Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Editor-in-Chief:
Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem | Coventry University, UK

Co-Managing Editors*:
Dr. David Curran | Coventry University, UK
Dr. Sung Yong Lee | University of Otago, New Zealand
Laura Payne | Coventry University, UK

Editorial Board*:
Prof. the Baroness Haleh Afshar | University of York, UK
Prof. Bruce Baker | Coventry University, UK
Dr. Richard Bowd | UNDP, Nepal
Prof. Ntuda Ebodé | University of Yaounde II, Cameroon
Prof. Scott Gates | PRIO, Norway
Dr. Antonio Giustozzi | London School of Economics, UK
Dr. Cathy Gormley-Heenan | University of Ulster, UK
Prof. Paul Gready | University of York, UK
Prof. Fen Hampson | Carleton University, Canada
Prof. Mohammed Hamza | Lund University, Sweden
Prof. Alice Hills | University of Leeds
Dr. Maria Holt | University of Westminster, UK
Prof. Alan Hunter | Coventry University, UK
Dr. Tim Jacoby | University of Manchester, UK
Dr. Khalid Khoser | Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland
Dr. William Lume | South Bank University, UK
Dr. Roger Mac Ginty | St Andrews' University, UK
Mr. Rae McGrath | Save the Children UK Somalia
Prof. Mansoob Murshed | ISS, The Netherlands
Dr. Wale Osofisan | HelpAge International, UK
Dr. Mark Pellling | King's College, UK
Prof. Mike Pugh | University of Bradford, UK
Mr. Gianni Rufini | Freelance Consultant, Italy
Dr. Mark Sedra | Centre for Int. Governance Innovation, Canada
Dr. Emanuele Sommario | Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Italy
Dr. Hans Skotte | Trondheim University, Norway
Dr. Arne Strand | CMI, Norway
Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh | University of Po, France
Dr. Mandy Turner | University of Bradford, UK
Prof. Roger Zetter | University of Oxford, UK

The Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security is published on behalf of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN) as bi-annual academic e-journal. The articles are brought into use via the website of CESRAN (www.cesran.org). CESRAN and the Editors of the Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security do not expect that readers of the review will sympathise with all the sentiments they find, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, which appears in the Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security.

* The surnames are listed in alphabetical order.
The Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) provides a platform to analyse conflict transformation and security as processes for managing change in non-violent ways to produce equitable outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. A wide range of human security concerns can be tackled by both hard and soft measures, therefore the Journal's scope not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security apparatus, reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive remnants of war and cross-border management, but also the protection of human rights, justice, rule of law and governance. JCTS explores the view that by addressing conflict transformation and security holistically it is possible to achieve a high level of stability and human security, requiring interventions at both policy and practitioner level. These would include conflict management, negotiated peace agreements, peacekeeping, physical reconstruction, economic recovery, psycho-social support, rebuilding of primary services such as education and health, and enabling social cohesion. Other macro-level governance issues from constitution writing to state accountability and human resource management also need to be considered as part of this process of change.

Peer-reviewed | Academic journal

By CESRAN International (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)
# Table of Contents

## Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gendered (In)Securities: Refugee Camps in Southeastern Turkey</td>
<td>Dr. Selin Akyüz and Dr. Bezen Balamir Coşkun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Leadership and Economic Integration: The case of the Cameroon-Gabon couple</td>
<td>Kiven James Kewir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>At War against Itself: Religious Identity, Militancy and Growing Insecurity in Northern Nigeria</td>
<td>Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Field Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Participatory Development in Myanmar’s Dry Zone Region: The Village Book</td>
<td>Janine Joyce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Book Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Building a People-oriented Security Community the ASEAN Way</td>
<td>Alvin Almendrala Camba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>The Middle East Peace Process and the EU: Foreign Policy and Security Strategy in International Politics</td>
<td>Laura Van Dievel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution and Human Needs: Linking theory and practice</td>
<td>Sezai Özçelik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Overcoming Intractability in Divided Societies, Transitional Justice</td>
<td>Dženeta Karabegović</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>The Identity Politics of Peacebuilding – Civil Society In War-Torn Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Rukshan Ratnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Formal Peace and Informal War: Security and Development in Congo</td>
<td>Janosch Kullenberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action</td>
<td>Kai Chen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Mabel González Bustelo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>‘Issues in Peace and Conflict Studies - Selections from CQ Researcher’</td>
<td>Richard Slade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CESRAN Int. is a think-tank specialising in international relations in general, and global peace, conflict and development related issues and challenges.

The main business objective/function is that we provide expertise at an international level to a wide range of policy making actors such as national governments and international organisations. CESRAN International with its provisions of academic and semi-academic publications, journals and a fully-functioning website has already become a focal point of expertise on strategic research and analysis with regards to global security and peace. The Centre is particularly unique in being able to bring together wide variety of expertise from different countries and academic disciplines.

The main activities that CESRAN International undertakes are providing consultancy services and advice to public and private enterprises, organising international conferences and publishing academic material.

Some of CESRAN International’s current publications are (www.cesran.org):

- **Journal of Global Analysis** (biannual, peer reviewed)
- **Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security** (biannual, peer reviewed)
- **International Journal of Maritime Security** (biannual, peer reviewed) - upcoming
- **Political Reflection Magazine** (quarterly news-magazine)
- CESRAN Paper Series
- **Turkey Focus Policy Brief**
- CESRAN Policy Brief
- China Focus Network
Gendered (In)Securities: Refugee Camps in Southeastern Turkey

By Dr. Selin Akyüz* and Dr. Bezen Balamir Coşkun**

Abstract

Academic literature on security and securitization has been criticized for neglecting the significance of gender as a dimension of security. Literature on security within the international relations discipline, whether in the West or in Turkey, has been inadequately engaged in analyzing the pervasive insecurities of women during armed conflicts. Instead it penetrates statist discourses on armed conflict. We argue that an examination of gender-related human (in)security issues arising as a result of the armed conflicts would enrich the literature. Through such a mode of inquiry, this article examines the conditions of Syrian refugee camps in southeastern Turkey. Using primary data collected through in-depth and semi-structured interviews with experts and members of civil society, we question how refugee settlement procedures, networks and discourses reproduce women’s (in)securities in these camps. This is critical to understanding the gender-specific social, economic and cultural barriers that create insecurities for women refugees.

Key words: Gender, Human security, Syrian refugees, Turkey, Women

* Selin Akyüz completed her doctoral studies in May 2012 in the Department of Political Science at Bilkent University, Turkey. She worked as an Assistant Professor at Zirve University, Turkey, until September 2014. Akyüz is currently conducting her research on gender and migration at University of Oxford, International Gender Studies Centre at Lady Margaret Hall. Her major research interests are critical studies on men and masculinities, gender studies, migration and contemporary social theory.

**Bezen Balamir Coşkun is an Associate Professor at Zirve University, where she has been since 2009. She is also Research Fellow at the Turkey Institute, London. She teaches international relations and international security. Her current research interests are human security, refugee policy/refugee politics and forced migration.
Introduction

The literature on security and securitization has been criticized for failing to include gender as a significant dimension through which to investigate security. Whether in the West or in Turkey, mainstream academia has neglected to engage in the analyses of women’s and men’s unique, gendered experiences of (in)securities. Whereas identity shapes “individual and collective security needs,” gender is a critical dimension, revealing particularities and enabling the researcher to capture a multi-layered framework. Tickner likewise expresses support for the “reconceptualization of security in multidimensional and multilevel terms,” enabling a shift from state-centric to an individual-centric perspective that widens the parameters of both contextual and critical frameworks. Analyzing security through gender enables a more comprehensive understanding and will contribute to productive analyses for studies on migration, in general, as well as the issue of refugees, in particular. When investigating the relations of power that affect the processes of migration, it is critical to consider gender within analyses of specific forms of insecurities and vulnerabilities both of which are experienced by men and women.

In this framework, this article seeks to explore the conditions of Syrian refugee camps in the Turkish cities of Kilis and Gaziantep with a focus on considerations of gender. It will question how bureaucratic procedures, networks and discourses reproduce gendered (in)securities in these camps. With the worsening of the Syrian civil war, and with approximately 800,000 registered refugees in Turkey, it is critical to understand the gender-specific social, economic and cultural barriers that produce insecurities for refugees. The political science and international relations literature on refugees offers very little on the gendered nature of representations of the refugee and its intersections with insecurities. Especially, the literature underemphasizes the relationality of gender. For an analysis of gender, and also any inquiry that problematizes gender, it is not possible to understand categories of masculinity and femininity without reference to both genders. Yet there are few studies that highlight the relational dimension of gender. Scholars who study migration and human security with a gender lens have often neglected masculinities and masculinized realms.
This study attempts to provide a broader picture of gendered insecurities. Existing gradients of gender inequality have predominantly affected women, as field reports have proven. However, a gendered analysis of human insecurities should not replicate existing readings of women as victims and men as violators. Johnson critically argues that although women and their victimized status within the cycle of migration have been added to the literature, it remains to capture the particularities experienced by women as women, which has been taken up as an undifferentiated category. The insecurities of women were broadly defined in their performance of reproductive roles and domestic tasks. Johnson states that “the refugee is ... imagined as a depoliticized victim emblematized by a third world woman and child.” The parochial framing of gender in general, and women in particular, in such representations determines how we engage with them and denies the agency of women.

This article will also examine the discourses produced by experts on the conditions of refugee camps, the proliferation of a particular image of the refugee as well as the roles played by such representations within our understanding of state policies for dealing with refugees as they intersect with gendered identities. Experts from a diverse range of international, national and local agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in Gaziantep, a city in southeast Turkey, were interviewed. An examination of how these experts approach gender is critical in tracking how the various structures of refugee camps and bureaucratic regimes are produced and reproduced. As this study examines gendered implications of refugees and the camps through the experts’ understanding, it only interviews those elites who have lead the process. A complementary study that analyzes refugees and their construction of gender identity through their own positioning would contribute to the literature and offer a more integrated picture. We hope that this study can be considered as a first step in an understanding of the dynamics of the field, offering the main outline of the research topic.

Responding to the growing numbers of refugees, local branches of state agencies are diligently contributing to the day-to-day operations of the refugee camps. The Governorship in Gaziantep and the Disaster and Emergency Management Agency of the Government of Turkey (AFAD) are just two local governmental agencies whose staff were interviewed as a part of this study. Both share in the responsibilities for the daily operations of refugee camps in Turkey.

Besides the Governorship in Gaziantep and AFAD, many international NGOs are actively participating in the work being done in Gaziantep, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). No doubt the most widely recognized of all the organizations currently operating in Gaziantep, UNHCR established an office there to lead and coordinate international action aimed at the protection of refugees. In addition to the

---

7. Johnson, “Click to Donate”, 1031.
8. ibid., 1016.
9. According to UNCHR data by August 2014 there are 822,500 registered Syrians in Turkey, 33,141 of them live in camps in and around Gaziantep. It is estimated that in Gaziantep there are 200,000 Syrians who do not live in camps.
UNHCR, other humanitarian aid organizations operating in Gaziantep include Mercy Corps, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Norwegian Rescue Committee (NRC), the Irish Humanitarian Aid Agency (GOAL), and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Along with these international humanitarian aid agencies, several Turkish aid agencies have established offices in Gaziantep. The Istanbul-based Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) is the most well-known of these organizations.

Extensive interviews were conducted with consenting staff from among the Gaziantep branches of state agencies and NGOs. To complement the data gathered from formal interviews with these experts, an additional interview was conducted with an academic consultant specializing in the Syrian refugee crisis and who was conducting trauma trainings for Syrian refugees. Within this framework, seven open ended in-depth interviews were conducted with leading experts working on the plight of Syrian refugees and who aim to apply a human security perspective to negotiate the challenges of migration flow and present a more nuanced image of the woman refugee.

This study first offers an analysis of the intersections of gender and human (in)securities. The second part discusses the refugee question in Turkey. The final part critically examines the data collected from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with experts from local units, as well as national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs and INGOs).

**Security, Human Security and Gendering Insecurities**

Defining security has never been an easy task. The answer to the question of what security is differs according to disciplines, theory, practices and geographies. Security can be defined in many different settings with quite disparate meanings. As the Syrian refugee issue is primarily considered one of international security by the international community, we present and critique a traditional definition of security that predominates within the sector.

Traditional approaches to international security place the state at the center of security apparatuses. These explanations of security focus on the accumulation of power by states for their own sake. Thus, this traditional security approach in international relations examines the issues from the perspective of state security and self-interest. This limited definition of security stems from a privileging of Cold War era concerns and has since been challenged with the collapse of orientations suggesting a bipolar balance of power. The post-Cold War era has brought with it new actors, challenges and issues to the international system. Ultimately, with the inclusion of the concerns of non-state actors and non-state security challenges, the definition of security has been broadened. New security sectors and security objects have been included in global security paradigms, such as environmental security, human security, economic security, societal security, energy security and cyber security. Within this context, individuals and societies have been framed as objects of the international security agenda.

The term human security emerged in the post-Cold War era to incorporate humanitarian, economic, and social issues as a part of the agenda of global security: to alleviate human suffering and promote/ensure the security of individuals. Human security emphasizes a
people-centered approach to resolving inequities that affect security. Today, security is no longer simply about the security of nation-states; rather, the security of the individual is seen as directly impacting the security of the state, and vice versa. Human security has received a particularly warm welcome from international agencies and academics. Among the international community, with the introduction of the human development index the United Nations (UN) has taken the initiative to introduce a human element within international security.

As opposed to the traditional security approach, which focuses on national security and/or state security, human security instead concentrates on the protection of people while promoting peace and assuring sustainable, continuous development. As stated by Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the Foreword to Human Security and the New Diplomacy (2001):

> Today, we know that “security” means far more than the absence of conflict. We also have a greater appreciation for nonmilitary sources of conflict. We know that lasting peace requires a broader vision encompassing areas such as education and health, democracy and human rights, protection against environmental degradation, and the proliferation of deadly weapons. We know that we cannot be secure amidst starvation, that we cannot build peace without alleviating poverty, and that we cannot build freedom on foundations of injustice. These pillars of what we now understand as the people-centered concept of “human security” are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.  

Inaugurated by the announcement of its Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the UN has attempted to codify the scope of human security. The United Nations Commission on Human Security defines three different types of freedoms in its aspiration to fulfill human security: the freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. The Commission’s report underlines a number of key concerns, including: individuals experiencing violent conflict, refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs), integrated assistance in post-conflict situations, extreme poverty and sudden economic downturns, health care, basic education and public information. At present, human security has entered the daily vocabulary of government officials, military and non-government personnel, humanitarian aid workers, and policymakers. Though the importance of protecting human beings for international security has ultimately been recognized, the manner in which such protections are to be implemented is proving difficult.

The inclusion of a humanitarian element within international security paradigms has led to raised questions regarding the lack of a gender element in security studies. Recent research by international policy experts argues that a community cannot achieve sustainable peace without placing women’s security at the center of its concerns as absolutely critical. International efforts to reduce terrorism and war have been blurred by a general neglect of the significant roles played by women in communities experiencing both violence and peace.

10. Annan, Foreword to Human Security and the New Diplomacy, xix.
According to Leigh Cuen, conflicts in the Middle East cannot be resolved without the engagement of women and confronting sexual violence. Cuen discusses Syria as a current example of the ways in which women are specifically targeted in war. The Women’s Media Center, which collects data on instances of violence against women in Syria, highlights the use of rape as a form of collective violence against men and women, as a weapon against detainees and prisoners, and at checkpoints. However, each of these cases was largely ignored in reports on the violence.

It has further been argued that even an attention to human security neglects the dynamic of gender in its analysis. Feminist scholars, including Ann Tickner (1992), Spike Peterson (1998) and Lene Hansen (2000), development agencies, and the UN alike emphasize the need to include gender within current understandings of security. Many feminists including Tickner (1992) and Enloe (2000) argue that the neglect of gender by mainstream theories of international relations has resulted in a narrow conception of security while failing to account for the changing realities faced by international relations. Moreover, feminist scholars of international relations argue that “new threats to security demand new solutions quite at odds with the power politics prescriptions of traditional international relations theory.”

Realism, which continues to maintain its “state-centric, militaristic” definition of security, emanates from a masculine bias inherent in the theory. Feminist scholars have further argued that the masculine bias inherent in the theory prevents us from viewing the whole picture with respect to security, seeing only “a partial view of reality.” Similarly, Hansen criticizes the “blank spots in the Copenhagen School’s speech act framework, which prevent the inclusion of gender.” Hansen called these blank spots “security as silence” and “subsuming security” problems. According to Hansen, “security as silence occurs when insecurity cannot be voiced, when raising something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat being faced,” while subsuming security “arises because gendered security problems often involve an intimate inter-linkage between the subject’s gendered identity and other aspects of the subject’s identity.” In this regard, gender rarely produces collective, self-contained referential objects.

Gender considerations allow us to identify the vulnerabilities of both women and men. Hence gender, as a relational construct, is relevant to the security of both men and women. Research underlines the specific security threats that each gender group faces. For instance, gender has been inconsistently incorporated into security analyses, threat and vulnerability assessments and consequent mitigation strategies within humanitarian and development organizations.

13. ibid.
14. Tickner, Gender in International Relations, 20.
15. Hoogensen and Rottem, “Gender and Identity”.
16. Tickner, Gender in International Relations.
18. ibid.
As historical and existing gradients of gender inequality have predominantly affected women, human security policies and practices tend to stress the particular needs and vulnerabilities of women. More positively, the plight of women is receiving increasing attention and support from the international community. The UN Security Council, for example, adopted Resolution 1325 in 2000 on women, peace and security. This development represents a “high-level recognition of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, called for effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection, and urged the adoption of a gender perspective in peace agreements and related actions.”²¹

Despite the alleged ordered nature of the state, women are often the targets of violence, which stems from “a gendered society in which male power dominates at all levels.”²² Feminist theorists have revealed the failure of the traditional nation-state in serving as providers of security by “focusing on the consequences of what happens during wars rather than on their causes.”²³ This study picks the issue of refugees to discuss the lack of gender perspective in the politics of human security. In this study, it is argued that it is significant to add a gender lens to the analysis of different forms of insecurities and vulnerabilities for both men and women refugees.

Securing Refugees: Mainstreaming Gender as part of Refugee Protection

Ideally, national security and human security should be mutually constitutive, but over the last century countless individuals have lost their lives as a consequence of the actions of their own governments or rebel forces in civil wars. Acting in pursuit of national security, bureaucratic and governmental technologies and regimes pose profound threats to human security.

Furthermore, when the state is an actor in the conflict, the individual identified as an opponent is unable to receive any protection from the state. Thus, internal plight may provide little help. Cognizant of this failing of the state, millions of people seek protection abroad as refugees and asylum seekers.²⁴ According to the UNCHR data there were 10.4 million refugees at the beginning of 2013.²⁵ The number of Syrian refugees has risen quickly since the start of hostilities in 2011. In this regard, the plight of refugees and internally displaced people must be placed at the top of the international human security agenda.

Refugees fleeing from human insecurities as a result of state action become caught in a continuum of insecurity.²⁶ The figure of the refugee becomes compressed into bureaucratically determined categories of security/insecurity. Even though these categories are defined normatively by the UN and individual states, the discourse referring to the condition of being a refugee has been politically constructed. However, the intersection of refugee and security requires an approach that examines individual concerns: how does

²² Tickner, Gender in International Relations, 58.
²³ Tickner, Gendering World Politics.
²⁴ Guild, Security and Migration.
²⁶ Bigot, “Detention of Foreigners”.

Gendered (In)Securities: Refugee Camps in Southeastern Turkey

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security
refugee, as an individual and not a category of persons, fit into a set of structural frameworks?27

Refugee status has been applied to persons who are outside their country of origin due to armed conflict, violence, and political aggression and who, therefore, require international protection. For instance, within international law, refugees are given a special status in international law. Article 1A(2) of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as “a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”

Gender, however, is not included in the language provided by the international definition of a refugee as “a person with a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a social group” by the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. From a position of considering human security, the issue of the refugee paved the way for international agencies to include gender as part of the politics of refugee regimes. Within this context, there exist policy recommendations in the relevant UN instruments by applying existing concepts, such as citizenship, nationality, refugee, displaced person, etc. with an attunement to gender.28

The ideal organization of refugee protection programs requires a consideration of gender. Moreover, gender neutrality should be taken into account as a means of mitigating the social differences occurring between men and women. Pursuing this line of thinking, some agencies actually demonstrate a clear preference for gender-neutral policies and procedures. However, in practice, refugee policies today emphasize the victimhood of women and children. In her article Click to Donate (2011), Heather Johnson analyses three shifts in the imagination of the refugee that have contributed to changing the policies and practices of the refugee regime: racialization, victimization and feminization. Tracing the history of the contemporary refugee regime through an analysis of the pictures and images of refugees, Johnson argues that “as the refugee has been racialized and victimized, she has also been feminized.”29

International organizations’ and governments’ emphasis on the victimhood of women refugees have also been reflected in NGO practices. To question the modes of governance employed by NGOs in the settlement of refugees, Alice Szczepanikova criticizes NGOs as becoming ‘subcontractors’ of states or the United Nations. She highlights the micro politics of NGO assistance to refugees in the Czech Republic, but also emphasizes the gendered character of refugee protection regimes. She concludes that public representations depoliticize refugees and foster unequal power relations. For Szczepanikova, such representations “lock refugees in a position of clients lacking political means of influencing their place in receiving society.”30

29. Johnson, “Click to Donate”, 1016
30. Szczepanikova, “Performing Refugeeeness in Czech Republic”, 461
The problematic nature of the overwhelming need for protection of refugee women and children has brought the international community's focus on women. Through images and its discourse, the international community has emphasized human security threats. For example stories of refugee and displaced women under threat of rape when searching for firewood or refugee women forced to provide sexual favors in exchange for obtaining food rations proliferate across academic papers and official reports. According to Johnson, the change in the representation of the figure of the refugee has been strategic, “to mobilize public support and concern for the plight of refugees within a humanitarian discourse and at the same time to manage the threat of instability and difference presented by the refugees condition of statelessness.”

The construction of the refugee as a victimized woman has depoliticized the refugee. In spite of works criticizing the denial of political agency within the refugee regime and calls for a gendered analysis for more effective policy, we have few studies on the gendered nature of refugee representation and what these representations produce.

The condition of refugeehood affects women and men, old and young, and changes the lives of these individuals dramatically. Not only are families and households dispersed and dismembered, the very social fabric of these communities faces irreparable damage. The experience of refugeehood presents not only a profound disruption of ordinary life, but also creates possibilities for the (re)construction and (re)negotiation of gender as a vital part of identity construction. One of the problems with policies to support women refugees lies in the failure of the realization of gender sensitivity. Since the early 1990s, the UNHCR has identified refugee women as a policy priority. In spite of these efforts, the problematic construction of the discourse on women refugees remains intact. Hansen argues that those constrained in their ability to speak about their security/insecurity are prevented from becoming “subjects worthy of consideration and protection,” which serves as the basis of a wider criticism of the ways in which the voice of women refugees is ignored. In this regard, Freedman argues:

[…] the NGOs and associations that make claims for gender-specific policies and legislation do so on behalf of refugee and asylum-seeking women, but these women themselves have little or no voice in the process. Speaking for women asylum seekers and refugees leads to representations and framings of them which rely heavily on pre-existing cultural norms, (...) which contain these women in their role of victims.

