# Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

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# Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

**The Interaction Between Pakistan and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council: 'Sub-Imperialism by Complementarity'?**

By Bruno De Cordier*

## Abstract

The multi-faceted and often non-institutionalised cooperation and interaction between Pakistan and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, in which much revolves around Pakistan's ties with Saudi Arabia, is not merely geopolitical (military) and formal (economic); it also has a strong grassroots dimension through labour migration, the remittance economy, and pilgrimage. This paper examines whether the interaction between Saudi Arabia and the other high-income oil-exporting GCC economies on the one hand, and lower-middle income and more agricultural Pakistan on the other, constitutes a case of sub-imperialism. Although several of the characteristics and dynamics of sub-imperialism are indeed present, Pakistan is not completely peripheral. The interaction between Pakistan and the GCC is ultimately situated at the nexus of Saudi Arabia's pan-Islamic diplomacy, the interests of the respective nation-states, an urge towards economic diversification within the GCC bloc, and the creation and effect of the hubs in the region.

**Key words:** Pakistan, Gulf Cooperation Council, sub-imperialism, Arab FDI, non-OECD aid, labour migration, pilgrimage economy, military cooperation.

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# The Interaction Between Pakistan and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council: 'Sub-Imperialism by Complementarity'?

### Introduction and Framework

This article examines the nature of the ties, and the different levels and vectors of interaction, between Pakistan and the states, economies, and societies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC[1])[2]. While the member states of the GCC were all established as modern nation states between 1927 and 1971, and their political regimes are all hereditary autocracies, their interaction with, and their economic and ideological ties to, the territories that became the state of Pakistan extend far back into the pre-modern era and predate the foundation of Pakistan which was established on a republican model in 1947. Sea traffic and coastal trade between the Makran coast, Oman, and the Gulf, for example, have existed in some form or another for centuries.[3] The Makran coast, Multan, and Sindh were integrated into the eastern frontier of the Islamic sphere under the control of the Umayyad caliphs by the year 713, and this integration, as well as implanting Islam on the subcontinent, inserted a common ideological element into the different social and ideological identities that emerged beyond this point, an element that has persisted to the present day (Wink 2002). This article seeks to establish whether the ties and interactions between Pakistan and the GCC countries – which are, as we briefly noted, grafted in an old pattern – form an example of so-called 'sub-imperialism'.

The idea that such a sub-imperialist relationship might exist is relevant in the light of the notion that a multipolar world order is emerging or might soon emerge; it arose in relation to a reading of Matthew Flynn's case-based examination of sub-imperialism (Flynn 2007). Flynn's article revisits Mauro Marini's 1972 theory of sub-imperialism, and focuses, as Marini himself did, on Brazil; yet, despite the entirely different regional context, it contains a fair number of useful elements and insights for the overall framework of examination here. Marini considers sub-imperialism to be a power relation and dynamic in which certain countries and economies do not passively accept and undergo the real or perceived dominance of the traditional Triad centres – the US and, by extension, North America; north-western Europe; and Japan – which together form the core of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) bloc. Instead, non-Triad countries actively participate in establishing that dominance by reaffirming and advancing global institutional power structures in their own peripheries or semi-peripheries. In short, despite often paying lip service to 'anti-imperialism', they function as extensions and sub-contractors of existing structural dominance, rather than as states that offer opposition or alternatives to it (See also Bond 2013).

This being said, sub-imperialism can also be understood as a process in which non-Triad countries and economies, often semi-peripheries themselves, actively expand and consolidate peripheries of their own, albeit at a different geographic scale, at the regional or sub-regional sublevel: their activities constitute 'sub-imperialism' because they are limited to a specific, common, cultural space. These processes may often be driven by one or more factors including a state's growing economic potential, new political vision, or the apparent void created by the contracting influence and legitimacy of the Triad centres. Flynn and Marini establish different conditions under which a sub-imperialist scheme can function (Flynn 2007, pp. 11-13). First, there is what Marini called 'industrialized dependency', which, he argued, results from an international division of labour in which the advanced economy specialises in high-tech industry while delegating intermediate and traditional production to other peripheral or semi-peripheral countries. Second, the super-exploitation of what he, perhaps anachronistically, calls 'the working class' means that production becomes disconnected from consumption: capital is attracted to developing countries because of the presence of a large labour reserve which makes wage repression possible. Third, the sub-imperialist entity has an assertive, if not interventionist, foreign policy, either bilaterally, through multilateral channels, or most often through a combination of these. Finally, there is the active participation of elites – historically rooted and based in national states – in what is called the 'transnational state', a non-centralised state which consists of informal and formal elite networks, transnational corporations, and international organisations, that has gradually become a framework for capital accumulation. The analytical framework established thus far will now be applied to a discussion of the different levels and sectors of interaction between Pakistan and the GCC bloc in order to see whether their relationships constitute an example of sub-imperialism.

The only common institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation frameworks that encompass both Pakistan and all of the GCC countries, apart from the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, are defined by common ideology and faith: the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, its different subsidiaries, and the Islamic Development Bank, are, furthermore, all organisations in which Saudi Arabia plays a leading role. Indeed, much of Pakistan's interaction with the Persian-Arabian Gulf revolves around its multidimensional ties with Saudi Arabia, the GCC's core state. Pakistan has the peculiarity of being one of the few modern national states defined and founded specifically for a religiously-defined community, South Asia's Muslim population. The state of Saudi Arabia – the GCC's largest member in geographic, demographic, and economic terms – is crystallized around a tribal monarchy from Nejd and it has, since it was founded, been the self-declared guardian and de facto owner of Mecca and Medina, the Muslim Ummah's sacred centres. The latter is not an unimportant factor since Pakistan, thanks to the size of its population and its religious geography, reflects the reality that the demographic centre of gravity for the Islamic world and the Ummah has long since shifted eastwards from the Arab sphere (The Pew Research Centre 2012, p. 21).

The GCC's economies are high-income and are highly integrated into the economic world system. That integration is ensured both by the lucrative extractive sector and, over the last

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fifteen years, the global hub cities and special economic zones that have either been sprouting in the region (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Manama) or are being planned or built (Saudi Arabia's special economic cities near Jeddah, Medina, and Jizan, and within Hail). Instead of relying on a classic strategy of industrial dominance, these states have invested capital from the extractive sector in economic diversification both abroad and in their domestic markets. The demand for cheap imported labour that this spending engenders is not disconnected from consumption though, since the remittance economy does feed consumption in the countries of origin of the labour migrants. The financial-economic ties and political interaction between the GCC economies and Pakistan are also supported and informed by both informal and formal transnational elite networks. Yet, when one takes a closer look at the levels and dimensions of an interaction which may well constitute a sub-imperialist relationship, one notices that they go well beyond elite networks and abstract diplomatic ties: they also affect and involve the grassroots of those sectors. Against this background, we will now discuss the following five key dimensions more closely: defence and securitisation; trade and investment; labour migration and the remittance economy; ideology and more specifically religious dynamics; and development- and humanitarian-based aid.

**The Defence Symbiosis**

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a tradition of close military cooperation. The official figures for Pakistan's armed forces in 2013 suggest that they have the strength of some 947,800 personnel, while the country spent 2.7 percent of its GDP on defence and has military nuclear capacity. During the same year, Saudi Arabia's armed forces comprised 248,000 personnel while the country's defence spending constituted 8.9 percent of its GDP.[4]

Pakistan – a state the backbone of which is its military – has been providing military aid to Saudi Arabia for decades, starting with assistance in training its air force in 1961, and the provision of air raid support against an incursion by what was then socialist South Yemen in 1969 (See Quandt 1981, pp. 39-41). Since that time, varying numbers of Pakistani military personnel have been stationed, in one capacity or another, in Saudi Arabia (See Fair 2014, pp. 83-4). During the First Gulf War (1990-1) which followed the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Pakistan sent military units to protect Mecca and Medina, and Saudi Arabia has also been providing various forms of support to Pakistan's nuclear programme since 1979. Saudi Arabia also gave favourable oil supplies and loans to help Pakistan cope with the economic consequences of its nuclear test in 1998.[5]

Historically, in much of its military cooperation with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has used its capacity as the guardian of the sacred sites of Islam to mobilise support for containing the influence of both socialist and Shia movements and regimes in the Arab-Islamic world. Since late 2001, much of the cooperation in this field has been framed in the context of 'fighting international terrorism' although the use of this politicised discourse often generates the need to manage internal dissent in Saudi Arabia and in other GCC states. Recent developments that will have a profound impact on the security paradigms of both the Gulf monarchies and Pakistan are the emergence of Daesh (داعش, the Arabic acronym of the Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL), and, latterly, the declaration of allegiance and support for Daesh by

the Taliban movement of Pakistan, some smaller Takfiri Sunni groups in the country, and dissident al-Qaeda factions on the Arab peninsula.[6] Despite alleged ties between Daesh and at least some interest groups and informal financial networks in Saudi Arabia and Qatar,[7] Daesh and its affiliates could, sooner or later, target both what they see as the apostate and illegitimate rulers of Pakistan and the GGC countries, as well as the Shia minorities there. A possible collapse, fragmentation, and subsequent dispersal of Daesh will also confront Pakistan and several GCC states with a fluid militant network that could generate yet another de facto tie between their militant fringes across state boundaries.

The military connections between Pakistan and the GCC countries have a sizeable economic dimension. Business activities in various sectors – agro-industry, banking, transport and communications, and energy – that are related to, or initiated by, groups and individuals from Pakistan's defence sector allegedly account for approximately twenty-five percent of the country's gross domestic product. Companies embedded in networks of military or former military personnel are also active in the trade between Pakistan and the GCC sphere.[8] Finally, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, along with several other GCC states' military sectors, have traditionally been major Anglo-American military clients in terms of arms and equipment purchases as well as aid. Just as the elites of the GCC states consider external military protection and suppliers crucial to their survival, the US considers all of these states to be crucial to its security strategy because of the role they have played in containing socialism (especially in the 1988-91 period), terrorism, and the emerging powers (1997-2001). It also recognises their strategic importance in relation to energy policy in the Arab and wider Islamic worlds: four GCC countries are OPEC members, and Saudi Arabia is vital in the petrodollar system.[9]

Pakistan, both as a state and a society – and especially, though not exclusively, its sizeable Shia component – is not as hostile to Iran as are Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, with the exception of Oman. This may explain why, in spring 2015, Islamabad turned down a request by Saudi Arabia to send Pakistani troops to Yemen to assist with its military intervention against the Houthi-Shia uprising there. Instead, the Pakistani authorities opted for the evacuation of 980 of its citizens who were living as expatriates in that country. It also chose to adopt a neutral stance and officially preferred to participate in mediation through multilateral channels like the United Nations and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The strongest reaction against Islamabad's stance came from the United Arab Emirates. Its importance as a Gulf trading partner with, and aid provider to, Pakistan has been increasing steadily over the last couple of years. Recent polls by the Gilani Research Foundation and by the Institute for Public Opinion Research suggest that between forty-seven and sixty-seven percent of those Pakistani respondents who are aware of the situation in Yemen would support the Pakistani military presence there.[10] These responses raise questions as to what extent such reserves can be repeated or maintained.

### Oil, Land, and Free-Trade Agreements

Since 1973, the privileged military ties between the US and Saudi Arabia and other GCC oil exporters have formed a core component of the petrodollar system, a system which also

determines the modalities of the energy trade between the GCC sphere and Pakistan. This brings us to the second level of interaction, embodied in the international trade and investment streams between the GCC economies and Pakistan. In 2011, total Pakistan-GCC trade officially stood at some $18 billion. Of this amount, some $15 billion was made up of imports from the GCC countries, as against three billion dollars' worth of exports to the same states. A glance at Figure 1 below reveals that, in terms of imports, the GCC countries as an economic bloc perform as by far Pakistan's largest single trade partner in the reference year. The near-totality of Pakistan's trade with the GCC bloc is, in decreasing order, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. As one can rather easily guess, this is largely because Pakistan's energy sector depends on petroleum imports from the GCC states and from these three oil-exporting countries in particular.



Pakistan has been trying over the years to diminish its dependency on GCC oil by a number of means. Strategies have included the partial reorientation of its energy supplies towards natural gas; planning to introduce gas imports by pipeline from Iran by 2015; prospecting and developing its domestic natural gas reserves in Sui and Makran as well as its coal and oil fields in the Thar desert; and upgrading the new port in Gwadar for the planned import of natural gas and coal from other regions. In terms of exports, Pakistan's exports to the GCC countries consist of agro-industrial products, food, and textiles. Its main export markets are elsewhere, in the EU, the US, and a plethora of other individual economies, and they are primarily related to its main exports which are raw cotton, sugar cane, and other agro-industrial commodities. The GCC bloc, as a portion of Pakistan's export market, has been slightly shrinking over the last few years, and, as Figure 1 shows, this results in a highly unequal trade balance.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the GCC bloc into Pakistan comes predominantly from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. Over the last one and a half decades, groups and companies from the GCC bloc have benefited from the shift towards privatisation in the

telecommunications and finance sectors; they have also invested in real estate, oil infrastructure, transport, and the steel industry. The latter is, in fact, a sector in which the family of Pakistan's current prime minister has assets and interests (Nawaz Sharif was in exile in Saudi Arabia between late 2000 and 2007). With 3.88 billion dollars' worth of foreign direct investment (FDI) during the 2000-14 period, the UAE even became the largest individual FDI source after the US which contributed $5.7 billion; meanwhile $776.5 million was provided by Saudi Arabia.[11] FDI and capital transfer do not create a one-way dynamic from the high-GDP GCC economies to lower middle-GDP Pakistan though. The UAE and Bahrain, in particular, attract substantial investment from Pakistani businesses and individuals who often have connections to the political elite. In 2013, for instance, 6,000 Pakistani companies in a variety of sectors like software and IT, electronics, logistics, real estate, agro-industry, and banking were operating in Dubai, or using the latter as a hub for their activities on the wider GCC market (Pravakar, Geethanjali and Dash 2014, p. 128).

In 2013 and 2014, Pakistani citizens and companies reportedly purchased the equivalent of 4.35 billion dollars' worth of real estate in Dubai, and constituted eight percent of the client base for the city-state's real estate market during that period (Khan, 2015a, 2015b). For the elite groups involved, this is not only an investment, but a way to secure capital, and capital investments, in case of political change in Pakistan itself. Since 2002, and especially since the global food commodity price spikes of 2008, an increasing interest and activity can be observed in FDI from the GCC towards the agro-industrial sector (especially the dairy and fruit branches, fisheries, and livestock) and related infrastructure (Woertz *et al.* 2008, pp. 6-7). This fits into a trend in which it is expected to see food imports into the GCC double from $27.5 to $53.1 billion between 2011 and 2020. These imports already cover ninety percent of the region's needs, and their expansion reflects a bid to enhance a food security strategy for the GCC which involves not just Pakistan but also some African countries which are geographically close and with which historical and cultural ties exist (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010, p. 16).

GCC actors are confronted in this field with similar interests from Chinese, Southeast Asian, and European corporations and investment consortiums. While this certainly boosts the agro-industrial sector, the ensuing competition for access to land also steadily exacerbates social tensions and faultlines in a country where forty-three percent of the labour force is made up of people in agricultural employment: in reality, land grabs bear out the popular view that they mainly benefit the neo-feudal landowner elites in Pakistan to the detriment of family-based agriculture and fisheries. Since 2006, the GCC has sought to push through a free trade agreement with Pakistan. Such an agreement would, theoretically, boost the trade volume between Pakistan and the GCC countries up to $350 billion by 2020. The actual agenda, however, is perceived to be driven by the interests of Qatar in particular. The state is itself one of the world's major exporters of natural gas, and is therefore deeply concerned by Pakistan's intention to import gas from Iran. A free trade agreement would deepen Pakistan's energy dependency on the GCC beyond the oil sector.

A final factor to consider here is that members of the Pakistani political and business elites have invested in real estate and the service industries within the Persian-Arab Gulf's hub

cities and so-called economic free zones; they also possess bank accounts in Bahrain which serves as a tax haven for the wealthy. The Bahrain uprising in early 2011 was suppressed – at least for the time being – for a number of reasons, and Iran's perceived role in events within the Sunni-ruled, Shia-majority kingdom were a factor. This financial investment helps to explain why the suppression was aided by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other outside actors, including Pakistan. Pakistan's involvement did not take the form of open and direct military intervention, as did that of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Instead, it occurred through the recruitment of up to 2,000 Pakistani personnel and advisors for Bahrain's national guard and riot police by so-called private security contractors from the wider business realm connected to Pakistan's military. Many of the recruits were allegedly retired military and police personnel from the Makran region (Mashal 2011).

### The Fibre of the Remittance Economy

Military recruits form a small minority within what is an enormous volume of labour migration between Pakistan and the GCC bloc. As we can clearly see from Figure 2 here, the GCC countries – and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular – form by far the largest destination for Pakistani labour migrants and expatriates in the world. In 2012, nearly 3.4 million Pakistani migrants, mainly men, lived and worked at least seasonally in the GCC countries. At first glance, this seems easy to explain in terms of the stark demographic and economic imbalances between Pakistan and the GCC bloc. In 2012, the GCC sphere had a total population of 43.3 million and Saudi Arabia accounted for nearly two-thirds of that figure, whereas the population of Pakistan was 175.3 million or over four times the GCCs' population. While the GDP per capita was $2,792 in Pakistan in that year, it amounted to an average of $44,987 in the GCC sphere (Islamic Development Bank 2012). Such discrepancies, however, provide insufficient explanation for the migration patterns that emerged.



As was noted earlier, trade, transport, and migration ties between southern Pakistan and the GCC countries – and with Oman in particular – have existed for centuries, and several population groups in Oman and Saudi Arabia claim ancestry from regions that are now in

Pakistan. Networks and niche presences that were later activated in modern labour migration clearly did already exist; however, it was not until 1980 that sizeable migration and expatriation from Pakistan to the GCC area occurred. The oil boom of 1971-3 initially attracted labour migrants from Arab countries which were not members of the GCC. After 1980, growing labour demand, a native GCC population that is culturally less inclined to engage in the specific work needed, and a Pakistani foreign policy that increasingly leaned towards the Persian-Arab Gulf all culminated in a second immigration wave in which Pakistani workers were prominent.[12] Another landmark event in this process came after the First Gulf War (1990-1) when Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries decided to turn eastward to Pakistan and other countries for new labour to replace those Palestinians and other Arabs who had been generally supportive of Iraq (then still under Saddam's Baathist rule) and were now perceived to pose a security threat (Lavergne 2003).

Between 1997 and 2001, the decision by several GCC governments to diversify and modernise their oil- and trade-based economies, coupled with high oil prices, led to a rapid surge in development activity, a 259 percent regional GDP growth between 1998 and 2008, as well as a peak in labour demand. The proportion of labour migrants of all nationalities in the GCC's active population came to range from over thirty percent in Saudi Arabia to over ninety percent in the UAE and Qatar. Pakistani migrants in the GCC area are primarily employed in construction. Pakistani labour has in no small part built the GCC region's modern metropolises, its mirage-like skylines, and the infrastructure and developments established in Dubai and Abu Dhabi by members of international elites. Other sectors in which Pakistanis are well-represented include maintenance work, small and medium trade, as well as the taxi industry, and other transport activities. Thanks to these links, the GCC economies form by far the largest source for remittances to Pakistan, followed far behind by the continental European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK).

In 2012, $13.18 billion in remittances – five to seven percent of the country's GDP – was sent to Pakistan from a variety of economies and regions. Of this amount, as Figure 3 shows, some $7.35 billion came from the GCC economies, with forty-six percent from Saudi Arabia, thirty-six percent from the UAE (more specifically, eighteen percent from Dubai, and seventeen percent from Abu Dhabi), seven percent from Kuwait, and eleven percent from the three other GCC states (State Bank of Pakistan - Statistics Department 2015). The remittance economy has created a substantial network of both official and informal financial transfer channels and services between the GCC countries and Pakistan (Piolet 2009). The official number of expatriate countrymen in the region forms only about two percent of the overall population of Pakistan, yet their remittances to the country form an important financial lifeline for communities at the grassroots level in their places of origin, much more so than international aid does. As is the case in other reception societies, the impact of remittance flows is complex and strongly related to the social psychology of the individuals and communities involved. These funds are certainly productively invested and help to alleviate poverty, but they can also contribute to handout dependency, consumerist mirages, deindustrialization, and agricultural decline (Qayyum *et al.* 2008, pp. 103-18). The remittances from GCC countries and other states have been of considerable use in helping to

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combat the economic setbacks brought about by the earthquake in north-western Pakistan in late 2005, the military offensive in Swat in spring 2009, and the floods in summer 2010.[13]

**The Political Economy of Hearts and Minds**

A channel of interaction and an economic tie that is specifically embedded in the religious geography that is shared between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Ummah in general, is what one could call the pilgrimage industry that brings visitors to Mecca and Medina. The number of pilgrims, or at least pilgrimage-related entries, between 2000 and 2012 is estimated at more than thirty million, and more than two-thirds of these came from outside Saudi Arabia. The economic and psychological dimensions of this influx are hardly negligible. Saudi Arabia's direct and indirect annual revenue from organising and hosting the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages (derived from permits and taxes, transport, accommodation, food, etc.) is estimated to be between $10 and $30 billion depending on the year and the source. Pilgrimage revenue is the country's second-largest source of income after the hydrocarbon industry. Official figures show that Pakistan took in 11.7 percent of the foreigners who performed the Hajj in 2012, and was the second-largest source of pilgrims to Mecca and Medina after Egypt which benefited from 14.9 percent of this traffic.[14] According to the official Hajj statistics, Pakistan had also occupied second place the year before, and had a prominent place in the years before that (Government Department of Statistics 2012, 2015).

These religious ties bring up the controversial issue of Saudi Arabia's, Kuwait's, and Qatar's 'ideological exports' to Pakistan through private foundations and quasi-governmental structures and their role in the growth there of Wahhabi and especially Salafi Sunni societal segments.[15] In Pakistan, as elsewhere, social identities traditionally dominated by more

syncretic Sufi beliefs and practices have come under pressure because of the impact of globalisation, social mobility, migration, and urbanisation. The discrediting of members of the Sufi elites that arose from their close association with unpopular parts of the political elites has also had an impact, and has helped to create space in certain sectors of Pakistani society for more orthodox and puritanical interpretations and practices of Islam. One of these interpretations is Salafism which is now adhered to by, or influences, an estimated five to seven percent of the country's followers of Islam.

Since 1978, Saudi Arabia, in particular, either through official channels or through an array of private charities, has been funding the construction of mosques – including the enormous landmark Faisal mosque in the capital Islamabad – and various forms of religious education as well as some religious movements and political parties. These parties include the Salafi Ahl al-Hadith (أهل الحديث, 'People of the tradition of the Prophet') movement and its political wing. These ties are not recent and can be traced back to 1927 when Ahl al-Hadith representatives from what is now Pakistan travelled to the Kingdom of Nejd and Hejaz, the predecessor state of Saudi Arabia. More structural support from Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait, was provided for the Ahl al-Hadith and similar political-religious organisations in Pakistan after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, and this trend accelerated after Pakistan's foreign policy turn towards the Persian-Arab Gulf after 1980 (Siddiqa 2013, Sikand 2007). Nowadays, the Ahl al-Hadith runs or controls seventeen social and political organisations and an estimated 400 Quranic schools in the country. This is some four percent of the registered total, but, when the growth from forty-seven Quranic schools affiliated to the movement in 1971 to 161 in 1988 is noted, it is clear that this is a niche which is expanding over time (Siddique 2009). The country's audiences can also capture religious satellite channels from the Persian-Arab Gulf, some of which broadcast Salafi and Wahhabi content. In general, Salafism is more prevalent in urban centres and those parts of the country which are relatively more affluent because, among other reasons, of a strong remittance influx from the GCC region. Although the Salafi Ahl al-Hadith movement is not involved in armed struggles, the existence of militant groups inspired by Salafism, and the fact that these groups consider Sufis and the large Shia minority to be heretics, means that their presence is perceived to be a societal threat by various opinion leaders and competing Islamic groups and leaders.

