a new actor in the spheres of international humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, and this is probably its main advantage, as it could learn lessons from other actors’ experiences in similar contexts to draw up its own strategy. Its cohesive response in Somalia has already placed Turkey in a unique position in responding to a complex set of peace and development related challenges. However, this could only be sustained and transformed as part of a long-term strategy for peacebuilding challenges in Africa and elsewhere in the world. It is time for that!

Turkey needs to come up with its own strategy that would listen to the voice of war-torn societies and enable them to build their own peace. Turkey’s strategy should be a viable alternative to what western-centric conflict responses fail to achieve. Repeating the Western models of conflict resolution and management would have nothing new to contribute to the practice of peacebuilding.

Youth needs to be the dynamo of this process and a peacebuilding strategy that would work with youth in their own communities and aim for transforming conflicts rather than managing or resolving them should be the way forward. Until now youth has always been considered as a risk for peace, ignoring the fact that they are often the most resourceful group of stakeholders in most war-torn societies. If Turkey’s peacebuilding strategy could work with youth effectively by merging a wide range of needs, expectations and aspirations in employment, livelihoods, education, political participation and social status, we would start to see a distinctively different and effective way of peacebuilding – assisting war-affected people to transform their own conflicts so that they could live in an environment of peace, security and development.

**Note:**

* Prof. Dr. Alpaslan Özerdem is the President of CESRAN International.
Eurasian Politics & Society

Annual Conference
25-26 September 2013
at Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon, Turkey
Registration is now open online:
Please visit www.cesran.org/epas
Gensler trabzon
trabzon da
meets at
bulusuyor
youth global peace and youth workshop

Glopeace.com

Cesran International

Coventry University

Eko Avrasya
France has “special” economic and political relations with Francophone African countries, dating back to the 19th century, and retains its military bases in Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Djibouti, and the Central African Republic. France’s security policy towards Africa has changed according to its economic, political and strategic interests. It has been linked with the concepts of change and continuity. For instance, during the apartheid regime, the French government strengthened its economic and political relations with South Africa and opposed the UN’s embargos of the pariah state, even encouraging Francophone African countries to increase their economic and political relations with it.

Additionally, France’s international power and position has also shaped its security policy towards Africa, seeing it become a member of the Group of Eight (G8) and one of the largest economic powers in the world. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and at the same time has been playing a significant role in European integration. Significantly, it is a nuclear power and a member of various security organisations, for instance NATO and the OSCE.  

Approximately 240,000 French citizens live in different countries of Africa, where French companies operate, such as Total, Areva, Accor, Bolloré, Bouygues, and Elf Aquitaine. In turn, Africa provides raw materials, such as uranium, natural gas and oil to France, which is still highly dependent on these for its technological industries. France also has special agreements...
with many African countries in the fields of defence and military power. France is the largest trading partner for the African countries within the EU members.\(^2\) When France’s exports to Africa in 2007 were 30,393 million dollars, its exports to Africa in 2008 increased to 36,878 million dollars. As shown in Table 3, France’s economic relations have significantly grown each year. Nevertheless, the global economic crisis of 2007 has had a negative impact on the growth of France’s economic relations with Africa, with both exports and imports falling. France’s exports to Africa in 2009 were €17.163 million and its imports to Africa were €14.312 million.\(^3\) France’s economic relations have relatively started to increase in 2010, with its exports to Africa increasing to €19.516 million and imports to €16.452 million. France was also the largest of the EU’s exporters to Africa, with €20 billion in 2010.\(^4\) According to Hansen\(^5\) and Martin\(^6\), the main aims of France’s security policy towards Africa are to protect French economic and political interests and citizens and provide intelligence for the French government. The Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the collapse of the authoritarian regime in the DRC, formerly Zaire, in 1997 weakened France’s security policy towards Africa.\(^7\) New developments in Africa forced French policymakers to re-define security policy in Africa, particularly after the Cold War. The bipolar international system in world politics and spread of communism in Francophone African countries had been the main threat for the French interests during this era, leading France to increase its social, economic, and political relations with former colonial states in Africa against the threat of the Soviet Union.

After the Cold War, the concept of security has appeared to change, and now includes the new threats, such as immigration issues, climate change, international terrorism, conflicts, and the emerging global actors in Africa. Particularly, conflicts and wars in Africa began to threaten regional stability and especially France’s economic interests after the 1990s, as democratic movements emerged. A new political rivalry between France and the USA arose in Africa after the end of the Cold war. Wary of what it perceived as imperial ambitions of the USA, France saw these new developments in Africa as a threat to its economic and political interests.\(^8\) Financial aid programmes are also seen as a momentous component of France’s security policy towards Africa, for instance strengthening the authoritarian regime of President Paul Biye in

Table 1: France’s overall trade with Africa (2006-2008) (in million dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>26,344</td>
<td>30,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa excl. South Africa</td>
<td>24,240</td>
<td>28,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>11,341</td>
<td>13,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa</td>
<td>9,237</td>
<td>10,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>2,216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009.
Cameron in 1992 with a pledge of 436 million dollars of aid. After the 1990s, France also started to support the concepts of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, due to its changing interests in Africa and in the world. In recent years, France has claimed that the UN Security Council should include one African country to reflect and support the continent’s interests precisely. However, its support for Africa at the UN Security Council remains somewhat rhetorical. The emergence of the regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa also affected France’s security policy. For example, France was opposed to the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created by the Treaty of Lagos, in 1975, the aims of which were to reinforce economic relations amongst the members, to create an economic integration in western Africa and to create a common security system. At the same time, it included a peacekeeping force, and in 1995 ECOWAS played a critical role in stopping the Liberian civil war. France established its own security institution, known as the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programme in 1998. RECAMP included Francophone African countries, the USA, the UK, Belgium, and five Anglophone countries. France’s economic and political relations with Africa have influenced its institutional relations with the continent. Meanwhile, the establishment of the RECAMP also shows that France is pursing its own individual security policy in Africa. Furthermore, the current economic crises also influenced France’s security strategy in Africa, causing France to close down two military bases in Central Africa. France also plays a large role in the international organisations, including in the UN and the EU, to keep its strategic influence in Africa. For example, it took a leading role in the EU peacekeeping force, which is the Artemis Operation, in the DRC in 2003, and has made a major contribution to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Since the post-independence era in Africa, France has institutionalised its relations with African states, and has organised Franco-African summits since 1973, in order to strengthen its social, economic, and political relations with Africa. The 25th took place in Nice between the 31st of May and the 1st of June 2010, in which France underlined that establishing a strategic partnership based on equality, solidarity and mutual respect was necessary for combating the common threats facing both continents and enhancing their interests. Importantly, France agreed to strengthen Africa’s security system through regional and sub-regional organisations, and in so doing pledged €300 million between 2010 and 2012 to African states and organisations. It also agreed to train 12,000 African troops to reinforce African peacekeeping
operations in that time. Meanwhile, the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, in his opening speech, argued that the spread of liberal concepts, such as human rights, democracy, and the rule of law was essential for the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in Africa. It seems that France is changing its relations with Africa according to global developments and its political and economic interests.

After 2000, France began to play a more active role in African politics and supported liberal principles, starting to put more pressure on its former colonial African states to show respect for liberal ideals. There are three important factors affecting France’s new foreign and security policy towards Africa. First, conflicts and wars directly damage France’s economic and political interests in Africa. Second, the new emerging actors such as India, Brazil, China and Turkey have begun to establish new strategic partnerships and increase their economic and political relations with African states and organisations. Third, dictatorial regimes have begun to lose their power in African states over the last decade.

It is important to note that France is playing the greatest role in developing security cooperation between Africa and the EU. For example, it took a leading role in establishing the African Peace Facility in 2004 to cement African organisations’ security structures. Moreover, France played a leading role in an EU peacekeeping operation in Africa in 2003, named Artemis Operation in the DRC and in the recent conflict in Mali. France is reinforcing its international position and also protecting its increasing economic interests. In particular, its economic relations have been increased with Africa, as shown in Table 1 (above).

Even though France’s security policy towards Africa has changed since 2000, due to its changing economic and international interests in Africa and in the world, it still does not take into consideration internal challenges of Africa, nor focus on resolving the continent’s structural, economic or political problems. However, these threats of the new millennium have led French policymakers to recognise that security cooperation with Africa is the best way to protect France’s economic and political interests.