To overcome these problems scholars and practitioners suggest the adoption of ‘gender mainstreaming’ as a principle to go beyond a mere focus on ‘vulnerable’ groups and to integrate a gendered understanding of the global processes that aim to protect refugees. In

31. Johnson, “Click to Donate”, 1016
34. Grabska, “Constructing Modern Gendered Civilized”.
the early 2000s, the UNHCR initiated bottom-up, community-based and participatory approaches in contrast to the previously top-down approach to refugees. These policies were intended to improve the efficiency, quality and appropriateness of refugee protection by mainstreaming gender. However, mainstreaming is a contested concept and is difficult to implement in practical terms. Jahan distinguishes two types of gender mainstreaming: integrative and transformative. Integrative mainstreaming simply incorporates gender into existing policy frameworks. Transformative mainstreaming, on the other hand, provides avenues through which to transform these frameworks and introduce new understandings. Freedman evaluates the UNCHR’s approach as an ‘integrative’ one, “which has not fundamentally shifted understandings or representations of refugees and asylum seekers and, in particular, has not moved away from a discourse concerning the ‘vulnerability’ of women.” Similarly, based on her ethnographic fieldwork in a Sudanese refugee camp, Grabska discusses the problems arising from the bottom-up approach of the UN in terms of mainstreaming gender in refugee camp conditions. She lists several obstacles that impede gender-mainstreaming programs:

1. The hierarchical power relations that define the camp settings made it highly challenging to introduce (gender) equality,
2. The simplified and homogenized view of (refugee) women as ‘victims’ or ‘survivors’ and men as ‘perpetrators’ and ‘violators’;
3. The inherent biases and personal value systems of humanitarian workers.

Through this framework we can analyze refugee camps in Southeast Turkey and question gendered (in)securities.

Refugee Camps in Southeast Turkey: A Critical Analysis of Gendered (In)Securities

Though Turkey is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it holds a geographical limitation under Article 1(B). In accordance with this limitation, Turkey is not obligated to apply the Convention to refugees from outside Europe. Under the framework of the 1994 Asylum Regulation, amended in 2006 and supplemented by a government directive, Turkey began to provide non-European refugees with “temporary asylum-seeker status” and permission to remain in the country until such a time as the UNHCR would be able to present more lasting solutions for them elsewhere. Since 2005, the Turkish government has been building an asylum system in line with international standards.

Since the initial outbreak of protests for democratic reforms, women, men and children have continued to flee from Syria. The numbers of such refugees have increased concurrently with the escalation of the civil war. Syrian refugees have fled in search of safety to the surrounding countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. By early June 2011, thousands of Syrian

---

39. Freedman, “Mainstreaming Gender”.
40. Jahan, “The Elusive Agenda”
41. Freedman, “Mainstreaming Gender”
43. UNHCR, Country Operations Profile: Turkey.
refugees had already fled across the Turkish border and taken shelter in tent cities in Hatay - Yayladağı, Altınözü and Reyhanlı. Along with the worsening of the war, the number of tent and container cities of refugees have also been on the rise. By the end of June 2014, there were 16 tent cities and 6 container cities for approximately 220,000 out of the 820,000 Syrian refugees registered in Turkey. In 2012, over 100,000 Syrians received protection and assistance in camps managed directly by the Turkish government, which has adopted a temporary-protection regime for all Syrians in the country. The coordination of camps and many refugee-related issues are dealt with directly by the Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate (AFAD). With local offices in each province, the AFAD bears primary responsibility for the day-to-day organization of refugee camps in Turkey. The UNHCR staff has also provided technical advice and support to the Turkish authorities in coping with the Syrian refugee crisis as experienced within its borders.

Since the beginning of the civil war, Turkey, which shares an 822 km-long border with Syria, has been among the most powerful critics of Assad’s regime and has directly felt the crisis. The Turkish government adopted an open door policy for refugees fleeing from the regime and referred to them as guests, rather than refugees. A guest, however, is not an internationally-recognized classification for refugee, thus creating gaps in legal arrangements and is a determining factor for a critical analysis of (in)securities as it refers to how the system interpellates them.

Legal status is very critical. Everything is organized according to their legal status. The open door policy of the Turkish government is a success. The ones who fled their country during the Gulf War did not face such a friendly attitude—the application is quite different towards Syrians. According to the main point in refugee law, the door should be open to the ones who have fled their country. However, while they have opened the doors for Syrians they have closed them for NGOs, researchers, and media. They are not refugees, they are our guests is an empty expression in national and international law. Until a meeting in Geneva, the politicians used that expression, then, after that, they began to use “temporary protection.” Today, everyone uses different expressions, such as refugee, guest, and asylum seeker. This creates a legal gap.

The initial and very critical problem for refugees, as illuminated by the above quote, is their unclear legal status and security. The classification of these individuals related with the problem of legal status creates the basis for the reproduction of insecurities—whereas one categorization can provide security and a guarantee, still another classification can strip them of any legal bearing. Such an ambiguous position and discourse refers to the state of being a ‘guest’ other than a refugee and, at various times, prevents official acknowledgment by either national or international law. This obscurity is the main determinant related to the insecure identity construction of refugees, as such, representations are a key component of how refugee identity and also policies are written, read and understood. Such a political procedure determines their undefined status and threatens their agency as subjects.

Another procedure that reproduces gendered insecurities is the lodging assignments within the camps. In addition to placements based on family status and efforts made to maintain

44. Director of an NGO, Gaziantep, 09 April 2013, personal interview
family units, our interlocutors highlighted the problem of privacy within the camps. Refugees are assigned their places in the tent and container cities according to family status. Single refugees, for instance, are placed in a different part of the camps, as a local representative of a state agency noted. “The placements are also organized according to the principle of family unity. They are staying in tents suitable for 5-6 persons. Moreover, one of the policies followed by the AFAD is that the tents of extended families are joined.”

The representative of the AFAD claims that the organization of tents and refugees is suitable, while the representatives of NGOs and various consultants have criticized the system. “Privacy is a huge problem in tents. Restrooms and bathrooms are not well designed. For instance, after having a shower, a woman should not walk around a man. It is shameful. Families and single ones are so close in tent cities. It is not good. That’s the main reason why girls are raped.”

Another expert from an NGO working primarily on refugees in Turkey further criticized the proximity of the tents. According to this volunteer, “the tents are very close to each other. It is not appropriate for the privacy of families in Turkish culture, and especially in Syrian culture, which is much more conservative.” The concern for individual privacy, especially for women and single girls, constitutes a threat to their security.

The view and imagination of women as victims and as vulnerable individuals create and compound barriers by framing them as cultural obstacles. The conservative structure of Syrian families and the existing vulnerability of women, especially girls, coupled with their disadvantaged positions, make the refugee experience for women far more precarious and contingent, in part due to the added insecurities produced by the very structures and organization of the refugee camps themselves. Refugee camps are meant to be idealized places of safe haven, of a joining together of people facing the same threats, except that women then also face insecurities in these zones as well.

The powerful, religious networks within the camps were extraordinarily influential in the lives of the camp refugees. According to the civil society volunteer who was interviewed “as it is a close and conservative society imams [leaders of the Muslim community] are very influential. They are advising or sometimes indoctrinating the refugees and they are really powerful.” However, access to the imams was limited only to men. Each of the NGO workers and volunteers we interviewed pointed out how active men are in the religious and political life of the camps. “Men are very active. They are crossing the border and going to fight each day” argued an NGO volunteer. Women, on the other hand, are generally performing within their traditional gender roles and carrying out their domestic labors. Such work, as mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters, prevent them from actively participating in any decision-making processes. Though promoting an active role for men, such division of labor obstructs women from exercising their agency as political subjects. In line with Baines’ argument, the isolation

45. Local representative of state agency (AFAD), Gaziantep, 09 April 2013, personal interview
46. NGO volunteer, Gaziantep, 09 May 2013, personal interview
47. NGO expert, Gaziantep, 03 March 2013, personal interview
48. NGO volunteer, Gaziantep, 09 May 2013, personal interview
49. NGO volunteer, Gaziantep, 09 May 2013, personal interview
of women from the cycle of refugee movement reproduces “(...) refugee women as particularly vulnerable and in need, [the] female refugee has been depoliticized.”\textsuperscript{50}

She has been further victimized due to her role as mother, by equating her solely in terms of her care for children. “Women are very busy with their domestic tasks, especially because there are so many children around. The main image of the camps for me is children. There are also orphans. Women are responsible for taking care of them. They do not have time for much else.”\textsuperscript{51} Another NGO worker similarly added “life is very tough for women, which depends on her marital status and age. It also depends on the number of children and other relatives that she is charged with taking care of.”\textsuperscript{52} This line of argument couples women with children in a traditional mothering role. For Johnson, “(...) [the] cliché of women and children serves to identify men as the norm\textsuperscript{53} and tends to ignore women’s agency.

Another powerful network that reproduces insecurities is that of refugees’ ideological positions and sectarian differences. “They do not trust each other. They feel such a threat”\textsuperscript{54}. The refugees are afraid of being scrutinized about their position towards Assad’s regime. Although the majority of refugees are against the regime, they do not feel comfortable identifying themselves in either case.

They are generally against the regime. I asked them and [they] told me that we are against the regime. The ones who are not against do not dare declare themselves. Also, I heard that they did not trust each other long before the uprisings as well. Assad delegated civil police among neighbors, who acted as spies. So, Syrians, especially the ones in camps, in a vulnerable position, can hardly trust each other.\textsuperscript{55}

In addition to this ideological segmentation that fosters unease among the refugees, another critical insecurity is reflected in sectarian differences. The most dramatic example took place in Antakya, where a car bombing in May 2013 killed more than fifty people and injured more than one hundred. “The problems are not same between Antakya and Gaziantep that have majority of camps. For instance in Antakya there are Alawites. Sectarian differences act in a negative way.”\textsuperscript{56} The civil society volunteer highlighted the problem of sects as well. For him, “the most difficult case is that of Antakya. There are Alawites and when refugees are coming to the city, they felt threatened. It’s just because of sectarian differences.”\textsuperscript{57} Therefore, the dynamics of relationships between religious sects also produces insecurity for refugees. Moreover, in line with the main concern of the article, from the perspective of gender, the experts who have touched upon the bombing incident during the interviews memorialized women and children with sorrow mentioning “innocent women and children died”\textsuperscript{58}.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Baines} Baines, “Vulnerable Bodies”, viii.
\bibitem{Academic consultant and trauma trainer, Gaziantep} Academic consultant and trauma trainer, Gaziantep, 05 June 2013, personal interview
\bibitem{NGO volunteer, Gaziantep} NGO volunteer, Gaziantep, 09 May 2013, personal interview
\bibitem{Johnson} Johnson, “Click to Donate”, 1032.
\bibitem{NGO director, Gaziantep} NGO director, Gaziantep, 09 April 2013, personal interview
\bibitem{Academic consultant and trauma trainer, Gaziantep} Academic consultant and trauma trainer, Gaziantep, 05 June 2013, personal interview
\bibitem{NGO director, Gaziantep} NGO director, Gaziantep, 09 April 2013, personal interview
\bibitem{NGO volunteer, Gaziantep} NGO volunteer, Gaziantep, 09 May 2013, personal interview
\bibitem{NGO director, Gaziantep} NGO director, Gaziantep, 09 April 2013, personal interview; NGO volunteer, Gaziantep, 09 May 2013, personal interview; Academic consultant and trauma trainer, Gaziantep, 05 June 2013, personal interview
\end{thebibliography}
men died as a result of this bombing as well, “the cliché of woman and children”\(^59\) has reified itself in this discourse and victimized them.\(^60\) Such understanding of victimizing women suffuses the discourses of elites and spontaneously reveals how the understanding of women refugees as emblemized victims of migration cycle is apparent. For instance, none of the pictures displayed on the UNHCR’s website contain women alone, but nearly all of the pictures include children or “cliché of women and children”\(^61\). It can be argued that these images are instructive in the development of a refugee image and in implementing policies. As Johnson states “to construct a representation is an act of power, representations are fundamentally political.”\(^62\)

In this framework, gender operates on multiple spatial and social scales across terrains. The final determinant of gendered geographies of power lies in individuals’ “agency as initiators,” hence, the question of who controls the process is one that determines gendered geographies.\(^63\) In this framework, it is crucial to consider gendered differences and to analyze individuals’ gendered agency. It is critical to surface the voice of women. The imagery of the experts is generally based on assumptions about women’s incidental needs, while their own voices should be available and present. What is essential is to locate women’s own positioning that embrace particularities and differences instead of the singular gender understanding of NGOs which is parochial.

**Conclusion**

With the inclusion of a gender perspective into concerns of traditional security, in general, and the human security perspective, in particular, “the danger of masking differences under the rubric of the term human” has been challenged.\(^64\) Unmasking these differences has not only enabled the researchers to understand security, but also to capture its particularities. Analyzing refugee camps in Southeast Turkey through a gender lens has offered a framework to detect multidimensional gendered insecurities.

Taking the refugee as depoliticized, victimized or as an object of study, limits the boundaries of critical analysis and hinders the exploration of the multiple interactions that make up transnational processes. There is a need to go beyond the hierarchical and inherently homogenized view of the refugee, as argued by Grabska, and to transform the avenues in contrast to the silencing of gendered experiences.

---

59. Johnson, “Click to Donate”.
60. See Carpenter for a detailed analysis on the discursive rhetoric on innocent women and children. The writer offers a comprehensive analysis on the influence of gender norms on international regime protecting war affected civilians.
61. Johnson, “Click to Donate”.
62. Johnson, “Click to Donate”, 1017.
63. ibid., 816
64. ibid., 157
Bibliography

Baines, E.K, Vulnerable Bodies: Gender, the UN and the Global Refugee Crisis, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004.


Martin, S. F. Women and Migration Report prepared for Consultative Meeting on Migration and Mobility and How This Movement Affects Women, United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, 2-4 December 2003.


POLITICAL REFLECTION welcomes contributions from scholars, students, and professionals in all aspects of international relations, politics, and political economy.

♦ Articles submitted should be original contributions and should not be under consideration for any other publication at the same time.
♦ Articles for the Magazine should be submitted via email to the following addresses: oztufekci [at] cesran.org; editors [at] cesran.org
♦ Author’s name, title and full address with a brief biographical note should be typed on a separate sheet.
♦ Authors are encouraged to submit their manuscripts by electronic means as Word format attachments in Times New Roman and 1,5 space. 12 font should be used within text while 10 font should be preferred for footnotes.
♦ The minimum length for Articles is 1000 words.
♦ Quotations should be placed within double quotation marks ("……"). Quotations larger than four lines should be indented at left margin and single-spaced. Use footnotes (not endnotes). Dates should be in the form 3 November 1996; 1995-1998; and 1990s.
♦ Foreign language text should always be italicized, even when lengthy. American spelling is accepted but spelling practice should be consistent throughout the article.
♦ If a submitted article is selected for publication, its copyright will be transferred to Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN). Published papers can be cited by giving the necessary bibliographical information. For re-publication of any article in full-text permission must be sought from the editors.
♦ Authors bear responsibility for their contributions. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in Political Reflection Magazine are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the Magazine or the CESRAN.
♦ Submissions whether they are published or not are not returned.
Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) is for academics, policy makers and practitioners to engage in discussions on a wide range of peace, conflict and human security related issues in a multidisciplinary forum with contributions from political science, security studies, international relations, development studies, post-conflict reconstruction studies, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.

As an international refereed e-journal, edited by a group of acclaimed scholars indicated in the Editorial Board, the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security is published at its own website http://www.cesran.org/jcts. It welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in the social sciences. Submissions in comparative analysis, with case studies and empirical research are particularly encouraged.

Prospective authors should submit 5.000 - 10.000 word articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/jcts. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:

Prof. Alpaslan ÖZERDEM - Editor-in-Chief - alpozerdem@cesran.org

Publication date:  
Spring issue — April  
Autumn issue — October
Leadership and Economic Integration: The case of the Cameroon-Gabon couple

By Kiven James Kewir*

Abstract

Sub-regional economic integration offers benefits to members, including new trade opportunities, larger markets, an increase in bargaining power and increased competition. However these benefits are yet to become a reality in Central Africa, close to five decades since the creation of the first regional economic scheme (UDEAC) in the sub-region and almost two decades after it was replaced by the current Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). This paper examines the role of leadership in economic integration. Using specific criteria for determining economic leadership in integration, it shows that there is a strong potential for joint leadership by Cameroon and Gabon within CEMAC. Yet it reveals that this potential is plagued by several challenges, which can be overcome through the joint initiation and sponsorship of sustainable business initiatives, likely to attract investments in other projects.

Key Words: Leadership, Joint leadership, Economic integration

*The author is a visiting lecturer fellow of the Institute for Governance, Humanities and Social Sciences at the Pan-African University, Yaoundé, Cameroon and a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Buea, Cameroon. He was awarded a Ph.D of Political Science from the University of Yaoundé Il Soa, Cameroon in December 2012. His main research theme is how regional integration can serve as a vehicle for conflict resolution in Central Africa. He is the co-author of “Elections and conflict prevention in post conflict societies” (Journal Article) and “Rethinking Regional Security in Central Africa: the Case of the Central African Republic,” (Conference paper).
Introduction

Economic integration is not a new phenomenon in the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) zone. Some authors like Gankou and Ntah, 1 trace the origins of integration to the Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF), during the period of French colonial rule. Others like Mayer have argued that the idea of a Central African sub-region dates back to the German colonial era. 2 Quite apart from this association of the origins of integration with the colonial past of CEMAC states, N’Kodia argues that the experience of integration in Central Africa is ‘the result of the progressive assertion of a pan-African conscience and the quest for independence born out of colonisation’. 3

Whichever position one takes, it is clear that there is a strong historical basis for integration among CEMAC states. It is thus understandable that the first formal economic integration scheme among independent states of Central Africa, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), was created only four years after independence. The treaty establishing UDEAC was signed on the 8 December 1964 in Congo Brazzaville and entered into force on the 1 January 1966. 4 The main objectives of UDEAC were to liberalise trade among members and adopt a common external tariff for non-members. It also aimed at harmonising investment and industrial policies. As a sub-regional project, it was the oldest in Central Africa and one of the most ambitious. 5 UDEAC however failed to meet its objectives and was replaced in 1994 by CEMAC.

The treaty instituting CEMAC was signed on the 16 March 1994 by Cameroon, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Chad, the CAR and Equatorial Guinea. This treaty entered into force in December 1999. 6 The main objectives of the CEMAC are to strengthen relations between member states and promote a spirit of solidarity within the sub-region, and to promote national markets

---

through the elimination obstacles to trade, the coordination of development programs, the harmonization of industrial projects and the creation of a common market.

Almost two decades after its creation CEMAC has also not delivered on its objectives. Several reasons have been advanced for the poor performance of economic integration within the CEMAC framework. The main reasons advanced include the absence of community identity, the weak nature of the economies, devaluation and structural adjustment, debt burden, and the near absence of sub-regional leadership. Of these, I argue that the near absence of leadership appears to play a determining role.

Lessons from other parts of the world show that leadership plays a very central role in the development of a regional integration scheme. In Europe, Germany and France have played a determining role. In West Africa, the leading role of Nigeria has been important for the development of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while Senegal and Ivory Coast have constituted the centre of stimulus for the more restricted West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). But this is not the case in the CEMAC zone. Here, no state or couple of states has assumed a leadership role. It appears evident that Cameroon and Gabon can jointly exercise leadership, because history and natural endowment give this couple the potential for stewardship in the sub-region that cannot be associated with any other pair. However they are yet to do so, partly as a result of obstacles originating with the two states and other member states of CEMAC as well as some extra-regional players, particularly France.

This paper thus seeks to ascertain the pertinence of leadership for the advancement of integration in the CEMAC zone, the potential of Gabon-Cameroon couple and the obstacles to the leadership of this duo in the sub-region. The study is qualitative. Hegemonic stability theory is used as the framework for analysis. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 clarifies key concepts and sets the theoretical framework. In section 3 the relationship between leadership and regional economic integration is examined. Section 4 discusses the leadership strengths of the Gabon-Cameroon couple, while section 5 delves on the obstacles to the leadership of Gabon-Cameroon couple. The conclusion and policy implications of the study, including possible limitations, are examined in the final section.

Clarification of Concepts and Theoretical Framework

The idea of leadership in integration, also referred to as hegemony, was introduced in international relations through neorealism and hegemonic stability theory. Manning and Curtis define leadership as ‘initiating and guiding’ for change. To them leadership has been behind every wave of political history. In the realm of interstate relations leadership can be considered as the development and use of both hard power (in the form of military and

8. The word hegemony comes from the Greek word egeomonia, which itself comes from egeom meaning 'leader, ruler, often in the sense of a state other than his own' (Williams; 1977: 144)
economic capabilities) and soft power (includes cultural and ideological assets) by one or more states to influence the behaviour of neighbouring states, or states in an integration arrangement, in a desired manner. Although most scholars have focused on the use of these forms of power, the development of economic resources in itself may be enough to influence the behaviour of other states who may be interested in benefiting from such development. Joint leadership is a situation where typically two states make and implement policies with the aim of influencing policies in neighbouring states. In other words, two states use their power resources to influence other states in an integration scheme to meet shared goals. The aggregation of power by two states makes more resources available for the integration project and thus increases the chances of success.

Regional integration is the process or situation where countries in a defined geographical area voluntarily surrender their sovereignty in one or more areas to carry out specific transactions, in view of achieving a goal(s) or enjoying specific benefits to a higher degree than they would individually. When the area of cooperation envisaged is trade, it is called regional economic integration. Economic integration traditionally has taken the form of removing trade barriers between member states.

Literature on regional integration reveals that leadership has played a determining role in the success of integration. Hegemonic stability theory is particularly suitable for studying the role of leadership in integration efforts. According to proponents of hegemonic stability theory like Gilpin, Ikenberry, and Kindleberger, the presence of a hegemon favours the development of cooperation ties. A hegemonic state is a state that in the period under study has the necessary power (economic, political, military) and the will to create a stable global environment (in the place of the pre-existing anarchy) through the establishment of a global system of principles and rules that secure world order. This global system is of course reflecting the principles and the interests of the hegemonic state. Although originally set for the global level the theory has been increasingly used to explain cooperation at the regional level. Sotirous, for example, has argued that hegemonic stability theory, ‘can provide a successful explanatory theoretical framework of the creation and, to a degree, the evolution of regional cooperation schemes in the developing world.’

Apart from its original application to cooperation on the world stage, hegemonic stability theory has also been traditionally associated with the dominance of a single state in international cooperation. It was founded mainly as an explanation by neorealism to the

historical periods (end of 19th century, end of World War II) when Great Britain (1st period) and USA (2nd period) succeeded in turning the anarchical global political environment to a stable and peaceful one while also enhancing global economic growth. The realities of the contemporary international system have led to the application of the theory to situations where two or more states come together to provide leadership or jointly influence international cooperation. The most common trend at regional level is that of cooperation between two states. The European Union as seen above provides a typical example. This situation is referred to as cooperative hegemony. I use joint leadership or shared hegemony here to mean the same thing. The main advantage of such leadership is that it makes power aggregation possible to the extent that hostile competition by smaller states is discouraged.