Labour migration and religious interaction through pilgrimage ensure that the GCC region has a presence – and Saudi Arabia in particular has an impact – on the mental map in Pakistan. Despite the often harsh and exploitative working conditions and the social segregation to which labour migrants are exposed, and despite the opulent lifestyles and conspicuous consumption of some of the region's elites and of the wealthy expatriates who settle in Dubai and other hubs, opinion in Pakistan generally seems to reflect a primarily favourable view of Saudi Arabia. Although opinion polls can only give indications of real opinion, a 2008 survey was typical in suggesting that not less than ninety-seven percent of Pakistan's residents held a favourable view of Saudi Arabia to some extent or other. Iran received a sixty-seven percent favourability rating, while the non-GCC Arab countries included in the questionnaire lagged far behind with thirty-three to thirty-nine percent of participants granting them favourable views. The US was rated favourably by nineteen percent of the respondents in that specific

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study (Pew Research Center 2008). Of course, this less reflects a popular endorsement of the GCC region's political regimes and power elites than it does the positive associations generated by the employment and income opportunities they provide, and by Mecca, Medina, and the Hajj. This author's anecdotal evidence and impressions gathered in Pakistan suggest that popular feelings are much more mixed and vary according to personal experiences and the international climate of the moment.[16]

Finally, the idea that Pakistan exists in a sub-imperialist relationship with the GCC bloc needs to be considered in relation to the humanitarian aid and development cooperation provided by the GCC region to Pakistan. Here again, the most prominent interactions are those between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser extent, between Pakistan, the UAE, and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia's semi-governmental aid body al-Igata – better known as the International Islamic Relief Organization – has been almost constantly operating in Pakistan since 1982 (Observatoire de l'action humanitaire 2016). Kuwait's International Islamic Charity Organization and various semi-governmental and private charities from the UAE and Qatar have also been present in the country since their initial involvement began during the period from 1989 to 1999. The graph in Figure 4 shows that, in terms of registered humanitarian assistance between 1999 and 2013, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries formed the



fourth-largest bloc of donors to Pakistan after the US, the EU (both as an institution and through its individual member states), and private donors including individuals, organisations, and companies in the affected country and beyond.

In a number of specific crises like those caused by Pakistan's floods in the summer of 2010, Saudi Arabia's contributions were much more prominent. With $242.2 million in aid, it was the third-largest donor after the US, which contributed $631.7 million, and private donors who added a further $247.5 million to the total. However, if we add in the $96 million from the five other GCC countries, of which $77 million came from the UAE and $9.25 million from Kuwait, it becomes clear that the GCC as a bloc actually ranked second and contributed a

Pie chart (top): US 38%, Saudi Arabia 19%, UK 18%, EU institutions and countries 9%, Japan 8%, China 6%, Multilateral donors and IFIs 1%, Others 1%

- US
- Saudi Arabia
- UK
- EU institutions and countries
- Japan
- China
- Multilateral donors and IFIs
- Others



Pie chart (bottom): Asian Development Bank 45%, World Bank (IDA and IBRD) 37%, China 8%, Japan 3%, Islamic Development Bank 3%, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 2%, Other multilateral donors and IFIs 1%, EU institutions, EIB and EU countries 1%

- Asian Development Bank
- World Bank (IDA and IBRD)
- China
- Japan
- Islamic Development Bank
- Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
- Other multilateral donors and IFIs
- EU institutions, EIB and EU countries

total of $338.2 million in relief aid during the flood crisis.[17] If we look at Figure 5, we see that – in terms of the development grants alone that were allocated to Pakistan in the period between 2004 and 2009 – Saudi Arabia was Pakistan's second-largest donor after the US. The grants were especially directed at post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction and at social

and economic infrastructure development and they often serve to facilitate later economic investment.[18] They were either disbursed bilaterally or through the Islamic Development Bank of which Saudi Arabia is the largest individual shareholder.

Saudi Arabia and other GCC states also continue to contribute to the activities of specialised UN organisations in Pakistan. The circumstances which prompt the granting of GCC development aid to Pakistan are generally quite volatile and focused on urgent responses to major adverse events like the earthquake in northern Pakistan, the Swat offensive, the 2010 floods, and the energy crisis.[19] Significant contributions to development aid come from the UAE and Kuwait as well as from Saudi Arabia. By contrast to this pattern for the sourcing and deployment of development grants, loans to Pakistan are most often disbursed, not from the GCC countries, but from international financial institutions and development banks in which the US plays either a key role or wields considerable influence. The GCC countries' share of these loans does not exceed five percent, even when the input of the Islamic Development Bank is taken into account.

The activity of 'classical' international financial institutions and development banks in Pakistan has grown strongly since Pakistan became a frontline state in the so-called War on Terror; it has also increased in the wake of setbacks like natural disasters and the energy crisis with which the country has been coping since 2007.[20] Critics see this increase as evidence of the 'buy-off' of Pakistan's establishment in return for cooperation with foreign geopolitical agendas. They regard the increasing debt and adverse loan conditions as deleterious to Pakistan and its society. Last but not least, it is vital to remember here that the remittance economy – the primary sources of which are the GCC countries and especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE – can be interpreted as an alternative channel of aid. Remitted funds arguably have much more direct impact at the grassroots level in terms of fostering communities' ability to cope and their investment capacity than official development assistance ever does.

### A Conclusion in the Light of Recent Events

As one can see, the interaction between Pakistan and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is multi-faceted and pretty much set on the interface of the geopolitical and social grassroots because of the religious dimension and labour migration. Now, to come back to the initial question, do we have a case in which Pakistan exists in a sub-imperialist relationship with the entire GCC bloc, or at the very least with Saudi Arabia and the UAE? At first glance, it is tempting to see Pakistan merely as a provider of mercenaries, cheap labour, and cultivable land for the GCC countries and for their respective interest groups. This is also how some opinion makers describe it. The financial aid, advantageous oil deliveries, and of course the remittances from Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries, are definitely of enormous importance to Pakistan, and, while they may not be essential for its outright survival, they contribute greatly to its ability to function. This level of reliance means that Pakistan is vulnerable to economic downturns and political unrest in the Persian-Arab Gulf. The power elites of Pakistan thus have a vested interest in helping to ensure the continuity and stability of regimes in Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries.

The relationships and interactions between the GCC economies and Pakistan clearly do have more than a few characteristics of sub-imperialism. These characteristics are particularly striking in Pakistan's relationship with Saudi Arabia which largely exercises its influence in political and economic ways; they are also there in the UAE's economic influence and effects on Pakistan. In sum, the interaction is situated at the nexus of pan-Islamic diplomacy connected to Saudi Arabia's capacity as guardian of the Ummah's sacred sites, the interests of the respective nation-states, an urge towards economic diversification within the GCC, and the creation and effect of the Gulf's globalist city hubs.

Pakistan is not completely nor typically peripheral here. It has more military strength and experience, as well as a more diverse industrial base, than the GCC countries; it also produces military hardware and delivers defence expertise to Saudi Arabia and other GCC states. It has the distinction of being the only Islamic nuclear power to date. Pakistan's potential may be stunted due to setbacks, political factors, and lack of capital, but it is not a fully-fledged or completely passive periphery. What we have, in effect, is an interaction between *semi-peripheries*, an interaction that is defined and shaped by a confluence of historical factors, genuine and perceived security paradigms, and economic geography. Once more, much revolves around the ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the UAE, with which Pakistan's links are of a more economic nature, the ties with Saudi Arabia are highly political and ideological: both states – Saudi Arabia as the guardian of the Ummah's sacred sites and Pakistan as a modern nation-state which was founded for an Islamic community – are entities which, in their formation and in the construction of their legitimacy, are closely intertwined with Islam or certain interpretations thereof.

Pakistan, and the rulers of Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states have long been crucial US allies, and so they have benefited from considerable strategic dividends, among which are those derived from the containment of Soviet as well as Baathist socialism before 1991, support against Iran after 1979, and more recently, since 2001, participation in the fight against a much less defined, fluid and ubiquitous terrorist threat. Pakistan is also a major recipient of aid from both the US and the international financial institutions that the US controls. More than a few political opinion makers, both in Pakistan and in the Persian-Arab Gulf, feel that this relationship with the US serves a neo-imperial agenda of control over the Ummah, its sacred sites, and its resources, one that is against the very Islamic character and destiny of both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.[21] There is another factor that jeopardises the effectiveness of the religious dimension of interaction, and the ties between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and that is the perception that pan-Islamic diplomacy is operating as an alibi for Saudi Arabia's bid to mobilise or enhance a Sunni axis against Iran and the Shia sphere in general.

Within Pakistan, there are vocal actors who, and movements which, have for some time been calling on the country to take a less amenable line vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the GCC; for these critics, the Yemen crisis and the Saudi-Arab League intervention there emphasised once more the need for a stronger position. A number of patriotic opinion makers and people in oppositionist circles believe that Pakistan should avoid entanglement in conflicts that divide

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the Ummah and in which Pakistan, eventually to its own detriment, merely acts as a sub-contractor for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. More importantly in this instance, though, is, in this author's opinion, the reluctance of the military to become actively involved in the Yemeni Civil War. The Pakistani army, with Shia represented in its rank and file and its upper echelons, is not sectarian and is not eager to enter into a proxy war with Iran (See also Waraich 2015). As the army is the structure on which the country's cohesion is largely based, Pakistan is also apprehensive about overstretching militarily and about exacerbating Sunni-Shia tensions within Pakistan itself during a period when it is heavily involved in fighting Takfiri insurgents at home.

So, to conclude, the ties, channels, and networks that exist between Pakistan and the Persian-Arab Gulf form a geopolitical habitat based on complementarity that is crucial in enhancing the sustainability, if not partly the survival, of the states involved, especially Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Because of its historical and civilizational and religious dimension, this complementarity transcends mere economic interests. It will be interesting to see, in the mid-term, how this entire ideological and social-economic set of relationships, and their position in the wider Islamic world, will be further shaped by the newer generation of leaders in Pakistan and the GCC sphere and by various groups and individuals in the respective regions that seek to contest and resist the present world order and the incumbent political and economic elites who sustain it. The role and intensity of Islamic identity politics in this whole process will also shape future developments.

## Notes:

1. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, مجلس التعاون الخليجي in Arabic) or Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG) to give it its full title, was formed during the Iran-Iraq war in 1981 as a framework for economic, political, and security cooperation and regional integration between six Arab states that border the Persian-Arab Gulf. Its member states at the present time are, in alphabetical order, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The organisation's website is at http://www.gcc-sg.org. For background on the GCC's formation and the real and perceived interests behind it, see Ramazani and Kechichian (1988).

2. Parts of this text were previously published in an earlier draft in the Central Asia Economic Papers series of the Elliott School of International Affairs. See De Cordier (2013).

3. For more in-depth examinations, see Agius (2005) and Nicolini (2006).

4. The armed forces in the rest of the GCC region numbered 152,000 in total, with the UAE (51,000) and Oman (47,000) expanding most in this area. See International Institute for Strategic Studies (2014), *The Military Balance* (2014), the SIPRI database (2016), and Koch and Long (1997).

5. See Bennis, Moushabeck and Said (1998) p. 297; F. Khan (2012) p. 383; and Mason (2014) p. 58.

6. See Al-Jazeera, (2014) and Le Nouvel Observateur (2014). Takfirism (تكفيري) is a purist and often violent current within Sunni Islam. Its adherents believe that all Muslims (and, in the first instance, all Shia and Sufis) who deviate from their very strict interpretation of the actions and statements of the prophet Muhammad and his companions should be excommunicated. The movement, the origins of which can be traced back to the early times of Islam, gained fresh impetus in Egypt in the years from 1971 to 1973 and after the start of the Syrian War. It is believed to have provided ideological inspiration for Daesh and other groups since 2011. See also Alshammari (2013).

7. For an elaborate examination of Daesh's support and funding networks and mechanisms, see Napoléoni (2015).

8. For an in-depth study of defence-related business structures and activities in Pakistan, see Siddiqa (2013). The influence of this military-economic relationship between the GCC and Pakistan goes even further in the sense that Pakistan and two GCC states (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) were the only countries that officially recognised the Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (until they were pressured by the US and the UN to withdraw their recognition in late 2001). The Taliban's Islamic Emirate (not to be confused with Islamic State or Daesh), existed from the autumn of 1996 until late 2001 and continued as a shadow state in parts of the country after its official demise. This internationally isolated entity was seen not only as a common sphere of influence, but as a society and economy which could be steered by Pakistan and the GCC's leading countries during its reconstruction after years of civil war thanks to their recognition.

9. See Grimett (2011), Center for Global Development (n.d., a, b) and Niblock (2006). With $13.8 billion in purchases between 2007 and 2010, Saudi Arabia was the foremost buyer of US arms and military equipment in that period. Pakistan was seventh with contracts worth $4.1 billion. Both countries are also major clients of the UK's arms industry, and

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received various forms of military aid from the US, especially during the Cold War and since the War on Terror began.

10. See Gallup Pakistan and Gilani Research Foundation (2015) and Institute for Public Opinion Research (2015).

11. See Khan and Khan (2011) and Board of Investment of Pakistan (2016).

12. Pakistan's foreign orientation towards Saudi Arabia and the Persian-Arab Gulf in general was especially explicit under the leadership of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq who was in office from the autumn of 1978 until the summer of 1988.

13. For a case study, see Suleri and Savage (2006).

14. For more in-depth examinations of the political economy of the Hajj and Umrah, see Leverrier (1996) and Bianchi (2008).

15. For a discussion of the differences and similarities between Wahhabism and Salafism, see Stanley (2005). Wahhabism, which is the official religion of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is believed to be adhered to by 22.9 percent of the native or naturalised Muslim population in Saudi Arabia where Wahhabi Sunni Muslims thus form a dominant minority: 44.8 percent in the UAE, 46.87 percent in Qatar, 2.17 percent in Kuwait, and 5.7 percent in Bahrain. See Izady (2014).

16. The role of Saudi Arabia and Qatar in quelling or hijacking some of the recent Arab revolts, as well as the role of companies and investors from GCC economies in land grabbing practices, has certainly affected popular views in some sectors of society, not least among the sizeable Shia minority and those in the affected agricultural areas.

17. UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (2016) and IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis (2010).

18. For example, part of the land that is being acquired for agro-industrial investment by firms and groups from Saudi Arabia is purchased from a global $556 million agricultural development line from the Saudi Fund for Development.

19. See, for example, Baker, Tierney and Weissberger (2010). The picture is never clear since much development aid from Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries is not reported as such and is also tied to economic investments from the GCC in the country.

20. Center for Global Development, (n.d., a, b). Note that Saudi Arabia gives in-kind loans to Pakistan to help it cope with energy shortages in the form of oil supplies and deferred payments. It did so, for example, when Pakistan suffered economic sanctions due to its nuclear programme between 1998 and 2002, and again after the general elections of 2013 when a coalition perceived to be more friendly was elected into power.

21. See also Saïdi (2009). Some critics even consider the close ties between the GCC and Pakistan to be a way to further anchor the country in the wider orbit of US and NATO by proxy, so as to further roll back its independence. For details on the various forms of GCC -NATO cooperation, in particular against Iran, and for the overthrow of Saddam in Iraq and Gadhafi in Libya, see Nazemroaya (2012).

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
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# Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

'Order' and 'Justice' in World Politics: A Retrospective Analysis of the Gulf Crisis (1990-1) and the War in Iraq (2003) from Hedley Bull's Perspective

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**Abstract:**

This article examines Hedley Bull's approach to international order and justice in the context of two major Iraq-related crises in the post-Cold-War era which raised questions about the key components of international order. The article tests Bull's hypothesis that order has priority over justice in world politics, and reveals the limits and strengths of that hypothesis in relation to problems international society encountered during the Gulf crisis and the war in Iraq. Many developments in the post-Cold-War era are shown to confirm Bull's 1977 analysis of the order-justice relationship which remains relevant to any analysis of the changing circumstances of world politics.

**Keywords:** Order, justice, Hedley Bull, Iraq, post-Cold-War period

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# 'Order' and 'Justice' in World Politics: A Retrospective Analysis of the Gulf Crisis (1990-1) and the War in Iraq (2003) from Hedley Bull's Perspective

### Introduction

The English School of International Relations was created in the 1950s thanks to the efforts of a special group of scholars working under the name of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics; it is now accepted as having provided one of the key approaches needed to understand change in world politics. Despite its realist inheritance, due to the centrality of the state, the English School's difference from its forebears is evident in its new emphasis on the analysis of 'the nature and the distinguishing marks of the diplomatic community' (Butterfield *et al.* 1966, p. 12). Its proponents analyse 'international society' and understand change in world politics in terms of 'cultural change which produces a different perception of common interests in a context of coexistence and cooperation' (Hofmann 1986, p. 185). Indeed, according to Hoffmann, Hedley Bull, who is one of the prominent figures of the school, can be differentiated from the mainstream realists such as Gilpin and Waltz precisely because his definition of change focuses on changes in the way that members of international society understand their common interests. Bull is also original in his analysis of international order and justice in world politics when he defends the priority of a state-based understanding of international order over justice in his 1977 book on *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1995).

Order and justice are two important concepts which have been the focus of numerous academic debates within the international relations discipline. The relationships between order as a fact of world politics, and justice as a moral value, have long been debated by philosophers and scholars. This debate gained particular momentum after the end of the Cold War, and – as this article will demonstrate – the priority of international order over issues related to morality was particularly open to discussion during the 1990s and 2000s when many crises in world politics brought that priority into question. This article, which is deeply rooted in Hedley Bull's work, seeks to analyse the relationship between order and justice within the framework of two important crises related to Iraq in the post-Cold-War period, namely, the Gulf crisis and the war in Iraq. Through the analysis of Iraq, which seems to have become the paradigmatic case study for such discussions, the article will seek to define change in world politics in the context of 'order' and 'justice'.

The Gulf crisis in 1990-1 and its aftermath generated lots of questions about what constitutes an exception to the norm of non-intervention. 'The old questions of what kind of security and security for whom' remained central to 'the debate over the role of collective security', and 'priorities' around security and justice were frequently discussed (Hurrell 1992, p. 55). It is

important to note that this decade also witnessed a transformation in normative understandings of the concept of state sovereignty, a crucial component of international order, which was called into question when a safe haven was established in northern Iraq to protect its Kurdish population (Wheeler 2002, p. 169). The war in Iraq in 2003 also paved the way for the rise of new academic discussions about the United States (US) which now sought to be recognised as a 'normative innovator' by claiming an exceptional right to self-defence (Morris 2004, p. 279). The fact that the US appeared to lose its credibility and power in the aftermath of its invasion of Iraq demonstrated that the concept of power is not only the product of material sources, but also 'the product of legitimacy, of the perception, on the part of other social actors, that the exercise of power is rightful' (Reus-Smit 2011, p. 88). It seems that nowadays power is understood to depend on the conformity of an action to the general perception of what is right in international society, and this reliance on perception calls into question the concept of absolute justice as an important component of power in world politics. The war in Iraq posed particular difficulties for conventional ideas about order and justice, and so Iraq offers an indispensable case study for an analysis of these important ideas.

This article begins its analysis with a review of Hedley Bull's understanding of international order and justice, and of his main arguments about the relationship between these two concepts; it then goes on to discuss his arguments in the post-Cold-War period. The article's second section discusses important features of the Gulf crisis and investigates whether or not developments that occurred during and after the crisis denoted changes in the roles served by order and justice in world politics. The third section conducts the same analysis in relation to the war in Iraq, and addresses important questions about how order and justice are prioritised. The article concludes by pointing out the strengths and weakness of Bull's arguments, and explains change in world politics with reference to conclusions drawn from the application of his ideas to the Gulf crisis and the war in Iraq. This article argues that, despite the limits of Bull's approach to the order-justice relationship, his ideas are still useful in helping us to understand current crises, and have continued relevance in the post-Cold-War period.

### 'Order' and 'Justice': A Theoretical Framework

The relationship between concepts of 'order' and 'justice' formed an important subject for discussion in Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1977). Bull was one of the early figures in, and key members of, the English School of International Relations. Like all members of the English School, he departed from the idea that an international society exists 'when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions' (Bull 1995, p. 13). According to Bull, in his work on international order and the place of justice within that order under Cold War circumstances, the idea of international society has always existed in world politics but has been understood to have different characteristics at different times. Bull insisted that, although the characteristics of international society have changed throughout the centuries due to changes in beliefs and

norms, the idea that an international society exists survives in a precarious and imperfect way. The survival of that idea pushes the main actors in world events to behave in conformity with it, and to justify their actions vis-à-vis the dominant contemporary beliefs and norms of international society as they conceive of it (*Ibid.*, pp. 26-44). It is worth saying that Bull ascribed special importance to the beliefs and perceptions of members of international society because of their power to influence the historical evolution of the very concept of international society (Hoffmann 1990, p. 19).

Bull argued that in each social group there are three unchangeable goals: all societies seek to ensure that life is secured from violence; that promises, once made, are kept, or arrangements are carried out; and that the possession of things remains stable (Bull 1995, p. 4). Bull saw these goals as elementary, primary, and universal, and argued that – because they are in the interest of every member of every social group and it would be difficult to imagine stable social relations without them – these rules also hold for international society which can be understood as another level of social grouping. According to Bull, each state will feel safe if it is sure that no other state will use physical violence against it (protection from violence through the limitation of the use of force); violate its sovereignty (stability of possession with respect to state sovereignty); or break its promises (respect for liability through the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*). According to Bull, what we call 'international order' is in fact the pattern of activity that achieves these elementary, primary, and universal goals in a sustained way at the level of an international society (*Ibid.*, p. 8). From Bull's perspective then, the principles of the limitation of the use of force, respect for state sovereignty, and liability towards agreements represent components of international order on which all members of an international society can reach consensus. International order can therefore be defined objectively as the provision of the minimum standard of coexistence for all members of an international society.

Bull argued that, while international order can be defined objectively, what we call 'justice' has a subjective definition, since ideas relating to justice are moral ideas that 'treat human actions as right in themselves' (*Ibid.*, p. 75), and justice may mean different things to different actors. From Bull's perspective, justice exists at the human, international, and cosmopolitan levels, and, at each of these three levels, moral rules confer rights and duties upon different actors. Human justice concerns the rights and duties of individual human beings, and international justice consists of the rights and duties of states; meanwhile, cosmopolitan justice concerns the more general and universal rights and duties of humankind. Bull argued further that it is only international justice which is in conformity with international order, since both of these concepts focus on states. However, human justice and cosmopolitan justice, since they concern the rights and duties of other actors, tend to be in conflict with international order.

After his insightful account of the definitions of order and justice, Bull analysed the relationships between them and discussed which one has priority over the other under specific sets of circumstances. He argued that, at the time of writing his book, international order had priority over justice, and he used concrete examples to suggest that subjects relating to justice have always been of secondary importance in terms of the world's political

agenda; he claimed that this was because international order is to some extent inhospitable to projects that seek to realise human justice, and wholly inhospitable to cosmopolitan justice. Bull claimed that human justice issues like human rights, and cosmopolitan justice issues like nuclear armament; inequality in the distribution of global resources; and ecological or environmental problems – all of which treat threats to human life and human civilization in general – were easily overshadowed in the Cold War period (*Ibid.*, pp. 79-82). Although the idea of justice was included in official United Nations (UN) documents throughout the Cold War, there has been, as Roberts (2003, p. 52) finds, 'a striking disjunction between […] UN rhetoric and aspiration on the one hand, and what actually happens'.

However, according to Bull, the priority of order over justice was not just a fact in the Cold War period but also a requirement for stability in world politics. Bull saw the priority of order over justice as key to his own work and essential in world politics because, in his view, justice was only achievable in the context of order (Vincent 1990, p. 60). However, Bull was increasingly attracted by the liberal ideas of the early 1980s and by the idea that 'without justice, there could be no lasting order' (Wheeler and Dunne 1996, p. 100). He also noted that a just world was not possible while states were 'notoriously self-serving in their policies' (Bull 1984, pp. 194-5). Despite his attraction to justice, Bull was concerned that no shared understanding of morality, and no common conception of justice between members of international society, existed, and that therefore there was 'no consensus on what level of human suffering would justify humanitarian intervention' (Wheeler and Dunne 1996, p. 104). Indeed, from Bull's perspective, any states that acted unilaterally in the name of human or cosmopolitan justice would risk breaching the main principles of international order and posing a challenge to the harmony, the concord, and the coexistence of the society of sovereign states (Bull 2000, p. 221; 1984, p. 195). Hoffmann (1990, p. 21) suggests that 'Bull was painfully aware not only of the gap between moral imperatives and political reality, but also of the multiplicity of moral perspectives'. Bull argued that the priority of order over justice was in effect in the common interest of international society because different understandings of justice among states could erode the stability of the very concept of an international society. He therefore argued that the defence of the components of international order, and particularly of the principle of state sovereignty, represented 'the best contemporary way of protecting human beings against forcible external interference' (*Ibid.*, p. 30).

Bull's Cold War arguments, as well as his previous and subsequent claims relating to the order-justice relationship, paved the way for a theoretical division between positions which became known respectively as pluralism (supporting the priority of order over justice) and solidarism (supporting the priority of justice over order). Bull himself had already launched a discussion of these ideas via his Oppenheim-Grotius distinction (Bull 1966). The end of the Cold War, as Hurrell notes, 'witnessed a dramatic rise in support of the idea that international society could and should seek to promote greater justice' (Hurrell 2003, p. 31). The rise of non-state actors, the growing importance of human rights in world politics, the birth of new concepts such as 'humanitarian intervention', and the unavoidable issues generated by environmental and armament problems, together with the threats they pose to 'human' and 'global' security, led some scholars to revitalise Bull's discussion.