NOTES:
* Dr. Abdurrahman Siradag is an Assistant Professor at International University of Sarajevo.
2. See the detailed report for France’s economic relations with Africa published by EUROSTAT, Revival of EU 27 trade in goods with Africa, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010.
3. Ibid., pg. 1.
4. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
8. Ibid., pp.11-3.
Central Africa, as a geopolitical complex and security complex, is plagued since independences to the dynamics of insecurity and border smuggling, structured around the mechanic of networks and the entrepreneurship system. This is especially true in the CEMAC zone, where the permeability of intra-regional and interregional borders has become a commonplace. Entrepreneurs of insecurity here are rebel groups, militias and armed gangs, bandits and urban gangs. These cliques are enterprises in the sense of liberal capitalism. They seek to minimize their costs and maximize their profits. Based on various trafficking and smuggling networks and taking advantage of the porous borders, they are able to acquire the necessary equipment to generate insecurity and instability. These insecurities and instabilities are used at different scales as an investment whose benefits can be beneficiaries enrichment (case of Bandits), the control of an urban or rural area (gang case), the control of a sub-state territory (case of militias and armed bands) or to coup d’état within a state (in the case of rebellion). It is important to identify and highlight their relationship with the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) insecurity in the sub-region.

The theoretical blueprint of this article focuses on the following questions: is there a correlation between smuggling and insecurity in Central Africa? To what extent the entrepreneurship of insecurity fits into trans-border dynamics of the regional economy of crime? How smuggling networks and entrepreneurs of insecurity
organize themselves for the control of territories and the taking of State powers? This article is in the interstices of political geography and geopolitics, and draws on the sociology of territories and sociology of networks. The theoretical challenge is to show how entrepreneurship of insecurity is characterized by the triptych network, territory and power. It is also shown that in the absence of cooperation and pooling of efforts between Member States in Central Africa, the fight against insecurity, SME networks and smugglers will continue to be a zero-sum game. The hypothesis is formulated as follows: the permeability of borders in the sub-region promotes the proliferation of smuggling, which in turn catalyzes the transnationalization of companies of insecurity. These entrepreneurs are on a quest for the control of territories and the taking of power of State. This text is organized around a binary motion. The first movement constitutes the typography of entrepreneurs of insecurity and smuggling networks in the region. The second movement is an alignment of datas of the research with the theoretical problematic.

**TYPOGRAPHY OF ENTREPRENEURS OF INSECURITY AND SMUGGLING NETWORKS**

Making the typography of entrepreneurs of insecurity and smuggling networks returns to identify, and typing them out, in order to build graphs.

**SMEs of insecurity**

Central Africa is worked by five types of entrepreneurs of insecurity: gangs, armed gangs, militias, terrorist groups, roadblocks and rebellions. The expression entrepreneurship of insecurity here refers to a group of armed persons unlawfully constituted, with clear objectives and a strategy that puts peoples and states into insecurity, and proceeds by using violence and/or terror.

The security landscape of Central Africa is dotted with urban gangs, which mainly contribute to the de-securitization of populations and having enrichment as main goal. These gangs are usually lightly armed: Kalashnikov rifles, machetes and other weapons. They come in two variances: urban gangs and rural gangs. Gangsterism, as a social and cultural fact, is not new in central Africa. As shown by SAïBOU Issa, gangsterism in several regions of Central Africa, especially in the periphery of the Lake Chad Basin, was a cultural fact. In many cultures, the phenomenon of raids for example was considered as normal. Poliorcetics was taught very
early to boys. In northern Cameroon, several Haoussa tales are apologists of bandits. The semiotic study of these stories shows that these great bandits remained in the collective memory of war, considered as heroes. However, the cross-border banditry, as rampant today is different from that of yesteryear, to the extent that he had known a polemological mutation. Between 1990 and 2013, one has shifted from the era of raids, rezzous and campaigns to the era of ambushes and transmigration of armed gangs, and lastly to the current era, which is that of the military criminal gang. This change is even more visible that it is accompanied by the professionalization of bandits.

The situation is also the case of urban gangs. In Douala, Yaoundé, Bangui, Libreville, Bata, Brazzaville, N’djamena, urban gangs are numerous. The situation was such so much so that in Cameroon, the country has created in 2001 within the framework of keeping and reinforcement of security, an operational center of the gendarmerie, called operational command to fight against banditry and organized crime. The Operational command was a mixed force composed of police, gendarmerie and military. Similarly, faced with the inability of the regular armed forces to eradicate the phenomenon of highway bandits in the three northern Cameroon regions, the country has created the Light Intervention Battalion (BIL), a special unit of the Cameroonian army. In 2003, BIL has been transformed into Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR). To date, the bandits are rampant in Cameroon, Chad (Zaraguinas) and CAR.

Gangs and militias are many in Central Africa, including Chad (Djendjawids), Congo Brazzaville (Militiamen Nsifulu Pastor TUMI) in CAR and DRC (Mayi-Mayi militia). These armed groups that invest in de-securitization of the people, and whose aim is the control of territories, often rich in minerals and precious metals, for personal enrichment. It should be noted that many groups in these countries also have a political character. If the leaders of these cliques often know they cannot reach to seize power militarily, the armed gang or militia is an investment for them to negotiate access to government or to seek autonomy for their region. Hence, gangs, militias and armed groups can have serious military equipments. In Central Africa, militias and armed gangs pursue a fourfold objective: enrichment, control of a territory rich in natural resources, political calculation and irredentism. There are nearly 30 militias and armed gangs in Central Africa. They have a total of some 28,000 fighters, equipped with small arms, pick-up, RPG7 rocket, missile type Graad, Sam7 and Sam14, and some have heavy weapons.

Among entrepreneurs of insecurity, the most dangerous for the stability of the state and human security are rebellions and terrorist groups. With regard to training rebel armies, they are heavily armed, and in many cases better equipped, trained and determined than regular armies. They are particularly threatening the stability of States insofar as they are formed for the explicit purpose of conquering political power. The situation is particularly glaring in Central Africa. In CAR one can identify in the north and north-east regions: the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC), the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), the Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice (MLCI) and now the rebel coalition Seleka. Except Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea in each of ECCAS countries, almost all presidents have come to power through rebellion. In Chad, Hissen Habré (1982)
and Idriss Deby Itno (1990) came to power through rebellion. In 2009, had it not been for the intervention of the Hawk Force (the French troops based in N'djamena), a rebellion would have ousted the current president of this country. In Congo Brazzaville, Dennis Sassou Nguesso returned to power (1997) by the rebellion of Cobra, after a bitter struggle against the Ninjas, Aubevillois, Zulu, and Cocoyes Mamba. In DRC, Laurent Désiré Kabila came to power through the AFDL rebellion in 1996. In CAR, Jean Bedel Bokassa (1965), David Dacko II (1979), André Kolingba (1981) and François Bozizé (2003) came to power through rebellion. Power in RCA is currently threatened by the rebel coalition Seleka. In fact, the peace agreement signed in Libreville between the rebel coalition and power would not have occurred without the interposition of the 760 men of the Multinational Force in Central Africa (FOMAC), the presence of 600 French soldiers and 400 soldiers intervention in South Africa. In Angola, the FLEC, UNITA and the MPLA were committed between 1975 and 2002 in a long civil war for control of power.

The situation is just as garish as regards terrorism. Since 2001, in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center, there is an exponential rise of terrorist groups and piracy in Central Africa. If terrorism is always associated with political, ideological or religious goals, it is different from piracy, which pursues a mercantile objective. The kidnapping of hostages, at the edges of Bakassi in October 2008, the hold-up of several banks in Limbe, on September 28, 2008, the Ecobank robbery in Douala in 2012, even better those at regular intervals to Bata (February 17, 2009, Island Bioko) are all signs that maritime, river and lake piracy is a real phenomenon in Central Africa. If we take into account only the coasts of Cameroon, there are between January and October 2009, 36 acts of piracy. In ECCAS countries, piracy was committed in lakes (Chad, Tangayika, Albert, Mweru) and along rivers (Ubangi, Sangha, Chari, Wouri, Benue, Congo, Ogooué). In terms of maritime insecurity, the Zone D of Gulf of Guinea (Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe) appears as the most worrying. In ECCAS, there are more terrorist acts in general. In addition, the various terrorist groups on the edge of Cameroon, BFF, BOKO HARAM, MOSOP, MEND, are many companies of insecurity that may unsecure countries of ECCAS.