This is possible because it usually brings together the most economically viable states in the region and thus increases mutually profitable and varied connections with smaller states to the extent that defection becomes unattractive to the latter. Pederson has consequently argued that, ‘as a form of rule cooperative leadership is more stable than unilateral leadership’. It is important to note that while hegemonic stability theory may not fully explain why some schemes progress and others exhibit acute weakness, it remains very useful for understanding regional integration. It is in this vein that Baccini, Poast and Urpelainen, have concluded that ‘hegemony is a powerful but highly contingent force in international cooperation and political economy.’ Thus as a strategy, leadership is likely to be successful where it generates incentives like a wider market at the regional level, open to smaller states, and competitive access to other markets.

Leadership and Economic Integration

The relationship between leadership and integration can be better understood by using cases of regional integration. Studies of cases such as the Economic Community of West African States and the European Union have been widely used in this regard. The level of integration achieved in the case of the European Union makes it particularly suited for any effort at understanding this relationship.

The history of European integration reveals a strong relationship between leadership and regional economic integration. From the conception of the European project to date, France and Germany have taken centre stage in both policy formulation and implementation. The couple has also been a market attraction for smaller states. Ki-Sik Hwang for example has observed that “The Franco-German coalition has been a transcendent force behind the European integration ever since the early years of the European Economic Community (EEC).” This example also shows that joint hegemony or leadership by a couple in an

16. Smaller states are all states outside the leadership circle in a region. They characteristically have a lower economic potential than those assuming cooperative leadership in the region.
17. Defection here refers to the desire to leave the scheme or non-cooperation on specific policy areas by smaller states.
integration scheme is possible and sometimes inevitable. For leadership of an integration scheme by a couple to be successful however, the most suitable couple must clearly realise their potential and actively assume leadership. The speech of Fischer to the German Bundestag on 31 May 2001 is very indicative of the understanding by France and Germany that the responsibility for leadership in Europe lies first and foremost with the two countries working together. To Fischer,

"France is our closest and most important partner. Europe is founded on the Franco-German understanding, on our close partnership with France. This relationship is not interchangeable and that will also apply to the future of European integration."

"European integration was a French idea. The significance of France’s strategic far-sightedness and political courage in joining forces in the cause of European integration with its 'arch enemy' Germany, which brought war to France three times three times within a period of seventy years, cannot be overestimated... The German question could only be definitively answered within the framework of European integration, whose hard core Germany and France have formed for decades. Germany and France therefore have not only a pragmatic but also a much more profound, historical interest in continuing and intensifying their partnership."

The degree of harmony mirrored in this speech does not mean that there are no disagreements between the couple. Efforts have been made to intensify communication between the governments at different levels. The understanding in the case of the Franco-German couple has been that where disagreements arise, close examination of the perceived incompatibilities should be possible and quick enough. Hubert Vedrine, during the ‘Rencontre Franco-Allemande de Stuttgart,’ 16 February 2001 explains the approach used to forge harmony as follows:

"We use a very simple method (...) On each topic, we say in all sincerity what the position of our country is, and when there are differences in approach - which happens and is normal – we explain why, we try to see if these differences are based on superficial or deep issues or misunderstandings of language, which can happen. If we can overcome these problems at our level, we act immediately, developing a common position to overcome the differences. If we cannot at our level, because it involves other interests, other officials (...) we make proposals to the Chancellor, the President and the Prime Minister."

The European example shows that leadership is important for the success of regional integration, but that it is not necessarily provided by one state. In the European case, it has been by a couple. The advantage of joint leadership is mainly that a single state may lack the resources and influence to set the pace for integration. It also shows that for joint leadership to be possible there must be a willingness by the hegemonic states to engage in unending

21. From speech by Federal Minister Fischer to the German Bundestag on 31 May 2001.
and purposive dialogue with frequent meetings by government officials at different levels. Also, they must identify and ensure the implementation of viable economic projects that can generate and sustain interest in integration. In the case of the EU, the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) provides an example of such projects determined under the stewardship of France and Germany.  

Although it may be an exaggeration to compare the leadership role of core states in African regional integration to that played by Germany and France in Europe, leadership can be seen from the experience in West Africa and Southern Africa to be important for integration processes in Africa. Peter Draper affirms as regards economic integration in Africa that “...the role of regional leading states is critical...”.

Leadership Strengths of the Gabon-Cameroon Couple

The Gabon-Cameroon couple was born out of the desire by President Léon Mba of Gabon and Ahmadu Ahidjo of Cameroon to forge a spirit of interdependence between the two countries at the service of integration in Central Africa. The reasoning of the two leaders was that a wide integration scheme in Central Africa will have significant welfare benefits for states in the sub-region. It is important to note that their cooperation was favoured by the stability enjoyed by the two countries since independence. The solidarity and harmonious cooperation between the two countries, fed by a common interest in integration and stability in Cameroon and Gabon, served as a basis for leadership and explains to a large extent the creation of UDEAC in 1964.

Until 1968, the strong political commitment to harmonious cooperation in charting the way for integration by President Léon Mba and President Ahmadu Ahidjo, and the stability experienced by Gabon and Cameroon from independence, favoured the leadership of the duo. The warmth in Cameroon-Gabon relations between 1961 and 1967 laid a foundation for joint leadership in the CEMAC zone and can be seen as a binding factor. However the harmony that reigned between the two countries experienced a downturn with the death of President Leon Mba. While the cooperation was at its best when the joint communiqué of Ngoundere on 23 March 1968 instituted the Cameroon-Gabon Joint Commission, the period from 1968 to present has been marked by competition for leadership between the two countries.

As is apparent from Table 1 below, there is a clear basis for hegemony within CEMAC. Cameroon is an obvious candidate. It represents 47% of the population, 42% of GDP (PIB) and is the only country that shares boundaries with all other countries in the sub-region. It is also the main university, agricultural and industrial centre. Cameroon is the only country that has

successfully undergone a multinationalisation (several Cameroonian enterprises now operate branches in one or more other countries) of its enterprises. No other country actually has as strategic a position as Cameroon.

Table 1: The Basis of Hegemony in CEMAC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Density</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Natural Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>km²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>km²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>475,440 Co-astline: 402 km</td>
<td>15.74</td>
<td>19.4 million</td>
<td>47.05</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44.33</td>
<td>42.32</td>
<td>Petroleum, bauxite, iron ore, timber, hydropower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1,284,000</td>
<td>42.51</td>
<td>11.2 million</td>
<td>27.16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>Oil, Cotton, Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>622,984</td>
<td>20.62</td>
<td>4.4 million</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>Agriculture, cotton, mining, timber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eq. Guinea</td>
<td>28,051</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>668,225</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23.82</td>
<td>22.74</td>
<td>Petroleum, timber, fisheries, natural gas, agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>267,667 sq km Co-astline: 885 km Border with Cameroon 298 km</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>1.545 million</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.37</td>
<td>Petroleum, natural gas, diamond, niobium, manganese, uranium, gold, timber, iron ore, hydropower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Congo</td>
<td>342,000 Co-astline: 169 km Border with Cameroon 523 km</td>
<td>11.32</td>
<td>4.01 million</td>
<td>9.72</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.46</td>
<td>Petroleum, timber, potash, lead, zinc, uranium, copper, phosphates, gold, magnesium, natural gas, hydropower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,020,142</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41.23</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>104.75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The strategic position of Cameroon was indeed already recognised when the region was still under French colonial rule. The Governor of AEF, Louis Gabriel Angoulvant, was the first of the French governors to take note of this geographic reality. He told the French Minister of Colonies that:

Cameroon is in effect, from both the geographic and economic point of view, the essential complement of the AEF. Middle Congo and Ubangi-Shari Chad are only the hinterland. The Germans had so well understood that their entire railroad program was designed to attract traffic to Douala from most of the AEF...

27. Table source: constructed by the author with data from the CIA, the US Department of State and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Data available on their respective websites (2010 estimates).
Despite being a prospective leader, it is unlikely that Cameroon can effectively assume leadership alone. Cameroon still faces problems of underdevelopment and her leadership has been challenged mainly by Equatorial Guinea and Gabon on several occasions. Gabon for example challenged Cameroon’s leadership during negotiations over the location of the regional stock exchange. Equatorial Guinea has not only resisted and contested regional policies promoted by Cameroon, like the use of the CEMAC passport, but has been increasingly hostile since becoming an oil producing country in 1991 with the discovery of Alba. This was reinforced by that of Zafiro in 1996, and again in 1999 by the exploitation of the largest reserves in Campo Ceiba on the Rio Muni Coast. Chouala observes that ‘...oil production in Equatorial Guinea has been accompanied by a dramatic shift in regional policy.’ He also notes that

*The negative rhetoric and increasingly distrustful attitude of Equatorial Guinea towards Cameroon, its intervention in the delicate relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria, her constant suspicion that Cameroon is involve in a conspiracy to destabilize her, have given the impression that Equatorial Guinea wants to increase its influence in the sub-region by adopting an anti-Cameroon perspective.*

This attitude by Equatorial Guinea can be seen as a manifestation of the country’s leadership ambition and also as a fear of Cameroon’s dominance. Cameroonian citizens have been treated with a lot of contempt in recent decades and travel restrictions on Cameroonians are rife. Another factor that makes Equatorial Guinea unsuitable as an ally is that it is the only country that has Spanish as its most widely used official language. With a total value of imports for 2008 reaching 30, 240, 575 FCFA (see Table 3 below), Equatorial Guinea is the largest importer of goods from Cameroon. However in the light of the above, it probably has the worst diplomatic relations with Cameroon and this is a major constraint on further development of commercial relations between the two countries.

Gabon like Equatorial Guinea has exhibited an anti-leadership attitude in its relations with Cameroon. This is very visible from the nature of relations between the leaders of the two countries. Even with the accession of President Ali Bongo to power, there is very limited communication with President Paul Biya of Cameroon. Also the Cameroonian President has not visited Gabon since President Ali Bongo’s accession to power in 2010. This is similar to the situation that prevailed under President Omar Bongo who declared in an interview: “I have

---

been to Yaoundé on several occasions; Paul Biya never pays me a visit. I will not visit him again.”

As Awoumou rightly observes, to avoid appearing hegemonic and taking into consideration the costs of single handily assuming leadership, Cameroon can only assume hegemony by allying with another state. The most suitable ally appears to be Gabon. In addition to the prospects for leadership by the two countries mentioned above, it can be seen from Table 1 that Gabon is the third highest in ranking in terms of GDP. The country also has a coastline of 885 km and shares a 298 km long border with Cameroon. Finally, as Table 2 shows; Gabon is the third most important importer of goods from Cameroon in spite of travel restrictions with 12, 659, 905 FCFA worth of imports.

Table 2: Formal and Informal Trade in Agricultural and Horticultural Products between Cameroon and other Countries of CEMAC, based on the 2008 Official Statistics of the Ministries of Commerce, Agriculture and Rural Development, and the National Institute for Statistics (values in FCFA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of destination</th>
<th>Official exports</th>
<th>Non-official exports (informal)</th>
<th>Total sum of exports including informal trade</th>
<th>% of informal exports in relation to official exports</th>
<th>% of informal trade in relation to the total sum of exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>8 090 576 754</td>
<td>4 569 328 727</td>
<td>12 659 905 481</td>
<td>56,5</td>
<td>36,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eq. Guinea Eq.</td>
<td>12 253 918 538</td>
<td>17 986 656 508</td>
<td>30 240 575 046</td>
<td>146,8</td>
<td>59,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>6 222 845 443</td>
<td>2 962 956 487</td>
<td>9 185 801 930</td>
<td>47,6</td>
<td>32,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>3 824 277 976</td>
<td>1 697 869 653</td>
<td>5 522 147 629</td>
<td>44,4</td>
<td>30,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tchad</td>
<td>9 182 834 046</td>
<td>10 639 870 720</td>
<td>19 822 704 766</td>
<td>115,9</td>
<td>53,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39 574 452 754</strong></td>
<td><strong>37 856 682 095</strong></td>
<td><strong>77 431 134 849</strong></td>
<td><strong>95,7</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet given the apparent difficulty of sustaining cooperation between Cameroon and Gabon, other possibilities for joint leadership have been considered. The current strategy of Gabon has been to impose itself by cooperating with the Republic of Congo. As Awoumou observes,

the Republic of Congo certainly has a comparative advantage over Cameroon on the diplomatic chessboard, which is mostly the result of the interpersonal ties that existed between former President Omar Bongo and his Congolese counterpart and other heads of state in the sub-region, oil revenue and the historical role of Gabon as the arm of French influence in Africa. Gabon also has a good history of cooperation and strong ethnic ties with the Republic of Congo.\textsuperscript{35} The result of such close ties has been the adoption of a common approach to sub-regional problems. However this alliance with Congo can hardly enable Gabon to bring the much needed dynamism to integration in Central Africa. On the one hand, Congo has a very small population size (only 5.56 million out of the 41.23 million in the CEMAC zone). On the other hand, the country also has a very weak population density per Km\textsuperscript{2}, which necessitates heavy human and financial resources to secure the territory. Further Gabon shares borders with only three countries, as does Congo, and finally the Congo has been since independence one of the most unstable countries in the sub-region. The leader of the Ninja Militia, Pastor Ntoumi, who is accused of human rights violations including the killing thousands of unarmed civilians, the taking of hostages and the hijacking trains, only signed a peace agreement in 2007.\textsuperscript{36}

Cameroon has drifted towards Chad. There are several opportunities for cooperation and the two countries have jointly realised some major projects. The pipeline that permits the transportation of Chadian oil to international markets through the Cameroonian port of Kribi is the most emblematic example.\textsuperscript{37} Another example that should be mentioned is the free movement of goods and services in both directions which is a reality. There is sustained cooperation in secondary and university education. In addition to the increase in bilateral projects, Cameroon and Chad are the two most populated countries in the sub-region (over 30.6 million from the 41.23 people in CEMAC) and have a high density (17/km\textsuperscript{2}).

But an alliance with Chad presents a number of weaknesses. Chad is historically the second most unstable country in the sub-region after the Central African Republic. The country has experienced several rebellions since in 1965. There have been several rebel attacks in the last ten years. The last one by the Union of Resistance Forces (URF) led by Timane Erdimi took place very recently in May 2008. Apart from rebellions, Chad remains a very insecure country. The insecurity has spilled over to Cameroon in recent years and it is unlikely that the government of Yaoundé would be genuinely committed to making movement between the two countries more fluid. As Sali Aliyou has observed it can be noted that:

\textit{Insecurity at the border between Cameroon, Chad and the CAR (Mbaiboum), further makes the relations between these three states unfriendly. The Populations in this area are victims of road bandits (coupeurs de route). To address this situation, the states have adopted the policy of closing borders and worse, they accuse each other, a}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Ibid Awoumou, C., 2005
  \item \textsuperscript{36} http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/sub-saharan-africa/equatorial-guinea/
  \item \textsuperscript{37} web.worldbank.org/archive/website01210/.../0__CO-15.HTM
\end{itemize}
situation that makes relations between them more acrimonious. In fact, Cameroon accuses Chadians and Central Africans of blocking roads on its soil.\(^{38}\)

Finally Chad has been accused of supporting insurgents and bandits in the Central African Republic. Relations between Ndjamena and Bangui have depended almost entirely on personal ties between the two heads of state. The overthrow of President Patasse by the then rebel leader Francois Bozize was largely due to Chadian support. Colonel Laurent Djim-Woei Bebiti, who led the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), one of the main rebel forces in the CAR between 2006 and 2008,\(^{38}\) declared that “one of the reasons why his groups fights is because the country suffers from foreign aggression perpetrated mainly by Chadian elements that helped President Bozize take power in 2003.”\(^{39}\)

Recently, the overthrow of Francois Bozize has equally been largely blamed on the authorities of Ndjamena. The Seleka rebels that invaded the country and seized power in March 2013 were mostly Muslims and some had Chadian army uniforms. The events following the demise of the now former Seleka government give credit to these accusations. The Chadian peacekeeping contingent that is part of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA, French acronym for Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique) have been booed during patrols and feared by the majority Christian population that accuses them of being present solely to protect the disbanded Seleka force and the Muslims. These accusations have been largely given credit by the recent withdrawal of the Chadian forces following what the United Nations has qualified as an attack on civilians on 29 March 2014.\(^{40}\)

It is thus very difficult for a leadership with Chad as a key player in the sub-region to be effective given that it remains politically unstable and is perceived to be at the origin of important security problems in the member state CAR. Added to the acute problems of underdevelopment in the country it can be concluded that Chad cannot be a suitable partner for Cameroon in the quest for cooperative and effective stewardship of the sub-region.

In the light of this, the Gabon-Cameroon couple can thus be said to have the potential necessary to steer economic integration in the CEMAC zone. However the existence of a leadership crisis in Central Africa as shown above suggests that the leadership of the couple faces some challenges. Although some of these have been alluded to it is important to isolate and discuss the most pertinent of these.

**Obstacles to the leadership of Gabon and Cameroon in Central Africa**

The vision of joint leadership shared by President Ahidjo of Cameroon and President Leon Mba of Gabon led to the creation of the now defunct UDEAC. Moreover, the decline in Gabon

---

Cameroon relations following the death of President Leon Mba in November 1867\(^{41}\) can be considered as one of the core reasons for the paralysis of sub-regional integration which has continued even with the replacement of UDEAC by CEMAC. As Awoumou has observed, “the leadership crisis in Central Africa, is the result of the failure of the Cameroon-Gabon couple to position itself sustainably as the engine of this zone”.\(^{42}\) The main challenges to the leadership of this couple are as follows.

**The Existence of Protectionist Intentions and Practices**

Regional integration by design leads to the erosion of state sovereignty. Yet it is not uncommon for countries to recourse to protectionist measures to protect their sovereignty within integration schemes to maintain some level of control over their economies. Examples include the practices of Germany with regard to the industrial policy of Europe and the decision of the United Kingdom not to adopt the Euro. The situation is worse when such practices are carried out by core states and affect cooperation between them. Therefore, while such practices are not new in the politics of regional integration, the problem in CEMAC is that they affect cooperation between the core states - Gabon and Cameroon - in important sectors that are indispensable for integration like freedom of movement.

Cameroonian still need to obtain a visa to travel to Gabon. The procedural implications of this grossly hinder the movement of factors of production (people, goods, services and capital). Under these circumstances the generation of wealth is highly compromised. The need for visas is also an obstacle to dialogue, as it affects the rate of travel by members of government from Cameroon to Gabon. While it is the sovereign right of every state to make obtaining a visa an imperative for visits by aliens this situation is an obstacle within the context of integration. It is thus not surprising that Nkendah has attributed the high volume of informal trade between Cameroon and Gabon to visa restrictions.\(^{43}\)

**Leadership Quarrels**

As already mentioned above, there has been competition for leadership between Gabon and Cameroon since 1968. While it is common for leading states to have different views on important issues, such differences become problematic when they paralyse cooperation. Gabon and Cameroon’s quarrels are evidenced by the difficulty in reaching agreement on important decisions such as the creation of a sub-regional airlines company (Air CEMAC) and a sub-regional stock exchange. The disagreement between Cameroon and Gabon over the location of a sub-regional stock exchange, leading to the establishment of one in Douala and another in Libreville, is a clear testimony of the persistence of such quarrels that slow the integration process within the CEMAC. The Douala Stock Exchange (DES) was created on the

---

42. Ibid Awoumou, C., 2005, translation by author
1st of December 2001 following a decision by President Biya of Cameroon. The DES was inaugurated on the 23 April 2005. With a capital of 1.2 billion Francs CFA, this stock exchange had its first quotation by the end of May 2006. On the other hand, the stock exchange in Libreville, in Gabon, named the Central African Stock Exchange for Transferable Shares (Bourse des valeurs mobilières de l’Afrique centrale (BVMAC)), was created on 27 June 2003 and started activities in February 2006.  

**The Low Rate of Exchange and Meetings between Administrative Officials and Members of Government of the two Countries**

Joint leadership is by no means easy to achieve. Even when a couple like the Gabon-Cameroon duo in Central Africa has the resources for such leadership, a lot of active effort and exchange by the two governments is required. The description above of the method used to forge harmony in the case of the Fraco-German couple in Europe by Hubert Vedrine during the Rencontre Franco-Allemande de Stuttgart, 16 février 2001 shows clearly that for cooperative hegemony to be successful, permanent dialogue, frequent visits and exchange of information is crucial. Such an atmosphere is important because it makes, close examination of any perceived incompatibilities possible and quick enough to forge harmony in the leadership couple.

In Central Africa, this has however not been the case between Cameroon and Gabon. The Cameroonian head of state seldom visits Gabon and inter-ministerial meetings and projects are yet to be a reality. There are very limited working visits between government officials. This explains the limited number of sub-regional projects jointly initiated by the couple and the complete absence of joint economic projects. It is partly for this reason that suspicion and fear of the other triumphs as there is hardly sufficient opportunity for dialogue around issues for each side to be clarified of the motives behind the others views.

**The Absence of Strategic Joint Economic Projects**

For cooperative leadership to be successful, it is important for the economies of core states to be integrated to a level close enough to that expressed in regional treaties. Usually this requires a commitment to effectively initiating and implementing economic projects with high prospects for spill-over. The success of such projects usually generates interest in peripheral states that certainly enter into regional arrangements to share in the benefits of economic cooperation.

The effectiveness of joint strategic economic projects in consolidating the bond between core states and strengthening their capacity for regional leadership is very obvious with the European Union. In this case, the French and German governments have for example made enormous efforts to merge their biggest enterprises and it is important to mention that once united, these enterprises often rise to world leadership in their respective fields. Examples

include the European Space Agency, EADS (The European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) and Airbus.\textsuperscript{45}

In a similar manner, it is the joint realisation of economic projects and the intensification of trade relations between Chad and Cameroon that is somewhat improving the very poor image that each has had of the other for reasons mentioned above. The pipeline project mentioned above is very illustrative of this. In effect, as Saibou Issa observes, Chadian economic operators that have worked on Cameroonian soil thanks to this project have improved the image of Chadians in Cameroon.\textsuperscript{46} This was an image that from the perspective of the editorialist in the monthly \textit{Chad and Culture}, in commenting on a government communique of 18 December 1997, was reduced to that of road bandits (coupeur de route).\textsuperscript{47}

The Gabon-Cameroon couple has yet to initiate and more importantly implement business projects of such nature. The implementation of such projects requires frequent meetings at different levels of government and the participation of private enterprises. When successful, the benefits tend to strengthen the bond of cooperation between the couple and a window of opportunity is open for other projects. As new challenges emerge in the course of executing such projects, fears shift from possible dominance to how to meet market demand or how to be more productive to make products of such joint ventures more competitive in international markets.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The importance of a cooperative leadership between Gabon and Cameroon in CEMAC is clearly indispensable for successful economic integration. There have been sustained efforts to maintain frequent meetings between cabinet members within the framework of the Cameroon-Gabon Joint Commission since 1968. The two countries have natural ports facilities and together have the richest reserves of natural resources in the sub-region. Cameroon and Gabon also represent 56 \% of the GDP. Finally, of all CEMAC member states, only Cameroon and Gabon have been politically stable since independence. However, as demonstrated above, despite their historical legitimacy, their cumulated economic and demographic weight, the abundance of raw materials in the two countries and especially their strategic position, the couple faces several obstacles that prevent them from exercising the influence necessary to boost integration in the area. The existence of protectionist intentions and practices, quarrels for sub-regional leadership between the two countries, the low frequency of meetings between cabinet members in spite of the diplomatic efforts made since 1961 and the absence of strategic joint economic projects, are important obstacles to the leadership potential of the duo. As the analysis shows, to overcome these obstacles and effectively play the role of locomotive for integration in the sub-region, the two countries will have to multiply opportunities for meetings and exchange among government officials and

\textsuperscript{45} Hwang, K., 2007, op. Cit.
initiate and implement joint projects and encourage joint economic ventures in the private sector as well. Finally they must be able to take a common position on CEMAC projects.
Bibliography


At War against Itself:  
Religious Identity, Militancy and Growing Insecurity in Northern Nigeria  

By Daniel Egigba Agbiboa*  

Abstract  

This paper critically examines the uneasy nexus between religious identity and spiralling violence in contemporary northern Nigeria. This nexus is illustrated with the ongoing militancy of Boko Haram, the radical Islamist group from north-eastern Nigeria whose avowed aim is to rid the country of its corrupt government and create an Islamic state governed by Sharia. The paper shows how a spate of increasingly sophisticated attacks against churches and state security forces (since 2009) suggests not only growing foreign support, but also indicates a strategy of provocation through which Boko Haram seeks to spark large scale sectarian conflict that will strike at the foundations of Nigeria. This paper attributes the failure of the Nigerian state to deal effectively with religious militancy to its overdependence on coercion for compliance in lieu of authority. The conclusion offers recommendations on how to mitigate the ongoing problem of religious militancy and sectarianism in (Northern) Nigeria.