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In the post-Cold-War period, many scholars challenged Bull's pluralist arguments and suggested that the priority of order over justice is questionable in a world where the importance of human and global aspects of justice have gained force. Since state sovereignty has lost its pre-eminence in world politics, they argue, a critical understanding of world politics based on human and global dimensions rather than national ones should be developed (Wheeler 1997, 2002, Dunne and Wheeler 1999, 2004). Solidarism understands international society as a form of moral collectivity and takes into consideration ideas related to justice. Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, other scholars have followed Bull in supporting the pluralist idea that, although justice should be an inseparable part of world politics,[1] international order still has to keep its priority over justice because the subjective nature of justice leaves it open to exploitation; they maintain the validity of Bull's belief that order is a prerequisite for the materialisation of justice. Pluralists have based their arguments on the inefficiency and counter-productivity of those political interventions into states' internal affairs which have been undertaken in the name of human rights and/or democracy. According to them, this kind of action violates state sovereignty, one of the components of international order, without being able to ensure that justice is done, and so damage to the very idea of international society itself is compounded (Mayall 2000, Jackson 2003).

The debate is divided between those who believe that states are the principal bearers of rights and duties, and that states are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes, and those who argue that individuals are not only the objects but also the subjects of international society; according to this second view, exceptions to states' rights and duties are allowed and should be made in order to uphold a universal standard of morality (Wheeler 1992, pp. 467-8). While the discussion was launched by the scholars known as the new generation of the English School, its reach grew, and many other scholars started to adapt ideas from the English School of International Relations to the changing dynamics of the post-Cold-War era.

An important attempt to ensure the adaptation of the school's ideas to the changing dynamics of world politics has come from scholars in what is known as its 'structural wing' (Devlen 2010, p. 60) as opposed its 'normative wing' which remains focused on the order-justice relationship. The structural wing challenges 'the persistent over-reliance on the pluralism/solidarism dichotomy' (Adler, Buzan and Dunne 2005, p. 195), and a key figure here is Buzan who has criticised the normative questions hitherto posed by the school. From his perspective, it was by combining the structural elements of the school with the social constructivism of Wendt that the English School could become an efficient instrument for understanding globalisation. Buzan (2004, pp. 1-6) has also criticised the indifference of the traditional English School to significant contemporary factors such as regionalism and shifts in the international political economy.

The connection between the English School and social constructivism has also been the focus of work by other scholars such as Reus-Smit, Dunne, Linklater, and Suganami. While Reus-Smit (2011, p. 488) has suggested that 'constructivists and the English School scholars have frequently identified each other as fellow travellers, as having complementary projects at the "social vanguard" of the field', Dunne (1995, p. 368) has argued that Hedley Bull should be

thought of as an 'example of social constructivism', since both Bull and the social constructivists focus on the power of international society's non-material structures. Linklater and Suganami (2002, pp. 45-7) on the other hand, point out that it is Manning, to whom Bull acknowledged his academic indebtedness, who provides 'an early example of constructivism in International Relations'. From their perspective, the social bases of international society and the constitutive power of ideational structures constitute an important point of convergence for the English School and social constructivism; their important insight has convinced many scholars to work on the recalibration of the school.[2] This article, which aims to test Bull's relevance to the changing circumstances of world politics, will focus on Bull's main ideas, rather than applying new dimensions of the English School into the field.

### 'Order' and 'Justice' in the Post-Cold-War Era: International Society and the Gulf Crisis

Cold War circumstances provided convenient conditions for prioritising order over justice in world politics because the conflict was structured around two major poles – the United States and the USSR – with clear ideological divisions and a geopolitical competition in place. However, the dismantling of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which coincided with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, raised questions about order's pre-eminence. With the end of the Cold War, it seemed that a new world order, mainly based on the protection of both order and justice, was in the process of evolving. Indeed, there was a growing sense that world politics in the 1990s would require new instruments of international society, different to the use of force and the protection of international order which had proved effective in the Cold War. A justice-based conception of international legitimacy had emerged at the beginning of the 1990s, and it had generated new expectations and speculation about whether moral ideas could and would become embedded within the institutions and practices of international society in this new era: could it be supposed that the priority of order over justice – a basic principle that international society had adhered to throughout the Cold War – would become subject to challenge in the 1990s? The first important development which brought this debate to the attention of international society was the Gulf crisis. Indeed, Iraq became a perfect arena for observation of the consequences of the Cold War's end: its crisis held a mirror up to changing perceptions about the order-justice relationship in international society from the 1990s onwards.

Iraq occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990 for many financial reasons arising from its years of war with Iran; Saddam Hussein declared Iraq had invaded the country a couple of days later. The invasion represented a violation of the principles of state sovereignty and the breaking of limitations on the use of force by the Iraqi leader. In Bull's terms, Hussein had challenged the common code of coexistence in international society and had therefore violated international order. International society initially responded by condemning Iraq and demanding that Iraqi forces should withdraw unconditionally from Kuwaiti territories as soon as possible on the grounds that this violation was unacceptable (UN Security Resolution 660 1990). A series of resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council between 2 August 1990 and 16 January 1991 called on member states to apply economic embargoes; they were also to use 'all necessary means' to curb the immediate threat coming from Iraq, and to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty (UN Security Council Resolution 678 1990).

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The overall aim was to re-establish the international order which had been violated by the Iraqi military, and one of the most important features of this period was that states which were active within international society displayed an unprecedented degree of cooperation within the framework of 'collective security'. Indeed, once international order had been violated by a specific regime, international society was able to react as a unified body, despite certain points of divergence.[3] Operation Desert Storm involved twenty-six coalition forces and their collaboration was the unavoidable consequence of states accepting a concept of 'collective security'. The international society of the 1990s was different, then, from that of the Cold War which had been deeply divided due to the intensity of the confrontation between the United States and the USSR.

Notwithstanding this positive cooperation, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's forces demonstrated how costly politics aimed specifically at the protection of a specific side's definition of international order could be for the concept of international order itself. Indeed, just a couple of years before, when Iraq was at war with Iran, Western support for Iraq had been remarkable. The main objective of the Westerners during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-8 was to prevent a probable change in the Middle East in favour of Iran which was challenging the West with its Islamic ideology. The West, and particularly the US, had favoured the success of Iraq rather than Iran. During this period, although Iraq had violated many principles of international law – by, for example, using chemical weapons against its Kurdish population – it had drawn a response from many Western governments without that reaction leading to a fundamental change in their behaviours towards Iraq. Indeed, as noted in the official documents issued by the US Department of State (1988), there were significant human rights violations in the country and the chemical warfare launched by the Iraqi regime against the Kurdish insurgency prompted the US to condemn Iraq directly; however, these condemnations did not involve any kinds of serious economic or political measures being taken against the country (US Department of State 1988). On the contrary, the continuation of US exports to Iraq had contributed to its biological weapons capacity, a fact pointed out by the American senator Donald Riegle (1994). Meanwhile, statistics show that around 300 firms – particularly from the US, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, and Austria – had played direct or indirect roles in the development of Iraqi military infrastructure during that time (Salinger and Laurent 1991 pp. 17-9, Klare 2003, pp. 3, 5, 15-20). As Klare (2003, p. 3) argues, it was 'hard to think of any other major conflict in which the principal belligerents were able to acquire such a wide array of weapons and technology from the outside world'.

It seems that all of these factors had played important roles in the decision of the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, to invade Kuwait. In the 1980s, international society had engaged with Iraq on the premise that politics needed to exclude notions of human and cosmopolitan justice, and indeed that it must ignore their requirements, in order to avoid serious consequences for the whole concept of international order. Hussein, relying on the continuation of this worldview and expecting that no one could or would oppose him, launched a bombardment against Kuwait City which triggered the long-term Gulf crisis in the region. The Gulf crisis triggered awareness among international states that, for the protection of international order itself, ideas related to justice had to be incorporated into world politics. After the six-week-long Operation Desert Storm (16 January to 28 February 1991) had

ensured the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, there was a growing tendency for international society to protect international order from probable subsequent violations by taking action on all three levels. To this end, in the dispute with Iraq, three important steps were taken by the UN Security Council: an economic embargo was set up against the Iraqi regime, a safe haven was established in northern Iraq, and a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was put in place, under the aegis of the UN, to check Iraq's nuclear capacity.

From Bull's perspective, it seems appropriate to argue that the placing of economic sanctions on the Iraqi regime might be linked to the concept of 'international justice', a concept that includes the rights and duties of states. In effect, Saddam Hussein's attempt to invade Kuwait had violated Kuwait's right to exist. It was therefore the duty of international society to ensure justice by imposing a set of sanctions against the Iraqi regime for having committed an important violation of international order (Jackson 1995, p. 119). In other words, economic sanctions were launched against Iraq as a punishment for its unacceptable aggression. Other motives behind this step arose from the general assumption that economic sanctions would damage the regime's strength, thus preventing it from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It was also conceivable that sanctions would naturally bring about a regime change in Iraq, which would, in turn, be likely to bring cosmopolitan and human justice to the region, to the benefit of its people.

Similarly, the decision to establish a safe haven in northern Iraq might be linked to the concept of 'human justice'. The landmark decision taken in UN Security Council Resolution 688, dated 5 April 1991, represented the first time in UN history when the mass violation of human rights within a specific country was accepted as a threat, not only to the people of that country, but also to the entirety of international society: human justice and international order were perceived to be interdependent. The resolution condemned and demanded an end to Iraq's repression of its civilians, and it appealed to all UN member states and all humanitarian organisations to contribute to the humanitarian relief and protection of the Kurdish population; it also paved the way for the 'no-fly zone' initiative which was delivered through Operation Provide Comfort. Indeed, the Kurdish population of Iraq, which had suffered from the repressive measures of Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and throughout the Gulf crisis, had to be protected under post-war circumstances by the establishment of a special safe area exempt from Iraq's sovereignty. The zone, which would be protected by coalition forces and which gained UN Security Council backing for its suspension of Iraq's sovereignty, acted as evidence that ideas related to human justice could be given precedence over the basic principles of international order if necessary. In this respect, the establishment of a safe haven in the northern part of Iraq was critical because it constituted the first concrete action attributable to the concept of 'humanitarian intervention' in international law (Türkmen 2006, pp. 142-3). Robert Jackson (1995, p. 119) has argued that 'since Iraq was deemed to be an aggressor, it could be considered to have relinquished its right to control all its territory', which made the intervention in northern Iraq 'less exceptional'; James Mayall (1991, p. 428), another influential critic, has further argued that the intervention in northern Iraq to establish a safe haven for Kurds could not have occurred if it was not as a result of the Gulf War. Still, these observations cannot overshadow the significance of what constituted a

genuine transformation in the normative concept of 'sovereignty' in world politics (Wheeler 2002, p. 169).

The third step taken by international society in this period involved the establishment of a special commission to check the WMD capabilities of Iraq, and this move might be evaluated as another indicator of international society's commitment to cosmopolitan justice. As noted earlier, Bull regarded issues related to the rights and duties of all humankind as being vital to cosmopolitan justice, and the UN's attempt to control weapons that constituted a major threat to the entire world represented a bid to carry out a global duty that emerged from a shared understanding of that concept. In the light of these developments, it is important to note that, after the end of the coalition forces' operation in March 1991, there was an important consensus within international society about the three major steps which had been taken by the UN. This consensus is a critical indicator that there was significant awareness in international society about the necessity to incorporate ideas of 'justice' into world politics for the protection of international order itself.

International society had reached a new understanding that the common interests of that society could be ensured through the realisation of justice. The idea that order had priority over justice, a concept which had been dominant during the Cold War, seemed to have faced an important challenge here since human, and even global, concerns became important articles on international society's agenda. The solidarist tendency of international society was remarkable at the beginning of 1990s, a fact which could – in Bull's terms – be regarded as representing an important change in world politics; however, developments throughout the rest of the decade suggested that what had seemed like a major shift in perception had in fact been an illusion.

The consensus among international society's members started to fragment under pressure from different crises, most notably in the wake of disagreements about the efficacy of economic sanctions. It became clear that those applied against the Iraqi state were becoming dangerous weapons against the Iraqi people themselves who suffered from hunger and diseases while sanctions were in place. The humanitarian impact of the economic embargo against Iraq caused increasing controversy as the 1990s continued. According to a report issued by the US Department of State (1994), the standard of living of the Iraqi people had been reduced to at least half of its pre-war level; the World Health Organization (1997) announced that the health system in Iraq had totally collapsed in the first half of the 1990s due to the effects of the economic embargo. Research by UNICEF (1999) showed that the child mortality rate in Iraq had doubled, and that physical and psychological illnesses caused by poor nutrition had reached a critical level among Iraqi children. Mounting condemnation of the humanitarian impact of sanctions led to the development of alternative international programmes such as Oil for Food which was launched in 1995 and concretized in 1997 (Office of the Iraq Programme 2016).

Controversy also surrounded the existence of the safe haven founded in 1991 in northern Iraq to ensure the protection of Kurdish population from Saddam Hussein. The zone, exempt from Iraqi sovereignty, posed an important security threat for neighbouring countries such as

Turkey because it created a power vacuum in the region. The zone was widely perceived as a shelter for the Kurdish separatist terrorist organisation that Turkey had been dealing with for a long time, and this created significant suspicion in the minds of Turkish officials who had, in fact, been the initiators of this zone, along with France, at the UN. Turkish newspapers published many allegations that American helicopters were sending arms to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) located in northern Iraq, and these allegations became a primary source of concern, not only for Turkey, but also for neighbours in the region who feared that the zone would be transformed into an independent Kurdish state.[4] Over time, the attempt to ensure human justice in the post-Gulf-crisis period by establishing a safe haven generated major problems for the main principles of international order: Iraq's state sovereignty, which had been violated to ensure the safety of the Kurdish population, had become an important source of threat for the territorial integrity of Iraq and of its neighbours. The issue of how to reconcile human justice with international order remained an important problem for international society throughout the rest of the 1990s.

The third sign of decline in international society's fragile consensus on Iraqi politics became evident in relation to controversies about the work of UNSCOM. Scott Ritter, the UNSCOM inspector between 1992 and 1998, was among those who claimed that the commission was working as an intelligence institution on behalf of the CIA with the aim of overthrowing Saddam's regime, and these claims raised important doubts about whether or not the commission's reports reflected the realities of the situation in Iraq (Ritter 2005). When the US decided to bombard Baghdad's arms production sites in December 1998 in Operation Desert Fox (Clinton 2010), the US only had support from Britain; the rest of international society refrained from involvement in an action that lacked both UN Security Council authorisation and the support of global public opinion.

The priority of international order over justice seemed to have been challenged at the end of the Cold War, as a growing interest in human and global concerns led international society to acknowledge that justice needed to be incorporated into world politics to ensure the continuity of international order. A new awareness of the necessity of 'justice' emerged in world politics. In some senses, the society of sovereign states inherited from the Westphalian period seems to have adapted to the changes associated with globalization, but it is worth noting that this adaptation was likely to have been immature: new dilemmas emerged for the first time when the political responsibilities and moral obligations of international society were considered together.

In effect, the consensus which emerged among members of the UN Security Council, as well as in world public opinion, around the policy applied towards Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s revealed the general tendency of international society towards a certain level of solidarism. In the early part of the 1990s, there was a consensus in international society that any new aggression from the Iraqi regime should be contained through different channels that would incorporate the requirements of human, international, and cosmopolitan justice, as well as those of world politics; however, the very same consensus declined during the remainder of that decade due to a growing interrogation of these channels and their efficacy. It appears, then, that while ideas related to justice were needed and were given more

consideration during this period, there was a significant divergence of opinion on how to ensure justice within a given international order. The decline in a consensus which had appeared to be consolidating confirms Hedley Bull's suspicion about what would happen if justice was prioritised in world politics. It is possible to argue that although the arguments Bull made in *The Anarchichal Society* were challenged at the beginning of the 1990s, their validity was endorsed by events that unfolded in the rest of that decade.

### 'Order', 'Justice', International Society and the 2003 Iraq War

The first decade of the twenty-first century generally continued the pattern of the 1990s in its reflection of the inherent tension between the concepts of order and justice. Nevertheless, the events of 9/11 brought about changes and represented a landmark, not only for the US, but also for international society in general, and particularly for the Middle East where the consequences of a transformation in US foreign policy were directly felt. The grand strategy formally unveiled in the US' National Security Strategy 2002 (NSS) – composed in the aftermath of 9/11 and commonly known as 'the Bush Doctrine' – offered some insights into the new direction: it mentioned rogue states and their terrorist clients as the new threats that the US had to deal with, and it also indicated that unilateralism and pre-emptive strikes would be the main instruments that the US would use against these forces. Iraq, which was mentioned by Bush as one of the members of the 'axis of evil', became a focus for attention again, this time as the perfect arena in which to observe the consequences of 9/11 (Bush 2010c).

The US' decision to launch war against Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein was indeed a violation of international order in the sense that it directly ignored the principles of state sovereignty and limitations on the use of force. According to the official American position, traditional norms of non-intervention had to be diluted to allow such an intervention because the sources of insecurity lay within the boundaries of the state of Iraq (Bush 2010b, pp. 84-91). What was striking was the US' preference for basing its arguments about this decision on ideas related to justice: according to the most powerful figures within the US administration, there was 'no doubt' that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which could pose a threat to the Middle East; further, the connection of Hussein with Al-Qaida had the potential to make these weapons a global threat for the whole world; Hussein might also be able to take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies (Cheney 2010). Saddam Hussein posed a threat, not only to the Middle East and to the world at large, but to Iraq's own citizens too. According to the American administration, the act of overthrowing Saddam Hussein who used 'murder as a tool of terror and control' against Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans, Shia, Sunni, and others could serve to emancipate the Iraqi people who had been suffering under a 'murderous' tyrant for decades (Bush 2010b, pp. 84-91).

It is possible, in Bull's framework, to argue that the American administration pictured Saddam Hussein as a global and human threat, and that therefore the main justifications for the US invasion were linked to human and cosmopolitan justice. In effect, what the US endeavoured to do was to create a solidarist atmosphere in world politics by seeking to convince international society to support a pre-emptive war in the name of peace. It appears that the

concept of 'justice' as defined by Bull was implicit on the many occasions when the US sought to justify and legitimise a war that would 'disarm Iraq, free its people and defend the world from grave danger' (Bush 2010a, pp. 114-5). The use of the concept of 'justice' by a global power to justify its actions to its fellow members of international society might seem to suggest that ideas relating to justice in world politics were not as overshadowed as they had been in the past. Even the US, a global power, felt the need to appeal to justice to justify its decision of war against Iraqi regime.

Although ideas related to justice were often discussed in the pre-war period, however, international society seemed to shy away from the solidarism that the US sought to create. The planned invasion was rejected by the majority as a direct violation both of international law and of the international order that could bring chaos to the region. The pre-war period was largely characterised by many statements and declarations issued by opponents of the war,[5] and American attempts to create solidarism within international society were, in fact, limited by international society's pluralist tendency. International order and its basic principles, including state sovereignty, still had priority over ideas related to justice; meanwhile, the persistence of pluralism reflected the deep confusion that prevailed in international society about the definition of 'justice' itself. Indeed, no one could be sure at that time about whether or not the US' arguments on human and cosmopolitan justice were sincerely made, or were simply being used as an instrument to hide American strategic interests in the Middle East. Particularly in the Islamic world, there was a strong belief that the US had no business in overthrowing a regime by force without the support of a collective decision made by international society. Critics who argued against American foreign policy during that time were echoing Bull's concerns about the problems that could be caused by the subjectivity of any definitions of justice, and by the multiplicity of moral perspectives that existed within international society; they also echoed his arguments about why order had to take priority over justice in world politics.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched in March 2003 and lasted almost until the end of May that year. Apart from those states which were directly involved in this war, there were also many Western and Middle Eastern states that participated indirectly. In effect, the Gulf States on one hand, and France and Germany on the other, which had intensively opposed the war in the pre-war period, engaged in a partial involvement in this invasion by allowing coalition forces to use their territories, and by opening their air spaces to the coalition of the willing throughout the operation process. Although their partial involvement was criticised by many civil society activists and scholars for facilitating the invasion and implicitly endorsing the use of American and British aircraft (Carchedi 2010), this involvement denoted neither their full support of the 'human' and 'cosmopolitan' justifications of the US, nor their solidarist motivation. Instead, their involvement seems to have arisen simply because these governments wanted to refrain from damaging their relations with the US; they were also implicated in the operation in partial and indirect ways due to their obligations within the framework of the 'NATO alliance or bilateral agreements' (Hummel 2007, Fahmy 2005).

The partial and indirect involvement of many of international society's members became a direct and comprehensive one when the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom ensured the

collapse of the regime. After this point, the ultimate purpose of international society became to restore Iraq and to transfer sovereignty back to it. As many UN Security Council resolutions in the aftermath of the war show, international society seemed eager to ensure international order in the Middle East; the UN called on all member states to contribute to Iraq's stability and security by providing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the aegis of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the temporary administration formed by the US and Britain which were officially acknowledged as the occupying powers (UN Security Council Resolution 1483 2003). What was remarkable in this period was that, despite this mobilisation, international society seemed to lose control of its plan to ensure security and stability in Iraq. Iraq witnessed a high level of violence in the post-war period, and not only were there armed attacks against the UN headquarters in Baghdad, but there were armed conflicts too, particularly between the Sunnis and Shia. The level of violence increased dramatically in subsequent years to the extent that Iraq was in conformity with the scholarly definition of 'civil war' in 2005 and 2006 (Dodge 2012).

Two factors played crucial roles in the increasing violence in Iraq: firstly, the affiliated groups confirmed that there were no weapons of mass destruction on Iraqi soil, and that Saddam Hussein had no connection with Al-Qaida. The Iraq Survey Group, which was established to investigate the Iraqi nuclear stockpile, concluded in 2004 that Saddam Hussein did not have any functional programme for the production of WMD, and that his ability to produce nuclear weapons had 'progressively decayed since 1991' (Duelfer 2005). Further to this, the 9/11 commission, working on the sources of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, came to the striking conclusion that there was no evidence of a 'collaborative operational relationship' between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaida, and that there was no evidence 'indicating that Iraq cooperated with Al-Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States' (National Commission on Terror Attacks 2004, p. 65). These conclusions were critical in provoking a surge of resistance because they cultivated the local population's deep mistrust and hatred of the occupiers.

Increasing violence in Iraq was also triggered by the political strategy of 'De-Baathification' which was pursued by the CPA. The systematic expulsion of ex-Baathists from the reconstruction process in Iraq created a remarkable alienation of a hundred thousand unemployed people from the new Iraq and its governors (Dodge 2012, p. 38). These problems were exacerbated when the violation of human rights by CIA officers in Abu Ghraib Prison became public in 2004. Other repressive strategies applied by American soldiers such as those in Fallujah further embittered the violence within Iraq, and even those who had defended the idea that the US had been compelled to intervene in the country had to acknowledge that there was now a deep crisis of confidence about the strategy the US had chosen (Brooks 2004).

It is worth saying that all of the developments that led Iraq into chaos demonstrated the costly risk of any politics based on solidarist arguments, not only for those who initiate these politics, like the US, but also for the whole of international society. The credibility of the US was deeply interrogated by world public opinion and by local populations in the Middle East in particular, especially after it was officially recognised that the regime in Iraq did not

possess WMD and that the regime had no connection with Al-Qaida, since two major justifications for the US invasion of Iraq were invalidated through these related reports. The unfolding story of the invasion and its aftermath provides an important demonstration of the fact that 'power' is not only a product of material resources, but is also the product of legitimacy, or the perceptions of others of the 'rightness' of a given action. Furthermore, the rising violence in Iraq in the post-war period seems to confirm that, once international order is violated, it becomes much more difficult to ensure that justice is done. Civil war conditions effectively deprived Iraqi people of political, social, and economic rights, or, in other words, the human justice that they had been promised the invasion would secure. The post-war period in Iraq seems to justify Bull's concerns about the exploitable nature of 'justice', and to confirm the validity of his belief that 'order' is the prerequisite for 'justice' in world politics.

### Conclusion: What Kind of Solidarism can Exist in the Twenty-First Century?

There are two conclusions that might be drawn from the case studies presented in this article. The first one follows Hurrell's argument that the first years of the twenty-first century posed an important challenge to 'the hopes of those who a decade earlier had seen the real possibility of moving towards a more ambitious, effective and sustainable form of liberal solidarism' (Hurrell 2007, p. 288). As we have seen, there was an undeniable awareness in international society at the beginning of the 1990s of the necessity for incorporating moral ideas and justice into world politics. This awareness had provoked a general sense that solidarism would be an inseparable part of the new world, but the international community's experiences in relation to Iraq during the 2000s appear to show that the world is still far from being able to offer solidarism in practice.

The second conclusion that might be drawn is that many of the problems that international society faces today are deadlocked on the point of how to deal with the threats that sources of instability – the origins of which lie within the borders of states – pose for international order. While international order and many ideas related to human and cosmopolitan justice are so linked to each other, how is international society to reconcile their respective uncompromisable requirements?