**Smuggling networks**

Central Africa is marked by several types of smuggling, organized in networks. The flowering of the contraband market is mainly due to the permeability of borders between states. In Central Africa, there are traffic of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking, smuggling of drugs and smuggling of precious metals and minerals. Illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons is a real threat to security in the ECCAS. According to estimations of the GRIP, there would be about 20 millions of small arms in circulation in the central African countries. These weapons are divided between individual gangs and militia gangs. Within Central Africa, the most affected countries are: Chad, DRC and CAR. This smuggling has several sources and borrows several distribution channels. There are first internal sources. It should be noticed that the illicit arms trade in Central Africa is in part fueled by military rank. There are also the results of several years of civil war in some states. Despite DDR policies, there is a large number of weapons in circulation in countries that have experienced civil wars like Congo, DRC, Chad, CAR and Angola. To this is added the external factors, including international arms smugglers and foreign states (Russia, France, China, United States, South Africa, etc.).
maintain those wars and rebellions in Africa. Thus, the involvement of the United States has been demonstrated in the Angolan civil war. Similarly, the involvement of France has been demonstrated in various coups d’état in RCA. Drug trafficking and smuggling of precious metals are equally important in terms of volume in Central Africa. One and the other are often used to purchase weapons and financing rebellions and armed militias. Thus, in the Angolan civil war the control of diamond territory allowed UNITA to finance itself. Similarly, during the Biafra war in Nigeria (1967-1970), oil controlled territories allowed separatist Biafra to finance their rebellion.

Sociography of “no man’s land” and takeovers
The proliferation of insecurity businesses consequently generates the creation of “no man’s land” (territory without control and islands of insecurity) and takeovers by force in Central Africa. Between 1960 and 2012, there have been 70 coups d’état and attempted coups d’état in Africa, of which 20 in ECCAS. The East border of Cameroon shared with the CAR is a real gateway. Despite the presence of officers of the BIR in this region, hostile elements belonging to the militia and sometimes to the Central African armed forces often cross the border to ransom the Cameroonian population. On the 24th of November 2011, the Central African soldiers penetrated the Garoua Boulai region. They fired shots, burned the Cameroonian flag and vandalized public buildings. The North and Far North border of Cameroon shared with Chad has been source of bellicosity. In addition, these regions are riddled with road blocks, which are paradoxically supported by the local traditional leaders. North-west border shared with Nigeria also the presence of many gateways. The issue is even more sensitive in the Northwest Cameroon, since it is adjacent to the Nigerian Delta, which is the breeding ground for groups like MEND and MOSOP. To this must be added the Bakassi factor, because despite the recovered sovereignty of Cameroon on the island, it remains a conflict generating area. In fact, almost all ECCAS countries are struggling to control their borders and thus to maintain security.
peace in frontier villages. In the instance of Chad, its border with Libya, Sudan and the CAR are porous. This porosity gave the possibility to Sudan to destabilize Chad by supporting the Chadian rebels. In the same instance, Chad hosted Sudanese rebels. Similarly when Muammar Gaddafi decided to invade Chad in 1973, he took advantage of the porosity of the border between Chad and Libya. The borders between Chad and Niger are not better protected. Almost the entire Aozou band is considered a "no man's land".

In CAR, the permeability of the borders with Chad facilitated the coup d’état of François Bozizé against Ange Félix PATASSE. Without the support of reinforcements from southern Chad and entered the northern CAR, Bozizé's coup d’état would have never succeeded. Even within the RCA, the North is not controlled by the Central African government. That is another “no-man's” land. In addition, the border between CAR and Sudan, while also permeable, is an important link in the stream of weapons in Central Africa. The East DRC is under the control of the M23, and before the M23 it was controlled by the CNDP of the General Laurent KUNDA. If the eastern DRC is a no man's land, the eastern borders of the DRC are an additional source of instability in the country. Indeed, the borders with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda are permeable. Similarly, the border with Angola is fragile and insecure. In observation one of the characteristics of ECCAS countries is their inability to control flows that violate their borders. This situation facilitates the undemocratic takeovers.

Evidence of correlation Borders - Networking - Insecurity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Gabon</th>
<th>Cameroon</th>
<th>Congo Brazzaville</th>
<th>Équatorial Guinea</th>
<th>CAR</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Chad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SME of insecurity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militias and armed gangs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism and Piracy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel groups</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light weapons</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drogues</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicines</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minerals et Oil</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Conflicts in Central Africa and funding Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicts in Central Africa</th>
<th>Eastern DRC</th>
<th>Northern and Eastern CAR</th>
<th>Congolesse civil wars</th>
<th>Bakassi</th>
<th>Angola Civil War</th>
<th>Rebellions in Chad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbium Tantalium, Manganese, Tin, Copper, Iron, Bauxite, Nickel, Plomb, Titanium, Aluminium, Chromite.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a correlation between the permeability of borders, trans-nationalization of smuggling networks and the growth of the insecurity industry. Without the porosity of borders and corruption in the customs offices, the different weapons, drugs and precious metals networks trafficking could not acquire a transnational character. The trans-state traffic and mobility of traffickers increase the difficulty to fight smuggling in Central Africa. The borders between Cameroon and Nigeria, Chad and CAR are the topotypes of small weapons trafficking, drugs and stolen cars.

In addition, it is difficult to imagine how the various rebellions that have destabilized Chad could have erected if they had not had a rear base in neighbouring Sudan. As can be seen currently in West Africa with the case of Mali, the success of rebellions in Africa in general and in Central Africa in particular, would not have been possible if the sub-region and the continent did not have borders so porous. Therefore, there’s a double causal link between the slumping of borders in Central Africa and the development of transnational smuggling, between tangibility of borders and development of the insecurity SME. Identically, there’s a close relationship between the development of smuggling networks and the proliferation of companies of insecurity. As we have noted, weapon and drug trafficking, smuggling of precious metals and oil have been used in several countries of ECCAS to arm and finance militias and armed rebellions. Central Africa appears to be sick of his wealth.

The political economy of conflict in Central Africa, allows us to see the link almost umbilical between natural resources, annuitants systems and Entrepreneurship of insecurity. The Dutch Syndrome was fashionable in the last decade, which finally wears and tarnishes the paradigm. And yet, one cannot refrain to notice that natural resources are sources of conflict and maintain militias, armed gangs and rebellions in Central Africa. As shown in the table below, most of the conflicts in central Africa and most rebellions are funded and maintained by natural resources. What makes Central Africa not any more a geological scandal, but a political scandal which combines, mingle and intertwine insecurity, civil wars, dictatorships, “petrocraties” and “gemmocraties”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicts in Central Africa</th>
<th>Eastern DRC</th>
<th>Northern and Eastern CAR</th>
<th>Congolesse civil wars</th>
<th>Bakassi</th>
<th>Angola Civil War</th>
<th>Rebellions in Chad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Funding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbium Tantalium, Manganese, Tin, Copper, Iron, Bauxite, Nickel, Plomb, Titanium, Aluminium, Chromite.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

The fundamental challenge of this discussion was to demonstrate a correlation between entrepreneurship insecurity, smuggling and cross-border dynamics in Central Africa. It shows that there's indeed a causal link between the porous borders of Central African countries and the rise of smuggling, on the one hand, between the growth of smuggling and flowering companies of insecurity, on the other hand. Entrepreneurship of insecurity in question encapsulates the triptych network - territory - power and irrigates the sub-regional economy of crime. None of the Central African States has the means to fight individually and effectively against crime and sub-regional networks smugglers. Fight against these “evils” requires a sub-regional cooperation and the pooling of efforts between Member States. To do this, the Central African States must realize that their region is a complex of security. To switch from complex to security community, they must harmonize their policies in the fight against smuggling, insecurity and SMEs in securing their borders. The perfect balance of NASH is the efficient cooperation between Member States taking part in the security of the sub-region.

This article makes five recommendations to the Heads of States of ECCAS:

- Each state of ECCAS can develop a doctrine to fight against asymmetrical threats, particularly SMEs insecurity.
- Harmonize policies against smuggling networks, in particular the trafficking of arms.
• Adopt the principle of smart security by pooling efforts and sharing logistical challenges capability.
• Create a brigade within ECCAS in partnership with the United Nations Office against Drugs and Crime (UNODC), for an efficient sub-regional fight against drug trafficking.
• Better cooperation between the police, the gendarmerie and the armed forces of Central African States with the sub-regional office of Interpol and Europol.

NOTES:
* Hans De Marie Heungoup is a Political Scientist, Researcher at the Paul ANGO ELA foundation of geopolitics in Central Africa (FPAE). His recent book is “Le BIR, la GP et le pouvoir au Cameroun”, Berlin, Editions Universitaires Européennes, 2011, 152 pages. E-mail: hans.heungoup@yahoo.com
** Isidore Collins Ngueuleu Djeuga is a Human Rights Law Specialist, Ph.D Candidate on Business and Human Rights at the University of Paris V René Descartes. E-mail: collisidore@yahoo.fr
8. NTUDA EBODE Joseph Vincent, art. cit.
10. Legend: this table summarizes the SME insecurity and smuggling in Central Africa, ECCAS. The stars represent the level of prevalence of the phenomenon in a given country. In the absence of a star, there is no threat. 3 stars means the threat is at the maximum. Green means that there is no star and red that there are 3 stars.
CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The Journal of Global Analysis (JGA) is pleased to announce its transformation from a publication covering all aspects of international affairs to a more specialized focus on international political economy (IPE) in emerging markets. The journal wishes to engender new dynamics and create conceptual incentives to the current scholarly debates.

