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

# Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

**Special Issue:**

**Palestinian Young People after Oslo: Resistance and Cooperation**

**Edited by**
**Professor Alpaslan Özerdem**

# Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

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# Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

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


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2018

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Special Issue:
Palestinian Young People after Oslo: Resistance and Cooperation

# Five generations after the Balfour Declaration: How do Palestinians Resist and Engender Significant Social Change?

By Patricia Sellick*

## The context of Israeli expansion and Palestinian dispossession

Over the past year, a series of anniversaries has occurred which marks the progressive dispossession and displacement of the Palestinians. One hundred years ago, on 2 November 1917, the British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour wrote to Lord Rothschild "a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations", which stated that the British government viewed "with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people". Seventy years ago, in 1947, the United Nations adopted the partition plan which divided the territory of Mandate Palestine into two political communities, one Jewish and one Arab, and the move paved the way for the foundation, not just of a national home for the Jews, but for the nation state of Israel. Fifty years ago, in 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Seen together, these anniversaries can be understood to mark not three separate events but rather a continuing process of Israeli expansion and Palestinian dispossession.

Against this background, I write the introduction to this special issue aware that hope for equality between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis is in scarce supply. The articles presented here speak to the dynamic relationship between unequal power relations and the actions of the generation of Palestinians who are now young adults in Israel, the occupied Palestinian territory, and in the diaspora.

Four or five generations have been born since the Balfour Declaration. The Palestinian authors in this special issue belong to the generation that has become known as the isolated or post-Oslo generation. This is a generation of Palestinians who have grown

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up cut off from each other, not only by the wars of 1948 and 1967, but also by the Israeli and Egyptian siege of the Gaza Strip and the building of the Separation Wall in 2004. The Israeli-built Separation Wall severs Palestinian villages from their agricultural land and the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. The authors who have contributed to this issue have been unable to travel freely across the entirety of the territory of Mandate Palestine, and their writing necessarily reflects this. At the same time, since the articles are written from different points of access, together they could be said to construct an imagined political community which is not defined by physical borders.

### Power in its plural forms, resistance and cooperation

The Palestinian authors represented in this special issue have all had to comply with limitations on their freedom of movement. Palestinian citizens of Israel who hold Israeli passports are denied entry to those States that do not recognize Israel. Palestinians from the Gaza Strip have been living under siege from both Israel and Egypt since 2007, with minimal opportunities to travel unless they have been granted a rare permit for work, study, or medical purposes. Compliance with this zero-sum first dimension of power has determined not only where the Palestinian research students published in this journal conduct their research but also the sources to which they have access. The UK researcher who visited both Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory confined his research to the West Bank because of the difficulties involved in gaining Israeli permission to enter the Gaza Strip.

In addition to compliance with the usually zero-sum first dimension of power, the authors have also engaged with the two-dimensional power of the structures of Israeli society. As Gaventa and Cornwall have shown, power operates through knowledge production to perpetuate asymmetries and prevent grievances from entering the political arena.[1] By publishing the work of Palestinian researchers who have deliberately sought out evidence of resistance to the deeply unequal power relations between Israel and the Palestinians, this special issue expands participation in the knowledge production process to new actors and counteracts the prevailing mobilization of bias.[2] The first article is written by Nijmeh Ali, a Palestinian activist born and raised in Israel. She observes the irony of the way in which Palestinians living within Israel, a political entity which they wished had not come into being, campaigned for full citizenship. They complied with the two-dimensional power of the structures of Israeli society in order to gain permanent status and resist becoming refugees.[3]

Cooperation with prevailing power relations is often a necessary, practical response to an overwhelming situation. The article by Casey Davison O'Brien, who is positioned as an outsider to the two groups of Palestinians he interviews, is a reminder of the complexity and diversity of experience, ranging from cooperation to resistance, which exists within the Palestinian population. Davison O'Brien explores the often uneasy and under-explored relationship between Palestinian youth who grow up in Israel and their peers who grow up in the West Bank. After 70 years, the structural constraints of Israeli society, which entail inclusion and exclusion, have become part of the natural order of things for the current generation of Palestinians living in Israel, and they take it for granted that they are more economically affluent than their peers in the West Bank. Davison O'Brien's research reveals that, over time, Palestinians who live much of their lives in Israel have changed their behaviour and ideologies, assimilating the dominant culture's norms, even to the extent that they unconsciously mix Hebrew language with their Arabic, a practice that makes evident and creates cultural distances between them and their Palestinian contemporaries in the West Bank. Davison O'Brien found that this third dimension of power only became apparent to the Palestinians living in Israel he interviewed when they encountered Palestinians living in the West Bank.