The ultimate impact of this long-standing problematic still manifests itself in today's Iraq which is dealing with another threat, that posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a terrorist organisation stemming from the long-lasting power vacuum created in 2003. That vacuum is being extended by the recent turmoil that has developed in Syria due to the conflicts between Assad's regime and its opponents. International society seems to face another challenge while it seeks a solution to this crisis because the inherent tension between order and justice manifests itself once again. Although it is increasingly accepted that a legitimate state must combine the principles of state sovereignty and human rights, and that those principles are not contradictory (Reus-Smit 2001, p. 520), it remains difficult to reconcile human needs with states' rights and duties in practice. If there is a clear normative shift in international society towards a greater solidarism, how is international society to deal with a terrorist organisation without the support of states? For example, the struggle against ISIS requires support from the Syrian regime. In addition to this, how is international society

to decide 'what is right' for a specific society, for a nation, or for human beings living within a given geography? These questions remain problematic.

The two cases related to Iraq set out in this article have shown that politics which are supposed to be based on 'justice' face significant difficulties within an international society which needs to create a strong consensus. There is a general tendency to see policies that are apparently justice-based as instruments being used by big powers to bolster the rules of co-existence in their own favour. If states continue to fail in their roles as agents of human and cosmopolitan justice, it will fall to non-state organisations to promote solidarism in world politics and to secure explicit recognition for human and cosmopolitan justice by state leaders. Although there seems to be growing awareness in international society about the need to include 'justice' in definitions of world politics for the protection of the international order itself, this seems to pose an important challenge to Bull's reading of world politics because there is no consensus on how to ensure that order and justice are combined in international society.

While the international order that was violated by the US-led war of Iraq in 2003 was re-established in the post-war period, the outbreak of civil war in Iraq has shown that ideas related to justice face significant resistance generated from local dynamics if international order is bolstered by an outside force; it has therefore justified Bull's argument on the necessity for order to retain priority over justice. It seems possible to surmise that order constitutes the minimum standard of coexistence: once it is violated, there is very little opportunity to realise other important justice-based values. Although Bull's pluralism has faced an important challenge in the post-Cold-War period, at the present time it seems to maintain its validity, and Bull remains one of the most influential, forward-thinking, and relevant international relations theorists.

**Notes**

1. As Suganami (2010, p. 26) states, 'Most English School thinkers are solidarist at heart – although they may disagree about the degree of solidarity which they claim to witness in the world they study'.

2. I am indebted to the referee of the Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security for drawing attention to this point.

3. The points of divergence, particularly between permanent members of the UN Security Council, emerged over both the timing of the operation of Coalition Forces against Iraq and its destructiveness. Indeed, it was known that the USSR made great efforts to prevent the Operation Desert Storm air operations, which began on 16 January 1991, being extended into a ground operation. However, as no consensus was reached between the US and Saddam Hussein, the ground operation became inevitable. It was launched on 24 February 1991 and lasted for just four days. For a comprehensive overview, see Baker III (1995, pp. 391-5).

4. For a comprehensive analysis of Turkish concerns about northern Iraq during the 1990s, see Aykan (1996).

5. The European Parliament of the EU, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Gulf Cooperation Council adopted a strict attitude towards the war in Iraq and emphasised the need for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In addition to this, France, Germany, and Russia declared their anti-war positions on many occasions. In the special session of the UN Security Council organised to facilitate the debate about the invasion of Iraq, the opponents of war declared their opposition to it by enumerating the sources of their concerns. See European Parliament (2003), XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non Aligned Movement (2003), CNN (2003), Arab News (2003), Lichfield and Penketh (2003), UN Security Council Press Release (2003).

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**Reconciliation in Zimbabwe:**
**Building Resilient Communities or Unsafe Conditions?**

By Joram Tarusarira* and Bernard Manyena**

**Abstract:**

Reconciliation and resilience are intimately connected concepts. They emphasise the agency involved in influencing and enhancing bottom-up social change, and the self-help mechanisms that persist despite the disturbances following intrastate conflicts. This article uses a qualitative methodology to examine the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities of communities as they seek to deal with intrastate conflict. It also assesses the extent to which the government-led reconciliation approach used in Zimbabwe since 2008 has facilitated community resilience. This research suggests that local communities have adapted to the conflict in order to go about their daily lives, but that neither community actions, nor the government-sponsored reconciliation process, have led to the transformation of the status quo that caused the intrastate conflict in the first place. Absorptive and adaptive capacities should not be seen as ends in themselves. Instead, they should provide the basis for facilitating sustainable peace and social change.

**Keywords**: Reconciliation, Resilience, Intrastate Conflict, Absorption, Adaptation, Transformation, Zimbabwe

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# Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: Building Resilient Communities or Unsafe Conditions?

### Introduction

Much ink has been expended in debates about the concept of resilience: it has long been in vogue across a variety of fields, particularly in research that concerns socio-ecological systems (Adger 2005, Holling 1973), disaster risk reduction,[1] child development (Rolf 1999), and, most recently, international relations (Chandler 2013). However, peacebuilding studies seem to be lagging behind, despite the apparent attractiveness and promise of resilience thinking: resilience frameworks emphasise the role of agency in influencing and enhancing bottom-up social and political change and the importance of self-help mechanisms for local communities and institutions, and this should make resilience thinking a fruitful line of enquiry for peacebuilders (Milliken 2013). Transitional justice in particular, a key component of both reconciliation and peacebuilding, offers opportunities for the transformation of the status quo *ante bellum* (before the violent conflict) with the potential to bring about lasting peace and resilience after disturbances end.

In this article, we use resilience thinking to examine two key issues: firstly, we consider the extent to which communities have used their absorptive and adaptive capacities to cope with the intrastate conflict in Zimbabwe; secondly, we consider how these coping strategies could be used as the building blocks for a reconciliation process that would facilitate community resilience. We argue that the failure of durable and resilient reconciliation processes and outcomes, even after the formation of Zimbabwe's government of national unity (GNU) in 2008, is a manifestation of the deficiencies and inefficiencies of the processes through which communities try to restore themselves. The restorative agency of communities is important but often idealised in ways that are unhelpful to their members. Not only does our strategy of examining reconciliation and resilience provide a novel way of conceptualising reconciliation in post-conflict contexts, but it also makes an important contribution to broader discussions within peacebuilding studies.

This article is broadly structured into three sections. We begin by acknowledging that the concepts of reconciliation and resilience are notoriously contested. We then briefly describe Zimbabwe's conflict in order to contextualise the need for reconciliation and resilience in the country's communities. In the second section, we analyse evidence from the Shinje community in order to examine how local communities have handled conflict, violence, and their legacies. We investigate how resilience strategies, such as absorption, adaptation, and transformation, have been used by people in this community, and we explore the extent to which these reconciliation processes have enhanced their resilience. While the findings of this study are context-specific, they may resonate with similar cases elsewhere.

## Conceptualising Reconciliation and Resilience

Although reconciliation is a contested term (Dwyer 1999), the relevant research literature is generally clear on its broad meaning. Reconciliation tends to be associated with the question of how surviving victims and perpetrators move from a divided and violent past to a shared future (Bloomfield 2006). It is not a straightforward undertaking for former enemies to build new relationships and live together in harmony despite their past differences (Bloomfield 2006); it can be challenging and the process may involve complex emotions, aspirations, feelings, beliefs, and attitudes. Moreover, reconciliation relates to both 'a perspective' and 'a place' (a focus and a locus) where truth, justice, mercy and peace need to be brought together (Lederach 2011). From a peacebuilding vantage point, reconciliation should be understood to include transitional justice, a form of justice which involves the use of both legal and non-legal means to address critical issues that have contributed to the development of violent conflict (Carey *et al.* 2010). Table One (Loizides 2011) illustrates at least four instruments of transitional justice, namely retributive justice, restorative justice, amnesties, and truth recovery. Retributive justice is concerned with the rule of law. Restorative justice, amnesties, and truth recovery, meanwhile, tend to be associated with the rebuilding of communities' relationships in post-conflict situations in order to enable them to bounce back. Communities are supported in dealing with their past differences so that they can coexist and work together in harmony (Carey *et al.* 2010). Restorative justice tends to involve a people-centred approach: it focuses on the victim, perpetrators, and the community, and tackles the impact of post-conflict violence in order to create new futures (*ibid.* 2010).

**Table I: Approaches to Reconciliation**

| Approaches | Focus/ Unit of Analysis | Instruments | Objectives |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Legal* | Individual (perpetrator) | Retributive Justice (Tribunals, Policies of Lustration) | Reconciliation (deterrence and rule of law) |
| *Political* | Society | Amnesties | Reconciliation (democratic consolidation) |
| *Theological* | Individual (victim and perpetrator) and Society | Restorative Justice (Forgiveness, grassroots activities – Ubuntu, Gacaca, Truth Commissions) | Reconciliation (restoration of broken social relations) |
| *Political Psychology* | Collective/ National identities | Truth Recovery (Truth Commissions; revised history textbooks) | Reconciliation (reconstruction of collective identities) |

Peace is not always positive, however, and the literature makes a clear distinction between positive and negative peace. Negative peace refers simply to the absence of violence. When, for example, a ceasefire is enacted, negative peace will ensue because something undesirable has stopped happening (e.g. the violence has stopped, and the oppression has ended) without something positive having taken its place. Positive peace, by contrast, includes the restoration of relationships, the creation of social systems that serve the needs of the whole population, and the constructive resolution of conflict (Carey *et al.* 2010). Positive peace creates space for former enemies to engage in a dialogue of reconciliation; this, in turn, builds

and enhances new relationships that can serve as the basis for a more lasting settlement. Efforts to secure positive peace are, therefore, critical to the process of building resilience.

Indeed, what is new about this article is the link we make between reconciliation and resilience. Resilience resonates with reconciliation in many respects and its promise that it can enable communities to cope positively with disruptive events is attractive; however, defining resilience is complicated. Different fields use resilience to mean slightly different things (Zolli 2012); it can be conceptualised as either a narrow or a wide-ranging term, the meanings of which can understood in a range of ways from 'a dead end' to 'a bridging concept' (Davoudi *et al.* 2012). Nonetheless, the generally agreed definition suggests that resilience represents the capacity of a system, community, institution, or society – when exposed to the onset of hazards or significant and protracted disruption – to resist, absorb, adapt, or transform in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure.[2] The triggering disruption can arise rapidly or slowly from a complex combination of natural and human-made hazards including stressors such as conflict, poverty, corruption, resource scarcity, environmental degradation and disease. Surprisingly, or unsurprisingly, this definition of resilience is closely related to the definition of vulnerability (Wisner *et al*. 2004). Manyena (2006) clearly demonstrates the connections and disconnections between these two terms, which can serve as factors of each other and as separate constructs. The semantic similarities between them arguably stem from the fact that both constructs share ontological foundations as well as a social focus. To be resilient is to accept vulnerabilities, and to be vulnerable is to accept a lack of either the capacity or capabilities to deal with uncertainty (Manyena 2015). Such uncertainties include post-conflict situations which are often characterised by political polarisation, tension, and lack of trust, among other problems.

On a more fundamental level, discussions of resilience resonate with social theory and particularly with Giddens' (1984) structuration theory which develops from the idea that reality is socially constructed. Giddens' theory helps us to examine the dialectical relationship that exists between the human capacity to act, or agency, and the structures that (re)produce opportunities, as well as constraints, for such actions. While agency implies power (*ibid.*), the exercise of that power depends in large part on what a person possesses and what they can do with those possessions. A focus on capabilities is particularly helpful when we seek to understand the connections between resilience and reconciliation; it illuminates our understanding of the implications of relationship breakdown at the community level where breakdown can be triggered by violence and oppression through, for example, the political or economic exclusion of certain people or groups. Not only does a critical focus on resilience help us to recognise the importance of agency, but it also increases the attention given to the strengths of local communities rather than their weaknesses (Milliken 2013). In definitions of resilience, its absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities are commonly recognised. While these three capacities are by no means exhaustive, they do provide us with a sense of how local communities have 'coped with the conflict'; they also illustrate the extent to which the reconciliation processes that followed the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 have contributed to enhancing resilience in Zimbabwe.

'Absorption' is sometimes used interchangeably with terms such as 'persistence' and 'resistance', and, in the technical sense, it describes an ability to withstand and absorb change and disturbance while still maintaining stable relationships between populations or state variables (Holling 1973). Absorption is used to refer to an actor's or community's ability to minimise the negative impact of shocks and stresses through appropriate and successful coping strategies. It is characterised by recuperative power, perseverance, and stability, and by the use of relief and recovery mechanisms that help avoid permanent damage while preserving and restoring essential basic structures and functions. Absorption involves a 'business-as-usual' approach and is enhanced by parallel or redundant systems and structures, humanitarian assistance, support for victims and survivors, rehabilitation, and recovery. However, an absorptive strategy can narrow community and management options, as it tends to support the maintenance of status quo.

By contrast, adaptation is an approach that involves diversification and alternative livelihood strategies, adjustments, modifications, or changes that can be made to benefit communities, institutions, and organisations. It is also a strategy that can be used to moderate the potential future damage that might be wrought by, for example, migration to urban areas for better medication, education, or remittance, among other reasons. Adaptation also offers opportunities for actors or communities to continue functioning without major changes to roles, functions, or structural identities. Some adaptive adjustments may be short-term yet result in positive outcomes, while others may produce negative 'resiliencies'; for example, corruption may solve short-term supply issues but pose difficulties for people in disadvantaged communities who cannot afford to pay their way through the system to access services.

Of course, in some instances it is neither possible nor desirable to persist or adapt. These practices may be inappropriate in situations where levels of destabilisation cross the critical threshold beyond which a system cannot self-organise along a different trajectory towards a new dispensation (Folke 2010). Some systems, including egalitarian ones, may appear highly resilient, persistent, and adaptable, but are at the same time characterised by poverty, corruption, and oppression. In these cases, transforming, if not dismantling, the status quo that might have caused the disturbance in the first place becomes the most plausible option. Transformation involves a capacity to create a fundamentally new system when the existing system's ecological, social, or economic conditions become untenable or are undesirable (Nelson 2007, Walker *et al.* 2004). The changes can be made incrementally, or can be drastic and sometimes violent. We argue that, among their other effects, reconciliation processes can provide an opportunity for communities to transform existing systems; they do this by making time and space for people to ask questions about the stakeholders, institutions, practices, structures, problems, and social relations that must change (See Brand 2013).

**Approach to Collecting Evidence**

This article is based not just on the research reviewed up to this point, but on the authors' experiences and fifteen in-depth interviews with Shinje community members in the Mushavanhu district where attempts to reconcile communities were made following the

political violence in 2008. The real names of the Shinje community and Mushavanhu district have been anonymised to protect their inhabitants from political victimisation. Mushavanhu district is located in a province which is known to be a stronghold of President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), and violence is always at its highest level during election campaigns. The Shinje community is based about 150 kilometres from Harare, and six kilometres from Mushavanhu Growth Point. It consists of about eighty households, and its population comprises people who survive mostly thanks to self-help projects: the area is dry and hot with a rainfall level far too low to make farming a viable survival option. Their self-help projects involve welding and blacksmithing, carpentry, poultry-keeping, and peanut-butter-making, as well as gardening cooperatives and general business dealings. Farming takes place, but on a very low scale. Prominent political players include war veterans, party youth groups, local politicians, and 'traditional' leaders.

In terms of our methodology in gathering data for this article, we took a qualitative approach. This allowed people to express themselves, but it also provided us, the researchers, with ways of discerning, examining, comparing, and contrasting meaningful patterns or themes which would not be made available by statistical procedures (Berkowitz 1996). Qualitative methods are very useful when exploring the viewpoints of people or groups, like victims of conflict and violence, who have a particular need to be heard (Berkowitz 1996). Research ethics were observed, respondents participated completely voluntarily, and no payment or reward for participation was promised. We did, however, share with community members the information that, while the study was a purely academic endeavour, its results could inform policy formulation which might facilitate peace in their communities. We kept the transcripts of the interviews under lock and key, and they were only accessible to the authors of this article. Cognisant of the political sensitivity of the topic of our research, we assiduously observed confidentiality protocols and used pseudonyms to make sure that there was no link between any data and the person who provided it. We carried out semi-structured interviews because they involve a low level of intrusion and are therefore well-suited to research projects, like this one, which are of a politically sensitive nature.

The resilience framework guided our analysis. We classified the responses we collected according to the absorptive, adaptive, and transformative capacities which became our categories of analysis. We acknowledge that our study has limitations generated by its political sensitivity. At the time of our research, the community still suffered from political violence to the extent that we cannot be certain that participants' responses represented their actual feelings about the past. Fear could have been a limiting factor in their provision of valid data, though we reassured them about the aforementioned research ethics. While the findings presented here are instructive, it should be noted that our sample involved a very small number of contributions from which to obtain an exact picture of the community, let alone of Zimbabwe at large. This is a story of one community then, but it may still serve as a story with relevance for many other communities in the country during the period under discussion. Certainly, the dynamics of conflict and violence that emerge here dovetail with stories told across Zimbabwe with slight contextual variations.

## Contextualising Reconciliation in Zimbabwe

Attempts at reconciling the Shinje community after a violent conflict were not a new phenomenon. After Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 following a protracted war, the then prime minister, Robert Mugabe, announced a policy of reconciliation which decreed that the 'wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten' (de Waal 1990). While Mugabe made concessions to demonstrate reconciliation with the white population by reserving twenty seats for the Rhodesian Front party in parliament, the limitations of Mugabe's reconciliation policy were proved just two years after independence with the emergence of the 1982-7 Gukurahundi conflict, a government-sponsored attack on the people of Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. An estimated 20,000 people were killed in this conflict (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009).

After the Matabeleland crisis, all violations committed during this period were pardoned, but the conflict and violence did not go away: they resurfaced and escalated in the 2000s following the formation of Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 which challenged Mugabe's rule. Probably the deadliest violence of the 2000s was witnessed during the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2008. The first presidential round saw ZANU-PF's Mugabe garnering fewer votes (forty-three per cent) than MDC's candidate Morgan Tsvangirai who secured forty-eight per cent of the poll. As neither of the candidates achieved the constitutionally required majority of fifty per cent plus one vote, a second round of elections was organised. ZANU-PF became increasingly vicious between the first result's announcement and the second round of elections, progressively unleashing all forms of violence on MDC's supporters and ordinary citizens (Kaulemu 2011). As a result, MDC withdrew from the contest leaving ZANU-PF's Mugabe participating alone in an election that was labelled internationally as a sham.

The magnitude and intensity of the violence in the run-up to the elections prompted the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to suggest a Government of National Unity (GNU) which would be achieved through a Global Political Agreement (GPA). The GPA was signed in 2008; it involved ZANU-PF; the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations of MDC-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) led by Morgan Tsvangirai who later became prime minister; and MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M), founded by Arthur Mutambara who later became deputy prime minister in the GNU. ZANU-PF was effectively forced into a temporary power-sharing deal that it did not want by an economic collapse that resulted from the deleterious economic policies of the Mugabe state; it was also affected by its lack of national legitimacy and punitive international measures in the shape of American and European Union sanctions (Raftopoulus 2010). Both formations of the MDC were similarly pushed into the GPA. Factors in their cases included state repression and violence against their structures; the structural erosion and political exhaustion of their support bases; the weakening of the civic movement as a result of similar factors; and the limits of the SADC regional bloc in dealing with Mugabe's regime (*ibid.*). Unsurprisingly, there was continued polarisation after the GPA was reached, and ZANU-PF and MDC remained as different as fire and water (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). Mugabe retained much of the executive power he had wielded prior to the GPA, including

control of the security apparatus, and his regime continued to harass human rights defenders, journalists, and lawyers (*ibid.*).

Nevertheless, some of the ambitious targets of the GNU involved reconciling Zimbabweans and attempting to reconstruct or build new relationships and bury their past differences. The Organ for National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (the Organ), a government department, was tasked with leading the post-2008 reconciliation process. While earlier reconciliation attempts had tended to take the form of political pronouncements that were largely ends in themselves, the creation of the Organ was intended to make the reconciliation process structured and government-led: the Organ's role was 'to oversee the healing process and to promote dialogue among parties, and to diffuse tension and threats that may lead to incidences of violence through engaging all parties' (ONHRI 2009). Whereas past attempts to achieve reconciliation had relied on aspirational political statements, the Organ offered an opportunity for citizens to discuss Zimbabwe's troubled transitional justice discourse. It was possible that such discussions would contribute to strengthening community resilience against future violence and conflict. To assess its effects, we now move forward to analyse the experiences of the Shinje community through the lens of the resilience framework.

### The Absorption of Violence and Everyday Resistance in the Shinje Community

The narratives we gathered from the Shinje community reveal that it absorbed sporadic violence that could occur at any time of the day. To remain safe from that violence, people avoided open resistance. The adoption of a non-confrontational approach towards aggressors meant that community members were forced to participate in acts of assault and arson; they burned down properties and the livelihood assets of suspected enemies whether the people were from MDC or ZANU-PF. Meanwhile, those who openly resisted participating in acts of violence were targeted. Some people sustained scars and injuries, and deaths were also recorded. Jennifer, a fifty-five-year-old woman who was born in Shinje, gave her testimony:

> We lost our property such as houses, livestock, and farming implements. People were intimidated and arrested on a daily basis and detained in police custody – they weren't taken to court. If you reported a case to the police, they would first find out whether you are an MDC supporter or whether you come from a village dominated by MDC supporters. If the answer is 'yes' then you who reported would be taken into police custody and not the one you reported to them. We ended up playing along, to avoid worse situations.

The nature and dynamics of in-conflict case reporting, which emerged here as a way of absorbing the violence, depended on the political party to which one belonged. Those who belonged to the MDC rarely reported acts of violence to the police or court for fear of being victimised. Thomas (29), an MDC activist said: 'I was arrested and stayed in remand prison for three months. I didn't go to court as there were no charges against me … I didn't complain for fear of being victimised.' Zandile (30), a ZANU-PF member, related her contrasting story: 'I had a miscarriage and I lost my baby as a result of violence from MDC members because I

supported ZANU-PF. When I reported the case, the perpetrators were arrested and taken to jail.'

The narratives from the Shinje community regarding the way they absorbed violence were corroborated by media reports which revealed that some people were being detained by the police without charge:

> In Chivi, police last month rounded up district organisers who had arranged a rally at Makovere Business Centre, and detained them for days at Mashava Police Station … Partisan police officers have shown contempt for Tsvangirai and memories of a brutal 2008 terror campaign, waged through the length and breadth of Zimbabwe, have left MDC supporters traumatised by fear. (Phiri 2012)

Absorption of the effects of the conflict and violence also varied according to gender. A woman in her thirties, Shupikai, stated that 'I for one would not sleep in our house because my husband and I were suspected of being MDC supporters. I was therefore afraid and I was eight months pregnant.' Interviewees reported that women were forced to cook food for the political activists during political rallies and campaigns, and complied. This was despite food shortages during the period of the violence. In some instances, women abandoned their homes for fear of abduction and rape. Women who were raped while their husbands were either away in hiding or in remand prison rarely told their husbands about their experiences for fear of being divorced. They stated that there was no guarantee that their husbands would understand them, and they feared the high chances of having contracted HIV and AIDS. Some women who were sexually abused, raped, and conceived children during the conflict period were branded 'prostitutes'.

Men who were suspected of supporting MDC were also abducted, beaten up, or had their property destroyed. Peter (33), a tuck shop owner, said:

> I was arrested at midnight by police in the company of Green Bombers[3] … I was beaten up, and then sent to remand prison where I stayed for twenty-three days. My tuck shop business at home collapsed. My eight months' pregnant wife also suffered as she had to sleep outside because the militia were coming to interrogate her almost every night about my political activities.

Some men died in the process of abduction when they tried to resist their captors or were murdered for resisting conscription into militia groups, particularly those groups that supported ZANU-PF. In most cases people lied or pretended to belong to the political party of the perpetrator of violence to avoid being attacked at that very instant. Perhaps the most telling example of this practice involves a man who, despite being an MDC member, contested the elections of 2008 as a local councillor on a ZANU-PF ticket to avoid harassment and the destruction of his property and livelihood by ZANU-PF supporters. Even if most participants did not support lying, few disputed the logic of lying in order to absorb violence.

In the absence of formal institutions, which had virtually collapsed, the traditionally powerful chiefs sometimes supported communities in absorbing the conflict; they became providers of services, and were often involved, for example, in the distribution of seed packs and relief. While it is often assumed that chiefs prioritise their communities above everything else, this idealised commitment was often undermined in practice by what was at stake for them personally: they stood to lose their allowances and salaries from the government, as well as resources such as free vehicles, tractors, and grinding mills. As a result, most of the participants did not trust chiefs or their traditional authority. Manyepo, an MDC supporter for ten years, said:

> Chiefs are now politicians. They're no longer performing their traditional roles. They organise meetings and tell their people who to vote for. If you tell them you will vote for a party of your choice, they will tell you to leave their area. They fan violence instead of maintaining peace.