Key words: Religion; Identity; Violence; Northern Nigeria; Boko Haram.

*Daniel E. Agbiboa is a Doctoral Scholar in the Department of International Development, University of Oxford, UK. He works as a Senior Consultant for the African Union Commission (AUC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Transparency International, UK. His research interests are in the field of corruption, security and development in sub-Saharan Africa. His writings have appeared in over 40 major peer-reviewed journals, including Third World Quarterly, Review of African Political Economy; Australian Journal of International Affairs, Conflict, Security and Development, Peace Research, and Journal of Asian and African Studies.
Introduction

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, makes an interesting case study of the uneasy nexus between religion, identity and violence. This is largely because of its complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts which qualify her as one of the most deeply divided countries in Africa. To be sure, Nigeria’s vast heterogeneity, specifically its ethnic and religious diversity, remains an abiding source of her societal tensions and political instability. The mixture serves not only as a source of national strength and potential but also as a seam interminably threatening to tear at the core of national peace, unity and posterity. In particular, political mobilisations along ethno-religious lines increasingly put ethno-religious groups at daggers drawn. This has not only triggered conflicts that have claimed thousands of lives and properties, but ultimately precluded the emergence of a true national identity. Individually and (or) collectively, the disparate and often warring groups in Nigeria subscribe to a model of conduct that elevates religion over and above the broader interests of the national state. Indeed, since Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999, religious identity politics and attendant violence have assumed historically unprecedented proportions. According to Ake, ‘religion in Nigeria is politicised, politics is religionised and religious groups tend toward becoming political formations whose struggles with each other and competing interests may be more conflictual due to the exclusivity of religious group membership.’ However, Ehusani draws a useful distinction between the politics of religion and the actual practice of religion in Nigeria, arguing that ‘Nigerians have hardly had to fight over the practice of religion. It is the politics of religion that has brought upon us so much trouble.’ But why does religion seem to need violence, and violence religion?

This paper critically examines the uneasy nexus between religious identity and spiralling violence in northern Nigeria. This uneasy nexus is then illustrated with the ongoing militancy of Boko Haram, the radical Islamist group from north-eastern Nigeria whose avowed aim is to rid the country of its corrupt government and create a fully Islamic state governed by Sharia law. The paper shows how a spate of increasingly coordinated and sophisticated attacks against churches and state security forces (since 2009) suggests not only growing foreign

---

2. Oyediran and Agbaje, Nigeria: Politics of Transition and Governance; Agbibo and Okem, “Unholy Trinity: Assessing the Nexus”.
5. Ehusani, Inter-Religious Dialogues in Nigeria, 1.
support, but also indicates a strategy of provocation through which Boko Haram seeks to spark large scale sectarian conflict that will strike at the foundations of Nigeria. The paper attributes the failure of the Nigerian state to deal effectively with religious militancy to the militarised nature of its responses and its historical reliance on coercion for compliance rather than authority. The conclusion offers some practical recommendations on how to mitigate the ongoing problem of religious militancy and sectarianism in Nigeria.

Conceptual Analysis and Theoretical Perspective

Since the epochal terrorist attacks of 9/11 it has become commonplace to say that ‘more wars have been waged, more people killed, and these days more evil perpetuated in the name of religion than by any other institutional force in human history’.\(^7\) But what is religion? According to McGuire, ‘Religion is one of the most powerful, deeply felt, and influential forces in human society. It has shaped people’s relationships with each other, influencing family, community, economic, and political life... Religious values influence their actions, and religious meanings help them interpret their experiences.’\(^8\) For Geertz, religion is essentially a ‘cultural system of meaning’; ‘(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing those conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.’\(^9\) Eitzen and Zinn identify three core aspects of religion. First, religion is a social construction—that is, it is created by people and is a part of culture. Second, religion is an integrated set of ideas by which a group attempts to explain the meaning of life and death. Third, religion is a normative system defining immorality and sin as well as morality and righteousness.\(^10\) Sociological explanations offer two basic reasons why the study of religion is vital: (1) religion is a ubiquitous phenomenon that has a profound impact on human behaviour, and (2) religion influences society and society impacts on religion.\(^11\)

Conflicts motivated by religious identity are the most severe because they are characteristically tied to absolutist or dogmatic views.\(^12\) While devotion to belief systems can create and nurture a sense of meaning, purpose, and belonging, they can easily lead to intolerance, discrimination, and violent intergroup identity conflicts.\(^13\) According to Erikson, identity refers to ‘some belief in the sameness and continuity of some shared world image.’\(^14\) Identity may also be defined as a combination of socio-cultural characteristics which individuals share, or are presumed to share, with others on the basis of which one group may be distinguished from others.\(^15\) In this sense, identity is not only circumscribed to how I see myself, it is simultaneously a fusion of how I see myself and how I am perceived by others.

---

9. Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System”, 436
13. Ibid.
Fundamentally, identity is a group concept in the sense that it is based on traits which make individuals members (or non-members) of a group; such traits also provide responses to the question: ‘Who am I?’.

Religious identity can be both an integrative and divisive force in any society; it may not only foment and perpetuate violence but may contribute to peace. This ‘ambivalence of the sacred’ was clearly captured by Appleby’s probing question: Why is religion a source of ‘intolerance, human rights violations, and extremist violence, but also of nonviolent conflict transformation, the defence of human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and stability in divided societies?’ Parekh similarly argues that ‘Although religion can make a valuable contribution to political life, it often breeds intolerance of other religions as well as of internal dissent, and has a propensity towards violence.’ In Nigeria, for instance, there is little doubt that religion has had a largely disruptive influence: it has divided more than it has ever united, deformed more than it has ever transformed and decimated more than it has ever animated. According to Agi, ‘Religion has contributed in no small measure to the social anomie which has characterised Nigerian national life for so long without an end in sight. Religious fanaticism, bigotry and violence have become an obstacle to the achievement of social harmony and interaction. It is gradually destroying the country’s social fabric: the basis of trust and mutual respect. It has weakened the very foundation of Nigeria’s socio-cultural existence.’

At the theoretical level, a number of hypotheses have connected religious variables to violent conflict. First, from a socio-psychological angle, diverse religious identities, similar to ethnic and other social identities, form a group identity and can result in escalating inter-group dynamics. Research has demonstrated that people often privilege in-group members over out-group members. As such, there is a greater chance of violent escalation. Second, religious identities are specially connected to particular religious ideas that are transcendental in source and, as a result, hardly subject to negotiation and compromise given their accepted divine origin. Conflicts over the role of religion in society or the state are likely to emerge between different religious groups, especially if the religion in question claims universal validity. In addition, combatants might be motivated through specific religious incentives/rewards for participation in dastardly acts of violence. Third, religious factors might be understood as a possible mobilisation resource for and in conflicts. This idea is not unrelated to the foregoing two ideas, but this theoretical branch stresses the role of leaders in the organisation of collective action. For instance, the political instrumentality of religion might increase the risk of a violent escalation of a conflict, which is principally embedded in political or socioeconomic problems.

16. Ibid.
Another school of thought connects religion to the onset of terrorism. To be sure, the proposed nexus between religion and terrorism has a long genealogy in Western scholarship, going back to David Rapoport’s 1984 seminal paper analysing the use of terror in three religious traditions: Hinduism, Islam and Judaism. In this strand of literature, religious terrorism has been elevated above a simple label to a set of descriptive characteristics and substantive claims which appear to delineate it as a special ‘type’ of violence, fundamentally different to secular forms of terrorism. The claim about the special nature of religious terrorism rests on three key hypotheses which are briefly considered below.

The first states that religious terrorists have anti-modern goals of returning society to an idealised version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-democratic and anti-progressive. The second hypothesis states that religious terrorists employ a different kind of violence compared to secular terrorists. Bruce Hoffman, for example, argues that for the religious terrorist, ‘violence is... a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand,’ as opposed to a tactical means to a political end. As such, religious terrorists often aim for maximum casualties; they are ‘relatively unconstrained in the lethality and the indiscriminate nature of violence used...’

The third and final hypothesis states that religious terrorists have the capacity to evoke total commitment and fanaticism from their members. It is argued that religious terrorist are characterised by the suspension of doubt and an end-justifies-the-means worldview – in contrast to the supposedly more measured attitudes of secular groups. Moreover, it is suggested that in some cases the certainties of the religious viewpoint and the promises of the next world are key motivating factors in driving insecure, alienated and marginalised youths to join religious terrorist groups as a means of psychological, even physical, empowerment. It is further argued that such impressionable and disempowered young people are vulnerable to forms of brainwashing and undue influence by recruiters, extremist preachers or internet materials. Romero, for example, argues that Islamist terrorist connections can provide ‘social backing, meaning to life (to compensate for the spiritual emptiness felt), and a social or collective identity mainly based on the pride of forming part of the jihad as the only way of reaching the power and glory of Islam.’

It is important to note that the seismic rise of radical Islamist terrorism starting in the 1980s and 1990s has significantly contributed to the lethal nature of attacks perpetrated by religious terrorist groups. Available empirical data shows that over the period 1968 to 2005, Islamists

---

27. Gunning and Jackson, “What’s so ‘Religious’ about ‘Religious Conflicts’”.
32. Gunning and Jackson, “What’s so ‘Religious’ about ‘Religious Conflicts’”.
33. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.
groups (especially groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) were responsible for 93.6 percent of all terrorist attacks and 86.9 percent of all casualties inflicted by religiously-oriented terrorist groups. Piazza explains the higher frequency and intensity of terrorist activity among Islamists in the light of the (mis)interpretation of certain doctrine and practice within Islam, including the concept of ‘lesser jihad,’ the practice of militant struggle to defend Islam from its perceived enemies, or the Muslim reverence for ‘Itishhad’ (the practice of martyrdom).

Based on Piazza’s article, the rise in Islamic terrorism would also be about how Al-Qaeda type group fit a typology defined as ‘universal/abstract’ while other Islamist terrorist groups are more properly categorized as ‘strategic.’ For Piazza, ‘the primary difference between universal/abstract groups and strategic groups is that the former are distinguished by highly ambitious, abstract, complex, and nebulous goals that are driven primarily by ideology... in contrast, strategic groups have much limited and discrete goals: the liberation of specific territory, the creation of an independent homeland for a specific ethnic group, or the overthrow of a specific government.’ According to this perspective, extremist Islamist groups like Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and Ansaru, among others, fall into the universal/abstract category on account of their global jihadist appeal and their ideological stance against Western missions and perceived (or real) enemies of Islam.

Mapping the Conflict Scenario

Northern Nigeria has a long and well documented history of militant Islam, going back to the successful jihad of Sheik Usman Dan Fodio of Sokoto (1754-1817) in the first decade of the 19th century. Dan Fodio launched a holy war against what he saw as a hopelessly corrupt and ‘apostate’ Hausa ruling elite of his time and established the Sokoto Caliphate (formed in 1804-1808), under the supreme law of Sharia, across much of what is today Northern Nigeria. For some authors, the defeat of the caliphate by the British in 1903 and subsequent dealings with colonial and post-colonial states opened the caliphate to the corrupting influence of secular political power. What began with Usman Dan Fodio as a search for religious purification soon metamorphosed into a quest for a political kingdom. The outcome is that ‘Islam has remained the focal veneer for the legitimacy of the northern ruling class,’ and consequently, ‘its politicians have always prided themselves as soldiers for the defence of the faith’.

38. Ibid, 65.
39. Ibid.
41. The concept of jihad is a central tenet in Islam. Contrary to misinterpretations common in the West, the term literally means a sacred struggle or effort rather than an armed conflict or fanatical holy war.
43. Hiskett, The Sword of Truth.
The general assumption is that there has been an exponential rise in religious violence since
Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999. However, statistics on religious violence across
the country show that at least 95 per cent of these violent conflicts occurred in Northern
Nigeria. Tellingly, out of the 178 conflicts that took place in the Muslim region between
1980 and 2004, 104 were related to religion. Violence in northern Nigeria has flared up at
regular intervals. Mainly in the form of urban riots, it has pitted Muslims against Christians
and has seen confrontations between different Islamic sects. Violent conflicts, whether riots
or fighting between insurrectional groups and the police, tends to occur at specific
flashpoints. Examples are the northern cities of Kaduna and Zaria, whose populations are
religiously and ethnically very mixed, and the very poor states of the far northeast, where anti-
establishment groups have flourished. Many factors fuelling these conflicts are common
across Nigeria: in particular, the political manipulation of religion and ethnicity and disputes
between supposed local groups and ‘settlers’ over distribution of public resources. The
failure of the government to assure public order, to contribute to dispute settlement and to
implement post-conflict peace-building measures is also a contributing factor. Likewise, the
absence of economic opportunities and gainful employment, especially as inequality grows,
fuels violent conflict in the region.

The Politicisation and Militarisation of Religion

Since gaining political independence on 1 October 1960, Nigeria has suffered a series of civil
unrests, ethno-religious bloodshed, resource conflicts, and endless riots. In particular, the
violence that has punctuated the history of the country’s return to civil rule in 1999
underscores the potent, and often disruptive, role of religion in the politics and identity of
Nigerian citizenship. Historically, Christians living in the north were seen as infidels and they
were treated as such in earlier years. During the 1950s and 60s, when Christian people from
the predominantly Christian South immigrated to the north, they were compelled to place
their children in separate schools and forced to live in segregated areas. In addition, any form
of interaction between the Muslim northerners and the Christian southerners was
forbidden. According to Meredith, a section of the non-Muslim minorities who lived in the
north had long been trying to depose the Muslim leaders of the region. This set the scene for
the Tiv resistance that exploded in the 1960s. Since this event, thousands of Nigerians
(mainly in the north) have lost their lives, buildings and properties as the country teetered
precariously on the brink of a religious war between Muslim and Christians.

The encroachment of religion into the political realm in Nigeria portends a grave danger for
the peace and unity of the country. For one thing, the close relationship between religion

47. Agbiboa, “Ethno-Religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest”.
48. Ezeanokwasa, “Islamic Banking”.
50. Falola, Violence in Nigeria; Adesoji, “Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram”.
52. Meredith, The State of Africa, 76.
53. ICG, “Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict”; Falola, Violence in Nigeria.
54. Meredith, The Story of Nigeria.
55. Falola, Violence in Nigeria.
56. Agbiboa and Okem, “Unholy Trinity: Assessing the Nexus”.
57. Agbiboa and Okem, “Ethno-Religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest”.
and social life in Nigeria creates deep suspicion when it is perceived that one religious group
is dominating (or trying to dominate) the political affairs of the country. The subsequent
jostling for ascendancy puts the major religions – Christianity and Islam – at loggerheads.
Unfortunately, the actions of past Nigerian leaders have often fanned the flames of conflict
by suggesting that the country was under a single religion. For example, during his tenure in
office (1985-1993), President Ibrahim Babangida registered Nigeria as a member of the
Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). Premised on the values of OIC, membership of the
organisation is underpinned by a commitment to the advancement of Islam.58

Babangida’s military successor, General Sani Abacha, again unilaterally registered the country
as a member of the D-8 (Developing-8), an organisation for development cooperation among
major Muslim developing countries, including Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia,
Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. These leadership decisions caused much anxiety among
Nigerian Christians many of who saw the government move as an attempt toward
Islamisation of Nigeria.59 Following a chorus of disapproval from Christians, the issue of
Nigerian membership in the OIC was suspended. This decision, however, fomented religious
riots in northern Nigeria, beginning with the March 1986 violent clash in Ilorin between
Muslims and Christians60 and the May 1986 clash between Christian and Muslim students at
Uthman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto.61

From the 1980s and beyond, religious violence became one of the biggest crises facing
Nigeria.62 Falola attributes the religious violence of the 1980s to internal economic and
political decay. Many religious organisations felt that the society and its political leaders had
degenerated, so they rejected the constitution and called for a theocratic state whose leaders
would have better moral values.63 As the religious crisis of the 1980s deepened, Muhammad
Marwa (popularly known as Maitatsine64) became the central figure around which Islam’s
struggle in Nigeria revolved. Originally from Marwa in northeastern Nigeria, Maitatsine
moved to Kano, Nigeria in about 1945 where he became known for his controversial
preaching65 on the Qur’an. Maitatsine claimed to be a prophet, and saw himself as a
mujaddid66 in the image of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio.67 Maitatsine attracted the urban poor in

the Nexus”.
60. Udoidem, “Religion in the Political Life of Nigeria.”
63. Falola, Violence in Nigeria.
64. Maitatsine is a Hausa word meaning ‘the one who curses’ and refers to his curse-laden
public speeches against the Nigerian state. See Adesoji, “Between Boko Haram and Maitat-
sine”.
65. Although a Koranic scholar, he seemingly rejected the hadith and the sunnah and regarded
the reading of any other book but the Koran as paganism. Maitatsine spoke against the use
of radios, watches, bicycles, cars and the possession of more money than necessary. In
1979, he even rejected the prophethood of Mohammed and portrayed himself as an anna-
bi (Hausa for ‘prophet’).
66. A mujaddid according to the popular Muslim tradition, refers to a person who appears at
the turn of every century of the Islamic calendar to revive Islam, remove from it any extra-
necessary elements and restore it to its pristine purity. A mujaddid might be a caliph, a saint
(wali), a prominent teacher, a scholar or some other kind of influential person.
the northern city of Kano with its message that ‘denounced the affluent elites as infidels, opposed Western Influence, and refused to recognize secular authorities’. The urban Muslim poor were attracted to Maitatsine because ‘he condemned the hypocrisy and ostentation of the nouveau riche and promised redemption and salvation to God’s righteous people’. Another notable group that was drawn to Maitatsine were the ‘Almajirai,’ described as young itinerant students of the Koran who had a very poor and simple life-style and eke[d] out a living on the streets by begging.

Maitatsine extremists, rejecting Muslims who had, in their eyes, gone astray, lived in secluded areas to avoid mixing with mainstream Muslims, and rejected material wealth on the grounds that it was associated with Western values. The Maitatsine uprising led to eleven days of violent clashes with state security forces in Kano in December 1980. A tribunal of inquiry set up by the federal government in 1981 found that 4,177 people were killed in the violence, excluding members of the police force who lost their lives. In addition, state security forces were implicated in extrajudicial killings and torture of Maitatsine members in their custody. Although the Nigerian military crushed the uprisings and killed its leader, over the next five years hundreds of people were killed in reprisal attacks between remnants of Maitatsine in the north and government security forces.

At the dawn of democracy in 1999, the pseudo-harmony forged during the protracted military rule in Nigeria was exposed as different religious groups began a systematic campaign for the recognition of their rights. Civil rule acted like the release of a pressure valve, enabling people to vent their pent-up anger and express themselves more freely. As Duruji aptly argues, Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 ‘opened up the space for expression of suppressed ethno-religious demands bottled up by years of repressive military rule.’ Within the Muslim society in Nigeria, there was a move for the institutionalisation of the Sharia legal codes in predominantly Muslim states. Proponents of the movement contend that it is their constitutional right to practice their religion within the tenets of the Sharia legal code. The agitation for the implementation of Sharia code was laced with ‘human rights language’ as it sought to justify its implementation through a constitution that protects religious freedom.

Through the campaign for the implementation of the Sharia, the battle line was drawn between the majority Muslims and the minority Christians in northern Nigeria. The agitation crystallized on 27 October 1999 when Zamfara became the first state to implement Sharia legal code in the country. The then governor of Zamfara, Ahmed Sani, announced that the state will adopt Sharia law as its only legal system with effect from January 2000. Sani argued that Sharia will restore morals and values to an immoral state. Although Sani maintained that

67. Adesoji, “Between Boko Haram and Maitatsine”.
70. Ibid.
71. Agbiboa, “Sacrilege of the Sacred”.
72. HRW, “Spiralling Violence”.
73. Ibid.
74. ICG, “Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict”.
75. Agbiboa and Okem, “Unholy Trinity: Assessing the Nexus”.
only Muslims would be affected by Sharia law, he proposed a ban on alcohol and prostitution for the entire state.\textsuperscript{79}

Between 1999 and 2000, 12 northern states implemented Sharia and set up the \textit{hizbah} groups to enforce the code.\textsuperscript{80} While Muslims interpreted Sharia as a legitimate application of their religious faith to their daily lives; many Christians read it as part of a plan to transform Nigeria into an Islamic state, in which they would be reduced to second-class status, with consequences, for example, concerning access to land to build churches.\textsuperscript{81} In response, some Christian leaders under the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) began clamouring for the implementation of the Canon Law in predominantly Christian states. The consequences of this religious difference, laced at times with intolerance, degenerated into major religiously inspired violence. In 2001, Nigeria was embroiled in ethno-religious conflicts which occurred in Kano, Kaduna and Plateau states. This sectarian violence came in the wake of the implementation of Sharia in some northern states of Nigeria. In particular, the ‘indigene’ versus ‘settler’ problem\textsuperscript{82} has raged on in Jos metropolis, the capital of Plateau state. Ostein explains how local conflicts in Jos have arisen ‘primarily out of ethnic differences, pitting Hausa ‘settlers’ against the Plateau ‘indigene’ groups of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom.’\textsuperscript{83} He argues that the underlying problem is ‘the alleged rights of indigenes... to control particular locations’.\textsuperscript{84}

Jos registered a major crises beginning on 7 September 2001 and again on 2 May 2012. The crises claimed hundreds of lives, first in Yelwa in February 2004 with the massacre of about 100 Christians, 67 of them in COCIN Church Yelwa, and reprisal killings by Christians who massacred between 650 and 700 Muslims in May 2004.\textsuperscript{85} According to a report released by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in February 2004, more than 250,000 people were internally displaced due to religious violence in Plateau state.\textsuperscript{86} The spiralling violence only experienced a lull in 2004 following a declaration of a state of emergency and the suspension of the government by President Obasanjo. Between 1999 and 2010, up to 10,000 Nigerians were killed in religious violence.\textsuperscript{87} It is important to note that these violent conflicts are often disguised ethnic struggle for ascendancy between the various ethnic groups in the region. As articulated by Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor: ‘From the Jos city tragedy to the recent killings in the adjoining towns and villages, the state has been engulfed for just one reason: the battle for supremacy between Hausa and Fulani settlers and the indigenes. And this has been largely

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Ilesanmi, “Constitutional Treatment of Religion”.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Agbiba and Okem, “Unholy Trinity: Assessing the Nexus.”
  \item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Kenny, “Sharia and Christianity in Nigeria”.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Officials in Nigeria tend to use the slippery term ‘indigene’ to limit access to public resources, such as land, schools, and government jobs. In effect, the population of every state and Local Government Area (LGA) in Nigeria is divided into indigenes (defined as earliest extant occupiers or the recognised original inhabitants) and settlers (people who cannot trace their roots back to earlier times). Settlers can still be Nigerian citizens, and thus are not completely stateless. But discrimination against them can provoke major violence.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} Ostein, “Jonah Jang and the Jasawa”, 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Agbiba, “Why Boko Exists”.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Cited in Meredith, The Story of Nigeria, 187.
\end{itemize}
exploited by religious bigots and political jobbers.\textsuperscript{88} The net effect of this sectarian violence lies in the bringing about of further homogenisation of societal lines of segmentation.