The editors of JGA, an interdisciplinary refereed scholarly online journal of CESRAN International, would like to invite manuscript submissions for its upcoming relaunch issue in summer 2013.

We seek original research papers on themes pertaining to the analysis of:

- Economic and industrial development
- Global trade
- Governance
- Investment
- Market structure
- National and multinational enterprises
- Policies and strategies
- Role of Institutions
- Transformation

These themes need to be related to countries of the emerging markets or to countries whose experience may be relevant to emerging economies.

Examples of emerging markets include the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), most countries in Eastern Europe and Turkey, some countries in the Middle East (e.g. Egypt), Latin America (e.g. Chile), and Southeast Asia (e.g. Indonesia, South Korea), as well as parts of Africa (e.g. South Africa).

JGA will take into consideration thematic trends and challenges at the top of the global agenda and endeavour to share different perspectives with and leverage new knowledge among its readership. Within this context, the journal will extend its current collaboration and would like to reach out particularly to the academic world in the countries of the emerging markets.

JGA is published twice a year. The deadline for submission is April 30.

For author requirements and information, please visit JGA’s website at www.cesran.org/globalanalysis.

Contact details:

- Manuscripts: Birgit Brauer, First Managing Editor (birgit.brauer[@]cesran.org)
- Inquiries: Annett Richter, Second Managing Editor (annett.richter[@]cesran.org)
- Book reviews: Kaan Renda, Book Review Editor (kkrenda[@]cesran.org)
Introduction
The upsurge of China’s economic supremacy is being monitored carefully in many parts of the world largely because the impact of this new ‘economic power house’ would have significant implications for developed and developing countries throughout the world. While there are arguments that effective policy reforms may have triggered robust export of Chinese manufactured products that increased the economy’s international competitiveness, China is showing no signs of losing its grip of the global economy as yet. The ramifications of this increasing economic might on Sub Sahara African countries cannot be underestimated. In order to consolidate its influence over the global market, covert and overt attempts are being made by China to penetrate into new and emerging markets. As if the wild quest to find destinations for their exports is not enough, the Chinese have relentlessly launched a grandiose search for raw materials such as gold, petroleum, copper, and coal to keep their economy in motion. Ngomba (2007) observed that China’s hunger for natural resources in Africa seem to be influenced by the support the former rendered to many resource rich countries in Africa during nationalist movements that led to independence in many African countries. This has led to the intensification of interaction between China and many African countries in recent decades, culminating in what could be described as significantly ‘profit oriented’ (Sautman, 2006). Ghana, a relatively small West African country has become attractive to Chinese mercantilist

By Hamza Bukari Zakaria
interests chiefly as a result of her natural resource endowments, more especially by her richness in gold deposits. It is important to note that mining and other forms of mineral exploration in Ghana is appropriately regulated by state institutions that are enjoined by law to manage the mining sector. Even though these agencies discharge their duties on a daily basis, it is quite disturbing that illegal mining, popularly known as galamsey in Ghana is growing at an alarming rate. Originating from the expression ‘gather and sell’, galamsey operations are inherently small scale alluvial mining activities dominated by native Ghanaians because the law does not allow non-natives to operate small scale surface mines. This is however changing rapidly due to Chinese involvement in the gold trade. The paper argues that the preponderance of illegal mining in Ghana can be understood better by looking beyond popular justifications by Ghanaian nationals who attribute their involvement in the trade to mere joblessness and nationwide poverty. The proliferation of illegal mining must be situated within the context of massive participation of Chinese nationals in the illegal gold mining business. The paper offers a local government perspective to ongoing debates about the Chinese involvement in small scale mining activities in Ghana. Firstly, the paper highlights the status of small scale artisanal mining by focusing on illegal mining activities. A brief overview of Ghana-China relations is given, followed by a description of the study areas and the participants interviewed for the study. Attempts by key stakeholders to address the opportunistic mad rush for gold is explored, and the perspectives of residents in mining communities, community leaders, local government administrators and elected representatives of mining communities are elicited to ascertain the perceived ‘foreign invasion’ of the mining industry. The consequences and implications of Chinese participation in unauthorized gold mining in the study areas are examined, and some recommendations proposed accordingly.

**The Anatomy of Small Scale Mining in Ghana**

Small scale mining in many parts of the world is seen as an informal economic activity regardless of its potential destructive environmental impacts. Nonetheless, what may be described as ‘small scale mining’ tends to be influenced by the degree of sophistication and level of technological investment it attracts, and this invariably differs from one place to another. In Ghana, small-scale (gold) mining, for example, is defined as “...mining (gold) by any method not involving substantial expenditure by an individual or group of persons not exceeding nine in number or by a co-operative society made up of ten or more persons” (Government of Ghana, 1989). It is mostly seen as an activity for people with little alternative means of survival especially in rural hinterlands where mineral deposits are found. In Ghana, the geographic landscape of illegal mining...
stretches along the southwestern and northeastern parts of the country where production begins with the identification of prospective sites that are believed to be endowed with precious minerals. Appiah (1998) reported that about 200,000 people are involved in the small scale mining industry in Ghana alone, even though recent estimates place the figure at 1 million people (UNECA, 2011).

To many analysts, the growth of Small Scale Mining (SSM) can be attributed to the liberalization of investment codes in the mining sector aimed at attracting both local and foreign investors. Arguably, the most important piece of legislation that accelerated the ‘galamsey boom’ was the enactment of the Minerals and Mining Law 1986 (PNDCL 153). According to Gavin and Potter (2005), this law promoted liberalization of the mining sector by introducing measures that include: “a reduction in the government’s entitlement (10 per cent) of equity in new mining operations; implementation of a low investment allowance (5 per cent) during the first year of operation; complete capitalization of all pre-production expenses; and provision of favourable amortization levels (75 per cent the first year, 50 per cent thereafter), elimination of import duties on capital equipment, and generous retention allowances on foreign exchange profits” (p. 107).

Around the same time, some attempts were made to formalize small scale mining, and this culminated in the promulgation of the Mercury Law (PNDCL 217), Small-Scale Gold Mining Law (PNDCL 218), and Precious Minerals and Marketing Law (PNDCL 219) in 1989. With the support of the World Bank, the government established a Small-Scale Mining Project (SSMP), with the Geological Survey Department, Minerals Commission, Precious Minerals and Marketing Corporation (PMMC), and Mines Department playing key roles.

From the legal and regulatory frameworks mentioned above, the intentions of the State to inject some orderliness by specifying acceptable operational standards for mining in Ghana could not be in doubt. It was therefore not surprising that in 1998; about 23 new companies had acquired mining permits to start operations, whilst 237 companies were known to be prospecting for gold, out of which 154 were Ghanaian owned whilst 83 were owned by non-Ghanaians (Banchirigah, 2008). Records have shown that approximately 13.7% of Ghana’s land area (31,237 sq km) was obtained by mining companies by 2006 (Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2006). This demonstrates that prospective miners may obtain licenses from the appropriate authorities before starting their businesses, provided...
they are able to complete the requisite paper work, attend an interview with government officials, undergo an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and pay some fees (Gavin and Potter, 2005). Companies that comply with laid down registration procedures to obtain permits are mostly referred to as ‘small scale mining companies’ whereas unregistered and unlicensed companies are popularly called *galamsey* operators. The latter often spring up either within the perimeters of concessions obtained by giant multinational mining companies (such as AngloGold Ashanti, Goldfields and Newmont) or sometimes very close to such concessions. Whereas any Ghanaian citizen 18 years and above is eligible to apply for a license to operate a small scale mine, there are countless miners who disregard the legal framework and operate illegally without any entitlements to the land they exploit (Gavin and Potter, 2005; Teschner, 2012). Because foreign nationals may not have the same privileges as natives of mining communities in the acquisition of concessions for the purpose of small scale mining, many foreign nationals, particularly Chinese, collude with natives who obtain licenses that allow them to mine areas that are defacto owned by non natives. This has created a situation whereby plots of land are owned by natives on paper, but in reality, are managed and owned by Chinese nationals who disguise their ownership rights by dealing in the sale of equipments at the mines. Apart from selling rock crushing machines known as Chang Fa, these expatriates also play a key role in the supply of banned substances such as cyanide, mercury and dynamites which are used in the refinery process.