This statement is far from unique. Our interviews with Shinje community members were consistent with independent media reports which branded chiefs as 'puppets' of the government. While it was in some ways seen as legitimate for chiefs to act in this way to avoid being targeted by perpetrators of violence, some participants suggested that a number of chiefs 'overdid' their pretence as they openly coerced their subjects to support the ruling party, ZANU-PF. Some Shinje community members were seen to blur the boundary between the state and traditional institutions: the chief was seen as a civil servant and politician who turned against the people who they are supposed to protect from conflict. However, in step with the concept of absorption, the stance the chiefs sometimes adopted, while clearly biased in favour of the ruling regime, reduced the violence that could be meted out by ZANU-PF militia against their communities.

These accounts demonstrate the ways in which the Shinje community tried to absorb the physical and psychological effects of violence. While these narratives justify the need for reconciliation, they also demonstrate the difficulties that arise in a community that absorbs violent conflict.

## Adaptive Capacity of the Shinje Community to the Conflict

Adaptations or changes that enable people to live together in a post-conflict environment can mark a closure of the violent past and a new beginning based on better values, not least among which are trust and healing. However, it might be worthwhile to first establish the participants' understanding of the concept of reconciliation in order to establish their community's adaptive capacity needs. Their understanding determines their actions in response to the violent situation. Common responses from different people to questions about what reconciliation means were consistent with the literature and included: 'kuregererana' (forgiveness); 'kureurura zvitadzo' (talking about the bad things one did); 'restoring relationships'; 'building social unity'; 'kubatsira vanhu vakasangana nemirizhonga' (helping those affected by the conflict); 'people understanding each other so

they can become one people again'; and 'kugarisana zvakanaka' (living together peacefully after quarrelling). Reconciliation is about being in 'good books' with each other after a misunderstanding. Tinashe, a 40-year-old unemployed father of four, said that reconciliation was from the 'heart' and contingent upon truth-telling and testimonies, without which it would difficult to live together:

> Reconciliation means to forgive from inside the person's heart who was wronged
> … Those who cause violence must come out in the open, tell, and testify what
> they did. They should say, 'I am sorry for what I did, this shouldn't happen again',
> then we can forgive each other. Without this happening, I don't think we can be
> able to work together.

Maidei is a 33-year-old MDC activist and a single mother of two. Before she joined MDC, she was a member of the ZANU-PF Youth League. While she felt that reconciliation was important, she stressed the importance of people taking part voluntarily on a basis of trust:

> It [reconciliation] can work, but it mustn't be forced on a person. In the first
> place, I should be prepared to participate in the activities. I am very suspicious
> about these activities [of the Organ], because I don't trust anybody.

Maidei's account raises questions about structural and institutional approaches to reconciliation, particularly in relation to how people are helped prepare to participate in the process and to own the outcomes. Perhaps this would also facilitate dialogue on what the communities need in order to adapt to the new environment. Consistent with Maidei's account, the majority of the participants were ignorant of the government-led reconciliation process being conducted through the Organ. According to Tinashe, a forty-year-old unemployed man, 'very few people knew about it [the Organ] … [and those] who know about it, I'm not sure if they know what it does … there is no information.' Tinashe doubted if 'they are serious at all … If they were serious they could have come to talk to us [to hear our views]'. However, Mheremhere, a fifty-year-old man, had heard about the Organ. A self-employed blacksmith, he was the father of five children affected by the conflict in different ways: two were injured and another two dropped out of school, while the remaining child went to South Africa to look for a job because there were no jobs in Zimbabwe due to the collapse of the economy. Mheremhere said '[the] reconciliation process is a disguise, it's not going well'. He stated that 'reconciliation shouldn't only be in word but also in practice as leaders [of political parties] say one thing and what happens is another'.

Participants recalled the partisan nature of security and law enforcement agents, particularly the police. They asked questions such as: 'What reconciliation can we talk about if the person who reports a case is the one who is arrested, even to this day?' and 'How can we forgive each other under these circumstances?' Some of the sentiments of the participants were supported by media reports:

> Tsvangirai's party alleged army personnel have been deployed in Masvingo and
> Manicaland … The MDC claims over thirty soldiers are now camped at

government offices at Range office in Chikomba West, where they are alleged to be intimidating villagers ahead of the coming referendum on the new constitution.

The Mutoko arson came hard on the heels of another attack on MDC Midlands North provincial treasurer, John Kinnaird and his wife Jackie at their Kadoma residence when Zanu PF youths, in party bandanas, broke into their residence at night last month and attacked John with wheel spanners and metal rods while one grabbed Jackie around the neck and dragged her to the bedroom.

The Zanu PF youths freed them after they offered $2000 cash and two cell phones. Hospital authorities said he suffered multiple lacerations from the machete-wielding assailants and received dozens of sutures in his head and neck. (The Daily News 2012)

Some non-governmental organisations responded to the reconciliation needs of the people, mainly through civic education workshops. Participants supported the workshops as they bridged the communities which stood traumatised and polarised by the conflict. Joina, a forty-three-year-old mother of three and a member of ZANU-PF, was beaten up by suspected MDC supporters during the violence. In her view,

> Workshops help since they don't target people from one political party. They take people from all walks of life and put us in one room. This is helpful. It helps us engage with issues as much as is possible. It gives us chances to express ourselves.

Another participant, Jeremiah (49), said workshops were important for exchanging knowledge on reconciliation and building peace in the community.

> Workshops are important because when we are in communities we don't know everything, we're closed from new knowledge, hence workshops bring an opportunity for new knowledge. It's the only chance for the grassroots communities closed out to formal education and the media. So far I have gained a lot from training workshops in many aspects of my life.

As to how the reconciliation agenda can be incorporated into workshops, they suggested that it should not be 'a stand-alone topic'; instead it should be embedded in other topics involving development, gender, HIV and AIDS, and farming. Sebastian (57), a primary school teacher, gave this advice to fellow participants and organisers:

> When in a workshop look for appropriate topics which are not sensitive but related to development projects so that, as people discuss, they build what they lost. Reconciliation can't be eaten. It can't send your children to school. Move slowly from that [development] topic until you reach the aspect of reconciliation because if you just go straight to it participants will be frightened or traumatised. If you were to call for a workshop on reconciliation only one political party would come. During the training workshops mix the participants overlooking which

party a person comes from. Also mix training and practical projects and when you create committees for any task mix people from different political parties.

Josephine (30), and Pamberi, a 38-year-old man, were much more sceptical about including reconciliation topics in workshops because reconciliation is such a sensitive issue. They indicated that they were afraid because, in some instances, talking about reconciliation had landed people in trouble in the past.

> To be honest, talking about reconciliation is accepting that violence took place. That would be acceptable to MDC but not to ZANU-PF. You are then caught in between, if you are not careful. What can you do? The best is to keep quiet … You will be safer that way.

Participants warned that reconciliation workshops should be carefully conducted, otherwise they would lead to violence instead of peace. They suggested too that workshops should not just target the community leaders but should also 'target the community at large so that everyone hears for himself or herself'. The participants asserted that, once everyone has the knowledge, 'the people will protect their own peace.'

The preceding narratives demonstrate that attempting adaptation to the legacies of violence and conflict through the reconciliation process requires approaches that are highly sensitive to political implications. Most importantly, this also requires us to view adaptation processes securely within the context of the struggles over democratisation and nation-building that are taking place in Zimbabwe today.

### Transforming the Structures that Caused Violence

To lay the foundation for sustainable and resilient peace and reconciliation, it may be essential to enhance the capacity of communities to transform the structures that have contributed to the conflict's causes. We asked participants whether there were any attempts by the Organ to reform policies and institutions that were complicit in the violence. In response, participants questioned the Organ's sincerity. They pointed out that the reconciliation process was elitist because it served the politicians: 'Politicians [across the political divide] sit together in parliament, they laugh and eat together, while we are living in tense and suspicious situations. They talk about healing and people to live together, but that ends in speeches,' said Tonderai, a 35-year-old unemployed father of two boys. Other participants pointed out that the Organ had not dismantled the institutions that had contributed to the violence, particularly the police. Failure to transform institutions and policies such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) were seen to mean that violence would continue. Statements like the one that follows here were commonplace in the independent media:

> This commendable effort by the Organ needs to be backed up by action demonstrative of political will on the part of the political leadership. But more

importantly, the Organ must realize that the key to ending the culture of violence lies in the ability of the Organ to deal with key state institutions responsible for violence, and for the maintenance of law and order. State-sponsored violence must end, and the police must discharge their mandate professionally and hold accountable perpetrators of violence. (Holland 2011)

While the Organ was meant to heal the fractured community and also provide opportunities for communities to rebuild their lives, the media did the opposite. State-controlled media painted a rosy picture of President Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party while at the same time lambasting the then prime minister Morgan Tsvangirai and his MDC party and calling him, among other names, 'a stooge of the Western countries'. By contrast, private media praised the then prime minister Tsvangirai and his MDC party while condemning ZANU-PF as corrupt and violent. The SADC Observer Mission of the 2013 Elections noted that:

… a number of stakeholders raised concerns about the coverage and editorial bias of both the state and private media towards one or the other party while other stakeholders raised concerns regarding the existence of pirate media. (Membe 2013)

Before and after the 31 July 2013 elections, there were still pockets of violence in Zimbabwe. Violence occurred in various places and the practice of arresting human rights activists continued. The Organ was silent about such developments. Generalisations cannot be made based on the evidence from this study given its small sample size; still, this research indicates that the Organ faced challenges in initiating a reconciliation process and in developing activities that would transform the structures that caused violence and conflict, and bring sustainable peace to Zimbabwe.

### Discussion

This study's findings reveal that both physical and psychological violence were normalised in Zimbabwe as mechanisms for thwarting political opposition. Instances of sexual assault, imprisonment without charge, torture, beatings, and murder, among other acts, destroyed both social and political relationships in Shinje. Violence became institutionalised during the conflict: law enforcement agents, the military, and the justice system were partisan, as were the wider government institutions; and the militia or 'Green Bombers' as they were commonly known – trained under the guise of the national youth training service – were deployed to commit violence (Raftopoulus 2010). This ZANU-PF strategy was not new in Zimbabwe. Kriger (2005) expertly demonstrates that ZANU-PF has, since independence, used strategies such as organised, unpalatable coercion and violence, often with the active participation of the police. These strategies were underpinned by ZANU-PF's machinations in the political space where its domination was pursued through a range of communicative and discursive practices including propagandist language, framings, threats to return to war, and the labelling of opposition parties either as puppets of white people's interest groups or opponents of pan-Africanism (*ibid.*).

In order to absorb or cope with the violence, people in the Shinje community did not engage in open confrontation; this difficult option would have fuelled violence. Instead, they deferred to non-confrontational acts that enabled them to go about their daily lives. The coping and survival strategies they used included avoiding the police and Green Bombers, not reporting acts of violence to the courts, lying to avoid trouble, agreeing to participate in acts of violence, and pretending to belong to a certain political party at a particular time. These acts may appear to represent extreme ways of absorbing violence since some of them resulted in the loss of lives and livelihoods; however, decisions to respond in this way did represent some kinds of individual and collective agency. They were agreed in principle in Shinje through multiple interactions including 'whispering to each other' about how best to respond to threats of violence. In some cases, those conscripted into acts of violence would send messages in the form of 'kuruma nzeve' (biting the ear) to alert individuals, households, and community members of impending violence against them so they could vacate the area, but such warnings were communicated without the knowledge of the authorities.

These gestures form a contrast with the chiefs' use of their traditional authority to support the acts of violence openly. The chiefs were accused of being partisan, working in cahoots with the police, and 'furthering political ideologies and the interests of the [ZANU-PF] ruling party at the expense of the people's socio-cultural ideologies and interests' (Ndlovu 2012, p. 61). This is not surprising given that chiefs have long been labelled as 'puppets' of sitting regimes, a charge which can be traced from colonial to postcolonial times (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996). While the representation of chiefs as anti-tradition and as appendages of ruling elites has become a common narrative, it has also been noted that real political power still attaches to their roles (Manyena 2014). When a ruling party's support wanes, there is a tendency for political parties, and ZANU-PF is no exception, to fall back on traditional institutions because these institutions 'own the people'. To appeal to chiefs, the parties engage a number of mechanisms that range from the use of praise names, cultural symbols, and a discourse of appeasement, to the provision of resources such as motor vehicles and mobile phones. However, in some cases chiefs will be echoing their communities' 'everyday acts of resistance' (Thomson 2011, p. 446) and absorbing the violence by pretending to work with the ruling party while 'in their hearts' sympathising with their people.

It would appear that, at the time of this study, the situation was one of 'negative peace' (Mani 2005): while there was no overt violence, the atmosphere was replete with anger, hatred, and fear and people were drawing on a negative psychological repertoire. It is difficult to point to any one section of society as having been impacted most severely by the worst of the conflict and violence. That said, the manner in which women and children suffered during the conflict confirms their culturally constructed vulnerability. Denial of what happened is 'destructive for both victims who remain traumatised, and might resort to revenge violence, and perpetrators, who also may remain disturbed, and might continue to be violent. This blocks the development of communities' (Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum 2009, p. 35).

The absorption of violence and the avoidance of confrontation and escalation can create opportunities for communities and individuals to adapt to new environments. Certainly, there

appear to be overlaps between absorptive capacity and adaptive capacity: as communities absorb violence, they make adjustments to their lives and livelihoods, but these are not necessarily positive adaptations. A reconciliation framework encourages us to focus on how the reconciliation process fosters productive adaptation to changed circumstances. The starting point here is to obtain a sense of the community's understanding of reconciliation. The Shinje community's perception of reconciliation is generally consistent with the literature. In line with Bloomfield's findings (2006), people in Shinje community viewed reconciliation as a way of being in each other's 'good books' and of building and restoring relationships after a conflict. They felt that the process of building relationships after a conflict depended on certain conditions: it should be underpinned by truth-telling and forgiveness, and it should involve not only saying 'sorry' but also agreeing that 'it shouldn't happen again'. This insistence on conditionality was perhaps an indirect way of calling for retributive justice. It suggests that while the victims held the perpetrators of violence accountable, they also blamed politicians, and particularly those from the MDC and ZANU-PF political parties, for masterminding the violence. It is worth remembering that, at the time of this research, participants were still gripped by fear, and so any calls for justice were likely to worsen the violence, particularly considering that some of the perpetrators were still in positions of power and influence.

In these circumstances, some interviewees suggested that reconciliation should not be included in discussions since it was such a sensitive topic that it would put people's lives at high risk of political violence. Moreover, talking about reconciliation would mean the political parties, and particularly ZANU-PF, would have to accept that violence took place. This sounds familiar. What is new is the proposition that reconciliation should be 'mainstreamed' into development projects rather than established as a stand-alone project. This would allow the community to rebuild their livelihood assets, and enhance their resilience, instead of focusing on the perpetrators of violence. Technically, this strategy would be referred to as 'reparation' as reparations seek to provide both practical and symbolic compensation to victims of human abuse (Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum 2009, p. 29). As participants noted, against a backdrop of high unemployment, economic projects would enhance the community's income and help people to support their families. Consistent with the Asset Based Community Development (ABCD) concept, economic activities could be seen as more direct and having more immediate results than, for instance, justice and truth-telling approaches, although these are by no means less important. The Shinje communities had worked together on development projects prior to the conflict and a focus on these projects would therefore build on the strengths and relationship they have built from before. Further research might be needed to unravel the nature and dynamics of mainstreaming reconciliation frameworks into livelihood-asset-based reparations.

One of the approaches participants favoured for helping communities fractured by conflicts to adapt to new circumstances was the opening of 'reconciliation spaces', or relational spaces, through workshops or gatherings. Research participants proposed 'mixing', or a 'hybrid' approach, whereby reconciliation facilitators would be drawn from a wide range of partner institutions, including government and non-government agencies. They also favoured the idea that educational training, which imparts values, and economic projects be

seamlessly mixed, and proposed that participants from different backgrounds be mixed during workshop tasks. Here, participants were in some ways calling for education for reconciliation (McMaster and Higgins 2002), a form of social learning (Bandura 1971) which raises each communities' critical consciousness and agency, so that people are able to safeguard their peace and become responsible for their own security. However, the success of such workshops would also depend on the skills and credibility of the facilitators. John (2011) notes the difficulties faced by the community development staff who worked on the post-conflict Human Rights, Democracy and Development (HRDD) project in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He states that several HRDD community development workers reported that they were treated with suspicion by authority figures in their communities as their political allegiance and motives were called into question (John 2011). Again, the form reconciliation education should take, particularly in transitional power-sharing governments, needs further investigation.

The research participants in this study were, to some extent, aware of the existence of the Organ but not its activities. Those members of the Shinje community who were aware of it seemed to lack trust in its operations. The dynamics within the inclusive government did not point to a society in genuine search of reconciliation, and it would appear that the primary concern was to maintain rather than to transform the status quo. The Organ was a political creation co-chaired by three individuals representing political parties and, in many ways, its focus was on securing political reconciliation, mainly at the national level, rather than on healing fractured communities such as Shinje. A complete reconciliation process requires both political and social, or structural and attitudinal transformation. Engaging effectively in the reconciliation process would also mean acceptance that violence occurred, especially on the part of ZANU-PF. Such an acceptance would have worked against ZANU-PF's campaign in the elections that were due to take place in July 2013. Reconciliation was a secondary concern for the ZANU-PF and MDC parties which were preoccupied with winning elections by maintaining rather than transforming the social and political status quo. An additional obstacle arose because the Organ had a limited legal mandate and the interpretation narrowly drawn from the GPA in 2008 caused so much confusion that even the advisory role it eventually settled for was carried out unconvincingly (Mbire 2011).

The ineffectiveness of the Organ is a manifestation of the defective and flawed foundation of the GPA itself. Even if the Organ had not been chaired by political parties and had had a clear legal mandate, the lack of resources would have created a major constraint considering that Zimbabwe's economy had virtually collapsed. Even if resources had been made available, there was no guarantee that the Organ would be effective given that power was still locked by Mugabe and there was no willingness for reconciliation.

## Conclusion

Using a resilience framework of analysis, this article has explored how local communities dealt with conflict and violence; it has also explored the extent to which the reconciliation process can set a foundation for the rebuilding of resilient Zimbabwean communities that were fractured by the conflict of the 2000s. We applied the resilience framework in order to

understand the contextual linkages involved in building reconciliation at different scales in time and space and the relationship between hierarchical structures and community agency. It is reasonable to conclude that the agency of local communities in Zimbabwe is organised in a series of connected, complex, absorptive, and adaptive systems, some of which are 'durable' in the face of shock, while others are negative: one particularly negative strategy involves people agreeing to participate in acts of violence in exchange for self-protection. While the findings reveal a compelling need for reconciliation to address the legacies of violence, the government-led process which aimed to deliver this was barely effective. Arguably, its failure was due to the fact that, while Zimbabwe transitioned, the legitimisation of Mugabe secured by the signing of the GPA in 2008 quickly reinforced the oppression and continuation of violence, rendering reconciliation irrelevant. The prospect that reconciliation could help communities bounce forward, transforming the structures and attitudes that caused disturbances in the first place, remains latent. It is also contingent upon communities reaching a reorganisation phase that will allow time and space for novelty, innovation, and experimentation. We are conscious that we cannot make generalisations based on this research without producing several further case studies; however, we have demonstrated that a resilience analysis provides a valuable heuristic for the evaluation of reconciliation and wider peacebuilding efforts within highly complex social systems.

**Notes**

1.  See Manyena, (2006), Paton (2006), and Tobin (2002).
2.  See Adger *et al.* (2005), Aldrich (2012), Holling (1973), Kelly and Adger (2000), Norris *et al*. (2008), and UNISDR (2015).
3.  These were members of Zimbabwe's National Youth Service who were supposedly assigned to lift young people out of poverty. Effectively they were the ruling ZANU-PF's teenage militia, popularly known as 'Green Bombers' for the colour of their uniforms and the chaos and violence that followed in their wake.

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# Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Conflict Prevention Strategies in Northern Ghana:
A Case Study of the Ethnic Conflicts in Kpemale

By Albert Yelyang*

**FIELD REPORT**

**Abstract:**

This case study report focuses on a protracted interethnic dispute between the Konkombas and the Bimobas at Kpemale in the Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo district in the Northern Region of Ghana. The objectives of the study were to explore the root causes of the conflict and to examine the efficacies of the strategies adopted in addressing its causes. The study participants identified mutual disrespect between ethnic factions, controversy over land, and a culture of violence as the reasons for the conflict. Early warning systems, force, dialogue, and mediation are explored here and are identified as strategies that have been helpfully employed to de-escalate the conflict.

**Keywords:** Ghana, conflict prevention, ethnic conflict, land disputes.

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# Conflict Prevention Strategies in Northern Ghana: A Case Study of the Ethnic Conflicts in Kpemale

## Introduction

In Ghana, interethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts have become more frequent, intense, and widespread since independence was gained in 1957. Northern Ghana in particular has experienced over twenty-three recurrent ethnic conflicts between the 1980s and 2005. For example, the Konkombas and the Bimobas, whose land conflict this paper is about, fought wars in 1984, 1986, and 1989 which resulted in over sixty deaths and several houses being destroyed. These two ethnic groups, like others in the region, have engaged other tribes in violence over land and chieftaincy and in bids to win recognition and respect. This kind of conflict sparked the worst violence in modern Ghana: the so-called Konkomba and Nanumba guinea-fowl war of 1994-5 resulted in more than 2,000 deaths and the displacement of over 200,000 people (Pul 2003).To address the recurrent violent conflicts in the region, a number of programmes for conflict prevention have been undertaken over the last decade in Kpemale in north-eastern Ghana. Nevertheless, despite these continued efforts, direct and sporadic violence still recurs in some communities, especially between the Konkombas and the Bimobas in the area.

This report attempts to unearth why these conflict prevention efforts have not been successful, and it has two primary objectives.[1] Firstly, it seeks to clarify the root causes of the conflicts in this area. Contrary to many external researchers' assumptions it finds that the root causes are structural and that quests for political autonomy and the impartial distribution of socio-economic power by marginalised groups arise in conditions where there is a culture of disrespect and condescension. Secondly, the article identifies three strategies that were being used to address the conflict by the state security apparatus, religious actors (churches), and civil society groups at the time of this research: these were peace operations and peace education; early warning and early response systems; and dialogue. This report focuses in particular on outlining the specific strategies adopted in these programmes, and on evaluating their effectiveness.

The report's author conducted a field study between 1 October 2014 and 30 November 2014. Qualitative research methods, social constructivist theory, and a phenomenological data inquiry methodology were employed, and an open-ended questionnaire was used to collect data from a target population of men and women. These respondents came from the relevant conflict factions and communities, and, along with state and civil society actors, formed part of a random sample of ten interviewees. This report will now offer an overview of the origins and development of the conflicts in Kpemale and of the gaps that exist in the

existing academic literature on them. It will then share the project's research data, focusing on people's responses as they explore the root causes of the conflicts. It will also discuss the effectiveness and limitations of the three types of conflict prevention programmes currently in use.

## Overview of the Conflict in the Northern Region of Ghana

Kpemale is a community in the Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo district which is located in the north-eastern corner of the Northern Region of Ghana, West Africa. Bunkpurugu is the district capital. The district's population is 122,591 with an annual growth rate of 2.8% compared to 2.9% for the entire region. The population is made up of 60,240 men and 64,351women (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). The average population density is 97.5 persons per square kilometre, and there are 192 communities in the district. Five urban settlements each have populations of 5,000 or above, and so people in urban settlements constitute about 18.1% of the total population of the district; accordingly, 81.9% of the population is based in rural areas.

Nakpanduri is a suburban community located about twenty-two miles west of the district capital, while Kpemale is about three kilometres west of Nakpanduri; indeed, Kpemale can be recognised as a section of Nakpanduri. The population of Nakpanduri (including Kpemale), Bimbagu, and Nasuan is estimated to be 119,736, a figure which represents 49.98% of the district's population. The dependent population is 46.9% – children of school-going age make up 40.1% of this figure – and this increases the financial pressure on the community. The economic mainstays of the area are peasant farming and the rearing of small livestock (Ghana Statistical Service 2012).

For decades, the Bimobas and Konkombas in Kpemale have engaged in sporadic intercommunal violence over issues connected to land and a disputed demand for autonomous chieftaincy.[2] The conflict started in 1984 at Bimbagu, another town close to Nakpanduri.[3] It was triggered by a quarrel between a Bimoba man from the Tamong clan and a Konkomba man from the Komba clan over the price of a mango fruit in a market (Brukum 2000). A second escalation of violence ensued when the Konkombas considered the attitude of the Bimobas disrespectful towards the chieftaincy skin occupied by a Konkomba; this was seen as a reflection of their broader disregard for the Konkombas' claim to the land in the area.

The outbreak of violence in 1989 was fuelled by the chief of the Mamprusi Traditional Area when he requested that Jandan Toitor, a Bimoba chief, should hand over the chieftaincy regalia to Naabi Tam, a Konkomba and an older person than Jandan, so that Naabi Tam could be installed as chief of Bimbagu (Assimeng 1990). What triggered the violence was the relocation of Naabi Tam and his subjects to the Bimoba territory and the denial of the Bimoba's access to their farmlands which were located on the Konkomba side.[4] The conflict extended to Jimbale during 1985 and 1986 (Pul 2007), and again in 2007 (GNA 2007a, 2007b). There it became a conflict over interethnic chieftaincy and land; it expanded again to include Kpemale in 1995 and, in this instance, land was the source of the conflict.