**Case Study: Boko Haram and Militant Religiosity**

In recent years, no religious group has posed greater threat to Nigeria’s peace and unity than Boko Haram or, as the group officially calls itself, Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’Wati wal Jihad ('People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad'). Since July 2009, this radical Islamist group based in northern Nigeria has been responsible for more terrorist attacks and casualties in Nigeria than all other militant groups combined.\textsuperscript{89} Human rights organisations report that attacks by the group has claimed over 5,000 lives in the past three years, with the death toll rising almost daily.\textsuperscript{90} The group’s increasingly coordinated attacks are specifically targeted at Nigeria’s ethno-religious fault-lines in an escalating bid to hurt the nation’s stability. In particular, a spate of attacks against churches from December 2011 through July 2012 suggests ‘a strategy of provocation’ through which the group seeks to ‘spark a large scale of sectarian conflict that will destabilize the country’.\textsuperscript{91} But who is Boko Haram?

The concept of Boko Haram is etymologically derived from a combination of the Hausa word for book, ‘boko,’ and the Arabic word for forbidden, ‘haram.’ Thus, Boko Haram means ‘Western education is forbidden.’ It is important to clarify that in Hausa the word ‘boko’ originally had the sense of ‘false’ and ‘duplicitous.’ It certainly has come to mean ‘book’ in recent times but only with regard to books of Western provenance as they contain material that runs contrary to Islam and, therefore, ‘boko.’ The group itself rejects the designation ‘Western education is forbidden.’ Instead, it prefers ‘Western culture is forbidden.’ The difference, according to one of its senior leaders, is that ‘while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West... which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western education’.\textsuperscript{92} According to Isa, Boko Haram implies a ‘sense of rejection’ and ‘resistance to imposition of Western [culture] and its system of colonial social organisation, which replaced and degraded the earlier Islamic order of the jihadist state.’\textsuperscript{93}

Boko Haram was first led by Mohammed Yusuf until he was killed by state security forces just after the sectarian violence in Nigeria in July 2009 which claimed over 1000 lives.\textsuperscript{94} Yusuf was born on 29 January 1970 in Girgir village, Yobe State, Nigeria. Yusuf established a religious complex in his hometown that included a mosque and a school where many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children. However, the centre had ulterior political goals and soon it was also working as a recruiting ground for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} Agbiboa and Okem, “Unholy Trinity: Assessing the Nexus”.
\item \textsuperscript{88} Ojie and Ewhrudjakpor, "Ethnic Diversity and Public Policies", 7.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram”; HRW, “Spiralling Violence”.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Agbiboa, “No Retreat, No Surrender”.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram”, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Cited in Onuoha, “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Extremist Islamist Sect”, 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{93} Isa, “Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria”, 322.
\end{itemize}
future jihadists to fight the state. The group includes members who came from neighbouring Chad and Niger and speak only Arabic. Boko Haram was able to attract more than 280,000 members across northern Nigeria as well as in Chad and Niger Republic. Members of Boko Haram comprise university lecturers, bankers, political elites, drug addicts, unemployed graduates, almajiris, and migrants from neighbouring countries. The group’s members are also predominantly drawn from the Kanuri tribe – roughly 4 percent of the population – who are located in the north-eastern states of Nigeria like Bauchi and Borno, and the Hausa-Fulani (29 percent of the population), spread more generally throughout most of the northern states. In 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan warned that Boko Haram members were present at all levels of government. 

As early as 2004, the first followers of Mohammed Yusuf adduced corruption and poor governance as motivation for their actions. One of Yusuf’s followers, arrested in January 2004, told a journalist: ‘Our group has definitely suffered a setback, but our objective of fighting corruption by institutionalizing Islamic government must be achieved very soon’. In addition, Boko Haram leaders blame Western influence in Nigeria for corrupting the country’s leaders and corroding the criminal justice system. Embedded in deep tradition of Islamism, the Boko Haram ideology is but one of several variants of radical Islamism to have emerged in Northern Nigeria. Its adherents are purportedly influenced by the scriptural phrase: ‘Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors’. Boko Haram is vehemently opposed to what it sees as Western-based incursion that erodes traditional values, beliefs, and customs among Muslim communities in northern Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf, told the BBC in 2009: ‘Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam’. Elsewhere, the charismatic leader declared: ‘Our land was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a kafir [infidel] land. The current system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs’.

Boko Haram became a full-fledged insurgency following violent clashes in 2009 between the Islamist group and the state’s security agency in Bauchi charged with the responsibility of enforcing a new law of wearing crash-helmets by motorcyclists in the country. The confrontation began on June 11 in Maiduguri when the security agency and participants in a Boko Haram funeral procession clashed over mourners’ refusal to wear motorcycle helmets. Members of an anti-robbery task force comprised of military and police personnel opened fire on the procession, killing 17 Boko Haram members.

94. Umar, *The Discourses of Salafi Radicalism*.
95. Uzodike and Maiwangwa, “Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria”.
96. Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram”.
97. Agbiboa, “No Retreat, No Surrender”.
100. Ibid.
104. Kwaru and Salkida, “Funeral Procession Tragedy”.

apologized for the shooting. On 21 July, the group’s hideout in Bauchi was also ransacked by the state security forces and materials for making explosives were confiscated. Following this crackdown, the group mobilized its members for reprisal attacks. On 26 July, Boko Haram members burned down a police station in Dutsen Tanshi, on the outskirts of Bauchi, resulting in the death of five Boko Haram members and several police officers were injured.

In response, the military and police raided a mosque and home in Bauchi where Boko Haram members had regrouped, killing dozens of the group’s members. The police reported that 52 Boko Haram members, two police officers, and a soldier were killed in the violence in Bauchi. Boko Haram retaliated by launching coordinated attacks across Maiduguri that night, attacking the police stations and homes of police officers (including retired officers). They torched churches and raided the main prison—freeing inmates and killing prison guards. In response, on July 28 and 29 Yusuf’s compound was shelled by the Nigerian army and many of his followers were arrested, with at least several dozen killed in police custody. On July 29, in Postiskum, state security forces also raided the group’s hideout on the outskirts of town, killing at least 43 of Yusuf’s followers. The riot was temporarily quelled on July 30 after Nigerian forces captured, and later killed, Mohammed Yusuf who was found hiding in his father-in-law’s goat pen. Following Yusuf’s death, and the arrest of several of his followers, the group went underground for a while.

For many Boko Haram members, the extrajudicial killing of their founder was the catalyst event that served to foment pre-existing animosities toward state security forces. In a video that was released in June 2010, Abubakar Shekau – Yusuf’s second-in-command – announced that he had taken over leadership of the group and vowed to avenge the deaths of its members. In September 2010, a Boko Haram member told the BBC’s Hausa radio service that ‘we are on a revenge mission as most of our members were killed by the police’. In November 2011, during the trial of six Boko Haram suspects, one of the group members told the court that their mission was to avenge Yusuf’s death. Boko Haram followed through on its revenge mission by bombing the police headquarters and the United Nations Headquarters (Abuja) in June 2011 and August 2011 respectively. The group used petrol bombs, improvised explosive devices, car suicide bombing, and armed assaults in these

106. Uzodike and Maiangwa, “Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria”.
110. HRW, “Spiralling Violence”.
renewed violent attacks. Notably, between January and September 2012, at least 119 police officers were killed in suspected Boko Haram attacks, more than in all of 2010 and 2011 combined. According to Boko Haram leaders, these wave of attacks are a direct response to the extrajudicial killings by the police of Mohammed Yusuf and Boko Haram members, as well as for ongoing police abuses including ‘arbitrary arrest,’ ‘torture,’ and the ‘persecution’ of its members. In a video message posted online in January 2012, Shekau stated: ‘Everyone has seen what the security personnel have done to us. Everyone has seen why we are fighting with them’. The violent attacks are also connected to the overriding demands of Boko Haram which includes the immediate release of all its prisoners and the prosecution of those responsible for the killing of their leader. Most importantly, the group wants the Sharia law to become the supreme law of the land. On December 26, 2011, the day after Boko Haram’s bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger State, the group’s spokesperson Abu Qaqa avowed: ‘There will never be peace until our demands are met’.

It is instructive to note that Boko Haram is not a monolithic entity with a unified purpose. There are separate factions within the movement who disagree about tactics and strategic directions; jostling at times for attention and followers. A recent U.S. House of Representatives report suggested that one faction of the group may be focused on domestic issues and another on violent international extremism. Another report indicated that the group may have even split into three factions: one that remains moderate and welcomes an end to the violence; another that wants a peace agreement; and a third that refuses to negotiate and wants to implement strict Sharia law across Nigeria. In July 2011, a group calling itself the Yusufiya Islamic Movement distributed leaflets widely in Maiduguri denouncing other Boko Haram factions as ‘evil’.

In 2012, a splinter group of Boko Haram, known as Jama’at Ansar al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan, or ‘Supporters of Islam in the Land of Sudan,’ emerged in northern Nigeria, led by a man that goes by the pseudonym Abu Usamatul Ansar. The group, commonly known as Ansaru, announced that it had split from Boko Haram in January 26, 2012, claiming that Boko Haram was ‘inhuman’ for killing innocent Muslims as well as for targeting defectors. This announcement came six days after Boko Haram attacked government officers in Kano, leaving more than 150 civilians dead, mostly Muslims. Ansaru has pledged to defend the interests of Muslims in Africa, claiming a different understanding of Jihad. In a video posted on the internet, the jihadist splinter group announced that they will not target non-Muslims

117. Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram”.
118. Ibid.
121. Onuoha, “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Extremist Islamic Sect”.
124. Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram”.
125. Ibid.
126. Agbiboa, “No Retreat, No Surrender”.
127. Ibid.
except ‘in self-defence or if they attack Muslims’. Ansaru’s faceless leader noted that one of the group’s main goals is ‘restoring the dignity of the Muslims as it was in the time of the Caliphate... [and] the method of achieving these aims and goals is “jihad”’. In 2012, Ansaru kidnapped, and later killed, seven foreigners from Britain, Italy, Greece, Lebanon, and the Philippines. According to a statement allegedly released by the group, the kidnappings were a response to alleged attacks against Islam by European countries in “many places such as Afghanistan and Mali etc”.

Given their large-scale attacks that have spread serious ripples beyond the shores of Nigeria, there is no doubt that Boko Haram’s activities have generated a psychological impact that transcends the actual physical damage caused. The group’s increasing sophistication of attacks and its adoption of suicide car bombings may be a sign that Boko Haram is receiving tactical and operational assistance from global jihadist groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Somali-based al-Shabaab. Indeed, on 24 November a spokesman for Boko Haram, Abul Qaqa, confirmed what many had long suspected: ‘It is true that we have links with al-Qaeda. They assist us and we assist them’. Boko Haram has also admitted to establishing links in Somali. A statement allegedly released by the group read: ‘very soon, we will wage jihad...We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable...This time round, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they have been’. Members of Boko Haram are known to have fought in Mali alongside groups affiliated to al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. Boko Haram members were reported to have been significantly involved in an April 2012 invasion of the Algerian embassy in the Malian city of Gao, which resulted in the hostage-taking of seven Algerian diplomats. A local official in Mali confirmed that ‘there are a good 100 Boko Haram fighters in Gao. They are Nigerians and from Nigeria... they’re not hiding. Some are even able to speak in the local tongue, explaining that they are Boko Haram’. In August 2011 General Carter Ham, Commander of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), claimed that al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab are financing Boko Haram and also said both global Jihadist-terrorist groups shared training and fighters with Boko Haram. He described that as ‘the most dangerous thing to happen not only to the Africans, but to us as well’. In November of that year, Algerian Deputy Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel said he had ‘no doubts that coordination exists between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda,’ citing intelligence reports and common operating methods.

In association with Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram could pose a major threat not only to Nigeria, but also transnationally since Nigeria is the world’s eighth largest oil producer. Since AQIM has attacked UN targets in Algeria, and al-Shabaab has attacked UN targets in Somalia, Boko Haram’s decision to attack the UN building in Abuja is unlikely to be a coincidence. This attack

129. Ibid.
130. Roggio, “Boko Haram Leader Praises Al-Qaeda’s Leaders”.
132. Zimmerman, “From Somalia to Nigeria”.
133. Agbiboa, “No Retreat, No Surrender.”
134. Ibid.
on a distinctly non-Nigerian target was a first for Boko Haram, and may indicate ‘a major shift in its ideology and strategic goals’ (Forest, 2012: 81). Mindful of this transnational threat, on June 21, 2012, the US State Department added the group’s most visible leader, Abubakar Shekau, to the list of specially designated global terrorists. Khalid al Barnawi and Abubakar Adam Kamba were also included in the list because of their ties to Boko Haram and close links with Al-Qaeda. The designation ‘blocks all of Shekau’s, Kambar’s and al-Barnawi’s property interests subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with or for the benefit of these individuals’ (US Department of State, June 21, 2012). The media note also reads: ‘These designations demonstrate the United States’ resolve in diminishing the capacity of Boko Haram to execute violent attacks’ (ibid). The Obama administration also announced a $7 million bounty for the capture of BH leader Abubakar Shekau, putting him in the top echelon of wanted jihadist commanders (ibid). Four other al-Qaeda leaders in Africa where also included in the ‘Rewards for Justice’ list. The US State Department noted that that BH and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen and Saudi Arabia are cooperating to ‘strengthen Boko Haram’s capacity to conduct terrorist attacks’. On November 13, 2013, the US Department of State, following the examples of Nigeria and the UK, finally designated Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ and ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’.

While the overriding goal of Boko Haram is to create a fully Islamic state of Nigeria under a strict form of sharia law, the cocktail of corruption, poverty, inequality, and unemployment in northern Nigeria continues to fuel members of the group. According to Isa, Boko Haram communities have been wrecked by ‘poverty, deteriorating social services and infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising numbers of unemployed graduates, massive numbers of unemployed youths, dwindling fortunes in agriculture... and the weak and dwindling productive base of the northern economy.’ According to a recent report on northern Nigeria by Human Rights Watch, unemployment, lack of economic opportunities and wealth inequalities are a source of deep frustration in many parts of the restive region. According to the National Bureau Statistics report, the highest poverty rate of 64.8 percent is recorded in the northeast, followed by 61.2 percent in the northwest. On the other hand, the lowest rate of 31.2 percent is recorded in the southeast, followed by 40.2 percent in the southwest. The report further shows that 70 percent of Nigerians in northeast Nigeria survive on less than one dollar a day, vis-à-vis 50 and 59 percent in southwest and southeast Nigeria. Thus, Sope Williams Elegbe, Research Director of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG), argues that:

The increasing poverty in Nigeria is accompanied by increasing unemployment. Unemployment is higher in the north than in the south. Mix this situation with radical Islam, which promises a better life for martyrs, and you can understand the growing

140. HRW, “Spiralling Violence”.
142. Ibid.
violence in the north. Government statistics show that the northern states have the highest proportion of uneducated persons. If you link a lack of education and attendant lack of opportunities to a high male youth population, you can imagine that some areas are actually a breeding ground for terrorism.\textsuperscript{143}

The link between the rise of terrorism and socio-economic underdevelopment has been criticised as simplistic because it fails to explain why some poor places do not engage in collective violence. Another criticism is submitted by Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierriek in their recent empirical research. In their work entitled ‘What Causes Terrorism?’ the duo examines a host of possible influences on terrorism including global order, contagion, modernization, institutional order, identity conflict, inter alia.\textsuperscript{144} Following a detailed review of the relevant empirical literature on terrorism causes they conclude that ‘there is only limited evidence to support the hypothesis that economic deprivation causes terrorism... poor economic conditions matter less to terrorism once it is controlled for institutional and political factors’.\textsuperscript{145} Instead, they argue that terrorism is closely linked to political instability, sharp divides within the populace, country size and further demographic, institutional and international factors.\textsuperscript{146}

While acknowledging the skilful way in which Boko Haram has exploited and harnessed the extant circumstances of relative deprivation and political grievance in northern Nigeria to promote its vision to turn Nigeria into a fully Islamic state, this paper argues that the ultra-violent turn of Boko Haram must be traced back to the extrajudicial killing of its leader, Muhammed Yusuf, and the ongoing arbitrary arrest, torture and bloodletting of its members. Until 2009 Boko Haram was seen as radical, but not ultra-violent.\textsuperscript{147} The killing of Yusuf while in police custody ‘provoked a staunch reaction from Boko Haram members who primarily want to settle their scores with the police and army’.\textsuperscript{148} In a video that was released in June 2010, Abubakar Shekau – the group’s current leader – vowed to avenge the deaths of its members. In a typical Al-Qaeda-style video, Shekau said: ‘Do not think Jihad is over: Rather Jihad has just began’.\textsuperscript{149}

**Conclusion: The Dynamics of State Response**

Since the early 1980s, the Nigerian government has taken a number of constitutional, legislative and policy measures to manage the incidence of religious identity conflict and sectarian violence. These measures include: (1) the exclusion of religion as an index in the design, conduct and reporting of national population census; (2) the promotion of inter-faith cooperation and dialogue through the establishment of the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) in 2000; (3) the constitutional establishment of the Federal Character Commission


\textsuperscript{144} Krieger and Meierriek, “What Causes Terrorism?” 3. It is important to note that the focus of Krieger and Meierriek was essentially on global (or transnational) terrorism in lieu of domestic (or sub-state) terrorism.

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{147} Onuoha, “Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Extremist Islamic Sect”.


\textsuperscript{149} Agbiboa, “Boko-Haram and the Global Jihad”.
(FCC) to prevent the predominance of one religious group in all government institutions; (4) the political application of the principle of power sharing between the north and south as well as Christian and Muslims; (5) non-registration of political parties with ethnic or religious overtones; and (6) prohibition of registration of banks with religious appellations. Despite these measures, religiously inspired violence has raged on especially in northern Nigeria and remains arguably one of the biggest security challenges facing Nigeria today. One of the key reasons why management measures have emphatically failed to rein in religious identity conflict is due to the highly militarised nature of the Nigerian state. The military ruled Nigeria for nearly 30 of its first 40 years of independence. According to Ekineh, ‘No other country in Africa has been coercively dominated for so long a period by their own military as the people of Nigeria.’

According to the late Nigerian scholar Claude Ake, ‘More often than not, the post-colonial state in Nigeria presented itself as an apparatus of violence, and while its base in social forces remained extremely narrow it relied unduly on coercion for compliance, rather than authority.’ The culture of militarism implanted by the Nigerian state has been reproduced by virtually all resistant groups in the country.

Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that the Nigerian state seems to favour short-term measures aimed at repressing violent religious tendencies in lieu of a non-killing conflict management approach that is open to political dialogue or manoeuvre. Hence state responses have remained inchoate, uncoordinated, incendiary and ultimately counterproductive. In the name of restoring order and eliminating the security threat of Boko Haram, for example, the Nigerian state established a special Joint Military Task Force (JTF) which has been implicated in horrific human rights violations in northern communities. According to Human Rights Watch:

During raids in communities, often in the aftermath of Boko Haram attacks, members of the security forces have executed men in front of their families; arbitrarily arrested or beaten members of the community; burned houses, shops, and cars; stolen money while searching homes; and, in at least one case, raped a woman. [In addition] Government security agencies routinely hold suspects incommunicado without charge or trial in secret detention facilities and have subjected detainees to torture or other physical abuse.

In Bornu State, for example, JTF resorted to extra-legal killings, dragnet arrests and intimidation of hapless residents. According to Hussein, ‘Far from conducting intelligence-driven operations, the JTF simply cordoned off areas and carried out house-to-house searches, at times shooting young men in these homes.’ In Maiduguri, residents complain that: ‘During raids into communities soldiers have set fire to houses, shops, and cars, randomly arrested men from the neighbourhood, and in some cases executed them in front

153. Adejumobi, “Ethnic Militia Groups and the National Question”.
of their shops or houses’.  

In the most recent crossfire between members of the JTF and BH in Baga, a village on Lake Chad near Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, up to 187 people were killed and 77 others injured. But Baga residents have accused the JTF, not Boko Haram, of firing indiscriminately at civilians and setting fire on much of the historically fishing town. The Nigerian authorities have rarely brought any to justice for these crimes against civilians. According to Keller, ‘An overreliance on intimidatory techniques not only present the image of a state which is low in legitimacy and desperately struggling to survive, but also in the long run can do more to threaten state coherence than to aid it.’

As fighting intensifies between the JTF and Boko Haram, the indiscriminate use of force by both sides is contributing to a rising number of deaths as civilians in northern Nigeria continue to face potential mass atrocity crimes. Already, the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have announced that over 6,200 refugees have arrived in Niger from northern Nigeria fearing retaliatory attacks and general insecurity as a result of intensified state offensive against Boko Haram. Unfortunately, the few attempts at negotiating with Boko Haram, including the recent amnesty offer extended to its members, have stalled due to distrust on both sides, and the factionalized leadership of Boko Haram’s different cells. The growing frustration of the Nigerian government with the deteriorating security situation in northern Nigeria is evident in its carrot and stick approach, from amnesty talks to the deployment of troops and the declaration of outright war on Boko Haram. According to one leading human rights activist in northern Nigeria, ‘You can’t talk of peace on one hand and be deploying troops on the other’. 

The militarised approach of the Nigerian government appears to be further radicalising Boko Haram members. In recent attacks, alleged Boko Haram extremists attacked a boarding school in Potiskum (northeastern Nigeria) before dawn, killing 41 people (29 students were burned alive) and torching university administrative blocks and hostels. Following the violent attacks, Abubakar Shekau, the group’s current leader, released a 15-minute video on Youtube calling for more similar attacks. Shekau warned: ‘School teachers who are teaching Western education: We will kill them! We will kill them!’ Shekau also denied he is negotiating a ceasefire with the Nigerian government: ‘We will not enter into any agreement with non-believers or the Nigerian government,’ he said, adding that ‘The Quran teaches that we must shun democracy, we must shun Western education, and we must shun the constitution’. October 2014 marks six months since Boko Haram abducted over two hundred schoolgirls from Chibok, in Borno State. The Chibok girls, kidnapped on April 14, have not been rescued yet. This is despite efforts by the US, the UK, France, China and Israel to support Nigeria’s efforts to turn the tide of the insurgency and rescue the Chibok girls being held hostage in the forest of Sambisa.