It is regrettable to note that this clandestine conduct in natural resource extraction has tremendously failed to create jobs as advocates for Chinese involvement argue. Conversely, what is obvious is rather the perpetuation of illicit practices in the mining industry that does little to overturn the wanton deterioration of social and economic wellbeing of the people. It is common knowledge that despite the need to adhere to environmental regulations, miners continue to use hazardous substances such as mercury and cyanide that do not only pollute water bodies in mining communities, but also threaten the health of inhabitants who rely on these water sources for domestic purposes especially in rural areas. As if the deleterious deterioration of the environment as manifested in serious land erosion in many mining communities is not enough, the destruction, movement and improper resettlement of entire communities due to mineral extraction has had perverse consequences on social structure, family relations, cultural and social norms. Apart from the proliferation of youth unemployment caused by the displacement of mining communities, many of these young folks who often possess less skills and...
expertise end up embarking upon rural-urban migration in search of non-existing jobs in urban areas. There are reports of increasing prostitution in mining areas that mostly target expatriate employees in multinational mining firms. This could have huge implications on the spread and fight against HIV and AIDS in Ghana. The foregoing discussions suggest that a proper socio-economic cost analysis of illegal gold mining might be needed if policy makers want to find a lasting solution to the galamsey phenomenon.

**Antecedents of Diplomatic and Economic Cooperation between Ghana and China**

It is believed that diplomatic relations between Ghana and China dates back to 1960 when Ghana became a Republic after the Convention Peoples’ Party, led by Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah led the struggle for independence in 1957. At that time, Ghana lobbied for the reinstatement of China to the United Nations, and in return, it was rewarded with the strengthening of bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Since 1972 when diplomatic relations was restored between the two countries, China’s financial and technical assistance has resulted in many benefits to Ghana. In the least, it has resulted in the construction of a state of the art national theater in the heart of Accra, a district hospital in the Dangme East District, and the reconstruction of a 17.4 km road from Ofankor to Nsawam on the Accra-Kumasi Highway with the aid of a US$28 million interest-free loan. Ghana also benefited from the cancellation of $25 million of debt under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. Furthermore, an estimated 700 or more Ghanaians have undertaken various training courses in China to boost their capacities in the areas of agriculture, communication, energy, business development and aquaculture to mention but a few. The Chinese government also provided a US$99 million interest-free loan to support the construction of landing sites for fishing communities in Ghana. Recently the government of Ghana obtained two credits from the Exim Bank of China: a concessional loan up to the tune of US$270 million at 2% interest; and a commercial loan of US$292 million to supplement the US$60 million contribution of the government for the project. On 20th September, 2010, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) on behalf of the government of Ghana signed an unprecedented financial agreement with the China Development Bank Corporation (CDB) up to the tune of US$3 billion. While this framework agreement is aimed at accelerating Ghana’s economic development within the overall framework of strengthening the long-standing bilateral relationship that exists between the two countries, its dividends are yet to be seen.
The Study Area and Data Collection

This study was conducted in two local government areas namely, Amansie Central District and the East Akim Municipality in the Ashanti and Eastern regions of Ghana respectively. These areas are predominantly in the forest belt where chiefs and traditional leaders exercise usufructuary rights over the use of land. Almost every clan in these districts possesses some parcel of land on which food crops are produced. However, several decades of exploration and prospecting for gold have popularized small scale mining in these regions. The most popular gold mining companies are the West Chester Resources Limited; Apponi limited, Realistic Enterprise and the Achcolo mining company limited. As important stakeholders in natural resource extraction, local communities and local government councils who are respectively affected by the operation of licensed companies and unlicensed miners are not enthused by the wanton depletion of the environment. The study targeted this group of people in order to understand their frustration at the alarming rate of Chinese intrusion into small scale mining in the districts. Interviews were conducted with community leaders such as traditional (local) chiefs, elected councilors (assembly members as they are known in Ghana) as well as local government officials including District Chief Executives (mayors), Coordinating Directors, Planning Officers and Finance Officers. In addition, the views of some natives whose farmlands are being endangered by illegal Chinese mining activities in the areas was sought to appreciate the veracity of the threat to livelihoods posed by galamsey. The local government actors offered a local development perspective by highlighting the challenges of illegal mining to the local economy, and the need for regulatory agencies to strengthen the enforcement of mining codes aimed at eliminating...
the Chinese invasion of concessions in mining communities.

DEALING WITH CHINESE OPPORTUNISTIC
IN VolVEMENT IN THE MAD RUSH FOR GOLD

It is common knowledge that what drives many people into the mining industry is almost always linked to the quest to get rich quickly. It is therefore not surprising that the recent surge in gold prices has tremendously attracted Chinese migrants into rural areas in Ghana in search for gold. However, there have been several reports in the media (print and electronic, most of which are ugly) about the detention of Chinese nationals caught in illegal gold mining. Whereas some of these victims pay huge sums of money to local landowners and farmers to explore for gold, many of them tend to encroach on lands that have been legally acquired by licensed gold mining (Akabzaa and Darimani, 2001).

It is not uncommon for these registered companies to employ the services of security agencies such as the Ghana police service or even the military to undertake raids of these illegal mines. The reason why armed security contingents are used is because the illegal Chinese miners often wield offensive weapons and sophisticated arms and ammunitions. Even though the latter purport to be protecting themselves from armed robbers who might threaten the transportation of their precious metals to urban commercial centres; this claim cannot be verified since there are several instances when these illegal miners fired shots indiscriminately, without any provocation, intimidating local residents. For instance in October 2011, it was reported that a Chinese teenager; Chen Long, who was only sixteen year old was shot dead after he fired a rifle to resist arrest by a joint mission of police and immigration officers who were flushing out illegal immigrants in the gold industry in the Ashanti region. It turned out that dozens of these illegal miners neither had work and residents permits nor the requisite license to operate a small scale gold company. Consequently, about 40 of these illegal immigrants were duly deported.

In recent times, Civil Society Organizations have stepped up their campaigns, agitating for improved standards of living in mining communities. The formation of the National Coalition on Mining (NCOM) has further intensified the momentum of lobbyist to demand appropriate action in the form of policies and the enforcement of mining regulations. They are seriously perturbed by the extent of deprivation and misery faced by people in local communities where illegal mining continues unabated (Hilson and Yakovleta, 2007). Land owners who offer their lands to these gold merchants are unable to use the lands for farming afterwards because the large pits they dig are often left uncovered, causing significant physical destruction to the environment which consequently leads to loss of livelihoods. The work of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in preserve the sanctity of natural resources in mining communities leaves much to be desired (Hilson and Potter, 2003).

PERSPECTIVES FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL

It is important to note that every local government authorities in Ghana are enjoined by law to take full responsibility for development management in their areas of jurisdictions. The Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) equips Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies with executive, legislative, deliberative and administrative powers. Local councils are empowered to exercise administrative authority, provide guidance, give direction to, and supervise all other administrative authorities within any given district; formulate and execute plans,
programmes and strategies for the effective mobilization of resources necessary for the overall development of the district; promote and support productive activity and social development in the district by removing obstacles to initiative and development; initiate programmes for the development of basic infrastructure and provide works and municipal services in the district and must be responsible for the development, improvement and management of human settlements and the environment in the district. The combination of the aforementioned litany of powers and responsibilities of local governments reflects their capacity to tackle their development challenges to foster the achievement of their development goals. This certainly does not exclude districts with mineral deposits.

Many local government officials acknowledge the existence of laws and regulations for the acquisition of land but blame traditional leaders and land lords for releasing their lands to galamsey operators. They also indicated that the local government authorities generate revenue by issuing business operating permits to licensed small scale mining companies as well as local Chinese businesses that sell the inputs used by small scale miners. However, it is believed that a considerable amount of money is lost due to the inability of local government officials to reach out to the majority of illegal miners operating in the hinterlands. According to the District Coordinating Director in the Ashanti Region:

“Lack of vehicles is impeding our capacity to undertake routine monitoring of physical development projects that we commissioned ourselves, how then can we take record of illegal mining networks so that we could issue our business operating permits to them. This is severely affecting our revenue mobilization targets”

While this might appear to be a genuine concern, the following options could be considered. Firstly, local government authorities must ensure that their sub structures, notable, the area councils and unit committees are functionally active and vibrant to support in revenue mobilization. In addition, the assembly members that represent these communities can be used as the conduit to sensitize local residents not to evade taxes and obtain business operating permits accordingly.