Yousef Al Jamal and Ahmed Tannira, both from the Gaza Strip, have interviewed Palestinian students living in the United States, Canada, and Europe about their participation in the Palestinian boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement launched in 2005. They

examine why Palestinian young people living in the diaspora have adopted BDS as a tool of nonviolent resistance. Like Nijmeh Ali, these two authors are interested not only in the resistance these students carry out in relation to Israeli structures of domination but also in the challenge that the younger generation of activists pose to the established Palestinian political hierarchy.

### The power of global solidarity

This brings me to the fourth dimension of power and the question as to what kind of subject is being produced by participation in a global resistance movement. I would suggest that one of the reasons for the appeal of the BDS call among diasporic Palestinians is that it adopts a human rights framework which is emancipatory. Yousef Al Jamal and Ahmed Tannira learn from their interviews that, through their activism, Palestinian students in the US, Canada and the United Kingdom were integrated within a global Palestinian diaspora and were encouraged to educate themselves about what it meant to be Palestinian. They also became part of a global solidarity movement made up of Palestinian, Israeli, and international allies. As Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon note, "The issue is simultaneously one of form and of substance. When in a given situation the existing forms of human rights mobilizations do not help undo domination, human rights activists should reconceptualize and reframe the struggle".[4] Rather than limiting itself to solving individual human rights cases within the Israeli court systems, the BDS movement deploys human rights to challenge the very structures of those courts. By invoking parallels with the pass laws of apartheid in South Africa and the segregated system of the pre-civil rights era in the US, the BDS movement not only calls on people to withdraw their economic support from a particular company, but also to withdraw support from a system which is morally wrong.[5] The BDS movement appeals to "people of conscience" and to popular more than diplomatic support and thus it mobilizes human rights while at the same time decoupling them from the nation state system. The movement has reframed the struggle by being inclusive of Palestinian refugees (widening its appeal amongst the diaspora); calling for an end to the military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and, most importantly, insisting on equal rights. How those equal rights can be embodied in the current international system of States is not defined. Nevertheless, the principles of the BDS movement make it clear that in the desired future the movement aspires to help implement, both Palestinians and Israelis will be constructed as State subjects by political and social practices which reflect equality. To achieve this goal, not only the significant imbalances in the control of military power and taxation but also the micro-practices involved in the social interactions of daily life will need to be transformed.

While I began by saying that the research presented here is set against the background of Israeli expansion and the progressive dispossession and displacement of the Palestinians, the articles all focus on Palestinian agency and they tell what Bayat calls "the story of agency in times of constraints".[6] Bayat suggests that the story of agency has within it the potential to produce dramatic change in power relations. More research is necessary to explore "how these ordinary and often quiet practices by […] ordinary and often silent people engender significant social changes".[7] A clearer understanding of these practices will increase the capacity of this new generation of scholar activists to undo and transform asymmetric power relations.

## Notes

1. Gaventa and Cornwall, "Power and Knowledge", 174.
2. Pappé, Ilan, *The Idea of Israel*.
3. Haugaard, "Rethinking the Four Dimensions of Power".
4. Perugini, N. et al, *The Human Right to Dominate*, 138.
5. Atack, I., *Nonviolence in Political Theory*, 141.
6. Dunsky, "Alternative Narrative of Palestinian Resistance".
7. Bayat, A., *Life as Politics*, 56, ix.

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Bayat, A., *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2010.

Dunsky, M., "Alternative Narrative of Palestinian Resistance Flips the Script on Ways of Seeing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *Journal of Political Power*, Vol. 10, No 1, 2017, p.115-118.

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# Lifestyle of resistance: Palestinian *Sumud* in Israel as a form of transformative resistance

By Nijmeh Ali*

**Abstract:** Sumud, the concept most frequently employed to describe the daily reality experienced by Palestinians in Israel, translates as steadfastness and refers to a form of infrapolitics or everyday resistance. It describes a stubborn insistence on continuing with life despite all obstacles, but it can also suggest that resistance involves reactive actions carried out by weak people. "Everyday resistance" can also encompass a lifestyle in which resistance is understood as both a "value" and a "behaviour", one in which opposition is focused, not just on Israeli power structures, but also on the internal Palestinian power structures that affect Arab society in Israel. This article investigates how this expanded definition contributes to an understanding of both Palestinian behaviour in Israel and the internal and external challenges Palestinians face in their struggle for freedom, equality, and change within Israel and Palestinian society more generally. The paper contributes to the exploration both of the challenges young Palestinians face in Israel and the potential role of resistance in constructing transformative processes.