160. Agbiboa, “Sacrilege of the Sacred”.
161. Thurston, “Amnesty for Boko Haram”.
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. Agbiboa, “Silencing the Guns”. 
If the Nigerian government is to leave a dent on the solid walls of sectarianism and militant religiosity in the country, it must invest in inter-religious dialogues between leaders and followers of the two predominant religions in the country, namely Islam and Christianity. Dialogue between Christians and Muslims is vital because it will help clear the cloud of misunderstanding and create a better ambience of mutual enrichment. Moreover, all religious communities must understand that there is no alternative to inter-faith dialogue, as there can never be a universal religion or an exclusive society for adherents of a particular religion. Also, Christian and Muslim religious education should be tailored in such a way as to eschew the exclusive teaching of dogmatic Christian and Islamic doctrines and foster mutual respect, tolerance and amity.

In addition, there is an urgent need for Christian and Muslim leaders in Nigeria to join together to publicly denounce all forms of religious intolerance and sectarian violence and encourage, through their sermons, the need for religious harmony and tolerance of other faiths. Also, the Nigerian state should establish a comprehensive ‘Religious Conflicts and Early Warning System’ that would configure an intelligence gathering and evaluation system on religious identity violence, and also design the means to its timely containment through preventive dialogue. Finally, to achieve sustainable peace in northern Nigeria, the government should devise a sound socio-economic strategy that not only meaningfully addresses the problem of political corruption stemming from interreligious and interethnic rivalry aimed at the control of the state machinery for private or sectarian interests, but also incorporates development, security, and respect of the human rights of the citizenry, including those of alleged Boko Haram members. Unless the physical and social wellbeing of the individual is sufficiently protected within the state, and unless the state refrains from the unjust use of hard power, national peace and unity will continue to hang by a thread, with grave ramifications for Nigeria’s corporate existence.
Bibliography


THE_ROLE_OF_RELIGION_IN_AFRICAN_CONFLICTS_THE_CASES_OF_NIGERIA_AND_SUDAN.


Byman, D., ‘Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy.’ World Politics 56, 1, 2003, pp. 139-163.


Participatory Development in Myanmar’s Dry Zone Region: The Village Book

By Janine Joyce*

Abstract

This field report focuses upon the participatory development process utilised by ActionAid Myanmar in Myanmar’s centrally located Dry Zone area. Communities in Myaing and Pakokku Townships were observed at various stages of engagement, as a range of participatory rural appraisal tools were utilised to develop the strategic planning document known as the Village Book. For the purpose of this field report the In Yeung community will be given as a specific example.

The underlying Fellow programme of specially trained youth change builders from the local communities was a key aspect in the effective planning, development of democratic processes, practical outcomes and strength of unity spirit within the villages; required for the forming of the Village Book.

The observational and focus group data comes from an eight-day field trip (June 2014) reviewing the practical outcomes and peoples’ experiences of the bottom-up planning and development process. As such this represents a constructivist theoretical perspective. I am mindful that this is at best a glimpse into a much larger phenomenon, impacted by global systems of production, consumption, pollution, agencies, politics and policies. However, the strength of this field report lies in the way that it gives the people’s description and experience of themselves as agents; working alongside community members or fellows especially trained in participatory development skills.

Keywords: Bottom up development, Myanmar, Participatory development, Water

*Janine Joyce is a researcher and scholar specializing in the efficacy of complementary therapies such as Reiki Touch, Yoga Therapy and Meditation in health and lifestyle management. Her publications include articles in journals such as Preventive Medicine and American Journal for Health Promotion. Janine is in the last stages of completing her PhD through the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at University of Otago in Dunedin, and Bioethics Centre, Dunedin School of Medicine, New Zealand. Her recent achievements include a Commonwealth Scholarship for postgraduate study in yoga therapy and stress management, which allowed her to study at Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha in Tirupati, India (2012-2013). A recent Peacebuilder fellowship (2014) from Monterey University took her into The People’s Republic of Myanmar to gather stories on water conflict. Janine’s academic work is grounded in 30 years of practical experience as a social worker and trauma therapist.

**I would like to recognise this report as joint effort and creation. I would like to credit my collaborators Dr Sital Kumar, Advisor Governance and Field Operations ActionAid Myanmar, Aung Min Naing, Regional Manager, ActionAid Myanmar, Namsai Wangsaeree, Fletchers University USA, and Shihab Uddin, Director, ActionAid Myanmar.
Overview

Myanmar’s centrally located dry zone has suffered from ongoing drought and sub-optimal monsoon for over ten years.¹ Many communities lack electricity, drinking water and sufficient resources to manage the ongoing effects of climate change including; lack of water, loss of vegetation and rising temperatures. The dry zone area has been subject to severe climatic disasters; including Cyclone Nargis in 2008.² The effects of climate change on these communities has been evident in the areas of; i) loss of village infrastructure; ii) reduced educational opportunity and literacy; iii) poor health; iv) struggling economy; and v) changing livelihood.

The people are faced with the task of surviving conditions that require additional knowledge and rapid changes in agriculture, livelihood and networking. For hundreds of years they have lived in their communities without need for outside assistance. Climate change has altered that. As a consequence the people are negotiating and engaging with the state, outside agencies and agents. They are holding the state accountable as they identify their needs and aim to reduce poverty. They are competing for external aid agency funding whilst facing the practical requirements of survival. This preliminary report looks at the participatory development program that has encouraged such skills and the practical effect.

Myanmar has been politically sensitive and external development agencies that have access to those suffering from climate change do not take this for granted. As a result Actionaid Myanmar implemented a model of bottom-up development that relies on the youth within the communities to become the change builders. Actionaid seldom provides money to the communities; preferring to focus upon soft skill development including; livelihood training, coaching, networking, and funding applications, collaboration with funding agencies and encouragement. The initial key project outcome was to produce and develop the strategic document, known as the Village book. ActionAid Myanmar trains youth (known as fellows)

1. The Dry zone occupies 10% of Myanmar’s total land area. It has 57 townships and thirteen districts. Approximately a third of the national population (16 million people) live in this drought prone area (Kyi, 2012).
2. The Very Severe Cyclonic Storm Nargis was the worst recorded natural disaster in the recorded history of Myanmar. The cyclone sent a storm surge 40 kilometers up the densely populated Irrawaddy Delta causing catastrophic destruction and at least 138,000 fatalities. There were around 55,000 people missing and many other deaths were found in other towns and areas, although the Myanmar government’s official death toll may have been underreported. The feared ‘second wave’ of fatalities from disease and lack of relief efforts never materialized–Damage was estimated at over US$10 billion, which made it the most damaging cyclone ever recorded in this basin.
with the soft skills necessary to enable the community to come together and engage in SWOT analysis. The tools and techniques are context specific, although collaborative and inclusive of all members in the community. Traditional inequalities are addressed as women and youth take an active role in planning and change within the villages. In many ways it as practical embodiment of what social scientist Robert Chambers (1997) describes in his book as putting the first last. Alongside this important shift in mind set was the giving of the necessary skills, training and autonomy and power to the people themselves.

**Participatory Development**

What is participatory development? It is a human rights based approach to development, whereby the community’s power relations are transformed and there is priority given to the active agency of the people living in poverty. It recognises the importance of the people becoming conscious of their rights. The goal of development is to assist the people to become organised and able to collectively claim their rights (Kyumusugulwe, 2013). Or as In Yeung villagers state about their Village Book and resulting dam and reservoir;

> “It was made from everyone. We announce each other and we meet one place and we decide each other and it came from the people’s decision. Two years, every month talking and then the book was made...We already finished the last two years but we could only publish information in 2012....The fellows only organise the people and when they plan it is everyone...We went to the authorities and we said and they find out our difficulty and then together we have planned and made our dam. We would collect each other and face the problem together and go and ask like that” (In Yeung Village, 16th June 2014).

What are soft skills? Soft skills are the abilities that managers bring to the processes of engagement and include; trust building, maintaining morale, conflict resolution and facilitating the discussions that traditionally formed a SWOT analysis. The Village book analysis however goes further as it is predicated in any understanding of the dynamics of power and control and the macro-issues involved in community poverty. All planning seeks to have the ‘people’ as active agents to producing change and becoming capable in effective advocacy with state agents.

ActionAid Myanmar has been developing a unique program of participatory development processes. These processes rest upon the Youth Fellow programme and the production of the strategic planning document; the Village book.

**Youth Fellow Program**

The Youth fellow programme gives training and coaching to youth from the community; so

---

3. SWOT is an acronym for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats. SWOT Analysis is a tool that enables a subjective assessment of a given situation or subject in order to make critical decisions that are related to planning and risk management. Whilst this is not the language used by the communities in describing their change process; it is an easy way of understanding the thinking behind the village book and facilitative processes. However, the village book process is embedded in deep attitudes whereby the ‘first are put last’ (Chambers, 1997).
that they become change builders with the soft skills, knowledge and confidence necessary to create the links between their community’s identified needs and local authorities and external actors. The necessary soft skill abilities include; communication, trust building, positivity, constancy, confidence and the capacity to facilitate within communities. The purpose of the Fellow program according to a report by Ferratti included;

- to train young people as change makers in social development and participatory methodologies;
- to mobilise community members through the establishment of functioning Reflect circles in villages;
- to support the community to analyse the causes of their poverty and to identify strategies to overcome these;
- to support community action to undertake identified activities as determined by the communities themselves;
- to build the capacity of the community to undertake their initiatives and facilitate ongoing development processes;
- to strengthen the capacity of communities to actively engage with state and non-state actors to mobilise resources; and facilitate networks of fellows and community members too link people at various levels and strengthen civil society (2010: 4).

**Village Book Model**

The development of this document is formed as community members meet together and complete a range of participatory rural appraisal tools including; i) social map; ii) resource map; iii) seasonal calendar (seasonality diagram); iv) timeline; v) wellbeing analysis; vi) cobweb analysis; vii) venn diagrams and focus group discussions; viii) problem tree analysis; ix) matrix for rights mapping; x) dream map and; xi) the village development planning matrix. These materials are pictorial and therefore not dependent upon literacy skills. All members from the community including those most affected by poverty are able to come together to develop this material. In this we can see that the people are able to give complex information about their reality, without any exclusion due to the effects of poverty. This reflects the methodological revolution that Robert Chambers (1997) identified in his book, ‘Whose reality counts: putting the first last.’ In Myanmar the change builders are youth and in many communities have been joined by the women and landless who have formed advisory groups. In addition ActionAid Myanmar has begun training government and state officials in the principles underlying bottom-up planning and participatory development.

The Village Book is a planning document that is the outcome of a number of ‘soft processes.’ By this we mean that it is developed from a participatory and facilitative range of approaches and techniques that allow all villagers to be involved in problem identification and strategic planning. There are no barriers in this process as all villagers are invited and encouraged to attend the meetings. Full participation is reliant on a trust building process and is aided by the community engagement by specially trained fellows. The fellows often come from the village and recently have been nominated by the villagers themselves for the training programme. Most fellows described challenges at the beginning as people were sceptical that such a

4. Patrick Kyumusugulwa 2013 article on Participatory Development and Reconstruction offers excellent definition of terms and critique of the approach which remain outside the scope of this field report.
process would give practical results to the serious issues facing the community. Many fellows faced prejudice due to their age and gender (in the case of the female fellows).

Each village book is formed from a range of community meetings. From these community meetings a detailed analysis of the problems is developed. A detailed analysis of the assets of the village and map of the village is drawn. A pictorial representation of the village goals is produced in the Dream map. This map shows the exact location of where the needed extra buildings (for example: the school, dam, market) and infrastructure shall be.

The ActionAid Myanmar training material describes the Village Book model as having the following strengths; i) capturing the general situation of the village; ii) information is sourced from the community and processes are owned by the community; iii) the book is used to prepare the village development plan, engage relevant actors, such as local government to coordinate development activities, and hold them accountable; iv) supporting advocacy and planning; v) analysis of the village; including mapping of the status of rights; baseline of the situation; participatory indicators of change; village development and action plan; and detailed implementation plan; vi) at the end of the process the critical analysis and village development plan is shared and reviewed with villagers in a large meeting where it can be reflected upon and critiqued. Then the book goes to the village head for approval and signature. From there the process of implementation begins. Twenty three villages have had village books completed in the Myaing Township, Dry Zone Region. Within Pakokku Township all of the villages have completed village books (N= 297).

Findings

I will speak about one example of participatory development although we saw many examples in the Dry Zone region. The people from In Yeung village described how they began the process of addressing the lack of water in their village. They began with the Problem Tree (a form of participatory vulnerability analysis);

“We started at the root source which was; a lack of a sustainable way; the dam was weak and very small; we lacked technical support and past experience; deforestation; and no dam function. And this caused the following effects; deforestation; no more water for irrigation; less production of crops; community disappointed; and disaster. From this the following detailed effects included; no good quality of crops; global--warming; income is less; and health problems and aggression.”

I was impressed by the in depth analysis by the men and women as they shared the problems they had faced. Three years later the people have prioritised their needs; the school renovation (US $1000), water from irrigation (dam) (US $4000) and creating working opportunities are ongoing projects with significant investments of time and materials. The road and reservoir have been formed; and women and children are attending a training center and developing livelihood skills; and the farmers have already changed the types of crops being grown according to the new local conditions. The rural clinic (dispensary (US $4000), road renovation (US $3000) and tractors (2 tractors; US $5000) are ongoing projects. What was clear to me was that projects were manifesting empowerment and progress was
seen. I was impressed by the enthusiasm and hope that communities seemed able to maintain for a long period of time with the support of fellows.-- For example; it took three years to prepare the Village Book data and as an example included the exact numbers for the following types of categories; 1) number of livestock (chickens, cows, goats); 2) individual ownership of trees; 3) types of trees (tamarind, fruit trees, palm; toddy); 4) numbers of cell phones and televisions in the village; 5) the numbers of bicycles and motorbikes in village; 5) the amount of land owned by the village; 6) the numbers of people owning land in Inn Yeung village; 6) numbers working as farmers or in other occupations; 7) number of dams and other power sources such as solar; and 8) educational attainment figures. One report identifies progress in the area as including; 77 wells constructed in 33 villages; well cleaning in 50 villages; 45 ponds constructed in 26 villages; pond cleaning in 35 villages; and piped water arranged for a few communities (Lofving, 2011). All villages in the project group (50) now have drinking water all year round. There are many other villages not in the project group that lack these facilities.

In Yeung people are now focused upon getting electricity. The problem tree for electricity shows the detailed effects of not having electricity (no media, lack of access to international information for example).

As we continue with the community’s story of development we find coordination with the state;

“Once two years ago the foreman was invited by minister to a meeting and boldly presented about his village’s nearby small dam. He asked minister for support to enlarge it. At this forum were other officials from agriculture department and irrigation department. We said that the small reservoir made by hand was not sufficient so we needed support from you and the minister and the officials want to support this. The officials went to their office and then make the instruction that they want to check this place. I had no idea and he have no idea where it was and we all come together to see it. We continue this process of linkage with ActionAid and ActionAid sends fellows. So the fellows came and began meetings with the villagers and everyone develops the village book and we plan accordingly. The village set up advisory groups; the construction advisory group and the women and mothers group” (In Yeung Village, 16th June 2014).

The community describe how they prioritise needs and plan in an equitable way;

“Farmers that have land will get water but those without land will not. Definitely water for farmers but landless and poor families have no water. So we decide to be equal. Landless families group was formed and there are only women members on that group. The landless families group organized the mothers and women’s advisory group to get fair share of water and profit from them. So fish in the dam for the homeless. Goats for the landless and farmers to be charged for water use. For dam maintenance and support of 50% landless women, homeless families and 30% action plan and 29% dam maintenance. The mothers group sorted the rules and made sure of.”
We were curious about the ways in which the project practically happened;

“Of course from 2011 our effort has started from small dam built by hand 30 years ago. Since 2011 multiple similar work has started. Mother’s Advisory group will tell the story. For the dam construction we decide. Of course we all decided we all knew that we needed it. But this man had the chance to talk to the minister so it started like that. The story (village book) came first then they calculate the cost with the help of the town irrigation engineer. 200,000 dollars and government not supporting us just to say to us ‘to do’. So we request ActionAid that funding is needed. Heavy machinery is available in town. But to run, the machines need fuel. So asked ActionAid to give the money to run machines. We therefore don’t need $200,000 dollars. We only need $20,000 to run the machines. Shihad Uddin Ahamad, Country Director, ActionAid Myanmar, says, ‘$200,000 to $20,000 this is not so much.’ He says he will look for a donor. From his limited funding he give the $20,000 and then it is up to us to work and replace it when the dam is broken. We have no money but labour, stone carrying from the gorge so that gives $10,000. The project starts with $30,000. So we start the work. We combine this work and now the government has approved $200,000 more.”

It seems that the pervasive and serious nature of climate change has given the impetus for a productive working relationship between the people, the state and the aid agencies.

“Like when you ask about relationship with government. So when they make plan with government the next thing is electricity. So they show to authority who say it will cost 5000 lak and they do not the money for that. They have that difficulty because the government will not provide all. And also the second priority is the water they also have an idea to give water house by house but the problem is the water cannot go deeply. The water is not there underground. They do not know what the problem was. They were trying to find another place that will give water...And also UNICEF they would donate the pipe but you have to show you where the water resource is. You have to show but the problem is they cannot show where the water resource is. But they are trying to save their money to have their own because if you find the place you start to dig so you have to give the money. You have to pay to dig to find the water source.”

Here we see that the people are facing the changes in the underground water table. It is sobering when communities traditionally based in an area for such a long time say that the deep water is disappearing. Yet somehow through the Fellow and Village Book processes the people are uniting to meet their needs. Throughout this project the women took more active roles in the planning of village needs. We asked the men what this change was like for them;

“We like it. Before we were confused and we did not get things done. The women are not confused. The work gets finished.”

The women laughed and continued by describing their experience of participation;

“In the past we don’t speak but now we do dare to tell. If we want to tell we do tell.
We are really happy, we are proud of ourselves. We are women and we can speak our need. Before the ActionAid program we are less confident. In the first we were very shy with guest and now we see guest and tell openly. This is because of the meetings with ActionAid and in their meetings they talk a lot...and also she mention one Sawmya Thandar sister and because of her we manage as well because she is coordinator for Pan Village (also in ActionAid Myanmar program)... Like a role model...”

It was interesting to me that beneath the traditional roles was a community that valued unity. When I asked what unity was the people laughed and said, ‘unity is an energy.’ They explained the underlying importance of their values towards each other;

“Like they try to help each other and if they see if someone don’t have dam, then please come and have some it’s okay....really have unity each other...Because their religion shows the way.. Buddha. To love each other to love each other as much as they can and if other village need something with crops then we come with our own ration and help them as well...Yeah it’s getting better but its only time. We have to wait the time but when everyone one voice it will happen like that.”

Interpreting Findings

I am reluctant to interpret or generalise these findings too much. This field report represents a beginning conversation with the Dry Zone people and a step towards understanding development when it is nested deeply within indigenous values and understandings about life and being human.

However, it seems from the stories shared that when power is returned to the whole collective family, including the women and youth then sustainable development is possible. It is a story of progress and requires cooperation between the people, the state and the aid agencies. In addition, I was heartened by the lack of wastage of resources when the villagers and their advisory groups were given complete control and accountability for resources and progress.

Conclusion

The story of In Yeung dam and the surrounding villages in Myaing and Pakokku townships is hopeful. Although much yet needs to be done to eradicate the health and educational effects of poverty. The needs in the areas affected by climate change are many and continue to require outside resources. But it seems from this story that there is a style of resourcing that enhances the unity, agency and voice of the people themselves, as they tap into their own indigenous knowledge and expertise of the lands that have nourished their people for millennia.
Bibliography


Alan Collins

Building a People-oriented Security Community the ASEAN Way

With the possible emergence of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015, Alan Collin’s book is a very timely, well argued and elegantly structured work on ASEAN’s nascent, people-oriented security community in Southeast Asia. The author argues that in contrast to previous propositions of ASEAN’s state as a regional organization—either as simply an ineffectual security regime or an emerging international organization—ASEAN is moving towards a security community, but its own evolution is conceptually and empirically different from Karl Deutch’s initial formulation.¹

In order to argue the distinctiveness of ASEAN’s security community, Collins made two conceptual expansions of the term. Firstly, he looks at actors other than the elites at the state level by positing that non-state and non-elite actors in Civil Society Organizations (CSO) are the crucial players in community building. Secondly, he argues that the definition of security should be expanded from the more traditional conceptions, such as the use of force, to the more non-traditional security issues, such as human rights, health, and environmental security. In proving this argument, he structured the chapters logically.

The initial chapter focuses on analytically differentiating the regulative features of a security regime from the constitutive norms of a community building. The latter involves a sense of ‘we-ness’ that is firmly embedded amongst members of the organization. The second chapter analyzes the evolving features of ASEAN’s constitutive norms. With the recent political and economic shifts worldwide, ASEAN’s concern on building their strong² states and limiting interference from outside has translated to gradually interfering in the domestic affairs of its member and decreasing the relative importance of the traditionally held non-interference doctrine.³ However, to show that the changes in ASEAN are far reaching, the third chapter surveys the most recent role of CSOs in strengthening security through community building as a result of their activities, lobbying, and coalition building. These issues are Collin’s focus in the final three chapters as empirical studies which demonstrate ASEAN’s emerging security community in human rights, HIV, and natural disaster relief operations.


2. Although strong states mean many things in Political Science, the review pertains to states in Southeast Asia, which have traditionally valued domestic stability at the expense of civil liberties.
Two theoretical points are worth mentioning. First, the author engages the literature on state-society relations, the regionalization of state-level issues, and the eventual formation of stronger regional organizations. The conventionally held European Union example, which formed under the auspices of the United States’ (US) protection and the looming threat of Soviet Invasion, has been categorized as an elite-led regional organization. With the centrality of CSOs in strengthening security community building, Collin’s work is an important contribution to regionalization literature because it posits a non-elite path towards regionalization. Though some previous studies have engaged in the role of NGOs in the EU during the 1960s-1970s, it was the institutionalized role of the European Coal and Steel Commission’s High Commissioner that has been at the centre of the mainstream literature, which shows the elite character of the European regime. In addition, it highlights the confluence of traditional security issues and non-traditional security matters. Again, linking this to regionalization literature, this is a valuable contribution, which suggests that non-traditional matters could be venues for regional integration. This point demonstrates the route towards regionalization in an area of increasing economic flows and environmental issues across borders and generations.

However, several points of contention are open for review. First, I will focus on the initial argument of ASEAN security community building based on CSO participation through matters of non-traditional security. I would claim that human rights issues are still going nowhere in ASEAN: extra-judicial killings in the Philippines and the delay on the Freedom for Information Act, are strong features of the state’s reluctance to embrace human rights. Perhaps, CSOs might have embraced these concepts but definitely not states. This brings out the weak link of Collins’ argument. Are issues of HIV cooperation, disaster relief operations, and let us say, human rights, bringing ASEAN countries closer to a security community? This deftly brings us to the second point. With the changes taking place in Myanmar, Collins directed our attention to the political level of ASEAN elites, who realise that they have to ‘get their act together’ or else intervention from outside will take place. If this is the culmination of shifting the relative importance of non-interference, then this is perhaps what is missing in matters of non-traditional security. The focus on CSO participation in non-traditional security appears to have diluted the process of how matters from ‘below’ relate to matters from ‘above.’ Put simply, how do non-traditional security matters affect traditional security matters? The locus of change, of greater security building, I believe, is in the interaction between these two securities, which the book mostly overlooked. Third, there seems to be little justification for the choice of the empirical demonstration of his arguments. Put simply, why were human rights, HIV, and natural disasters chosen amongst regional issues? Was it because the ASEAN was not cooperating on other issues, or was CSO participation strongest in these issues? Collins could have strengthened his work if he explained the relative importance of the issues not only to one another, but also to other regionalizing initiatives.