The operators of small scale mining companies in communities where the phenomenon seem to be flourishing with the covert involvement of Chinese nationals accused politicians and policy makers including the Ghana Minerals Commission for promoting illegal mining. They claim that partisan politicization of debates on the legalization of small scale mining to create more jobs for the youth in mining communities has further exacerbated the phenomenon. An interviewee reiterated that:

“efforts to ban galamsey in this area will fail woefully because politicians promised that they were going to legalize it so that people can earn some money to alleviate their poverty. How then can they break their promise after securing our votes, that galamsey will be banned. That is impossible!”
It was obvious that local chiefs were unhappy about the spate of environmental damage, incidence of crime, alleged prostitution and the threat to the education of young people in the community owing to the mad rush for gold syndrome. Traditional leaders expressed their willingness to cooperate with regulatory bodies such as the Ghana Minerals Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency and the District Assembly as well as Civil Society Groups and Non Government Organisations (NGOs) to find a lasting but enduring solution to the menace. From the two districts that were visited, the officials of the assemblies unequivocally stated that they have always planned to tackle illegal mining by promoting the registration of local companies to enable them contribute positively to the growth of the local economy. A Municipal planning officer in the East Akim Municipality noted that financial constraints have always undermined their ability to implements strategies aimed at managing the fraudulent gold trade. This raises questions as to whether local authorities actually perceive galamsey as a major development priority.

CONCLUSION
Ghana is often hailed as a net exporter of gold; a reputation it obtained due to the huge quantities of gold produced per annum. Even though the commodity has been the country highest foreign exchange earner for decades, studies have shown that mining communities have benefited little compared to what goes to central government and large multi-national mining companies (Awudi, 2002; Hilson and Potter, 2005). The implications of this situation for Metropolitan Municipal and District Assemblies that have mining communities where there is evidence of Chinese participation in the local gold mining industry cannot be underestimated. It is affirmed that serious environmental degradation is underway in most of these communities, creating a lot of discontent amongst rural folks. The alarming rate of indiscriminate gold mining at the behest of Chinese illegal miners has left many people wondering as to whether foreign nationals can also replicate what the Chinese are perpetrating in Ghanaian mining communities in China. It seems foreign businesses that supply inputs to ‘supposed’ locally owned small scale companies are rather abusing Ghanaian mining codes by providing heavy machinery such as bull dozers and excavators to operate on designated lands that are indirectly managed by Chinese illegal gold cartels. The study also revealed that local government authorities face serious capacity challenges that worsen their financial ineptitude. The resulting consequence of this situation is an affront to the fight against illegal gold mining. One could argue that lack of political will and effective leadership may be responsible for the politicization of issues that border on illegal gold mining. Mayors find it difficult to arrest and clamp down on galamsey operators because periodic swoops initiated by the Assemblies in conjunction with the Ghana Police Service and the Military make the ruling government unpopular. There are also serious questions about the enforcement of environment by-laws and regulations dues to weak coordination between regulatory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Minerals Commission and the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. This is largely due to lack of decentralized departments of the EPA and the Mineral’s Commission at the local level. At this juncture, it is important to re-examine the country’s quest to attract foreign investors to ensure that potential investors and those who assist them to implement their investment decisions stick to ‘the rules of the game’. This
might require a thorough assessment of visa applications to Ghana by Chinese migrants to ensure that they obtain appropriate documentation that defines permissible and prohibited areas of investments. At the local government level, a comprehensive assessment of the social cost of illegal mining would be imperative in two ways. Firstly, it will enable local government authorities to ascertain the enormity of the challenges posed by mining and the resources required to deal with them. Secondly, a proper assessment will guide the design of mitigation strategies that might be introduced to uplift local communities from the ills of illegal artisanal mining. Even though local government officials proclaim to be addressing the mad rush for illegal gold; how effectives these efforts turn out remain to be seen and evaluated by the people. Until such time that a reasonable consensus is reached by all relevant stakeholders at the local level with respect to dealing with the Chinese intrusion into the local gold mining industry, local government authorities would be seen to be taking a very long doze.

NOTES:

* Hamza Bukari Zakaria is a Doctoral Researcher at Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM,) School of Environment and Development (SED), the University of Manchester.


Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS)

Postgraduate Programmes

CPRS courses are aimed at those who have an academic interest in issues related to peace, conflict, reconstruction, peacebuilding and reconciliation, and mid-career professionals who seek a meaningful addition to their qualifications and experience.

Online MA in Peacebuilding
MA in Peace and Reconciliation Studies (PRS)
MA in PRS as Distance Learning Programme

Postgraduate Certificate in Conflict Resolution Skills

Our programmes aim to:

- Develop the knowledge and skill base necessary to understand the causes of destructive conflict around the world.
- Understand the theory and practice of conflict transformation, peacemaking and peacebuilding at the various levels.
- Evaluate alternative modes of action and intervention in the attempt to transform violent and destructive conflict along non-violent and constructive channels.
- Draw the attention to the issues of human security and the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention in conflict zones.

www.coventry.ac.uk/peacestudy
The Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) provides a platform to analyse conflict transformation as the processes for managing change in a non-violent way to produce equitable outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. Security is understood as encapsulating a wide range of human security concerns that can be tackled by both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures. Therefore, the Journal’s scope not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security apparatus, reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive remnants of war and cross-border management, but also the protection of human rights, justice, rule of law and governance.

Peer-reviewed | Academic journal | By CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)

Editor-in-Chief
Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem, Coventry University, UK
Managing Editor
Laura Payne, Coventry University, UK
Assistant Editors
Mr. Richard Slade, Coventry University, UK | Mr. Hüsrev Tabak, University of Manchester, UK
Book Review Editor
Dr Sung Yong Lee, Coventry University, UK

Editorial Board

- **Prof. the Baroness Haleh Afshar**, University of York, UK
- **Prof. Bruce Baker**, Coventry University, UK
- **Dr Richard Bowd**, UNDP, Nepal
- **Prof. Ntuda Ebode**, University of Yaounde II, Cameroon
- **Prof. Scott Gates**, PRIO, Norway
- **Dr Antonio Giustozzi**, London School of Economics, UK
- **Dr Cathy Gormley-Heenan**, University of Ulster, UK
- **Prof. Paul Gready**, University of York, UK
- **Prof. Fen Hampson**, Carleton University, Canada
- **Prof. Mohammed Hamza**, Lund University, Sweden
- **Prof. Alice Hills**, University of Leeds
- **Dr Maria Holt**, University of Westminster, UK
- **Prof. Alan Hunter**, Coventry University, UK
- **Dr Tim Jacoby**, University of Manchester, UK
- **Dr Khalid Khoser**, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland
- **Dr William Lume**, South Bank University, UK
- **Dr Roger Mac Ginty**, St Andrews' University, UK
- **Mr Rae Mac Grath**, Save the Children UK Somalia
- **Prof. Mansoob Murshed**, ISS, The Netherlands
- **Dr Wale Osofisan**, Help Age International, UK
- **Dr Mark Pelling**, King’s College, UK
- **Prof. Mike Pugh**, University of Bradford, UK
- **Mr Gianni Rufini**, Freelance Consultant, Italy
- **Dr Mark Sedra**, Centre for Int. Governance Innovation, Canada
- **Dr Emanuele Sommario**, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Italy
- **Dr Hans Skotte**, Trondheim University, Norway
- **Dr Arne Strand**, CMI, Norway
- **Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh**, University of Po, France
- **Dr. Mandy Turner**, University of Bradford, UK
- **Prof. Roger Zetter**, University of Oxford, UK

www.cesran.org/jcts
According to a survey conducted in 2012 by the Arab Barometer, 84.5% of Algerians are not interested in politics and 52% do not have faith in the political system. Such lack of confidence might suggest that Algeria is ready to engage in its own Arab Spring. However, almost a year and a half has passed since the young Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, sparking a broad movement of revolts in several countries. However, despite some sporadic riots, Algeria remains a long way from emulating the revolts seen in Tunisia, Syria, Libya or Bahrain. This seems paradoxical in a country that was one of the leaders of the decolonization movement.

Factors that could lead to a major revolt have nonetheless long been present in Algerian society. In October 1988, for instance, a large anarchic protest movement led to the fall of the country’s single party system. The civil war that followed, however, neutralized the effects of the opening, and the long political hibernation that ensued has failed to resolve the structural problems in Algeria, nor indeed to reconfigure the political field and depose the elite class. During the last decade, the general population has become deeply detached from the power, while the revival of Islam in Algerian society has become an essential component of Algerian political identity. Finally, the civil war rejustified the state in the fight against terrorism. In this context, political Islam could appear both as a factor in the failure of the export of the Arab Spring, but also as a vehicle for changing the Algerian regime.
A STRONGLY DESTABILIZED SOCIETY THAT HAS RECENTLY UNDERGONE A MAJOR REVOLT

In the 1980s, population growth, the oil glut and the lack of economic and political reforms discredited the single-ruling party and led to the war of liberation. Obsolescence of its ideology translated, very prosaically in the Maghreb, into the major riots of October 1988 in which the malaise of society sought to regain control of its freedoms. Following the riots, effective Islamist discourse on inequality and injustice suffered by the people has served to delegitimize the FLN. The transition to a multiparty system, the emergence of a new press and the democratic openness that followed, also operated without discernment, led to what could be called an early “Arab Spring.”