**Key words:** Everyday resistance, Neopatriarchy, Palestinians in Israel, Young Palestinians in Israel.

* Nijmet Ali is a Doctoral student at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies of the University of Otago. The current paper is part of PhD research project that explores the hidden potential of Palestinian resistance in Israel.

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# Lifestyle of resistance: Palestinian *Sumud* in Israel as a Form of Transformative Resistance

## Researching the Palestinians in Israel

Writing about resistance and Palestinians is not new. Rich research already exists that focuses on how Palestinians make use of forms of armed and unarmed resistance; however, this rich research is not complete.[1] Most of it focuses on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while their counterparts in Israel are excluded from Palestinian political discourse and from resistance research; this exclusion owes its origins to the geographical fragmentation of the Palestinians and to questions about "who is a Palestinian?" that intensified after the Oslo Accord in 1993 when *Felastin* was reduced geographically to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The group discussed in this article, Palestinians in Israel, was effectively marginalized. The work of writing about the Palestinians in Israel does not simply involve telling their story, which is important; it also contributes to the action of locating them in the political discourse of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This action can challenge their exclusion from peace negotiations and add depth to the understanding of the conflict. Jamil Hilal, who has written about "Reclaiming the Palestinian Narrative",[2] has pointed out that the dominant political literature on the Palestinian question is permeated by misrepresentations of the history, geography, and identity of the Palestinian people. If the occupation of Palestine in 1967 is considered as a starting point for the conflict, then there is no need for anyone to examine responsibility for the historic injustice that was inflicted on the Palestinian people in 1948, but no genuine reconciliation can be achieved without an acknowledgment of the *Nakba*. Only if the *Nakba* is taken as a starting point will all Palestinians be taken into consideration in future political agreements or negotiations. Their inclusion is vital if a path is to be constructed towards a true reconciliation rather than a temporary "ceasefire".

Research on the Palestinians in Israel is both dynamic and politicized. Academic infrastructure in Israel was mobilized in the service of the Jewish State's ideology, and this has worked to erase Palestinian memory and presence.[3] Close investigation shows that three theoretical schools of research have shaped most of the research in relation to Palestinians in Israel. First, classic modernization theory was employed to explain the minority's status by emphasizing its internal, cultural, and psycho-social characteristics;[4] this kind of research presented the Palestinian minority as primitive and non-modern in order to justify and legitimize the existence of Israel, which was associated with beneficial, modern, and enlightened characteristics. This view still helps to justify superior-inferior relations between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians in Israel, and is used to imply that Palestinians will never become modern unless they are de-Palestinianized and de-Arabized.[5] The dominance of modernization theory cannot be examined without mention of Samuel Noah Eisenstadt from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, whose students examined Palestinians in Israel and Jewish immigrants from Arab countries (the *Mizrahim*); Eisenstadt's students suggested that these groups offered classical case studies of communities that had successfully modernized and westernized, thanks to their life in Israel.[6] Modernization theory, which ignores the role of power and hegemonic relationships between Palestinians and Jewish people in Israel, shaped the first efforts to research Palestinians, and these studies illustrate how the method, topic of research, and the researchers' own political approaches have contributed to the silencing of Palestinians in Israel as political actors.

Challenges to the modernization approach emerged in the 1980s from outside Israeli academia and were mainly posed by Palestinian scholars who were citizens in Israel and familiar with the contradictory reality of the Palestinians' life in Israel. Elia Zureik's pioneering 1979 work *The Palestinian in Israel: A Study of Internal Colonialism* represented the first Palestinian research to analyse the Palestinian minority within the framework of political sociology, and it identified Palestinians as an ethnic-national group surviving within a colonialist model. Zureik applied a Marxist dependency theory framework in order to interpret state-minority relations and argued that the modernization perspective, which idealized the Zionist project, was a project of colonization in which state-minority relations created a situation of internal colonialism.[7] Zureik's work created a legacy, not only because of the theoretical challenges it posed, but also because it suggested that critical analysis of Israel was legitimate at a time when any criticism of Israel's policies was silenced and labelled as anti-Semitic.[8]