Overall, it is estimated that 144 people died in the violence between 1984 and 1987 (Adjapawn 2010) and that more than seven major incidents of violence occurred after 1995.[5] According to one respondent, the sixth of these was a six-year dispute that ran until 2011 between one Konlan Baguor (a Bimoba) and the current Kpemale Konkomba chief over another parcel of land. In this dispute, the Nakpanduri chief sided with Baguor and endorsed his own brother, rather than the Konkomba chief, as the legitimate lessor of the land for development. The majority of the respondents concurred that the violence recurred on about 3-4 June 2012, on 6 March 2013, in May 2013, and from 3-5 April 2014.[6]

Although there have been academic debates about the effectiveness of the strategies employed in resolving this conflict, these studies have achieved only limited success in uncovering either its root causes or strategies for terminating the chain of violence. *Pul (2003) suggests that these conflicts or violence have mostly coincided with regime changes in Northern Ghana. In his view, neither regimes nor intra- and inter-group associations have proved effective in preventing conflicts in the region. Similar commentaries suggest that, when conflict parties are affiliated to political parties, they have a sense that they have political backing to revive conflicts (See Lund 2003, Ladouceur 1972).*

While these insights are helpful, existing studies on the area have largely been ethnographic, evaluative of development programmes, or anthropological, and have failed to provide the kinds of empirical evidence that would illustrate the root causes and catalysts of these conflicts. While the factions persist in carrying out this cycle of violence, little concrete research has been developed to unravel its root causes and to design appropriate strategies that would help to curtail its recurrence. Assimeng (1990) conducted a study which focused on the causes of the conflict and the prevention of violence in the area from a sociological perspective. He made the case that there have been no conscious efforts to understand these armed conflicts, but his study was itself too brief in discussing the relationships and attitudes that exist between the Konkombas and the Bimobas.

Kendie *et al.* (2014) attempted a conflict mapping of Northern Ghana for the National Peace Council (NPC), and their report highlighted ethnic identity, and control over resources and territory, as some of the reasons for the general Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo conflicts. This study also acknowledged the complementary roles that state and non-state actors can play in addressing the proximate causes of each conflict. Similarly, Awedoba (2009) presented a brief profile of the conflicts in the area, and offered some possible solutions. Although the discussions in these studies are insightful, these findings were written in rather brief and unsystematic styles and did not provide an empirical examination of either these conflicts or any related conflict resolution efforts. To address the limitations of the existing research literature, this article, based on the author's field research, is one of the first studies to represent how local residents in the area answer two key questions: why has the conflict over land between the Bimobas and the Konkombas in Kpemale been so protracted, and how can current conflict prevention initiatives best address the ongoing conflicts?

## Theoretical Overview of 'Conflict Prevention'

Conflict prevention has been the preferred peacebuilding approach in recent decades (Melander and Pigache 2007) because its benefits far outweigh those of violence or 'negative peace'.[7] While some critics argue that violence is necessary to influence development or promote peace, its negative effects far outweigh those that emerge from nonviolent approaches (Lederach 2003). Apart from direct effects such as the loss of life, injury, and the destruction of property, violence negatively affects infrastructure and the economic and social development of a people. Conflict prevention is, therefore, the preferred option in efforts to reduce levels of vulnerability to violence (Emma 2008). Kofi Annan, a former United Nations (UN) Secretary General, was assertive about this focus in his injunction that the UN should move from a culture of reaction to one of prevention. He was particularly concerned with the best ways to transit from the conceptualisation to the implementation of conflict prevention mechanisms (Melander and Pigache 2007).

However, despite a clear emphasis on the importance of conflict prevention, there is yet to be a consensus on its definition (Swanström Niklas 2005). A variety of definitions exist that describe the goal of prevention. Those definitions focus on issues such as violence reduction, resolving the incompatibility between contending parties, the length and appropriateness of an intervention, and the means that will be employed to prevent conflict which can differ considerably in terms of the levels of coercion they involve (Wallensteen and Möller 2003). There is also a debate about whether the term 'conflict prevention' is new (Bjurner 1998), or simply revives an old subcultural debate that dates back to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and was also evident in the writings of Sun Tzu (c. 403-221 BC) (Swanström and Weissmann 2005).

Despite this lack of consensus, the term is commonly understood to refer to 'the practical efforts that prevent conflict and deter conflict recurrence'. In other words, preventive actions in conflict are understood to be tailored either to resolve, manage, or contain disputes before they escalate into violence, or to reduce their escalation (Walker and Walter 2000). This definition implies that peace actors need to understand and recognise the various stages of the conflict cycle in order to determine the appropriateness of the strategies they plan to employ. In the conflict cycle, 'primary prevention' can take place in the short phase before violence occurs. As the conflict cycle progresses, there are options for 'secondary prevention' during the violent period, and then for 'tertiary prevention' which occurs after the ceasefire or settlement of the conflict (Melander and Pigache 2007).

At the response level, 'direct prevention' (Melander and Pigache 2007) is aimed at the immediate problem and might, for instance, take the form of mediation to prevent conflict escalation. The second level, 'structural prevention', tries to address root causes and the environment that give birth to the conflict (Annan 1999); this type of response deals with latent conflicts and its final goal is to ensure human security, wellbeing, and justice while also encouraging broad stakeholder participation (Carnegie Commission 1998). The third level is 'systemic prevention' and this approach aims to treat the global effects of conflicts, bearing in

mind that conflicts transcend borders, negatively affect the global village, and deserve global attention (Annan 2006). Practical strategies for the direct prevention of conflict include fact-finding, monitoring, negotiation, mediation, and confidence-building work, as well as early, rapid, or proactive responses to early warning information.

These discussions about conflict prevention and the various stages of the conflict cycle should encourage peacebuilding actors in the Kpemale conflict to revisit fundamental questions that relate to their own conflict prevention strategies. For instance, did the actors recognise and seize the opportunities for conflict prevention at appropriate junctures, and did they utilise appropriate strategies during their interventions? Have the strategies suitable to each stage of conflict prevention been applied? More importantly, have the fundamental issues, such as the structural power relations which lie behind the conflicts, been properly taken into consideration in their strategies? Ironically, in the context of Northern Ghana, the strategies implemented are the ones least likely to  address the specific structural concerns of conflicts (Azar 1981), even though disputes are known to be generated most often by the structures of the societies in which they occur (Bucham 2008). For instance, the violence in Kpemale is not occurring in a vacuum. The un-addressed structural difficulties (root causes) negatively affect social relations again after periods of peace, and that creates the cycle of conflict.

**Findings of the Research (Part One): Key Factors That Promote Conflicts**

The phenomenological study undertaken in this report's research phase first explored the local communities' understanding of the conflict and its root causes and catalysts. The research participants in Kpemale highlighted three main issues in their responses to the kinds of questions posed above.

*Cultural Disrespect*

The lack of mutual respect between the Bimobas and the Konkombas – the two ethnic groups involved in the conflicts – was singled out as the most important factor that leads to difficulties. The Bimobas tended to consider the Konkombas as nomadic, uncivilised 'bush' people, and so stereotyped them as people who are aimless in life, live in hamlets, and lack leadership potential. One male Konkomba respondent said that 'the denigration is too much', whereas a Bimobaman commented that, 'you know, these people are illiterate bush people and are difficult'. Such statements were echoed by respondents from both factions and were corroborated by non-faction members. One respondent said that the stereotype operates to the extent that any 'uninformed' behaviour by non-Konkombas is met by the sarcastic question, 'are you a Konkomba?'

A Bimoba woman remarked that 'even if a Konkomba man becomes the President of Ghana, I would not marry him.' It was also clear that Bimobas believe that the Konkombas lack leadership, despite evidence in the literature which shows that Konkombas are conventionally led by their headmen. The apparent contradiction here may stem from the expectations around leadership in the Mamprusi, Dagomba, Nanumba, Gonja, and Ashanti ethnic groups, among others in Ghana, in which chiefdom – a historical dynasty structure

where the chiefs or kings rule over the entire ethnic group – operates on a larger scale than the minute 'headmen' structure.

Although by no means a fundamental cause of the conflict, cultural insensitivity between the two groups reinforces resentment between the two sides. According to one respondent, the stereotype makes Konkombas shun the Bimobas and spurs them to demand autonomous chieftaincy for all Konkomba settlements, even those beyond the Bimoba/Konkomba jurisdictions; this is because Konkombas prefer paying homage to the Mamprusi chiefs. They also make requests for the elevation of Konkomba chiefs to statuses demanding of respect, and have been pursuing an affirmative agenda in their competition for political power space. They believe that, over time, the Bimobas have purposefully utilised public leadership positions to perpetrate structural violence against the Konkombas. It seems then that structural and cultural forms of violence in the Kpemale situation have generated communal violence because the Konkombas are seeking to secure respect, often by violent means.

Mutual discrimination produces other effects, and respondents argued that it has a clear relationship with the historical migration of Konkomba people. Some respondents explained that the dispersed nature of settlements, especially among Konkomba communities, offers one reason for inadequate infrastructural development. The lack, or inadequate provision, of social amenities such as schools, clinics, and portable water in Konkomba communities promotes behaviours that foster cultural stereotypes and unrest, and the Konkombas interviewed for this project felt that these inadequacies had been fostered deliberately. They alleged that while Konkombas strive to increase literacy, education, and living standards in their communities, the Bimobas prefer the status quo. At least three respondents indicated that the Bimobas seek to sustain the current state of affairs in order to maintain class privilege and perpetrate psychological violence.

In sum, this study has found that cultural insensitivity between the different tribal groups is an important factor that catalyses the cycle of violence and challenges the sustainability of peace in Kpemale. In this situation, the land question becomes one avenue through which people can vent and express their feelings. The question then arises, what is it about this land that generates so much conflict?

### The Controversy over Land

Another outstanding issue that arose in the project's interviews was the controversy over land from both historical and economic perspectives. All over the world, communities pride themselves on being able to trace their histories; however, depending on how the historical narratives are constructed, and the significance as well as the purpose of telling those stories, they can either serve as an incentive or a disincentive to peace. In the context of the dispute between the Konkombas and the Bimobas in Kpemale, controversies surround such historical narratives with each group using its narrative to try to gain advantage over the other. The Bimobas challenge the Konkombas' claim that they were the first to settle at Nakpandol (now Nakpanduri).[8] The Bimoba respondents argued that the Tamong clan of Bimobas was the first to have arrived in the area, followed by the Bauk and then the Puli clans. These clans settled

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along the border between Ghana and Togo, and they went on to migrate inland. The Bimoba respondents added that, to the present day, both Konkomba and Bimoba kinsmen and kinswomen continue to migrate into Ghana, and this migration increases the pressure on the land.

Controversy around the land frequently goes beyond the historical narrative, and, in these conflicts, title to land has become an identity and value issue. A respondent from one of the factions who wanted to stress this point suggested that 'a chief is not one who is wealthy but one who has people and land.' According to this view, a Konkomba or a Bimoba chief and his subjects are not respected if they do not own and control land. This might seem to confirm the idea that land is the problem in this dispute, and it also re-emphasises the point that natural resource scarcity, or greed in relation to natural resources, can lead to grievances. The controversy over land increases the desire of both factions to acquire more land, by whatever means, including violent methods.

Land is also controversial because of the role it can play in empowering people in economic and social terms over generations. The competition to amass more arable land and secure the economic security of future generations is a core dimension of the conflict. It reflects concerns about the title and control of land, and acts as a reminder about communities' senses of superiority or inferiority. For instance, the continuous harvesting of fruits from farms and the wild by Mamprusi women is a constant reminder of Mamprusi land ownership. While the Konkombas have no problem with this arrangement, the Bimobas feel that their long tenure of the land automatically grants them title. As one research participant confirmed, it also poses questions regarding the governance of natural resources. In the specific case of Kpemale, title to land has a relation to basic needs such as food and shelter.

### The Culture of Violence

Many research participants were deeply concerned by their sense that a culture of violence is being developed and regenerated in Kpemale through the protraction of this conflict. A vicious cycle is triggered when a violent incident provokes revenge and counter-attack. While these two main tribes are in conflict, intra-Bimoba and intra-Konkomba conflicts have further complicated the processes aimed at resolving their hostilities over the last two decades. For example, after the conflict at Bimbagu, the Tamong clan from Gbankuone attacked the Puli clan from Kambatiac (also Bimoba) for not participating in that fight against the Kombas. Similarly, Konkomba-Konkomba violence took place at Temaa.[9] The respondents pointed out that such situations prepare the participants for future conflict in Kpemale.

During a long sequence of violence, people tend to teach their children that their counterparts in any given conflict (either from other clans or ethnic groups) are uncivilised, aggressive, and disrespectful; divisions between indigenous and 'settler' identities are also cultivated. This orients children towards violence even at a young age, and the study's participants believed that this indoctrination reinforces the cycle of violence. They felt that identity issues were being mobilised as tools for confrontation, denigration, and insult; they also foster superiority and inferiority complexes and class systems for both factions. The

question of entitlement to land ownership can be settled by whose great-grandparents or grandparents first settled in the area. Genealogy also has a relationship with entitlement to traditional leadership roles such as the chieftaincy. It reminds a group – ethnic, tribal, or clan – of its past superiority, inferiority, or glory, and, no matter how socially or economically powerful a faction has become today, history can be used to weaken its pride.

It is notable too that the culture of violence is being exacerbated by the involvement of external groups. In the responses to a question about which other actors were involved in the conflict, it became clear that there was a widespread belief that the Mamprusi ethnic group – a 'chiefly'[10] group in the area – sometimes participated in the violence against the Bimobas. Three accounts were given of their involvement. In one account, the Mamprusis were said to have been drawn into the violence after suffering heavy casualties in incidents between the Bimobas and the Konkombas: their actions might be understood as vengeful. In another account, the Konkombas and the Mamprusis became allies after the Konkombas supported the Mamprusis in combat against the Bimobas. A third source recounts that, during a land dispute at Yunyoo (a bigger settlement than Kpemale), the Yunyoo chief passed judgement in favour of the Konkombas against the Bimobas. The Nayiri – Overlord of the Mamprugu Traditional Area – upheld the judgment in his final determination on the case.

To sum up, the original violence in Kpemale has created a culture of violence there and in the neighbouring villages. This culture has developed because intra-tribal violence and struggle provide fertile training grounds for intertribal engagements. The decades-long indoctrination of children increases negative perceptions about opposing factions and promotes a cycle of violence which attracts and involves other tribes which become involved because of relationship and power issues.

**Key Findings (Part Two): The Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention Strategies**

The second goal of this study is to identify the effectiveness of the three types of conflict prevention strategy which have been adopted in the Kpemale conflict. These include security sector operations by the state; education carried out by civil society groups such as churches and non-governmental organisations; and conflict early warning and response systems together with facilitated dialogue, which are led by the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding supported by international funding organisations and the district assemblies.

*Security Forces: Law Enforcement and Diplomacy*

As in every militarised security arrangement, the police have been responsible for maintaining law and order in Kpemale since the re-escalation of violence. The key actors include the Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo District Assembly, the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), the district police, as well as the Northern Regional Security Council (REGSEC) and the Ministry of the Interior; together they have made collaborative use of intelligence, force, and diplomacy to manage the conflict to date. The Ministry of the Interior has increased the number of police in the area while the military command has, since the violence began, sent about three contingents to protect Kpemale, a fact disclosed by participants from the Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo District Assembly and military troops at the time of the research.

In the first instance within a conflict situation, urgent methods for security stabilisation are deployed as the police and military embark on patrols and enforce curfews. The police also arrest people found breaking the law. Military personnel, for their part, despite some notable exceptions, have no tolerance for noncompliance: they show their readiness to counter violence with violence, and, while curfews are being enforced, they display their military machinery and weaponry to deter factions from engaging in further violent acts. Their superior force and tactics cannot, however, always be easily deployed. The military commander in charge at the time of this project's field visit was worried because sometimes his troops are confronted by civilians who fire sporadically from sophisticated weapons such as AK47 assault rifles, G3s,[11] M3s,[12] and revolvers. As the use of force is regulated for military personnel, the contingent under attack must wait for direction from their superiors before embarking on any counterattacks.

A second core type of peace activity involves efforts being made to build military and police relations with civilians through community diplomacy and peace sensitisation efforts. Through these means, military personnel work to transform people's belief that the army is an institution to be 'dreaded'. Individuals from within the military troop have been particularly engaged in 'door-to-door' peace talks on non-violence, and threats have sometimes been identified through this process. Together with the communities, military personnel make proposals to address problems that emerge. The military also consults local chiefs, district assembly staff, and people from specific localities when tensions increase in order to propose strategies and work with civilian stakeholders. Its personnel appeal to young people not to engage in violence and educate them about the effects of violence including the fact that they can lose their lives at a young age or jeopardise their futures. They also convene forums to sensitise people to the benefits of living in a peaceful community and society. In Northern Ghana, peace education and sensitisation are effectively interlaced with military operations, and this may be a consequence that arises from efforts to provide the civilian component in military activities that is required by the United Nations.

Thirdly, together with the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO), the military negotiates with the main conflict protagonists in order to agree on the specific needs of victims of the conflict; the District Security Council (DISEC) members also engage individually in public peace sensitisation activities, such as durbars and peace matches, which are supported by civil society and some of the district assemblies. These activities suggest that there is collaboration among the various peace stakeholders within government and that appropriate interventions are introduced with the help of other stakeholders at different stages of the conflict cycle.

Research participants confirmed that operations led by the police and military have resulted in stability, but they argued that this has been achieved through suppression as well as through the use of trust-building activities. The different factions are confident that the military, setting aside its military might, is neutral in its peace interventions, unlike the police. An Afrobarometer survey produced by the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) indicates that Ghanaians have more confidence in the military than in other institutions with

regard to corruption in the country (Afrobarometer 2014). However, the research respondents stressed that while the military is effective in attaining its primary objective of subduing violence, its strategies are not capable of addressing the real reasons for the violence; instead the military works to reduce casualty levels and deter violence through the presence of its personnel. The respondents further assert that this approach is found fault with because it does not seem to address issues of respect, discrimination, and power imbalances beyond the land question. Nonetheless, the military's efforts are regarded as being appropriate at certain levels of the violence and are seen to enable an environment in which peace education and dialogue can take place.

It should be noted that a challenge exists in relation to the capacity of the military to support peacebuilding because only a few of its personnel have some knowledge of, and are able to adopt, peacebuilding approaches. Its trained personnel are fully conversant in what they need to do, but face challenges in their day-to-day operations: the need to meet the demands of traditional protocols can be a hindrance because the technical arrangements for state funding of security operations do not ordinarily allow for peacebuilding approaches. One respondent disclosed that in some instances the military has found it difficult to satisfy traditional protocol because it is not the style of the state to provide funding for the military delivery of non-militarised operations like peacebuilding. In practice, the simple failure of the police and military representatives to present traditional items such as 'cola' to a chief can suggest enough disrespect to derail cooperation with the traditional leaderships.[13] One such incident almost rewound the clock of the peace process.

The presence of the military has the potential to be counterproductive because the direct parties to the conflicts might view them as executing the plan of 'the powers that be' within governments. This is because the conflict has been politicised and, depending on which political party is in power, the faction aligned to it is perceived to have some backing from the government. The present military detachment is believed to be neutral and civil in its operations but the situation remains uneasy: while the presence of the military and police means that the factions cannot perpetrate violence, the underlying quest for violence and revenge remains.

It is clear that the approach taken by the military detachment was influenced by the persona of the troop commander at the time of this research. One strategy in use to create better acceptance of their intervention involved the military in sometimes threatening other actors, and especially some of the chiefs, that they would withdraw their services if the factions were reluctant to comply. This strategy forced these chiefs to instruct their subjects to cease fire because the chiefs themselves feared being attacked if the violence continued.

### Churches: Peace Education and Sensitisation Activities

The religious institutions and civil society peace actors that make interventions in the conflict form another important strand within the conflict prevention strategies in Kpemale. Key religious groups include the Navrongo-Bolgatanga diocese of the Catholic Church, which covers parts of the Northern Region, and the Church of Pentecost. As their close collaborator, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, Ghana (WANEP-Ghana), is also deeply involved in

the process. These three stakeholders have some commonalities in terms of their approaches to resolving the conflict. From the field responses collected for this report, it is clear that the institutions have been collaborating and have sometimes communicated in ways that allow one group's activities to inform future activities organised by the other institutions. This helps to ensure that they avoid duplication, combat resentment and fatigue in the factions they work with, and maximise their collective impact. Their collaboration is based on areas of expertise as well as their other capacities.

WANEP-Ghana most often provides technical and financial support including early warning information through its Community Monitoring system; it also advises others on when it is appropriate to intervene, as well as on how to manage the dynamics of the resolution processes engaged in by other actors. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, provides logistical support, making contacts that help to mobilise groups and representatives, providing neutral venues for programmes, and using its leverage as a religious institution trusted for its impartiality to bring parties together without resentment. It has also funded some activities and items from its budgets. The Church of the Pentecost became dormant when the conflict became more turbulent and complex, especially after it attempted to be independent in its efforts. However, these three institutions have enjoyed goodwill from all parties because of their perceived impartiality and their show of empathy towards the different factions and victims.

The Navrongo-Bolgatanga Diocese of the Catholic Church came into the picture in 1984 during the violence at Bimbagu when it provided relief items. All through the recurrences of the conflict, this church has been prominent in the Kpemale conflict; it started to intervene on 6 June 2012 when it made an appeal to the Konkomba and Bimoba factions to eschew violence, spend their energies in productive ventures, and end the proliferation of arms and ammunitions. It also advised community members not to accept the negative roles offered to them by their powerful brothers and sisters in the conflict, and by others who stand to profit from the violence.

Before making a direct intervention, the Catholic Church conducted an assessment of the conflict to determine its status and causes; it then designed an intervention, and it has since held two dialogue sessions. However, the participants in this research said that the church, during the assessment phase, tended only to identify and address proximate causes, rather than offer an in-depth study that would reveal and confront the deep-rooted causes of the conflict. It has also failed to assess past interventions in order to inform the church's current approach. Despite these limitations, its strategies seem to be providing different parties with opportunities to interact, air grievances, and buy time for tensions to reduce.

More recently, the church has formed what it calls a 'Peace Management Group', solely Catholic in composition, and a 'Council of Churches' which includes representatives from other Christian denominations. These groups engage with and facilitate mediation processes and educate members of Kpemale, as well as communities related to the conflict, about the need to eschew violence and co-exist peacefully. These activities seek to empower

community peace animators as 'critical yeast' to spread the message of peace and non-violence; they also equip them to own and sustain their peacebuilding activities when the church is no longer directly involved. The church intends to use members of these two groups as community peace promoters who will engender change through self-transformation. When one youth spiritual mentor was asked about the current situation, he said that the culture of non-violence must be imbibed by the children and young people so that they can live it throughout their development.

While the Catholic Church has focused on this approach, the groups it has formed have unfortunately been met with limited enthusiasm by the key participants, and attempts to involve Muslims have not received much of a response. To address these challenges and sustain its efforts, the church has decided to partner with the Justice and Peace Group of the District Assembly in order to increase participation in its activities and ensure the enforcement of agreements that rely on the official capacities of assembly personnel. One priest said that, even though it is constantly discouraged because the conflict remains protracted and characterised by sporadic violence, the church has not relented in its efforts to prevent conflict in the area. As a part of its new efforts, it has formed Parish Peace Clubs, Community Peace Committees, and Parish Peace Committees, all of which are engaged in peace education and sensitisation activities such as peace dramas and public forums. The aim is to spread the message of peace widely and to the lowest levels of the conflict-affected communities.

When asked about the church's capacity to intervene, respondents noted that it has some ability to contribute through the work of both the Diocesan Development Office and some parish priests who have built capacity in terms of their own experience with the conflict; however, it is not in a position to lead the outreach, peace education, mediation, and dialogue processes it undertakes. One study participant quoted the bible to pose the cynical question, 'Can a blind man lead a blind man to be effective in peacebuilding?', but all factions believe that the church's activities have helped to reduce direct violence in the area.

Notwithstanding the activities of the churches, I found that there was still lots of speculation among local people about the proliferation of arms financed by farmers and powerful relatives who live outside the district. Interviewees confirmed that the acquisition of guns increases the tendency for violence. One male respondent in particular noted that, in a year when there is a bumper harvest, violence is more likely to occur because more guns will have been acquired. It was speculated that some ex-servicemen train their kinsmen in combat engagement, and there is also a high level of adherence to the instructions of chiefs who wield power and can choose to start violent activities.

*Civil Society Interventions: Early Warning and Peace Mediation*
This section presents the works of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, Ghana group, known as WANEP-Ghana: this is a non-profit civil society organisation located in Ghana which first came into the picture when the then Northern Regional Minister, Honourable Bede Ziedeng, spoke on the radio in 2012 and called on WANEP to intervene in the conflict. It has

since developed two key programmes which create early warning procedures and facilitate peace, dialogue, and mediation.