In sum, this is a very well argued, valuable book, particularly the innovative theoretical approach, which makes it a must read for anyone working on ASEAN, Regionalism, or

---

3. Hypothetically, this means that members of ASEAN do not interfere in another member’s domestic affairs.
4. This institutionalizes Civil Society to demand information from the government and for the state to disclose information annually.
Southeast Asian Studies. Moreover, regardless whether readers (including myself) agree the key arguments of this publication, it offers a good source of information on which varied lines of discussion on the development of ASEAN can be built on. With the AEC in 2015, this is a highly relevant and very timely book on ASEAN

Alvin Almendrala Camba
SUNY, Binghamton
Recent developments, in particular the set-up by the United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, of the first bilateral talks between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in three years, revealed that the United States is in the driver’s seat regarding the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). This book, based on the author’s PhD awarded by the Middle East Technical University in Turkey, is rather optimistic on the role of the EU in foreign policy and security strategy. Kaya argues that although the EU “plays a politically and diplomatically supplementary and subordinate role to the USA” (p. 214), “its overall balance sheet as a foreign and security policy actor in the post-9/11 era is fairly positive.” (p. 228)

This rather optimistic conclusion follows from an evaluation of the EU’s policy in the MEPP which focuses on measuring the congruity of the EU’s role conceptions in general EU foreign policy with its actual policy in the MEPP. The chapters on role theory (Chapter 2), role conceptions in general EU foreign policy (Chapter 3) and the historical overview of the EU’s involvement in the MEPP (Chapter 4) are building blocks for the main analysis (Chapter 5). In this analysis, Kaya compares the EU’s vision with the real actions of the EU in his case study, the MEPP, thereby focusing on the period between 11 September 2001 and 31 December 2006.

Borrowing from Holsti’s and Aggestam’s theoretical work on role theory and using content analysis, Kaya finds in the analysed EU policy documents and speeches indications of seven role conceptions of the EU. Indeed, the EU describes itself not only as a ‘force for good’, but also as a ‘force for international peace, security and stability’, a ‘provider of development aid’, a ‘promoter of its values and norms’, a ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’, a ‘partner for the UN’, and a ‘builder of effective partnerships with key actors’.

Interestingly, Kaya concludes that there is no apparent ‘conception-performance gap’ in the EU and that the EU is “more than a modest presence, but less than a robust actor.” (p. 213) However, he finds that the levels of congruity differ between the different role conceptions. Two main conclusions are formulated. First, the EU as a ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’, a ‘partner for the UN’, and a ‘builder of effective partnerships with key actors’ “has more successfully performed these roles, which has strengthened the EU’s profile, effectiveness and international credibility as a foreign and security policy actor in the case of the MEPP.” (p. 214) However, the EU in its roles of a ‘force for good’, a ‘force for international peace, security and stability’ and a ‘promoter of its values and norms’ has only in a limited fashion been able to reach the expectations in the field that were set in the speeches and official documents.

Measuring the performance of the EU in different settings is currently on the rise in international relations scholarship. Looking at this performance from the perspective of the EU and the role that the EU itself perceives to be playing in the world is interesting and contributes to this performance literature, also because it takes a theoretical stance in that
regard different from most of the literature. Not only the theoretical framework of the book is well-chosen, also the case study hits the mark, since, like the recent negotiations prove, the MEPP is a hot topic in international relations. Therefore, this book comes at the right time.

That being said, the role conceptions could potentially be simplified. Kaya developed the roles ‘promoter of effective multilateralism’, ‘partner for the UN’ and ‘builder of effective partnership with key actors’. The Question is could these three roles be merged into one role, partly because the author suggested that they are similar in general EU foreign policy and did merge these roles himself in the case study, arguing that they were interlinked and overlapping each other in the MEPP.

Another shortcoming is present at the end of the conclusion, where Kaya states that there is no apparent ‘conception-performance gap’ in the EU’s foreign and security policy. On the basis of this single case study, he cannot broaden this conclusion on the ‘conception-performance gap’ of the EU MEPP to the general EU foreign policy. In order to make this statement, the roles should be tested in other case studies. This could be an interesting opportunity for further research.

In a similar vein, another interesting opportunity for future research could be to look into the role conceptions of some of the EU member states when they speak of EU policy in the MEPP as well and to look at the ‘conception-performance gap’ for these individual states. Although Kaya sometimes mentions specific positions of member states on a particular action, in his analysis he tends to treat the EU’s foreign policy as a black box. Taking into account the reality of opposite opinions within the EU, it would be interesting to see on which role conceptions they focus.

Despite its limitations, the book gives a very complete historical overview of the EU’s involvement in the MEPP and shows not only how the EU sees itself as a foreign policy actor, but also how it tries to fulfil these self-expectations. This historical overview is combined with an extensive theoretical framework. Although this framework could be deterrent for practitioners, it makes the analysis comprehensible, even for non-political scientists. Therefore, this book is a welcome instrument in the study of the EU policy in the MEPP for practitioners and students of international relations.

Laura Van Dievel
Research fellow
Leuven International and European Studies
KU Leuven, University of Leuven
Kevin Avruch and Christopher Mitchell (eds.)
*Conflict Resolution and Human Needs: Linking theory and practice*

This edited volume examines Basic Human Needs (BHNs) theory in terms of theory and practice by examining new concepts and recent developments to determine how BHNs has been affecting the post-Cold War conflict and peacebuilding efforts as well as contemporary conflicts of the twenty-first century. The volume provides a comprehensive overview of the core concepts, theories, approaches, processes, and intervention designs about Human Needs theory in the conflict resolution field. The main theme is the analysis of HNs theory with multidisciplinary approaches. The book moves from the study of theoretical and analytical approaches for explaining the deep-rooted causes of conflict with HNs theory to HNs-based third-party intervention approaches to resolving and transforming conflict.

The book explores the journey of BHNs theory. It is divided into two sections each of which focuses on theory and practice of BHNs. In the first part of the book, BHNs and theory, there are 7 chapters. All these chapters have analyzed the Burtonian approach of BHNs through the lenses of the contributors. In the first chapter, Sandole has re-conceptualized some gaps within BHNs with the concepts of ‘conflict-as-start up conditions’ and ‘conflict-as-process conditions’. First, he introduces the nature-nurture dichotomy in BHNs. Second, he discusses the process whereby he used BHNs before as ‘conflict-as-process’. In the second and third chapter, both Avruch and Sandole – Staroste separately focus on the critique of the Burtonian BHNs with the concepts of power and gender. Although the issue of power is mostly neglected in the analysis of Burton because Avruch claims that BHNs theory is generic theory. But power is very important not only in theory but also in practice for Avruch, Sandole – Staroste first underlines the similarities and differences between feminist and BHNs theories. Both of the authors also mention the practical implications of power and gender on BHNs. Burton views BHNs theory to be universal and ontological and should be treated as a scientific approach. Kriesberg attempts to fill the gap about the morality issue in BHNs theory and problem-solving workshops (PSWs), as to how we judge between right and wrong in conflict situations. In the next chapter, the author presents the alternative metaphorical analysis of conflict with ethnography and phenomenology and refrains from medical metaphors of conflict analysis. Price interestingly bridges Burtonian HNs with an Aristotelian explanation of conflict. Simmons re-visited HNs theory with post-September 11 and post-Burtonian ideas and concepts. It may open up the way for post-post-Burtonian HNs for future analysis.

In Part II, the chapters focus on the practice of HNs theory. Mitchell re-examines the ‘do’s and dont’s’ lists of problem – solving workshops (PSWs) that is the basic cornerstone of HNs practical application. One of the major theorists and practitioners of conflict resolution, Abu-Nimer, makes us realize that BHNs has some strengths by demonstrating that everyone is human and has the same needs. However, the practical implications are that in skills based training, dialogue and PSWs, BHNs still miss the points of culture, asymmetrical power relations, irrational thinking and emotions. Fisher helps us crystalize the PSWs with two case studies, Cyprus and Darfur. Nan and Greiff conceptualize the “Track-Two” and “Track One and a Half” by using the example of Georgian - South Ossetian Point of View process, with
some innovative suggestions for future conflict resolution in conflict zones. Last but not least, Dukes shares his involvement in the dialogue process at the Shenandoah National Park in Virginia, USA.

All in all, this publication has successfully re-examines previous concepts and theories of BHNs such as culture. But it also introduces new concepts and ideas into the BHNs such as gender, power and ethics. It mingles the past and present with future concepts, ideas and theories. The book also comprehensively covers different theoretical and conceptual paradigms and approaches regarding BHNs. It is an edited book and so it brings an almost full picture of BHNs. Moreover, most of the contributors have been writing about and discussing BHNs for some time. BHNs theory has been almost “the theory” for the George Mason University (GMU), the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (SCAR) for a long time. With some contributors from SCAR and with the other new ideas and concepts, the book can be a valuable source for most of students of conflict analysis and resolution.

Moreover, to me, this book is an interesting read because it can offer those with significant experience of BHNs theory an opportunity to re-conceptualize it in the 21st century. Also, it offers a new generation the opportunity to become acquainted with BHNs. It is a good attempt to explain BHNs to a 21st century audience. In addition, the book has shown us the Journey of BHNs in the conflict resolution discipline field. These new ideas focus on gender, ethics and power with new conceptualizations of how these relate to BHNs.

Having said this, one missed opportunity is the book may have included a chapter about the research of human needs (HN) theory. Also, it could have further elaborated more on the connection between new ideas and concepts with HNs theory such as chaos, and complexity theories.

This book is strongly recommended for both current and past students of conflict resolution and HNs as well as interdisciplinary students who study international relations, peace studies, security studies, and social-psychology. People would be able to start to use HNs theory more comprehensively in most international conflicts after reading this book. HNs theory still offers great opportunities for both theorists and practitioners of conflict analysis and resolution. It is also a definite addition to the HNs literature and opens new doors for future scholars and practitioners.

Sezai Özçelik
Çankırı Karatekin University, TURKEY
Peer-reviewed | Academic Journal

by CESRAN
(Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)

www.cesran.org/jga

Abstracting/Indexing

- Academic Index
- Bielefeld Academic Search Engine (BASE)
- Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)
- Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)
- EBSCO Publishing Inc.
- EconLit
- EconPapers
- IDEAS
- Index Copernicus
- Index Islamicus
- Infomine
- International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR)
- International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ)
- International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
- International Relations and Security Network (ISN)
- Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature
- Peace Palace Library
- Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)
- Social Sciences Information Space (SOCIONET)
- Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory
Valorizing her doctoral research, Linnéa Gelot explains the emerging reality of regional-global security partnerships by focusing on the collaboration between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) within the context of the Darfur crisis of 2003. The author, based at the Gothenburg Centre of Globalization and Development (GCGD) and at the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) in Uppsala, provides a refreshing theoretical contribution to the current state of the art on regional organisations’ roles in conflict management by relying on social-constructivist insights. Indeed, the value of this book lies not so much in offering new empirical data, but rather on her application of Coleman’s ‘legitimacy pyramid’ theory. Arguing that states and international organisations fight for international legitimacy to safeguard the success of their activities, Gelot extends Coleman’s model by stressing the mutual interdependency of regional and international organisations, namely the AU and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The book contains two parts. In the first part, Gelot provides a historical overview of UN-regional collaboration and maps the often used perspectives to explain its success or failure (Chapter 1). Claiming that these material, legal and political explanations do not suffice, she first introduces the concept of ‘legitimacy contests’ by which states and international or regional organisations search and compete for recognition as a legitimate actor. Second, she sketches the geopolitical context of UN-AU collaboration and the gradual emergence of the “African solutions to African problems”-discourse which in recent years made the AU “the legitimate first responder in African conflicts” (p. 65) (Chapter 2). The transformation of OAU into AU was accompanied, she argues, by a move from the principle of ‘non-interference’ to ‘non-indifference’. Providing a new reading of Coleman’s ‘legitimacy pyramid’ by adding a bottom-up perspective to the traditional top-down interpretation she argues that, on the one hand, regional organisations seek legitimation through the UN, which is seen as the “apex” of international legitimation. This leads them to using universal principles, such as human security, for guaranteeing credible partnerships and thus legitimation as a means to enhance their visibility at the global political scenery. On the other hand, the UNSC’s growing need of regional assistance calls into question its global mandate. Doing so, Gelot argues that legitimacy contests not only take place inside the global, regional or local levels apart, but also between these levels of the legitimacy pyramid, making them mutually interdependent.

The second part focuses on the UN-AU cooperation within the context of the Darfur crisis of 2003. After providing the reader with a comprehensive summary of the Sudanese and Darfur conflict, Gelot presents her analysis of the AU’s internal legitimation process (Chapter 3). Although AU members generally agreed that “Africa must not only act in Darfur, Africa must be seen to act” (p. 83), an internal legitimation contest took place on the role the AU needed to play. In the next step, an assessment of the reception of the AU’s legitimacy claim in the UNSC is conducted (Chapter 4), which makes her stress the decisive role of senior officials inside the Secretariat in solving the internal legitimation contest within the UNSC between the traditional non-interventionists (i.e. Russia and China) and the pro-interventionists. It is at this point that the mutual interdependency of the AU and the UNSC becomes clear: in that the AU needs international legitimation and support for conducting its’ own agenda and the UNSC does not
want to be seen to be ignoring Africa but at the same time does not want to significantly commit to the Darfur conflict.

In a final chapter (Chapter 5), Gelot investigates whether these legitimization contests influenced the poor outcomes of AMIS and UNAMID. Although no direct relationship could be found between the legitimization processes and the missions’ perceived weaknesses, the author concludes that UNSC members potentially ignored the effect the AU’s performance could have on the UNSC’s legitimacy and performance which was clearly called into question. This finally leads her to urging for the protection of multilateralism because “for the UNSC to protect its collective legitimation function, it has to recognize and protect also that of those other organisations it calls ‘partners’” (p. 137). UNSC members must consequently be aware that regional actors are able to question their relationship with the UN and in this way uncover the UN’s vulnerabilities. Or in other words, “the shared goal involved in regional-global partnerships is to find collective political solutions to global problems” (p. 137).

This book provides the reader with some refreshing and thought-provoking insights on one of the most challenging evolutions of the past two decades in the peace and security sector, i.e. the emergence of the global-regional partnership, by moving beyond the traditional framework which is largely based on more realist interpretations of global politics. Its logic structure contributes to the clearness of the theoretical point made. Moreover, Gelot succeeds in combining the provision of a clear overview of the AU’s evolution towards intervention, the history of the Darfur conflict and the emerging AU-UN partnership with a detailed and thorough application of a rather unusual theoretical framework. In doing so, this book goes a long way in filling a vital gap in the current state of the art by stressing the need to focus on both the internal processes and persuasive contests at each level, as well as on similar contests between these levels.

Unfortunately, the analysis is somewhat thinner when it comes to the impact analysis conducted in the final chapter. It would have been interesting to see a more concrete explanation of the parameters used. Specialists would probably note that impact analyses of peace operations are hard to conduct and consensus on the method to be used still remains absent. While the legitimization approach certainly deserves more emphasis in the current state of the art as Gelot correctly argues, she does admit that material, legal and political factors cannot be sidelined. Applying the same reasoning, the approach used in this book could prove its real value when explicitly being combined with a more realist stance. Likewise, the data-collection could have been clarified by explaining that the data largely resulted from interviews.

That being said, Gelot’s book refreshingly contributes to the current debate by emphasizing some crucial and too often overlooked characteristics of the regional-global collaboration which is increasingly shaping the international peace and security domain. This book will therefore definitely serve as a valuable tool for students and scholars of the regional-global partnership.

Yf Reykers
Research Fellow, Leuven International and European Studies (LINES) Institute, Leuven University
Nevin T. Aiken

*Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Overcoming Intractability in Divided Societies, Transitional Justice*


Considering the disparate and interdisciplinary wealth of literature in regard to reconciliation, identity and transitional justice, Aiken’s book is ambitious, yet manages to accomplish what it sets out to do effectively, offering a timely contribution. Following recent trends in political science, he is interested in seeking out the causal mechanisms that lead to reconciliation in divided societies: in this case those of transitional justice. Through a comparative case study of transitional justice processes in South Africa and Northern Ireland Aiken integrates the empirical with a theoretical framework that goes beyond simply listing possible causal mechanisms. This he calls the social learning model of transitional justice, composed of three categories that can be utilized towards reconciliation in divided societies following prolonged conflicts.

In the introduction, Aiken sets out his research design and methodology, highlighting that he will not only introduce the social learning theoretical framework but also apply it through the two case studies using the process-tracing method to establish potential causal paths. He is thoughtful about addressing both his case selection on the dependent variable, as he seeks to use his framework for theory development. Further, his data selection, through primary and secondary sources as well as expert interviews, reflects the demands of the process tracing method, but also a realistic perspective for readers who are more policy oriented.

In the second chapter, Aiken provides an extensive literature review reflective of the academic field he engages with and sets out to connect transitional justice, identity and intergroup reconciliation incorporating an interdisciplinary approach. He spends the first section of the chapter convincing the reader that identity based conflicts, while complicated and difficult to resolve, are also not insurmountable as antagonistic perceptions of the ‘Other’ can be replaced with more positive ones over time. This leads him to a section on reconciliation, which he calls a theoretical concept, an empirical goal, and a transformative process (18-19), achievable through a variety of social learning mechanisms. He goes beyond this by elaborating on five different elements that are considered components of lasting reconciliation (20-23) within the literature. Here, he is careful to limit his ambitions by stressing the lengthy and fluid process of reconciliation depending on transitional justice strategies that are often more time constrained and structured.

In chapter three, Aiken sets out the social learning model of transitional justice based on instrumental, socio-emotional, and distributive learning. Throughout the chapter he not only layers each of these three broader categories with one another but also through a variety of five mechanisms he outlines: positive intergroup contact, transformative dialogue, truth, justice, and the amelioration of material inequalities. The importance of the analysis of these factors resounds as key towards investigating the causal paths between transitional justice and reconciliation. What is impressive is his ability to keep the reader engaged both at a theoretical level but also from a policy perspective, by providing alternatives and examples. This comes through especially from the fourth chapter on, after he introduces his two case
studies, the ‘decentralized’ Northern Ireland case as well as the more structured South African case through the TRC. This is followed by a chapter on each of the categories of social learning which he applies to the two case studies in order to provide the reader with empirical data as well as the varied paths of each case which both ultimately led to similar outcomes.

When it comes to instrumental learning, Aiken emphasizes the need for long-term efforts that provide space for intergroup contact, especially in environments with transitional justice institutions with limited mandates. He contrasts this with the decentralized nature of Northern Ireland’s process, which has helped to facilitate a largely bottom-up led approach through diverse civil society as well as governmental actors. However, this also means that an overarching narrative has not been established ultimately leading to a socio-emotional learning that has not advanced intergroup reconciliation in the same way as a more formalized process. Throughout this chapter, it becomes evident to the reader that socio-emotional learning is potentially the most difficult of the categories to institute from theory into practice effectively, in part because it incorporates not only the micro but also the macro levels of society. Finally, the distributive learning chapter explores the different, mostly government-led initiatives that seek to address deep-seated and historically laden inequality between groups. Aiken highlights that structural divisions within society can be more difficult to overcome as individuals often indirectly benefit from them, thus making it more difficult to address and engage in processes of restitution or redistribution.

Aiken is very careful throughout his study about setting out scope conditions such as noting the importance of having a negative peace before transitional justice institutions can create an effect on reconciliation. He further elaborates on this, what he calls ‘permissive conditions’ (48), noting that it is not only the institutions that matter but also elites or entrepreneurs that champion and foster them. One minor critique here is that he could have engaged with such factors and conditions that aid the social learning model in greater detail, perhaps also noting the influence of external actors for example. Nonetheless, the theoretical framework he does develop is inclusive of a variety of mechanisms, ideally layered and intimately connected, that can potentially be employed in order to achieve the ultimate result, intergroup reconciliation. It showcases an awareness of his methodology. Further, it highlights that reconciliation remains an ongoing process itself and doesn’t end with the cessation of outright violence.

This book offers both scholars and practitioners an overview of recent literature in transitional justice and reconciliation, but also a timely contribution of a theoretical framework that can be used in the context of post-conflict societies when instituting policies. Further, it applies the theoretical framework and offers a wealth of empirical data on the transitional justice approaches in Northern Ireland and in South Africa.

Dženeta Karabegović
University of Warwick
Camila Orjuela
*The Identity Politics of Peacebuilding – Civil Society In War-Torn Sri Lanka*

The common understanding of civil society engaged in peace efforts is that it is homogenous in its views, is peaceful, independent, and influences positive changes in behaviour. But as history has shown, civil society is not always as we perceive it, and situations within which civil society functions are extremely complex, more so in countries which have chequered histories, thus peacebuilding is not easy. Civil society itself is complex, and representative of a wide range of people who have many identities, needs, demands and prejudices.

In this book, Camila Orjuela analyses the positive contributions, the challenges, the negative aspects related to civil society, and the important role identity plays in its actions. To do this, Orjuela has dug deep into the murky depths of Sri Lanka’s modern history to put things in context, explain the situation in the country and its complexities, as well as provide an understanding of the formation of early civil society institutions, their linkages to religion, and efforts to organize and bring peace in a country wracked by a long drawn out and violent conflict. The author shows great depth of understanding and analysis of the history of conflict in the country, and knowledge of civil society and its myriad activities, successes and shortcomings in Sri Lanka.

A synopsis of the chapters is provided below. The introduction and first chapter of the book sets the stage for a closer look at identity politics, civil society and peace in Sri Lanka by defining some aspects of, or the misconceptions related to, these groupings and provides a brief background of the conflict and efforts to bring peace to the country. It also sets out the approach and methodology adopted in gathering and analysing material for the book.

The second chapter of the book attempts to understand what civil society can do for peace, by exploring the concept of ‘civil society’ and its roles; including the prevention of armed conflict, peace roles during war, participation in peace processes and post-war reconstruction and reconciliation. Chapter three is a study of the importance of identity in both conflicts and peacebuilding. It shows how groups strive to create exclusionist identities as being distinct from the ‘other’ for justifying conflict, or to build peace. The chapter examines the idea of creating group identities that are not premised on the maintenance of an enemy other, not tied to ethnicity or a nation state but by alternative identities based on cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism.

Chapter four is one that seeks to put the focus of the entire book in context, by studying the history of identity politics in the island nation. It starts by looking at how society identified itself during its colonial past through caste and ethnicity, explores the divisive factors related to ethnic polarization in post-colonial governance structures, the domination of one group above the other, as well as domination within such ethnic groups. This chapter also focuses on conflict resolution efforts in Sri Lanka, as well as the ethnic polarization of society itself, which has led to more segregation and creation of new conflict lines.

Chapter five of the book is a study of civil society in Sri Lanka, from the pre-colonial period when communities organized themselves to work in temples and irrigation systems, through
to colonial and post-colonial organizations that developed; beginning with Christian missionary activity for educational and social work, and including Buddhist and Muslim organizations, cooperative movements and unions, to community based and non-governmental organizations of contemporary society. The chapter also analyses the composition of civil society groups in modern Sri Lanka, motivations and identity politics, as well as the ability to draw mass support based on nationalistic, divisive, or peace messages. The author attempts to explain the challenges faced by these groups, their biases, interests, and links to and dependence on the aid industry. In analysing civil society in Sri Lanka, the author’s research showed that while many individuals and organizations were committed to peace in Sri Lanka and progress made in several areas, civil society advocating for peace lacked unity and a coherent policy.