The third school emerged via the politicization of the conclusions of the study of the collective identity of Palestinians in Israel. The first works on the identity question focused on the tension between Arabic national identity and Israeli civic identity and on the psychological mechanisms, linked to the modernization process, that allowed the coexistence of these contradictory identities. Focusing on political changes in the collective identity of Palestinian citizens, Rekhess developed his Palestinianization and radicalization thesis.[9] In his view, the union of Palestinian identity in terms of political extremism leads to the delegitimization of the State by Palestinian citizens and to the blurring of the distinction between the civic struggle for equality inside Israel and the national struggle for liberation in the occupied territories.[10] Sammy Smooha opposed the radicalization thesis and criticized its assumption that the two components of identity it singles out – the civic-Israeli and the national-Palestinian – exclude one another. In its place, he proposed a politicization model which regards the two identity components as independent of each other,[11] a move that indicates a parallel strengthening of both the national and the civic components of identity. Smooha saw the politicization process as representing the will of the Palestinians to participate actively and autonomously in the Israeli public space, without abandoning their national Palestinian identity.[12] He rejected the distinction made in the radicalization thesis between political activism and radicalism and pointed out that the failure to distinguish between politicization and radicalization reflects the attitude of the Jewish majority, which considers any autonomous political activity by Palestinians as radical and illegitimate.[13] However, all of these research schools still view Palestinians in Israel only as powerless people who are subjected to the State power structure due to their national affiliation, something that leads researchers to concentrate in their research on Palestinians' civic status in Israel. Different theoretical models have been developed for researching Palestinians in Israel, such as the "cultural diversity model",[14] the "diversified citizenship model",[15] the "ethnic democracy" model,[16] and the "ethnocratic system".[17] Approaches based on a "settler-colonial"[18] dichotomy or the "politics of indignity"[19] were adopted by critical scholars as the primary research frameworks for studying the Palestinians in Israel.

In this paper, I suggest an additional angle to this research by taking into consideration the potential role that Palestinians in Israel can play in shaping Palestinian resistance and transforming power structures. Furthermore, I suggest that "everyday resistance" theory is valuable as an analytical framework for exploring another aspect of the political behaviour of Palestinians in Israel. To explore this further, it is important to explore the concept of *Sumud* as a way of describing a repertoire of everyday resistance, and it is also important to capture its gaps and the contribution a new assessment of it can make to an understanding of Palestinian resistance.

### *Sumud*

The concept of *Sumud* as steadfastness finds its roots originally in Islam.[20] However, *Sumud* emerged as a political term in the Palestinian context during the 1970s and 1980s, when it

was used by the PLO to emphasize the importance of maintaining a physical presence on the land in the face of Israeli policies that were working to carry out a policy that can be understood as a kind of "silent ethnic cleansing".[21] Firstly, they sought to empty and reconstruct the geographical space; secondly, they worked to impose different means of control over Palestinians' daily lives; and thirdly, they made it hard for Palestinians to continue with the lives available to them. *Sumud* was adopted as the term that described their right to remain on the land, their need to resist forced expulsions, and their commitment to have many children who would continue the struggle for liberation and independence.[22] This understanding of *Sumud* has been criticized as a form of "passive non-resistance focusing on survival only",[23] but conceptualizations of *Sumud* vary. It can be understood as an attitude, a cultural trait, or an "inward-directed" life stance.[24] *Sumud,* in other words, represents an ability to live in the shadow of loss and calamity. Richter-Devroe conceptualizes *Sumud* as a social practice and a form of everyday and non-violent resistance.[25] Raja Shehadeh, a Palestinian lawyer and activist, adds the dimension of political strategy when he describes it as representing a "third way" that takes the form of neither armed struggle nor passive acceptance.[26] *Sumud* is often used to describe Palestinians' inner strength,[27] particularly in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) and in the refugee camps.

Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation is usually understood within the framework of two major uprisings – the first and the second *Intifada* (1987-1991 and 2001-2003)[28] – but this approach creates two gaps: first, it excludes the *Sumud* of the Palestinians in Israel who live in part of Mandatory Palestine that was occupied in 1948 but is not included in the "occupied Palestinian territories" for political reasons; secondly, the linking of resistance to specific Palestinian events pushes out other forms of resistance in Palestinian daily life, something that may prevent us from gaining a deep understanding of oppressed people's resistance strategies. A desire to explore these two gaps informs this paper. It aims firstly to locate Palestinians in Israel within Palestinian resistance research by introducing their *Sumud*; and, secondly, it seeks to contribute to a greater understanding of the power of everyday resistance as a transformative force by exploring that *Sumud* and its potential to challenge internal and external power structures.