WANEP had already been focused on developing conflict early warning systems in the area. In 2009, WANEP-Ghana had begun to implement a human security early warning mechanism adapted from the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) early warning mechanism and WANEP's Warning and Response Network (WARN). The WANEP-Ghana mechanism was launched on 10 September 2009 in Tamale and is known as the Ghana Warning and Response Network (GHANAWARN). It is one of three components of the organisation's Ghana Alert Project (GAP).

The structure is a community early warning mechanism with an interactive electronic database system and online interface which allows various stakeholders to interact. It also has parallel interpersonal ways of collecting information from various stakeholders and the public, by phone and text, for example. It has Community Monitoring Teams (CMTs), one of which is located in the Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo district, where Kpemale is located. The team comprises a comprehensive community group of five members with a team leader and a civil society mentoring organisation. Having been trained and having gained experience in collecting information, this group had already fed WANEP-Ghana with information that led to the prevention of about four violent situations in the Kpemale conflict. The WANEP-Ghana early warning mechanism resembles continuous research but it is not exploratory in the sense that it could unearth the core reasons for the Kpemale conflict. The system is able to pick up open threats to security, conduct analysis, and build an understanding of security nuances, but it lacks inputs from a broad spectrum of the population and any facility to probe the core reasons for the conflict. When the CMT participants in this research were asked if they knew about the structural reasons for the conflict, they only gave their personal opinions as community members. When asked why they did not report these views to WANEP, they indicated that they did not have any opportunity on the electronic system to submit information from key members of the factions, and they were hoping to have face-face interactions with WANEP to explain the potential value of such a facility.

In collaboration with the security commands and district assemblies, WANEP conducted two pre-dialogue sessions and mediations after the Northern Regional Minister called on WANEP to intervene (Zamana and Adjei 2014, GNA 2013) while the rapid response level remained the prerogative of the state departments. One main dialogue was conducted on 15 May 2013 in Tamale, followed by a post-dialogue session attended by representatives selected by the factions themselves. These dialogues provided a space in which both factions listened and responded to grievances surrounding land issues. The events were interlaced with peace education training sessions at neutral venues. A communiqué was drawn up after the negotiations, with timelines for implementation. The implementation of the agreement was monitored and threats to its implementation, including reactions from the communities involved, were proactively addressed to prevent attempts to derail the process.

WANEP also facilitated a dialogue meeting that provided the first opportunity for the military factions to meet face-to-face. As might be expected, this process enabled the parties to bring

up the issues around the land, but the six-item communiqué drawn up through the WANEP-Ghana process did not have an item that addressed the underlying power imbalances and disrespect identified in this research. During the dialogue, no mention was made about the fact that either group was more impoverished or more informed than the other because of access to key positions which allow the dominant group to perpetuate discriminatory tendencies. Such a discussion was necessary because, in a situation where trust is lost, truth-telling is not the cultural norm. Moreover, people's anxious desire to address the proximate issues overshadows attempts to dig more deeply into the conflict. As one key informant astutely explained, 'the WANEP process was good but you see, my brother, when we are back here, what we hear and see, we do not discuss those [things] during the dialogue. We only talk about land, history and who has right and who do not have.'

Another example of this obfuscation was evident in a durbar of chiefs, elders, politicians, and civil society figures which was facilitated by the Nayiri and the Northern Regional Coordinating Council (NRCC) and was held at the Nayiri on 21 June 2014. Here, the young people and chiefs from the Konkomba and Bimoba factions as well as the Mamprusis chewed symbolic cola in a pledge to denounce violence. The spiritual connotation attached to this is interesting as the people believe that the gods will punish those who violate such pledges. Still, one youth member soon afterwards remarked, 'I have told the youth not to fight, but I have also advised them not to sit idle and be killed'. A second respondent at the same forum suggested that 'people are only coming here to express their oratory abilities. Mr., … the real issues cannot be addressed here. This is a waste of time.' These responses suggest that this process, like the WANEP dialogue, also failed to address the core issues of the conflict in favour of discussing the proximate ones.

In a sense, the WANEP-Ghana process has been working. The durbar eventually produced messages calling for peace and solidarity, as well as a number of important agreements between the key participants. However, it is questionable for how long such a pledge will be effective. These dialogue and mediation processes fall short of discussing the fears, mistrust, and issues regarding respect, quest for political autonomy, and concerns around development imbalances that have been uncovered by this study.

To address this problem in my research interviews, the last question I posed asked whether the WANEP process had identified these key concerns and gone on to initiate the appropriate strategies to tackle them. This question was asked against the backdrop of recurring violence in Kpemale (Sannie 2014a, 2014b) which is influenced by the continuation of disrespectful and denigrating attitudes that cause rancour in the relative peace achieved through the efforts of state and non-state actors such as the police and military, political and traditional leaderships, the churches, and WANEP-Ghana. While relative peace prevails, various chiefs and their factions visit each other's jurisdictions and trade in markets, but these interactions are conducted with caution because of continuing fear and mistrust.

My final question prompted all of the respondents to agree that the strategies in current use are providing space for healing and increased understanding among the factions. For instance, one of the interviewees remarked that 'with time, pain and anger subside for

reasoned communication. My only worry is that if they do not stop the disrespect, violence will occur again.' This hope remains under threat because of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and this is coupled with fear about whether there is enough security available to counter this proliferation. In the meantime, the District Assembly as well as central government funds are drained by the costs of sustaining the troops.

## Conclusion

To summarise, this report has examined the key factors that have sustained the violent intertribal and interethnic conflicts in the Bunkpurugu-Yunyoo district in the northern region of Ghana. It has also reviewed the efficacy of the strategies employed in addressing these conflicts. A qualitative strategy design was used in the research process which relied on social constructivist ideas. The first objective was to discover the root causes of the conflict, and the second was to identify through field work the efficacy of strategies used to counter violence in this specific conflict case.

The residents of the area's communities identified three core catalysts of armed conflicts: mutual disrespect between ethnic groups, controversy over land, and an endemic culture of violence. These catalysts might not be the fundamental causes of conflict here, however, people are convinced that they have made substantial contributions towards escalating and sustaining the violence in the area. This conclusion has the potential to be ground-breaking, and the findings of this first empirical study based on interviews with people in the area will be of use for future studies that aim to examine conflict in the region.

This study also offers insights into the achievements and limitations of conflict prevention programmes operated by the state, church, and civil society. The respondents made it clear that existing efforts have been relatively successful in de-escalating the level of violence. Nevertheless, in evaluating the achievements of conflict resolution and prevention, Talentino's points about long-term strategies are insightful. He asks 'whether conflict-generating structures have been identified and is there a plan to alter conflict? Again, has the salience of group identity been decreased in the political and economic realms?' (Talentino 2003, p. 73). When these questions are considered in the context of Northern Ghana, it is clear that conflict prevention has failed to prevent or terminate conflicts, and trust and reconciliation between different social groups have not been effectively implemented.

In terms of proposals for future development, various issues have been raised as challenges to be addressed: these include the peacebuilding actors' limited agendas, the rigidity of strategies chosen, the decreasing enthusiasm of key participants, and a lack of coordination. In addition to these issues, although it has not been extensively discussed above, it should be noted that a lack of political will represents a fundamental barrier that has significantly hampered the effectiveness of all of the foregoing efforts for conflict prevention. Most of the research participants noted that, although political leaders openly express willingness to end the conflict, the reality is that successive governments have focused instead on maximising political capital through their local representatives. According to the respondents, individual

will, the morality of state and political leaders, and the government's political motives at local or national levels have determined the dynamics of the conflict; moreover, civil society peace efforts are frequently challenged when there is no or low political will shown by key personalities within the state structures involved the conflict.

**Notes**

1. The author acknowledges that the final output of this field report (an abridged version of his MA research) owes a debt to the support received from SungYong Lee, Chuck Thiessen, Miho Taka, Michaelina Jakala, and Rev. Fr. Clement M. Aapengnuo. Rev. Fr. Thaddeus Kuusah and WANEP are also recognised for their contribution here. Finally, he appreciates the contributions of all those who supported him in the field: the police, the military, the District Assembly, the Northern Region Peace Council, WANEP-Ghana, the Church of Pentecost, the Catholic Church, and his primary respondents: the Konkomba, Bimoba, and Mamprusi representatives involved in this research.

2. Chieftaincy in Ghana is formulated around social identities which are a source of power and recognition for a social group. It is a legal institution in the country.

3. Information was given by one interview participant from each of the key Konkomba and Bimoba communities.

4. Assimeng (1990) in his CUSO Project report indicates that the Konkomba chief had the support of the then PNDC District Secretary of East Mamprusi, J. H. Wuni, who was also a Mamprusi sub-chief.

5. Interview data from the key Konkomba respondent.

6. This information is also contained in a WANEP-Ghana community monitor's (name withheld) report on Kpemale.

7. Johan Galtung (1996) explains 'negative peace' as the absence of violence. The term 'negative' is used because it implies that something undesirable, such as violence or oppression, has ended, without something positive having taken its place.

8. One respondent explained that Nakpandol, in Konkomba, means hunters' residence or hunters' village. He said the Konkombas had lived by hunting and gathering, and had migrated from Nabole, through Gbintiri and Kojawen, and first settled at Nakpandol which is good for game because of the Gambaga escarpment.

9. The violence at Tema occurred on 22 March 2010 and again on 28 May 2011.

10. 'Chiefly' groups have traditionally organised leadership structures, and members call the leader 'chief'.

11. The G3 is a 7.62×51mm NATO battle rifle. It was developed in the 1950s by the German armament manufacturer Heckler & Koch GmbH in collaboration with the Spanish state-owned design and development agency CETME.

12. The M4/M4A1 5.56mm carbine is a lightweight, gas-operated, air-cooled, magazine-fed, selective-rate, shoulder-fired weapon with a collapsible stock.

13. 'Cola' here means a symbolic token which can take the form of actual cola, liquor, or money. These tokens are presented to show reverence to the chief or king when a visitor is about to leave the meeting venue. Upon arrival, the chief himself presents actual cola to indicate welcome.

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# JOURNAL *of* GLOBAL ANALYSIS

# BOOK REVIEW

**Karina V. Korostelina**

**History Education in the Formation of Social Identity: Toward a Culture of Peace**
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, ISBN 978 1 137 38078 4, 235p.

Karina Korostelina's book which evaluates history education makes an important contribution to the existing literature by recognising the specific aspects of history curricula that either facilitate or hinder intercultural understanding. Rich in historical analysis from multiple regions, this work's main value lies in its analytical framework. The framework connects the disciplines of social identity and history education to depict their potential to promote a culture of violence or a culture of peace. The book focuses on how history education can be leveraged to form a culture of peace, while also exploring the opposite possibility.

The first chapter explains how identity is formed through 'social identity theory' and introduces a conceptual framework, entitled 'the model of impact of history education on social identity', which is explained and elaborated on throughout the rest of the book. The framework presents various forms and modes of identity that represent how ingroup members – those who belong to the dominant culture – understand and reflect on the meaning of identity. Even though emphasis is placed on the potential of history education to cultivate a culture of peace, much of the book illustrates ways in which it has served to strengthen the negative perceptions of outgroups (those considered as 'others') while increasing loyalty towards the ingroup, or the dominant culture. The framework allows for the exploration of the main factors that foster a culture of violence, namely the connotations of ingroup identity and justifications of social hierarchies and power structures.

The second chapter elaborates on the different forms of social identity and explains how members belonging to an ingroup understand and reflect on the meaning of identity. Korostelina introduces the concept that there are cultural, mobilized, and reflected forms of identity. The cultural form of national identity is created through cultural traditions and historic developments and is evident in ideas about historical roots, narratives, values, beliefs, and attitudes. The reflected form includes learning about the position of the outgroups and reflecting upon context and therefore has the potential to contribute to a culture of peace. The antithesis of the reflected form of identity is the mobilized form which is based on fear, often of outgroups, and threat theories that focus on maintaining the power and status of ingroups. In this chapter, Korostelina explores how Taiwan and Singapore promote inclusive or reflective identities, while Romania, North Korea, China, Spain, and Ukraine display elements of nationalism in mobilized identity forms.

Chapter three introduces a further range of concepts into this discussion, and Korostelina's further subdivision of identity's meanings and modes into ideological, relative, historic, and

depictive identity categories is excessive. The concepts of ideological and historic identity are self-explanatory; the relative mode focuses on ingroup victimisation and promotes negative outgroup images, thus contributing to a culture of violence; meanwhile, a depictive mode promotes comparative representations which accommodate ideological differences and contribute to a culture of peace. Korostelina illustrates her discussion with examples from Russia, Armenia, China, Spain, Ukraine, North Korea, and Austria, and draws particular attention to the culture of peace promoted by France and Germany. France's history curricula avoid the glorification of conquerors and warriors, and instead, emphasise the consequences of the actions of national heroes; meanwhile, German curricula emphasise the roles played by resistance activists, democrats, and post-war democratic constitution and eschew an emphasis on military leaders.

The book's fourth chapter explains how inclusive or divisive social borders are formed. Divisive borders are created by denying a common culture with outgroups; omitting positive historical interaction from educational texts; and representing the outgroup as dangerous due to their divergent values. While Korostelina finds evidence that a culture of violence is being fostered in the history curricula of Serbia, Croatia, Georgia, Abkhazia, Macedonia, Greece, and Ukraine, Australia is depicted as creating a culture of peace through boundary redefinition because it includes positive examples of several nationalities within its history education.

The concept of collective axiology is introduced in the fifth chapter and, in her discussion of the common moral value system for offering moral guidance, Korostelina introduces the arguably superfluous concepts of 'axiological balance' and 'collective generality', as well as the polarities of 'high generality' and 'low generality'. Axiological balance relates to the virtues and vices attributed to groups, and so a balanced axiology, which contributes to a culture of peace, can be achieved when one accepts the wrongdoings of one's own ingroup, and reduces or eradicates the portrayal of specific outgroups as enemies. The concept of *collective generality* relates to resistance to change and to the long-term stability of beliefs. Curricula that are worded in an inflexible, biased manner contribute to a culture of violence through *high generality*, and examples of this at work are chosen here from China, North Korea, Azerbaijan, and Greece. France and Germany are discussed again in this chapter as nations which transformed their axiology to a level of *low generality*. The essence of this chapter might have been conveyed much more succinctly if Korostelina had summarised these points to argue that flexibility promotes a culture of peace while resistance to change promotes a culture of violence.

The sixth chapter focuses on the effects that national identity formation has on inter-group relations. Korostelina introduces the categorisations of ethnic, multicultural, and civic identity, and argues that the ethnic concept of national identity is connected with the dominance of one ethnic identity and the denial of available alternatives. The multicultural concept is connected with the acknowledgement and promotion of ethnic diversity, and the civic concept of national identity is connected with collective civic responsibility and coexistence. Ethnic categorisations in history curricula are identified as being in use in China, Taiwan, Honk Kong, pre-World-War-Two Austria, Serbia, Croatia, and Moldova-Romania; Singapore, Canada, and Germany instead promote multiculturalism by emphasising the

values and benefits that diverse cultures contribute to the community as a whole. According to Korostelina, the civic curricula in France and Northern Ireland place emphasis on the idea that everyone is a citizen of the nation, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

This book provides a rich variety of global comparisons to illustrate and strengthen the various tiers of the analytical framework Korostelina employs. It also contributes towards a comparative analysis of history curricula, and gives direction to attempts to mobilise history education as a tool for peace education. In terms of its presentation, it would have been extremely helpful for a comparative analysis if the book had included a table summarising the positions of each country over time. Also, while the book is targeted towards an academic audience and does not seek directly to inform policy-making, it would have been helpful for the author to have excluded the superfluous categorisations within the analytical framework she uses; this would have improved the fluency and effectiveness of the book's argument.

The book places importance on the need to generate a culture of peace for normative reasons at a micro-level, instead of acknowledging the macro-level political and diplomatic repercussions of fostering a culture of violence. While the purpose of the book logically follows a normative argument, the diplomatic reasons for changing the discourse of history books should not be ignored. The author's research on textbooks from Ukraine resonates – and might helpfully have been linked – with its current conflict regarding national boundaries and identity. The global diplomatic power held by Russia might also have been more openly discussed. One of the reasons among many that Russia continues to hold diplomatic power (regardless of its controversial past and repressive regime) is due to the monopoly the country holds over gas supplies. If antipathy towards Russia were to be promulgated throughout Europe (through a culture of violence in education or in the media), it is likely that most of Europe would freeze during the winter months. Also, in the long-term, it is evident that the promotion of a culture of peace would help individual nations (especially the economically weaker states within the European Union) to gain access to social and economic benefits during a financial or an environmental crisis.

Within the area of education, it would have been valuable if the author had mentioned the multiplicity of educational terminologies that are used to promote the same arguments. For example, Korostelina's argument that boundary redefinition leads to a culture of peace is reminiscent of Nussbaum's idea of world citizenship,[1] which makes the case that diverse groups of people (within a nation or between nations) contribute significantly to the process of fostering a cohesive global society. Therefore, the normative values behind an inclusive history education curriculum cannot be separated from the discourses within peace education, intercultural education, and citizenship education. While Korostelina's book succeeds in answering the question it poses through a comprehensive analytical framework, an exploration of the diplomatic implications of forming an inclusive discourse through history curricula would strengthen her argument and extend its reach beyond the boundaries of social identity and history education.

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[1] Nussbaum, M. (1997) *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defence of Reform in Liberal Education.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

**Louise Shelley**

**Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective**

Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, ISBN: 9780521130875, 356p.

Over the last two centuries, human trafficking has grown at an immense rate, and it is becoming more frequently documented by academic scholars, emerging non-governmental organisations, and social activists worldwide. The magnitude of the phenomenon extends beyond an exploited individual to the wider political, social, and economic influence that the global system has upon local communities, national stability, and transnational crime. Existing literature on human trafficking and illegal migrant smuggling has generally focused on debates about the push and pull factors that drive the system; the different types of victims and perpetrators within it; estimates of the numbers of those involved; and the efficacy of various policy responses.

Louise Shelley presents a comprehensive overview of the multifaceted dimensions of this complex issue in her book, *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective*. The volume aims to contribute both to human trafficking literature and to the practical battle against this transnational crime. Shelley readily acknowledges the difficulties that arise in making quantitative estimates of the victims currently being exploited and trafficked for labour, domestic services, organs, or their bodies: despite the highly public nature of the issue figures are difficult to establish. Whilst human smuggling is not as exploitative as trafficking, in reality the two crimes are not as easily differentiated as definitions in current legal frameworks suggest. Shelley recognises these limitations and uses a range of sources to present her research in an analytical form that is both informative and inspiring for readers. The book is mostly concerned with the exploitation of young girls and women in sex trafficking; this represents, in quantitative terms, one of the largest sectors of the human trafficking trade. Shelley, drawing on sixteen years of research, aims to fill a gap in the existing literature by analysing the role of internationally organised crime and economic incentives in relation to this trade. She also provides a comparative analysis between world regions.

The book's introduction establishes how human trafficking is understood in the existing literature and it also outlines Shelley's aims. The first section on the rise and costs of human trafficking goes on to address the rapid rise and consequences of this trade. It moves beyond the immediate circumstances that can feed this transnational issue, such as domestic poverty, to analyse the wider and more detrimental effects that globalisation has had on human trafficking thanks to the growth in rural to urban migration and gendered discrimination across nations. What is made clear here is the complexity of the issue when social, demographic, political, sovereign, health, and labour factors influence the continuation of this exploitation. In this section, Shelley introduces what becomes, as the book goes on, a call for a modified approach to target this unlawful issue: this new approach would contend with issues such as generational poverty, the uneven status of men and women, and ingrained political conflict.

In the second section of the book, which deals with the financial side of human trafficking, Shelley presents an analysis of the underlying business motivations that incentivise organised

crime. This aspect of the trade is emerging as an important focus in human trafficking literature. For a reader who knows little about the issue apart from the social factors involved, this section offers a coherent insight into the business of human trafficking. It explores lesser-known aspects of the trade such as the role of female traffickers; common methods and challenges with regard to control; recruitment; and the transportation of victims. In emphasising the financial motivation behind human trafficking, Shelley stresses the vital need to change the outcomes of cost-benefit analyses for perpetrators, as well as the importance of policy development to address the vulnerable social circumstances of trafficked people. Readers are encouraged to conceptualise the issue of human trafficking in a new way by making a direct comparative analysis between human and drug trafficking in terms of perpetrators, commodities, regions, and risks. The theoretical insights that emerge in this section establish a general framework that is then exemplified in the third part of the book which concentrates on regional perspectives. Shelley ties these regional perspectives together by analysing six business models in order to provide readers with a deeper understanding of the internal processes of human trafficking. Readers are challenged to apply their new understanding of profits and methods to these different cases.

The section on regional perspectives provides examples of each of the six business models within and between five different regions: Asia; Eurasia and Eastern Europe; Europe; the United States; and Latin America and Africa. Different sub-regions and countries within these regions, either alone or in combination, provide a point of origin, transit, or destination for human traffickers. With the aim of presenting a comparative analysis, Shelley writes about the historical precedents, distinctive features, and internal variations in each model. This provides readers with a consistent structure to help them identify similarities among, and differences between, incidences of this multifaceted problem across the globe. There are important distinctions to be noted between the patterns evident in more developed and developing nations, and nations in transition; for example, Asia provides the origin, transit route, and destination for human traffickers, whereas the United States is seen as the preferred destination for domestically and internationally trafficked persons. By analysing human trafficking trends in countries with different development statuses, Shelley challenges the common perception that it is solely the uneducated poor who are victimised and that the political corruption which enables traffickers only occurs in the global south.

In her conclusion, Shelley identifies the influence of the cold war and economic crises on contemporary human trafficking, and argues that this legacy will continue to exert influence if intervention is not more successful. She also furthers her call for the international community to make the issue a higher priority at the levels of systemic inequalities, a far-reaching demand and consumer market, and the trade's flourishing business profits. In line with the observations made in her overview of human trafficking, Shelley addresses a range of stakeholders with suggestions as to how they might use policy to counter trafficking. She calls on social activists to help, but also provides rational examples which offer consumers, the business world, civil society, governments, and multilateral organisations ways to make their own contributions.

Shelley draws from an extensive array of resources produced by scholars, journalists, and non-governmental organisations in an attempt to compile a concise range of ideas about and explanations of human trafficking in one publication. Each chapter is rich in detailed examples which shed light upon a hidden industry and illustrate Shelley's arguments for change. In addition to analysing supply and demand factors as other scholars have done, Shelley provides regional analyses that offer new perspectives on prevention, protection, and prosecution approaches to countering the human trafficking trade. These analyses are specific to local business trends within the industry and to local cultural systems too. Here, as elsewhere in the volume, Shelley's language and presentation are easily comprehensible and accessible to a wide audience whatever the reader's education levels or reason for interest in the topic.

At first glance there appears to be an economic bias in Shelley's book, despite its claim to offer a 'global perspective'. Human trafficking has a largely economic basis, encompassing as it does everything from re-sellable commodity profits to the debts generated that traffickers coerce from victims and their families. Although whole sections of Shelley's book could have been equally devoted to cultural, social, and political dimensions of the trade, Shelley has instead integrated them throughout the economic chapters and the book as a whole in order to provide a holistic overview.

The business models for human trafficking that Shelley sets out perhaps attracted my attention the most. I have read a lot of research literature about trafficking, as well as the first-hand experiences of anti-trafficking activists, because of my own interest in having a positive effect upon this corrosive trade. Shelley's new models go beyond the generalised understanding of how human trafficking works that other sources offer. Shelley has drawn six models from her regional studies that describe six overarching cultural trends in human trafficking, including, for example the 'violent entrepreneur model' based on Balkan crime groups (p. 121). Each model recognises specific, systemic, social and financial drivers, and offers a detailed explanation of how each strand of the human trafficking process functions from trafficker to victim. These models give a deeper insight into the multifaceted nature of human trafficking, and prompt the realisation that not all approaches to combating such corruption are applicable to each region or case. Shelley rightly argues that there is hope for mitigating human trafficking if an understanding of the vulnerabilities in each of these models is gained and if intervention efforts have at their core bids both to counter corruption and increase respect for children's rights. It is also interesting to note the ways in which colonial and communist legacies continue to have an astounding effect upon human trafficking systems in countries like Nigeria and Cambodia respectively.