However, the Islamists came to power in 1990, and the FIS victory in the legislative elections of 1991 triggered a “coup” carried out by the army, which was designed to block political alternation. From December 1991, Algeria experienced a wave of violence that degenerated, between 1992 and 1998, into a kind of civil war. This conflict arose between the military-backed regime and a complex network of covert Islamist opposition. According to unofficial figures, 60,000 people were killed during this period. In April 1999, a page was turned with the election of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, military candidate and foreign minister under President Boumediene from 1963 to 1979. This election raised great hopes. The president quickly declared an amnesty limited to those responsible for the violence - the law on civil concord - and promised to implement fundamental reforms to halt the violent crisis that shook the country since 1992. Ironically, the FLN again became the first political force to align themselves with Islamist parties. However, crisis factors remain: violence and corruption are high in Algerian society, and the gross inequalities felt by many social groups translate into a "contempt" of the government. The division between the elites and the rest of the population has not resolved since 1988 despite the emergence of democratic and peaceful elections. In addition, with the absence of political plurality, violence could always be regarded as a last resort to a change in political power structures. This tendency is fueled by unemployment and poor housing, especially among younger people who are mostly skeptical about the "official ideology."

Still, due to the fatigue of a decade of violence, the return of historical violence in the hands of the state - which is legitimized by the fight against terrorism - and the absence of a figure that could centralize discontent significantly reduces Algeria’s possibilities of a new popular uprising. Moreover, increased oil revenues since the beginning of the Arab Spring have enabled the Algerian state to buy social peace under these favorable economic conditions.

THE ABILITY OF POWER TO PREVENT MASS MOVEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL WAR

The beginning of the civil war in Algeria in 1992 coincided with the appearance of two phenomena which contribute to preventing the
emergence of a movement similar to the Arab uprisings. On the one hand, because of the violence and the collapse of business, more than 4000 executives and academics have left the country leading to a great brain-drain. On the other hand, the atomization of society into various interest groups seeking protection from the state have exacerbated social segmentation and prevented the emergence of alternative political projects.

This social segmentation is coupled with a generalized sense of fatigue from the years of recent conflict, as the Arab Barometer survey described. Indeed, since 1998, the decline in violence in the country was accompanied by a strong depoliticization of public space and aspiration of the people to a normalization of the political and social situation. The public space Islamized in a more traditional way - especially since the accession to power of President Bouteflika, who relies on a strong network of religious brotherhoods such as Zawiya Tidjania - while political Islam returned to normal. There has also been a strong national discontent – a décitoyenneté movement – in the behavior of Algerians.

In addition, with terrorist threats still real and valid in Algeria, intelligence services are paying very close attentive to any social movement. Other countries in the region are also considered, rightly so, as "police states" or "authoritarian states," but none, before the Arab revolts, were based on such knowledge and on a territorial and societal network as dense as Algeria’s. The terrorism of the 1990s provided both legitimate violence in the hands of the government but also developed security skills to counter the terrorist threats posed by AQIM and defused the crisis’ that shook the country in Kabylia and elsewhere. The persistence of news linked to Al-Qaeda’s presence in Algeria continues to question the legitimacy of the Algerian government in their fight against terrorism, and has helped justify the blockage of internal and external policies and maintained a state of national emergency.

With this effective device, the Algerian government carefully watched any propagation of Arab uprisings in the country. When calls for demonstrations appeared in January and February 2011, including the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (NCCD - bringing together opposition parties, representatives of civil society and trade union non-officials) who wanted a "system change," the government reacted quickly. It firmly outlined its desires to grant some progress. This was the case for the announcement of the lifting of the state of emergency (in force for more than 19 years) and measures in favor of employment and housing, especially for young people. Oil revenues clearly served to buy social peace. As recalled by the researcher Luis Martinez, the annuity provided the Algerian regime with comfortable foreign exchange reserves. Recently, the IMF urged Algeria to increase its financial participation in terms of cash acquired due to the soaring prices of oil and gas.

The appearance of a democratic regime also prevents this or that politician from being the target of any mass demonstrations (as was the case with Ben Ali in Tunisia). With the authorization of the creation of sixty political
parties, power has been parceled out to the political field which has been given more of a democratic face. In addition, many parties did not call for demonstrations. This difference is significant because other revolutions have occurred outside of a political party, through social networks and the massive presence of young people in the streets and symbolic sites. In Algeria, the ban on demonstrations and the harsh dispelling of small mobilizations stand out alongside the political movement growing in neighboring countries. Finally, the regime survives the chronic instability of a power split into rival clans due to the existence of an unofficial “red line” that the rival clans will not cross if it could potentially weaken the system. This has long been true for Islamist parties but political realignments in the wake of President Bouteflika’s reign could change that.

**ISLAM AS A TOOL FOR SOCIAL PEACE AND POTENTIAL POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE**

Islam has become an essential component of political and cultural Algeria. Still, according to the Arab Barometer, 47.02% of respondents believe that the laws in Algeria should be inspired by Islamic Shari’a. This factor was indeed taken into account early on by the Algerian government. The regime has compromised with Islamist parties for several years: Abdelaziz Belkhadem, general secretary of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and former Prime Minister (2008-2010) has long supported the Islamists. President Bouteflika has also embarked on the construction of the Great Mosque, the third largest religious building in the world (after those in Mecca and Medina) at a cost exceeding one billion dollars. The Islamization of power is also illustrated by the growing number of convictions for proselytism against Catholic missionaries or, in the summer of 2011, the conviction of two construction workers for non-observance of fasting during the month of Ramadan.

A recent trend of empowering Islamist parties is increasing due to the prospect of the end of Bouteflika’s presidency. Three parties affiliated with the Islamist movement officially came together on March 7, 2012 to give birth to the Green Algeria Alliance in view of the parliamentary elections on May 10, 2012. The party is under the aegis of Aboudjerra Soltani, president of MSP (Society Movement and peace represented by four ministers in the government), Hamlaoui Akouchi, Secretary General of El Islah movement and Fateh Rebai, secretary general of Ennahda. The coalition aimed to lead the government from the May 2012 legislative elections, imitating the examples of Morocco, Tunisia and Libya. The MSP has also broken its
commitment in the coalition alongside the FLN and RND in order to henceforth integrate itself with the broader Islamic movement, similar to what the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan did with the AKP. The results were not the one anticipated but the coalition tries the long run.

**CONCLUSION**

The fiftieth anniversary of Algerian independence in July 2012 resembled other anniversaries in terms of who governs the country. Several factors may explain this inertia experienced in Algeria when compared to recent events in Tunisia and Egypt. Algeria offers the ultimate image of a fully domesticated political climate whose politics are excluded, directly or indirectly, from those who still continue to question the system change. Aboubekr Benbouzid Minister has thus been minister of Higher Education and National Education since 1994.

The legacy of the 1990s, as well as the fragility and the discrediting of parties in a closed political system, has led to a profound disaffection of citizens towards politics, as well as a situation that favors short-and medium-term preservation of the established order. In addition, the volatility of the Sahel and the grip of the Islamists in northern Mali finally confirms the fact that Western powers will not support overly brutal or violent reform movements. Europe in particular is fearful of this scenario.

It remains that socially, Algeria is sitting on a volcano, and many people including those within the regime, fear an explosion: 70% of the Algerian population is under 30 years of age. Under the impact of the clash of generations, medium and long term change is inevitable. The lack of structure in Algerian society for independent political parties to defend their programs and projects in an open and competitive system poses a risk for the country to again pave the way for Islamism. The end of radical Islam\(^5\), as announced by some scholars was warmly celebrated by the Algerian press. Yet, if radical Islamism has thus far failed to take power and has suffered the effects of the terrorist drift of its radical fringe, it may eventually, amid social crisis and authoritarianism, represent again an outstanding alternative to changing the system.

**NOTES:**

* Mehdi Lazar is a research associate at Panthéon-Sorbonne University. M. Lazar has completed a PhD in Geography and is the author of "Qatar, une Education City" (l'Harmattan, Paris, 2012).

** Sidi-Mohammed Nehad is a French civil servant. He holds a master’s degree in North-African literature from Cergy-Pontoise University and a master’s degree in Public affairs from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris.

1. Report from the Arab Barometer on Algeria. Available at: [http://www.arabbarometer.org/reports/countryreports/algeriareport.pdf]

2. According to figures from Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (Minorities at Risk program of the University of Maryland at College Park). See the website of the University of Sherbrooke: [http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMListeConflits?type= CW].