The sixth chapter in the book is a study of why civil society peace work matters. It shows and analyses how civil society efforts have led to changing attitudes or influencing key actors and belligerents: emboldening those convinced that negotiation and coexistence is the way forward and those that advocate for peace, cross-ethnic dialogue and peace work, mobilization and peace work during the conflict as well as during the ceasefires. The author also finds that in times of conflict, civil society advocacy or gathering and documenting rights violations were used by donors and international representatives in pressurizing the parties to the conflict to end such practices. It also finds that at times when civil society is unable to influence national governments and other actors, its international links helped influence other states and international organizations to do this. The author also makes the point that despite many constraints, civil society has the ability to mobilize, spread information and influence a wide range of actors. The chapter also points out an often overlooked point that civil society is sometimes seen as a competitor to political groups who also draw on the same population groups for support.

The final chapter of Orjuela’s book is an analysis of the identities of peace organizations by deconstructing their focus of intervention. These include: ethnic identity and divisions, peace or human rights issues and their sometimes distinct separation, class and rural or urban divides, religious affiliation, gender, politics, and individuals personal experience and prejudice.

Civil society is often seen as having a positive influence on peace efforts, and Orjuela provides ample evidence of this, including through the use of interviews. She also picks out and highlights the aspects of civil society that are destructive and instigators of conflict, elitist or exclusivist, or driven by the agendas of its donor base. Orjuela’s book also highlights the complex nature of societies, the broad understanding of peace, the challenges faced by populations and other actors, and the situations in which civil society actors work.

The strength of this book, however, lies in Orjuela’s ability to use the Sri Lankan situation to highlight all aspects of the work and influence of civil society that transcends national boundaries, as well as the important role identity politics plays in the broader context. The book uses the Sri Lankan example to show how identity politics is not exclusive to warring factions, that civil society is diverse, and how in its various manifestations, can either contribute to peace or conflict in a country. To do this, she delves deeper to look at a cross-
section of individuals that make up civil society in a bid to understand the composition of these groups, and identify what makes each segment of society behave the way it does.

The book also highlights civil society’s challenges in not being able to reach a common consensus or unity, an inability to draw on large numbers of individuals, change the thinking of those for war instead of only emboldening those who oppose the conflict, and its limited impact on the national stage. These are examples of what donors, governments and other entities do not consider when engaging with civil society working on peace efforts.

The book, however, could have benefitted from a more detailed analysis of civil society, its influence on society, and its positive and negative aspects from a country with a similar history and situation as Sri Lanka. This could have helped draw parallels in understanding the similarities, or dissimilarities of civil society across borders, and assist practitioners in identifying what works, or not in similar circumstances. While it provides valuable information and critical analysis of civil society and its work, its extensive focus on Sri Lanka, might, unfortunately, deter those not interested in the country from reading this extremely informative book.

This book should, however, be vital reading material for academics, researchers, donors and aid agencies in understanding the composition and dynamics of civil society and how it can contribute to peace or conflict in any country.

Rukshan Ratnam,
Coventry University
CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Journal of Global Analysis endeavours to become the foremost international forum for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the discipline of international relations and its subfields: international security, international political economy, international organisations, foreign policy analysis, political history, etc.

Journal of Global Analysis is an open-access, double-blind peer-reviewed journal. The journal is published at its own web site http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Journal of Global Analysis welcomes submissions of articles from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as summary reports of conferences and lecture series held in social sciences.

Prospective authors should submit 4,000 - 9,000 articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Author Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN’s author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:

Ozgur TUFKCI, Ph.D
Editor-in-Chief
oztufekci [@] cesran.org

Deadlines for submissions: Summer issue — 15 April 2015
                           Winter issue — 15 October 2015
As the title suggests, the book is centred around the paradox of a formal peace agreement signed in 2002 and the continuation of violence into the present. Marriage argues that this phenomenon is a result of the negative impact Western security priorities had on Congo since the country’s independence in 1960. Examining the repercussions of human security, global security and liberal state building on the DRC, the author states that despite their benevolent appearance these discourses have not only tolerated violence against the population but set the economic and political context in which abuses take place. Marriage supposes that the contradiction stems primarily from opposed northern and Congolese interests, but is reinforced by an ideology that impedes donors from critically assessing the outcomes of their intervention. She concludes that “donors continue to compromise vulnerable people because it is in their interest to do so, and their claims of commonality prevent them from finding this problematic” (p.149).

Marriage proceeds her analysis by describing two conflicts that emerge from the interaction between northern and Congolese interests: the conflict between the Congolese leadership and the population, and the international conflict for Congo’s resources. In regards to the former, she describes how after the end of the Cold War, the loss of strategic interest of western patrons in Africa resulted in a reduction of funds, whilst at the same time the discourse on global security confronted president Mobutu with demands for democratization and liberalization. Facing the double challenge of being unable to sustain his established system of distributive patronage politics and being pressured to loosen his grip on the state and society, Mobutu resorted to the manipulation of the population into self-destructive behaviour. He orchestrated pillages of the major cities by the army and the population that had the double function of satisfying immediate survival needs and, through their repercussions on the economy, subsequently rendered opposition and resistance very difficult. In a similar Machiavellian manner, Mobutu antagonized ethnic groups on the provincial level with an ideology of Géopolitique, effectively using the question of origin to provoke violence over land, access to power and citizenship.

Marriage secondly describes how northern security and development priorities fed into the two Congo wars (1996-97 and 1998-2002). She argues that the discourse of state failure in Africa discredited the Congolese government and directed policy towards the market as an alternative to the state for achieving development and security. However, instead of resulting in prosperity for the Congolese people, the combination of a global demand for resources and porous borders lead to violent exploitation by the countries neighbours. She concludes that “the market became part of the mechanism of violence and further impoverishment as Rwanda and Uganda capitalized on the donors’ lack of concern for Congo’s sovereignty”(p.59). Marriage continues by stating that the patterns of violence and abuse, particularly through the RCD occupation, directly contradicted the on-going discourse on human security. She criticizes that this was not acknowledged by western donors while the discourse itself sustained the situation as “its terminology diminished the political significance of invasion, massacre rape and state abuse by imposing insipid categories and individualising
experiences of violence”. (p.59)

Without doubt, the author makes an important and necessary contribution through highlighting the hypocritical nature of northern security and development discourses as well as their detrimental effects for the Congolese population. However, the book remains somewhat sketchy, where the gravity of the accusations levelled would demand a more thorough argumentation and maybe even more systematic research. As it stands, Marriage contains herself to draw her thought-provoking argument in broad strokes and thus leaves it vulnerable to criticism, such as the challenge to specify the various actors that make out “the north” or acknowledge their multidimensional, at times, contradicting interests. Likewise, Marriage proves surprisingly naïve when she challenges northern countries to be honest in assessing their behaviour and to develop ways in which “more powerful actors can interact with less powerful ways that are not demeaning or exploitative” (p.149).

It’s the book’s second and more significant contribution, is that the book gives voice to the Congolese. This represents a practical step in challenging hegemonic discourses simply by considering the perceptions and priorities of a population that remains widely neglected in the literature as well as by security and development actors. Through numerous interviews Marriage collected testimonies and skilfully applies them to provide the reader with thick descriptions of experienced violence and individual coping strategies. In this manner Marriage is able to assess what security means to Congolese who have “prioritised agency and predictability by creating space and opportunity for themselves to operate” (p.62). Marriage clarifies that this integration of a Congolese perspective does not attempt to discover an objective definition of security but renders the political agenda of neoliberalism more visible. The approach is also to be commended for re-humanizing the Congolese which have been turned into “biological things” by the power of international interventions and abusive elites.

This book is strongest where it analyses the interplay between agency and structure in a sociological manner. The use of violence is, for instance, not only portrayed as products of restrained choices, structural factors and emerging frustration, but Marriage also investigates its repercussions on society and on the very individuals that resort to it. This is of particular value as most literature on the Congo seems to concentrate on the political and economic dimension of conflict in the East. Even when historically contextualized, it generally falls short of even attempting to understand the role of Congolese society both in shaping these conflicts and being shaped by them. So although conducting fieldwork between 2005-06 and primarily in four cities (Kisangani, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Mbuji-Mayi) at first appeared questionable for a contemporary book on security and development in the DRC, it might actually have provided the author with an out of the box perspective and reflections on more fundamental dynamics. Certainly, reading about other places than the Kivus, is not only refreshing but also helpful for understanding the dynamics of a country that is as big as western Europe.

Janosch Kullenberg
University of Oxford
Sorpong Peou (ed.)

Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action
2009, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, Routledge, ISBN: 978 0 41546 796 4, 208 p., £95.00

Though human security issues have been increasing in East Asia, the impacts of human security within the academic and policy-making circles are still limited, even advocates of human rights are always split on collaboration. This raises several critical questions: what are the theoretical differences between the West and East? What are the challenges to collaborations of protecting human rights in East Asian countries? Is there any hope for improving the extent of collaboration (e.g. humanitarian intervention, intrastate peacekeeping and international criminal justice) among actors in East Asia?

Human Security in East Asia gives the answers to these essential questions, which are urgently needed. This edited volume is a collection of analytical essays by the established scholars on human security in East Asia, this makes the arguments more tenable and convincing. This edited volume not only emphasizes the human security issues in East Asia (especially Southeast Asia), but also analyses the challenges facing collaboration in this region.

From Asian and Western perspectives, the edited volume does make three contributions to human security studies: first, it advances the MPCE framework (military, political, criminal and economic), which defines human security as “human freedom from the fear of direct and indirect physical harm resulting from military, political, criminal and economic violence” (p.6); second, it explores the barriers of collaboration in human rights and focuses on the human security issues in Southeast Asia; third, it highlights the policy recommendations to promote more effective collaborations in the future, that is “collaborative action based on normative consensus, policy coordination and material contribution cannot be forged and enhanced unless it also serves actors’ own interests” (p.27).

In my view, the most note-worthy chapters are 4 and 5, which explore the feasibility of collaboration on humanitarian intervention in Southeast Asia, and rethink the extent to which human security would be prioritized on the policy agenda in East Asian countries. In chapter 4, “Southeast Asia’s Points of Convergence on International Intervention”, Mely Caballero-Anthony highlights that several factors hamper Southeast Asian countries’ efforts in collaborations of humanitarian intervention. For instance, there is still insufficient consensus on the definition and norms of humanitarian intervention. As a result, most countries in this region have never prioritized humanitarian intervention on their policy agenda. Though ASEAN tends to the policy option of humanitarian intervention to some extent, it’s acceptance to humanitarian intervention is conditioned, that is, “within the framework of the UN peace operations” (p.69).

In chapter 5, “Human Security in Extremis: East Asian Reactions to the Responsibility to Protect”, Paul M. Evans argues that the future prospects of human security in East Asia are optimistic, although the human security collaboration is only at a primary stage. As Evans points out, human security has not been prioritized on the agenda of most East Asian countries, because “sovereignty” and “non-interference” still trump “human security” in the realm of policy making. For some countries in this region, human security was drawn from
Western experience “appears to many an alien” (p.79). For some countries facing armed conflicts and socioeconomic instabilities, human security might be regarded as “dangerous transplant” (p.79).

It’s worth noting that this volume questions the shortcomings of the mainstream schools. For example, as Simon Springer criticises, neo-liberalism’s appropriation of human security as “partiality-based”, which “provides free-market ideology with the necessary language to veil its inherent hypocrisy” (p.140). For paving a middle way between the competing approaches to human security (i.e. broad approach and narrow approach), Peou forwards a more proper definition of human security, which nonetheless acknowledges military, political, criminal, and economic (MPCE) violence as threats to human security.

The edited volume is divided into two sections: from multiple theoretical perspectives (e.g. liberalism, constructionism and postmodernism), Part I (chapters 1-4) explores the theoretical and conceptual contentions between the West and East, including the conceptual issues of human security, the dynamics of human security discourse in both academic and policy-making circles, and the different comprehensions of human security in the East and West. Part II (chapters 5-8) examines the challenges and implications to collaborations of human security in East Asia. Based on the case analysis of East Timor and Cambodia, the contributors highlight the weak points of collaborations in human security in this region. The case of East Timor shows that, the participation of East Asian countries in the peace operations was interpreted as “a form of cooperation with Indonesia, based on the pursuit of their national interests” (p.107). Moreover, the contributors discuss the feasibility of collaboration, such as, international criminal justice. Concerning the collaboration in the field of international criminal justice--an alternative option of promoting human security, the collaboration among stakeholders and powerful states is urgently needed.

Peou’s edited volume does succeed in achieving its’ goals, I look forward to the second edition of this well-researched and organized volume, which will hopefully explore the newly emerging human security issues in East Asia and their interconnections with collaboration. For example, what are the dynamics of child soldiering and other critical human security issues, including human trafficking and drug smuggling, in East Asia? What are the policy implications of these issues for collaboration in this region?

In short, Human Security in East Asia should be a must reading on human security in East Asia. It deserves a wide readership—academics, scholars, policy makers and students, who are interested in human security of East Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. In addition, this volume is a highly recommended purchase for university libraries and anyone who is trying to know more about the challenges and implications of human security in East Asia.

Kai Chen
National University of Singapore
Roger Mac Ginty (Ed)
Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding

Policies, practices and debates about peacebuilding and how to approach the complexities of building peace have entered the mainstream of the debates on global security. A number of trends have contributed to this, including the evolution of armed conflicts worldwide, the emergence of concepts like human security and the responsibility to protect (R2P), and emerging norms and standards on human rights and international justice.

In the last decades, traditional UN peacekeeping operations based on consent and with limited mandates have been surpassed and sometimes complemented by new complex and multidimensional operations. A breadth of actors has contributed to the development of doctrines and political tools designed to address conflict management and complex transitions from war to peace. Policies and practices on the ground have evolved in parallel with increased intellectual engagement and academic and policy driven research about peacebuilding theory and practice.

The book edited by Roger Mac Ginty provides a comprehensive and multilayered analysis of the theory and practice of peacebuilding. This is not a handbook in the traditional sense of a manual providing tools and instructions on “how to do” it. Instead it is a detailed review of existing theoretical approaches to peacebuilding, to the historical development and actors involved in policies, and to the practical and ethical challenges of building peace. What it provides is a framework to understand how peacebuilding has evolved in theory and practice and what are the complexities of trying to intervene in conflicts.

The editor manages this ambitious objective by using his own expertise and putting together an impressive group of authors. The book is divided into six sections with 29 chapters. An introductory text by the editor sets the scene for an understanding of the structure and objectives of the whole volume. Then a ground-breaking Part I deals with the complex task of “Reading peacebuilding”. Its three chapters engage in critical examination and appraisal of the main theoretical approaches that guide peacebuilding, the historical evolution of this academic and policy field and the limits of peacebuilding theory. A number of cross-cutting themes that (should) inform peacebuilding are gathered in Part II, namely gender, religion, reconciliation and memory.

The contribution of social sciences to peacebuilding is the subject of Part III, which includes psychology, anthropology, sociology, history and economic sciences, as well as a significant approximation to quantitative approaches to peacebuilding. The contributions and limits of International Relations theory are also addressed. The insights about historical and current approaches allow the reader to get a useful overview of contributions, the limits of each discipline and how each of them can complement the others, in ways that go far beyond frequent (and sometimes empty) statements about the need of multidisciplinary approaches to peacebuilding.
Part IV addresses violence and security from a double perspective. Firstly it analyzes the evolving debates about global security and how ‘securitization’ discourses and practices have impacted peacebuilding. Secondly it addresses those dimensions of peacebuilding that have the strongest impacts in terms of building security on the ground: from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants to security sector reform; and the debates about, and implications of, Law and human rights standards in peacebuilding contexts. Finally, Part V analyzes the impact of policies and practice on individuals, households and communities, and part VI examines the infrastructure of peacebuilding at different levels: international institutions and international aid for peace; national governments and debates about statebuilding; and the role of civil society and local communities.

One of the most remarkable features of this book is the attention provided to the “reading” of peacebuilding. The vast array of literature now available on this field includes theoretical analysis and policy prescriptions; evaluations, critical assessments and ‘lessons learned’; and a range of approaches to the concept of and the practice of building peace from the higher and macro levels of policy to the micro practices. The range of literature available is welcome but sometimes overwhelming. What this volume adds is an explicit orientation towards the understanding of theoretical and ideological underpinnings behind the analysis of peacebuilding, and how those ideas shape real practices.

Two broad schools of thought are identified and explained. The so-called ‘problem solving’ approach is mostly centered on how to make existing policies, tools and instruments work more effectively. This category includes academics (particularly in North America) and most policy makers and practitioners. Their theoretical assumptions accept the foundations of the current peacebuilding ‘system’ as basically correct, and understand practical shortcomings as caused by technical and solvable problems in terms of coordination, timing and financing, among others. On the other hand, the ‘critique’ school finds support in the UK and other parts of Europe and the global South and questions the underlying basis of dominant approaches. In this view, problems of peacebuilding policies and practice arise from the fact that they do not question fundamental power relations in a given society or the international system, and thus seek just superficial and short-term fixes that cannot provide long term and sustainable peace.

These broadly defined schools are very real and contribute to the shape of peacebuilding worldwide. But they present at least two problems. First, the theoretical underpinnings are rarely made explicit particularly in regard to the problem solving approach, and second, there is limited interaction between them, which the editor calls an “epistemological closure”. Both facts hamper efforts to grasp the complexities of this field and put in place more effective policies. The attempt to make theoretical approaches explicit is precisely one of the most remarkable aspects of this volume. The editor manages this aim by putting together: a) theoretical and practical chapters that address different peacebuilding approaches and b) an array of authors supportive of both schools. Each author addresses a particular issue or dimension of peacebuilding from the perspective of an advocate of a particular approach.
Another key aspect addressed here is the role of institutions and people in building peace. This broad issue affects a range of dichotomies, from statebuilding versus civil society; top-down versus bottom-up approaches; international or national preeminence, and the hybridized structures that result from those interactions. Tensions between institutionalisation and rights have permeated policies and interventions with very real consequences for people living in conflict and post-conflict settings. This book provides a deep understanding on how ‘hidden’ assumptions drive decisions about the international peacebuilding architecture, approaches to security, and the complexities of international aid for peace.

My only critique of the book is the lack of authors from the global South, particularly voices from emerging powers with a growing role in international peace and security. This is explicitly recognized by the editor, but the encyclopedic character of the volume would have made it an ideal place to provide room for Southern perspectives.

To sum up, this is a challenging and comprehensive review of peacebuilding theoretical approaches, policies and practices, and of the complexities of the field itself. It is highly recommendable for all those interested in historical trends and current debates. One could assume that most scholars are aware of the theoretical and practical debates, but a number of policy-makers and practitioners could benefit from exposure to a wider understanding of the complex realities they aim to engage with.

The Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding fills a gap in the literature and achieves excellence in highlighting a number of considerations of key importance for international peace and security. An updated and impressively wide bibliography only adds to this recommendation.

Mabel González Bustelo
Journalist, researcher and international consultant
This book provides a wide discussion of themes relevant to contemporary conflict across the globe, albeit from a USA centric perspective. The contributors are journalists and freelance authors writing primarily from a perspective based in the American media and using methodology based on desk top research followed by interviews with academics and others involved in a topic which is selected on the basis of its interest to the writer.

Targeted at students in American universities, the book explores three broad themes. 'Political and Philosophical Issues' includes a discussion of intervening in sovereign states to prevent genocide, the right of nations to self-determination when faced with the challenges posed by separatist movements, nuclear disarmament and whether the Obama arms reductions initiatives make the USA safer, and the future of NATO. A second theme 'Crisis, Conflicts and Peace Prospects Around the World' considers a variety of contemporary topics. Anti-Semitism in Europe and its relationship with policies of the Israeli government is followed by a discussion of the crises in Darfur and the likelihood of peace. Further topics range from prospects for democracy in Pakistan, issues for peacebuilding in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, through to the future of US - China relationships. The books third theme 'Coping with the Aftermath' begins with a review of UN initiatives to help displaced people before turning to the role of truth commissions and other processes of transitional and restorative justice in dealing with the aftermath of atrocities. Further topics include issues involved in making environments safe from unused ordnance after conflict, whether terrorists should be given military or civil trials, and a discussion of concerns regarding the care of veterans after conflict. The book concludes with a series of 'special topics' - Dealing with Piracy, Terrorism and the Internet, Climate Change, and the challenges facing a UN initiative focussing on rape as a war crime.

Overall, the range of topics covered is impressive. Most contributors provide a succinct overview of the views of key individuals involved in a particular issue. For example has NATO become irrelevant? Yes, says Lukyanov editor of Russia in Global Affairs – the organisation being obsolete and unfit to address contemporary threats: no argues Giegerich, from the Institute of Security studies – since it is the USA’s most influential way of having an impact on the policies of European countries. Throughout the book, each topic is accompanied by a chronology of events and graphics which provide a visual overview of the subject being considered by the author. Each topic includes a bibliography and signposting towards other information sources, although these should be used in conjunction with other appropriate data base searches.

The books treatment of profoundly important contemporary conflicts does not always impress. For example Glazer’s exploration of the extent to which Israel’s contemporary policies are significant in contemporary anti-Semitism in Europe lacks objective coherence, makes a nod towards Islamophobia being an inappropriate but understandable form of hostility (p126) and would have been more usefully located in a discussion of deeply rooted Western and Northern Hemisphere cultural traditions of racism and zealous religious identity.
– including those embedded in USA society. Indeed, the reader has to turn to Arieff’s discussion of prospects for peace in the Middle East to clearly identify the links between the USA’s support of Israel's policies, the oppression of Palestinian people and the relevance of this to violence perpetrated by Islamic Jihadists. Generally speaking those who undertake a comprehensive reading of the whole book will benefit from an overall balance and objectivity. Those who use the book to explore a single topic may find their perspective on important issues developing myopically.

A somewhat surprising feature of the book is what it does not include. For example Jost’s discussion of whether terrorists should be given military or civilian trials includes only a passing reference to practices of torture, including those perpetrated by the authorities in Guantanamo bay. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq together with their bloody and ill-coordinated aftermath, which rank in contemporary conflict as of equal significance to Israeli-Palestinian hostility, receives no specific attention. However other topics do provide useful in depth studies. Felton’s discussion of the growing plight of refugees encapsulates many of the issues facing humanitarian agencies in bringing relief to people fleeing or being displaced by conflict and environmental changes. Moore’s discussion of truth commissions illustrates the difficulties in bringing justice to the victims of atrocities and whether local arrangements or the International Criminal Court should serve as the way forward. Perhaps this organisation should pay urgent heed to the books final topic – confronting rape as a war crime. The author describes the struggle of victims to seek healing and justice as well as the practical action taken in some conflict settings to provide women with protection and address the stigma associated with the atrocity. The topic provides the book with a compassionate and humanitarian conclusion and it is to be hoped that those who dip in and out of its contents will pay it much merited attention.

In general terms the books accessibility would have been enhanced by a clearer rationale as to why topics had been selected - and would have been greatly improved by an index. However the volume is useful as a magazine-style primer for students and others looking for signposting to develop more in-depth knowledge. Fewer topics and a less USA centric perspective may be usefully considered when planning future publications.

Richard Slade
Leeds University
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION & SECURITY