Shelley has essentially fulfilled her aim which was to provide an analytical overview of human trafficking, its hidden issues, and regional settings; however, there are limitations to writing of human trafficking in general whilst maintaining a dominant focus on sex trafficking in her discussions. It was interesting that, after writing predominantly about sex trafficking, Shelley's conclusion notes that 'despite the disproportionate attention to sex trafficking today, contemporary trafficking victims are more likely to be victims of labor trafficking, forced to serve as child soldiers, or trapped in domestic servitude.' (p. 297). Human trafficking is

multifaceted, and trafficking for exploitation purposes demonstrates variations in quantities, tactics, and socioeconomic circumstances. The introductory section might have benefited from the addition of estimated statistics from approved organisations in each of the human trafficking trades – organs, sex, and labour – that Shelley mentions. To add a more rounded dimension to her passionate overview, Shelley could also have briefly acknowledged literary criticism about the extent of human trafficking and the nature of moral panic.[1] In addition to Shelley's call for more integrated scholarly research, there is also a need for empirical studies that exemplify documented claims of high prevalence, profitability, and organisation (Keo, 2013; Nicola, 2013).[2]

Overall, this book provides a good background for readers wanting more than can be delivered by a cause-oriented piece of literature. Shelley sets outs actions that people can undertake in their attempts to mitigate the ongoing issue of human trafficking. The book is written in a way that encourages readers to go further into the issue, and Shelley provides avenues for them to do so through references to organisations, films, and literature. Given the somewhat ineffective and slow approach to mitigating human trafficking being taken as the issue slowly gains momentum in terms of literature and awareness, *Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective* represents a step in the right direction toward making issues surrounding the phenomenon more accessible and practically approachable for a wide variety of readers.

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[1] See Talbot, M. (1999) 'Against innocence: the truth about child abuse and the truth about children', *The New Republic*, 3 May 1999. Available at http://www.ipce.info/library_2/pdf/talbot_99.pdf [Accessed: 6 February 2016]; Anderson, B. and Andrijasevic, R. (2008) 'Sex, Slaves and Citizens: The Politics of Anti-Trafficking', *Soundings*, 40, pp. 135-45; and Weitzer, R. (2007) 'The Social Construction of Sex Trafficking: Ideology and Institutionalization of a Moral Crusade', *Politics Society*, 35 (3), pp. 447-74.

[2] See Keo, C. (2013) *Human Trafficking in Cambodia*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis; Nicola, A. (2013) 'Researching into Human Trafficking: Issues and Problems'. In: Lee, M. *Human Trafficking*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, pp. 49-73.

**Chuck Thiessen**

**Local Ownership of Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility for Sustainable Peace and Development**
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013, ISBN: 0739181564, 208p.

International peacebuilding operations have suffered a barrage of criticism in recent years for assuming inappropriate levels of control over local political processes and for attempting to foist externally designed models of action onto unwilling or under-prepared local populations. As consensus emerges that the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts depends on 'hybrid' arrangements that blend local and international elements together,[1] scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have been searching for ways to encourage more local ownership of peacebuilding. Local ownership is envisaged as the key to long-term popular legitimacy for the political changes which peacebuilding demands. Unfortunately, this pivotal issue has received scant attention beyond the level of rhetoric, and many local voices continue to be sidelined in war-torn societies where the international community is engaged.

In his highly readable new book – *Local Ownership of Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: Shouldering Responsibility for Sustainable Peace and Development* – Chuck Thiessen explores why local and international actors are 'still struggling [...] to define and implement an effective strategy that leads to significant advances in local Afghan control over peacebuilding prioritisation, project design, and evaluation' (p. 3). He offers practical policy advice and important theoretical insights to guide efforts at supporting local ownership. The book is based on a series of interviews with (primarily Afghani) peacebuilding leaders from government, civil society, international, and NGO backgrounds, and the author describes some of the under-reported realities of intervention, and the implications of handing over ownership of its various aspects to the control of different local actors. While the findings would perhaps benefit from corroboration by data from additional sources besides the featured interviews, the author's deferential treatment of participants and their perspectives allows the reader a rare opportunity to witness the sophistication of local analyses of the complex dilemmas impeding progress towards local ownership. It is these dilemmas which provide the structure for the book and which form the basis for Thiessen's own promising theoretical contribution, developed in the final chapter.

The first three of the book's six chapters set the stage for the bulk of the analysis, which unfolds in the volume's second half. After the first chapter's brief introduction to the topic of local ownership of peacebuilding, chapter two provides a thorough review of the academic literature on this issue. The chapter is structured according to a division between two competing schools of thought: the Western-driven '(neo)liberal' peacebuilding paradigm which insists on the universal applicability of certain norms and standards; and the as-yet-untested 'emancipatory' approach to peacebuilding, which favours locally sourced definitions of peace and progress. Both bodies of literature still wrestle with the question of who the 'locals' are, and what effects their 'ownership' would have on macro-level peacebuilding success. Chapter three provides an overview of several major historical trends in Afghanistan, illustrating the importance of a historical contextualisation for many of the difficulties faced by the current intervention. Decades of joining with adversaries and outside powers (or

playing them off against each other) have made Afghanistan's tribal groups very adept at surviving and influencing the machinations of foreign invaders, but the chapter also sounds a note of cautious optimism, pointing to periods of 'sustained peace and political and economic development' (p. 66) as proof that progress is eminently possible.

Chapter four identifies major roles for foreign actors in the provision of physical security; the supervision of political reform and capacity-building; and the delivery and coordination of aid. However, the chapter also highlights the limits of foreign interventionism, and Thiessen argues that international efforts have been tainted by waste and inefficiency, periodic abuses, mistrust for Afghani counterparts, and interference from regional spoilers, including elements within Pakistan and Iran. Likewise, chapter five outlines the strengths and weaknesses of various local actors as prospective peacebuilding partners. Thiessen draws distinctions between government and civil society actors, as well as between national-level (elite) Afghan ownership and more grass-roots (often rural) forms of ownership. The author then makes a compelling case for shifting the current priorities of civil society actors away from service delivery management, and more towards the provision of citizen advocacy and oversight of the government. Corruption, sectarianism, and the culture of impunity surrounding predatory 'warlords-turned-politicians' (p. 122) remain key barriers that prevent more effective local ownership and capacity building. It is surprising to see no real discussion of the impact of opium, organised crime, and the illegal economy,[2] but Thiessen's treatment of local stakeholders is otherwise very thorough.

The book's major theoretical contribution lies in reconceptualising local ownership, not as a means toward achieving better peacebuilding results, but as an actual dispute in its own right. Thiessen argues in chapter six that, as such, the ownership issue should be susceptible to management using existing tools of conflict resolution. Theorising local ownership in this way has the advantage of acknowledging the roles of multiple indispensible actors, all of which have legitimate perspectives on how to advance peacebuilding, and none of which should be allowed to dominate discussions at the expense of others. The author does an excellent job of canvassing these actors, and explaining the roles and limitations of each. The book would be an ideal core text for university area studies courses covering Afghanistan, or as supplemental reading for courses geared more generally towards peacebuilding interventions in the post-September 11th world. In a future edition, the work could reach a wider audience by exploring how the findings might be generalised to settings beyond Afghanistan.

As it stands, the book should already appeal to practitioners and policymakers in particular – Thiessen advocates '[entrusting] the creation of an appropriate peacebuilding space into the hands of a more inclusive and broadly participatory process such as a strategic "dispute resolution system" (DRS)' (p. 153) – a forum for planning a coordinated and locally owned strategy for peacebuilding. While Afghanistan has seen its fair share of aspiring coordinating bodies, and buy-in from local and international actors would be essential, the ethos of respectful, inclusive deliberation underpinning such a forum could be exactly what is needed to break the local ownership impasse. Whereas international stakeholders have been

wondering how to transfer ownership to local actors who fail to meet certain standards, Thiessen declines to provide answers, but offers a mindset and tools to allow local actors to provide their own collectively acceptable answers. He offers fairly detailed policy recommendations for supporting such a system with educational advances, advocacy services, and a non-violent dispute resolution procedure. Whether or not the proposals in the book prove to be workable in the Afghan context, Thiessen has taken an important step forward in setting a new frame for the conversation about local ownership of peacebuilding.

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[1] Richmond, O. and Mitchell, A. (2011) eds. *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; MacGinty, R. (2011) *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

[2] See, for example, Hodes, C. and Sedra, M. (2007) *The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan*. IISS Adelphi Papers, 391*.* London: Routledge.

**Thomas Matyók, Maureen Flaherty, Hamdesa Tuso, Jessica Senehi and Sean Byrne (eds.)**
**Peace on Earth: The Role of Religion in Peace and Conflict Studies**
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014, ISBN: 0739176285, 454p.

*Peace on Earth* undertakes the Sisyphean task of convening an academic discussion on religion's role in Peace and Conflict Studies (PACS). The stated aim of the volume is 'to demonstrate the varied ways by which religion can contribute to the creation of a less violent world built on a foundation of justice, through faith-informed conflict management, transformation, and reconciliation' (p. 1).

The book is divided into three parts and the first section – 'Peace and Conflict Studies in a Contextualized Place' – consists of three stage-setting chapters. After a general introduction in Chapter One, the second chapter contends that religion has the ability 'to drive the transformation of human establishments' and examples are cited across several faith traditions from recent centuries. Chapter Three discusses the concept of 'ahmisa', as developed by Gandhi, as a universal lens. In Chapter Four, Girard's mimetic construct is applied to Corinthians 1:13 in an attempt to nuance a holistic understanding of reconciliation. Imitative desires which yield reciprocal violence are replaced with an ethic of mutual care or 'blessing-based love' that delivers authentic and sustainable reconciliation.

Part Two is entitled 'Religions and Peace and Conflict Studies' and takes up fifteen chapters, the majority of the volume. Each contribution discusses religion with regard to a particular tradition, namely Catholic, Evangelical, Judaic, Islamic, indigenous African, Aboriginal Canadian, Mennonite, Quaker, Haitian Vodou, Eastern Orthodox Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Daoist, and Baha'i, and indigenous faiths more broadly are also discussed. According to the editor's introduction, each analysis of 'faith tradition contributions to the PACS field' sets out to address a number of issues: the key relevant teachings of that tradition; its role in contributing to conflict; and the role of the tradition in contributing to peacebuilding and conflict transformation. In practice, however, each chapter stands independent of this rubric and of its counterparts. Arguments range from the deleterious impact of Christian and Western influences on Canadian Aboriginal peoples, to the implications of indigenous African religion for peace and conflict studies and practice. The resulting anthology provides useful, if perhaps scattered, insights.

Part Three, 'The Way Forward: Four Faith Models', attempts to provide case studies. Chapter Twenty argues that the church is uniquely placed to make a contribution in a world in which conflicts are 'simultaneously local and international'; it is also able to 'integrate' peace and conflict studies 'in local understandings and methodologies', a nod to the development trend towards *local ownership* (p. 367). Chapter Twenty-One is refreshingly specific. It's academic author, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, distances peacebuilding in Islam from historical figures and calls for new research, and specifically the inclusion of work by Shi'a and Sunni scholars, to complement the often-cited, but not universally accepted, Sufi interpretations. Abu-Nimer is effectively asking other academics to be more practical and relevant. Chapter Twenty-Two explains the meaning of 'Peace on Earth' from an Anabaptist-Mennonite perspective. Chapter Twenty-Three provides an actual case study which describes the 'Oasis of Peace' community

established by a Catholic priest to promote Jewish-Arab relations; this community is now evolving into the World Peace College. It is worth noting that, while the idea of including religion in Peace and Conflict Studies seems new, the 'Oasis of Peace' has existed since 1972. Twenty-nine authors contribute to the twenty-three chapters here, with two more editors joining their voices with one of the previous contributors in the conclusion. While each writes with a unique perspective, and multiple academic disciplines are represented alongside varied practitioner experiences, three overarching points of view emerge as the volume progresses. The brief conclusion uses an agnostic and pragmatic voice, observing that 'Religion is a human creation' and a potential source for peacebuilding, tolerance, and coexistence (p. 418). This echoes the introduction which advised readers that 'It is foolish to ignore what is' (p. 6). Throughout the book, some authors manage to voice this pragmatic view without condescension, while others cannot contain themselves.

A second point of view, distinct but not necessarily mutually exclusive from the pragmatic one mentioned above, is expressed in a tone that is more apologetic in the philosophical sense: it rationalises that 'all of the great religions instruct people to forgive, reconcile, be tolerant, help heal, and advocate for the greater good' (p. 419). This view is expressed by many of the book's authors and is more closely aligned with 'The Charter for Compassion', 'A Common Word', and universalist movements: pluralism is accepted as normative and is promoted. In appealing to universality, however, some authors overreach pragmatic boundaries to make claims like the argument that 'spirituality is that which animates reconciliation' (p. 58). This second perspective is also problematic because it ignores the reality that many religious actors practice exclusivist particularism.

The most helpful perspective emerges where these two outlooks converge. Authors following this third line of enquiry suggest that religion is part of our human social construct; they also recognise that 'faith based actors are increasingly active in peacemaking and peacebuilding' (p. 367). Actors for whom religious identity and practice are part and parcel of their daily lives are at the frontlines of violence prevention, conflict transformation, and active peacebuilding. Herein lies the rub: as the editors note, the academic and policy relevance of religion to PACS and peacebuilding is new, but the role of religion and religiously motivated actors in conflict settings is as old as recorded history.

Yet a third voice looms in the background, less audible, though implicit and occasionally explicit in several of the articles; it aligns with Western national interests in its commitment to religious freedom and the democratisation agenda. Cormier reacts against Western influence in a discussion of the Aboriginal peoples in Canada: 'The emphasis of Western ideals within popular forms of peacebuilding undermines the cultural traditions of local communities and promotes modern versions of the civilized/savage dichotomy' (p. 174). Creamer and Hrynkow, by contrast, elevate Clinton Bennett's 'goal of bringing about a global democratic future', for which religion is a resource (p. 17). To draw on Redekop (Chapter Four), such a future risk developing into a state of ontological mimesis, an escalating spiral of tensions that will play out as a clash of civilizations, even as the book would like to counter that notion. Promoting religious freedom also happens to be, at present, a well-funded agenda.

This edited collection struggles to identify common threads in a complex debate, and the collection might have been more coherent if the contributors to Part Two had adhered to the pattern described in the introduction. Such a book would have been more encyclopedic but less authentic: the variety of opinions included here yield ideas that are more interesting. One of the great challenges within PACS discourse more generally, and one exacerbated in conversations about religion, is how to build vocabulary and establish terms that enable common conversation without alienating or violating those who use alternative discourses and this problem is acknowledged: 'One of the reasons why the language of reconciliation was not used in the social sciences for many years was its association with religion in general and Christianity in particular' (p. 61). Nevertheless, PACS discourses on religion will have to find a more unified vocabulary and ways of permitting divergence, especially with regard to something as heterogeneous as religion, while still encouraging conversation. The volume contains unhelpful phrases (e.g. 'well-established faith tradition[s]') which illustrate that the need to find appropriate language is a priority.

The editors of *Peace on Earth* are commendable for their ambition and for collating contributions from many gifted thinkers. As PACS research starts to take religion more seriously and acknowledges the long-standing contributions that have and can be made by religious traditions and religiously motivated actors, further volumes that focus on addressing the particular challenges raised here will be welcome.

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**Hakan Yılmaz and Çağla E. Aykaç (Eds.)**

**Perceptions of Islam in Europe: Culture, Identity and Muslim 'Other'**

London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012. ISBN 978 1 84885 164 1, 210pp.

On 7 January 2015, two Islamist gunmen forced their way into the Paris headquarters of the satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* and opened fire, killing twelve people and wounding eleven. Beyond a doubt, the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* was a criminal act, but there were also ideological motivations behind the attack which must be noted if we want to avoid generalized theories and simplistic explanations that blame a 'clash of civilizations' or 'cultural conflict'. Such paradigms, in which violence and extremism are seen to be inherent aspects of Islam, position it as a ground for 'breeding terrorism'. In those terms, Islam is seen as a religion based on extreme fanaticism which can be activated at the slightest provocation. The danger of such approach is that it overlooks the fact that terrorist and militant acts are not just the products of religious doctrines, but of political and economic conditions as well.

In light of those recent events, *Perceptions of Islam in Europe*, a collection of essays by leading European scholars, is timelier than ever. Hakan Yılmaz and Çağla E. Aykaç edited the volume, which explores interactions between Islam and Europe and proposes alternative ways to accommodate Muslims and Islam in European political and cultural systems. The first part of the book provides theoretical accounts and the second part deals with case studies. These studies move beyond the kinds of descriptive account which simply report on the problems that Muslim communities face in Europe.

The book's contributors present interesting, well-formulated, and thought-provoking research. They make important theoretical advances, while also exploring issues that at times reveal contradictions. Gerard Delanty opens the volume's theoretical section by suggesting that any rethinking of the nature of the relationship between Europe and Islam requires a re-evaluation of our perceptions of history. Delanty convincingly challenges the dominant perception of European modernity, which tends to gloss over the role that Islam played in the unfolding of Europe's history and formation. He suggests that, taking that role into consideration, we ought to rethink Europe through Islam. In the next essay, Deniz Kandiyoti returns to the problematic issue of essentialism in relation to religion, and, from the perspective of gender, poses the question: 'What are the stakes around defining Muslims in Europe as religious subjects?' (p. 34). She concludes that these stakes are too high for everyone in Europe and beyond and especially for women in minority communities. In a complex scenario in which various players are at odds over different political projects, a focus on religion alone both limits our perspectives and creates formidable obstacles.

The chapter written by Stephanos Pesmazoglu deals with nine interrelated and overlapping paradoxes, including liberal-democratic, culturalist, and strategic problematics. He discusses those constructions of European identity which have been affected by the use and abuse of Islam for specific political and ideological agendas (p. 29). However, for Pesmazoglu a double and multiple policy which has remained dominant down to the present day makes it impossible to 'rethink' both Europe and Islam. In the next chapter, Jeffrey Haynes examines the issue of Islam and globalisation and asks, 'How does globalisation change our

understanding of Islam?' Through this discussion, Haynes presents the challenges and opportunities inherent in that relationship. The final chapter of the theoretical section of the book, written by Sia Anagnostopoulou, deals with interrelations between Islam and the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and Greece and Cyprus on the other. This is an issue which has not received the attention it deserves, and Anagnostopoulou offers up thought-provoking analyses, skilfully exploring the instrumentalisation of religion and its appropriation by various interested parties (Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, and the great imperialist powers). She cites this instrumentalisation as the main factor driving the creation of identity in the region, and she examines concerns around this issue which were invoked in the transition from empire to nation-state in the fulfilment of the countries' respective political agendas.

The second section of the book begins with a chapter on the European Union (EU) written by Çağla E. Aykaç. Taking up the issue of discrimination, Aykaç challenges the ways in which Islam is seen in the EU and poses the essential question at the core of the issue at hand; she argues that if we want to move ahead, first and foremost we must ask 'whether and how the European Union "thinks" about itself in relation to Muslims and Islam' (p. 89). She identifies a series of issues that have proven to be highly problematic, such as a tendency to emphasise religion, culture, racism, immigration, security, and xenophobia. The rest of the essays include a case study of Poland contributed by Katarzyna Gorak-Sosnowska, a study of Germany by Gerdien Jonker, an analysis of the Netherlands by Welmoet Boender, an examination of Great Britain and Italy by Sara Silvestri, and lastly a case study of Turkey by Kenan Çayir. The wide range of issues discussed allows the collection to question and challenge dominant paradigms in all of these countries. The essays deal with a number of complex issues, such as the way Islam is imagined in German textbooks and debates about the training of imams in the Netherlands.  These chapters help to provide a comparative perspective which gives readers a fuller account of the processes and modes of encounters between Europe and Islam.

Although there are some weaknesses of language in some of the essays, these do not detract from the core arguments and the book is highly readable. While the essays approach the issue of Islam and Europe from different perspectives, they complement each other in a compelling manner, and the theoretical and case study sections of the book interact very successfully. Together, they demonstrate the legacy of centuries of European-Islamic interaction, and the (in)compatibility of Islamic and European values; they also put in front of Europe one of the most crucial questions it faces: will Europe in future adhere to its political-legal values or its cultural-religious values?

There is no doubt that the book will stimulate further debate and analyses, and it is one of those rare publications that makes a significant contribution to the heated and ongoing debates prevalent today. Given that the whole debate over Islam takes place in relation to Europe, one would think that there would be a common, united approach to the issue of Islam within it. However, what we notice – and this becomes evident, implicitly or explicitly, as the book progresses – is that the issue of Islam is and remains firstly a national concern, and is only secondarily a European issue. This collection helpfully illustrates this paradigm,

and, although it is perhaps not one of its primary concerns and is not mentioned outright, it forces us to reconsider the issue of Islam from a European Union perspective. In light of current events, all interested parties, and especially policymakers, would do well to consult the book before making political decisions that will have far-reaching ramifications. This major work is highly recommended for professionals and a general audience interested in Europe, Islam, secularism, gender, integration, multiculturalism, imperialism, assimilation, and globalization.

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**Gabrielle Rifkind and Giandomenico Picco**
**The Fog of Peace: The Human Face of Conflict Resolution**
London: I.B. Tauris, 2014, ISBN 978 1 78076 897 7, 265p.

Rifkind and Picco's book ambitiously sets out to link the realpolitik of conflict resolution with an understanding of the psychology of the human mind. It also examines how appreciation of the psychological factors that impact on leaders involved in violent conflict could enhance peace negotiations. The book achieves these ambitious aims and explores in detail how an increased recognition of the 'mind of the enemy' can facilitate Track One mediations and negotiations in seemingly intractable conflicts. The book echoes the work of John Paul Lederach in its discussions of engagement with the narrative of the enemy, and the role of the mediator in seeking to work with parties to restore this narrative. Unlike Lederach's book, however, this work focuses solely upon those undertaking Track One negotiations, and it explores more deeply how trauma and violence impact on the desire of leaders and their followers to engage in a peace process. The authors explore the steps necessary to enable enemies to come together in search of peace.

The book is divided into five sections. The first section gives a brief overview of the history and background of the two authors and the personal journeys they have undertaken to reach their common approach and understanding of Track One conflict resolution. After this personal and engaging account, the second section looks specifically at the psychology of conflict. It gives examples from the Israel-Palestine conflict, Afghanistan, and Iran, and includes those opportunities which have been missed, as well as successful negotiations achieved. It offers an interesting exploration of the factors that continue to contribute to some of the most intractable conflicts in the current global context. In this regard, it gives a fascinating insight into the world of Track One mediation. The section on Afghanistan is particularly cogent and well-analysed, and offers a viable alternative to the response that the US and UK made to the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The authors highlight the need to include all parties in negotiations rather than to act hastily and so potentially exclude some of the main stakeholders in a conflict (p. 85).

Section three examines the changing nature of wars and includes discussions of the use of cyber-warfare and drone technology. It critiques the role of the military-industrial complex in the promotion and proliferation of armed conflict, and it contrasts this with the concept of non-violent action drawing specific examples from the Arab uprising with particular reference to Egypt. This section continues by considering the role that Track One mediation can play in potential conflicts when it is deployed far earlier than is the current norm; Rifkind and Picco postulate that early intervention in Syria may have altered the course of that conflict which has now deteriorated into sectarian violence. Section four analyses the changing nature of the world and government structures in the face of globalisation, mass communication, and a growth in 'people power'. This section focuses on the changing nature of identity and the increase in identity conflicts which have occurred as a result of this phenomenon. It examines the role of a 'more localised' approach to identity, and discusses how this can fit into a tolerant and pluralistic society as opposed to some of the violent nationalist and sectarian conflicts that have arisen. Although identity conflicts have been covered more

comprehensively elsewhere, the authors' approach allows for the consideration both of the impact of globalisation and new technology on identity, and of how these factors contribute to civil unrest.

The final section of *The Fog of Peace* reflects on the state of mind that is necessary for political leaders when they sit around a negotiation table to discuss a peace process. It concludes by calling on leaders to develop their self-awareness so that they can better understand what motivates them towards conflict or towards peace. This section highlights the need for mediators and the institutions seeking peace to provide safe spaces, and time for reflection and the building of trust, in order to enable and sustain viable peace processes.

The book leaves the reader feeling encouraged that there are viable alternatives to military intervention in nation states, which may well include early intervention systems; it also highlights the fact that there are groups of trained, culturally sensitive mediators available and able to respond appropriately to developing conflict situations. However, it also leaves the reader feeling frustrated and angry at the opportunities for peace that have been lost as a result of a change of government administration or the intractability of opposing leaders who have chosen to ignore or spurn opportunities to open channels of communication.

*The Fog of Peace* is a book clearly aimed at those involved in Track One diplomacy, in governments and in international organisations such as the United Nations. It challenges leaders to think again about military interventions, and to consider engaging with different worldviews and understandings to promote peaceful relations rather than holding entrenched positions. My concern for this work is how many leaders, government officials, and UN representatives will read it and concur with the approaches suggested: will the dictates of the machinery of government and multi-lateral institutions be such that it is considered a worthy idea but unrealistic? In their afterword, the authors conclude that

> Humanity has the tools to build something new, the question is, where are those individuals, indeed leaders, with the courage to fill the white pages of the future creatively, instead of repeating the past? (p. 245)

I fear that this timely, well-written, and challenging book will largely be ignored while governments consider it more expedient to send countless men and women into armed conflict settings rather than learn to relate to those from different worldviews and backgrounds when conflicts arise.

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Book Review

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# Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security