CESRAN Papers

CESRAN Papers | No: 6 | November 2011
FREE CORSICA! A Study of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism
By James Pearson

CESRAN Papers | No: 5 | July 2011
COMPETITIVE REGULATION: Stepping Outside the Public/Private Policy Debate
By Dr. Jean-Paul Gagnon

CESRAN Papers | No: 4 | May 2011
Turkey: The Elephant in the Room of Europe
By Hüseyin Selçuk Dönmez

CESRAN Papers | No: 3 | April 2011
"Whither Neoliberalism? Latin American Politics in the Twenty-first Century"
By Jewellord (Jojo) Nem Singh

CESRAN Papers | No: 2 | March 2011
"Civil-Military Relations in Marcos' Philippines"
By Richard Lim

CESRAN Papers | No: 1 | March 2011
"The Paradox of Turkish Civil Military Relations"
By Richard Lim
ALP ÖZERDEM, @AlpOzerdem, President of CESRAN | Professor of Peacebuilding, Coventry University
ÖZGÜR TÜFEKÇİ, @OzgurTufekci, Director-General of CESRAN
HÜSREV TABAK, @husrevtabak, Member of CESRAN Executive Board
YUSUF YERKEL, @StrategicLook, Deputy Chief of the Cabinet of Turkish PM office
BÜLENT GÖKAY, @BGokay, Professor of International Relations, Keele University
AYLA GÖL, @iladylayla, Lecturer in International Politics of the Middle East Islamic Studies, Aberystwyth University
BAYRAM GÜNGÖR, @BayramGngr5, Professor at Karadeniz Technical University
İBRAHİM SİRKECI, @isirkeci, Professor of Transnational Studies and Marketing, Regent’s College
ANTONY OU, @ouantony, Political Theorist of Modern Confucianism
MAZHAR YASİN TÜYLÜOĞLU, @MazharYasin, Field Expert, The Office of Public Diplomacy of Turkish Prime Ministry
in

FILM REVIEW
Section

The Hobbit
An Unexpected Journey
By Esra Çolak
The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey

By Esra Çolak*
TURNING TO A NEVER-ENDING STORY because of the uncertainty about the director whether to be Guillermo Del Toro or or the director of The Lord of the Rings trilogy Peter Jackson and delays due to legal actions, The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey is out at last!

In 1997, John Ronald Reuel Tolkien’s “The Lord of the Rings” trilogy met more Turkish readers when it published in Turkish. After four years, the movie adaptations by the director Peter Jackson, gained a big success. This time, Peter Jackson and his crew bring the audience together with “The Hobbit” which tells a story 60 years before The Lord of the Rings and it is actually a prologue to the trilogy. In the first place, Tolkien intended to create The Hobbit for his children but then, the big achievement of the book was also unexpected by our beloved philologist himself.

The movie, which was released on 14 December in Turkey, was filmed with RED Epic cameras in 3D and with 4k definition which has four times more resolution than High Definition technology. Can not be seen in High Frame Rate 48 frames per second in Turkey, it is the first film in the world that was filmed by using this technology. Because of being two times faster than standard 24 fps, this technology creates more life-like effects. That’s why James Cameron was one of the people who watched the film in the very first place in New Zealand world premiere, since he has been also thinking about filming Avatar sequel in higher frame rate than standard 24 fps. This new technology we have just met had some positive reactions for being more life-like which makes you feel like you are living the moments rather than just watching the scenes and it had some negative reactions for being too much life-like that extinguishes fantasy world or making it clear to see the plasticity of the film studio, making you have a headache, feel dizzy/sick as well. If you remember, we also encountered these kind of discussions and different views about 3D technology when we first met it. Peter Jackson’s view was “This is a new technology and people will get used to it” as well. I wish we could watch the film in HFR to be able to claim our own impressions about it, but maybe next time... I watched 24 fps 3D and IMAX 3D versions of the film. Especially, in front of IMAX giant, it is true that the film is dizzying! But except some rapid close-up moments, it has a dizzying effect in a positive way. You can easily find yourself...
running away through the tunnels!
When we look through the content, it is not a film that cannot be critised by the Tolkien fans who think the film should stick to the book. But we have already seen this situation in The Lord of the Rings trilogy. Actually, Peter Jackson (and the screenwriters) gives his own autograph by doing this. Maybe his success underlies here. He arouses interest and curiosity and keeps alive the excitement, not only with his imagination but also with his variations. He does so to the people who read the book and even to the people who know the whole “legendarium” of Tolkien, no matter they are pleased with it or not. It is even possible to come across with the characters whose names are mentioned in the book just once or a few times, or even the characters who does not exist in The Hobbit book at all. In this way, it contains not only the incidents from The Hobbit but also the characters and elements from The Lord of the Rings, The Silmarillion which is the core of all legendarium, and history of Middle Earth in general. Therewital, Peter Jackson indicated himself that the film is also been nourished by Tolkien’s appendices especially from The Lord of the Rings and other notes. Over and above, there is another point which shouldn’t be missed that Tolkien already wrote at least three versions of the book and even thought about starting to write all over it again. From this viewpoint, it can be seen as a richness than a negativity that not adapting exactly the same from the latest version of the book but including some other different elements as well. Another critism is that there is no profoundness in dwarf characters and it is hard to distinguish them. Perhaps it can be said that it is true for the dwarves who are not in the center all the time in the book. But, we have just started the journey and we don’t know how much we will be acknowledged about which dwarf and how well we will know them yet. However, the leader of the dwarves and The Company, Thorin, seems to maintain his dominance till the end. Moreover, the actor of the character, Richard Armitage deserves appreciation with his performance and it is a matter of time for him to have a leap in his acting career. Gollum is younger, more gamer and emotional than in The Lord of the Rings. The way he expresses his emotions is successful to make laugh the audience. Of course the role of Andy Serkis who gives life to the character - and directing the second unit at the same time- is beyond argument. In addition, the another reason is that the tone of The Hobbit is not as harsh and serious as The Lord of the Rings trilogy.
The film begins with the party day before old Bilbo leaves Bag End as we saw in The Lord of the Rings. While Frodo takes the road to the woods to meet Gandalf, without knowing what will happen after all as we know from The Lord of the Rings trilogy, Bilbo starts to tell the story:
“In a hole in the ground, there lived a hobbit.”
It all starts with this. Gandalf invites this hobbit, young Bilbo, to share in an adventure. Thorin and his fellows wants to go to the Lonely Mountain and take back their treasure and homeland from dragon Smaug and Bilbo should help them as the “burglar” in this adventure. But the worst is not Smaug. Meantime, Bilbo owns the One Ring coincidentally. Gollum, who was a hobbit named Sméagol long ago, sorrows for his lost ring. Worse than this, dark and evil things are rising from the ashes while even high Elves won’t be able to know them until after 60 years. At the end, something appears long before it is expected and Smaug wakes up! What will happen next? We will see it next year.

**Note:**
* Esra Çolak can be reached at following websites: esracolak.deviantart.com; esracolak.com

---

**Film Review | By Esra Çolak**
CALL FOR CONTRIBUTION

**POLITICAL REFLECTION** welcomes contributions from scholars, students, and professionals in all aspects of international relations, politics, and political economy.

- Articles submitted should be original contributions and should not be under consideration for any other publication at the same time.
- Articles for the Magazine should be submitted via email to the following addresses: oztufekci@cesran.org; editors@cesran.org
- Author’s name, title and full address with a brief biographical note should be typed on a separate sheet.
- Authors are encouraged to submit their manuscripts by electronic means as Word format attachments in Times New Roman and 1,5 space. 12 font should be used within text while 10 font should be preferred for footnotes.
- The minimum length for Articles is 1000 words.
- Quotations should be placed within double quotation marks ("......"). Quotations larger than four lines should be indented at left margin and single-spaced. Use footnotes (not endnotes). Dates should be in the form 3 November 1996; 1995-1998; and 1990s.
- Foreign language text should always be italicized, even when lengthy. American spelling is accepted but spelling practice should be consistent throughout the article.
- If a submitted article is selected for publication, its copyright will be transferred to Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN). Published papers can be cited by giving the necessary bibliographical information. For re-publication of any article in full-text permission must be sought from the editors.
- Authors bear responsibility for their contributions. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in **Political Reflection Magazine** are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the Magazine or the CESRAN.
- Submissions whether they are published or not are not returned.
Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practitioners to engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related issues in a multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, international relations, development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.

As an international refereed e-journal, edited by a group of acclaimed scholars indicated in the Editorial Board, the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security is published at its own website http://www.cesran.org/jcts. It welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in the social sciences. Submissions in comparative analysis, with case studies and empirical research are particularly encouraged.

Prospective authors should submit 5.000 - 10.000 word articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/jcts. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:

Prof. Alpaslan ÖZERDEM - Editor-in-Chief - alpozerdem@cesran.org

Publication date: Spring issue — April
Autumn issue — October