Palestinians in Israel generally label *Sumud* as cultural resistance.[29] Culture is understood here in two ways: firstly, culture, with a small "c", represents a set of values, norms, and patterns of actions that people follow, and secondly, in its artistic sense, culture refers to a physical phenomenon or artefact; for example, a piece of graffiti, or styles of music, dress, or speaking.[30] These divisions are interesting because they reflect and at the same time shape our thinking and behaviour, and so, as Stephen Duncombe states, "They are the Culture of resistance culture".[31] Scott views culture as a political space, the backyard of the weak, which offers room "off stage" for the release of anger, emotions, ideas, and opinions that cannot appear in public.[32] In Scott's terms, culture becomes a space where the weak can present their hidden truth. This idea suggests that culture can contribute to an understanding of the kinds of resistance expressed by the weak and of the different stages of resistance. This article suggests that Hall's characterization of culture as a behaviour and product and Scott's understanding of culture as a political space are both important to an interpretation of the lifestyle of resistance for Palestinians in Israel.

At the current moment, research into Palestinian cultural resistance (styles of art, music, graffiti, and dress, for example) is more popular than research into a "culture of resistance", or what I call the "lifestyle of resistance" that presents resistance as a value that constructs a political behaviour. However, when attention is paid to the dynamic role of culture in enabling transformative resistance to develop, it enables the examination of resistance in relation to different factors such as age, gender, and class. This article will go on to discuss this possibility in relation to the case of young Palestinians in Israel, who resist both the Israeli power structure and the internal power structures of Palestinian society. I will suggest that transformative resistance creates room for the kind of "healthy criticism" which can

develop, reconstruct, and give a revolutionary spirit to the political life of Palestinians in Israel.

### Resistance theory and everyday resistance - theoretical considerations

This section presents the analytical framework of the paper and analyses the potential of everyday resistance for revealing the political behaviour of Palestinians, and particularly young Palestinians, in Israel. Resistance theory helps to unmask the complexity of power relations in society in general, and in the politics of the subaltern in particular, by telling us that there is no one type of resistance or universalized form of struggle. Local resistance, understood as both context and experience, should be recognized as an independent and significant site of resistance; organized collective action may not be possible everywhere for a variety of different reasons, and so other forms of resistance must be discovered and acknowledged. Early work on resistance focused on large protests, movements, and revolutions which confronted their targets directly and openly, and this research took it for granted that resistance is visible and can be easily recognized and classified as such. However, James Scott's research on peasant politics challenged this definition by introducing the theoretical concept of "everyday resistance" to cover forms that were neither as dramatic or visible as riots, revolutions, civil wars, or any other forms of collective, organized, or confrontational activity.[33] Everyday resistance is quiet, dispersed, disguised, or invisible and constitutes what Scott calls "infrapolitics".

The theory of "everyday resistance" focuses on how people act in their daily lives in ways that challenge dominant power relations.[34] Scott moved away from structuralism as he studied the political behaviour of the peasantry in Asia, and he adopted an ethnographic method to focus on individual reactions and behaviours that contributed to this shift. Research associated with poststructuralism helped to make micropolitics and "everyday resistance" popular. The theory of everyday resistance tries to explain the puzzle posed by the fact that weak people are apparently silent when they face the impoverishment and exploitation imposed on them by more powerful social groups. Everyday resistance is capable of generating everyday politics; and the infrequency of mass social resistance does not mean that resistance is absent from everyday politics. The theory suggests that the calm faces of the weak hide genuine rage, distrust, and antipathy to the oppressors, and this quiet resistance can result in revolution.[35] Moreover, everyday resistance is "not a peasant monopoly",[36] but exists as a form of expression that is available to all kinds of subalterns.[37] The concept of "everyday resistance" has been expanded to explain resistance in the workplace, the family, and queer communities, and researchers study forms of everyday resistance expressed not only by specific categories of people, such as women, migrants, and peasants, but also sometimes "new agents" such as white-power activists.[38] Kerkvliet explains that the theory of everyday resistance moved research beyond the trivial and popular view of traditional politics by bringing to the analysis several, previously missing, but politically significant elements of social change.[39]

"Everyday resistance" theory offers an important route into the analysis of resistance by young Palestinian people. It allows researchers to give a human face to resistance by highlighting everyday lived experiences, and it also helps to identify different levels of uneven power relations, which can be used to develop a properly nuanced picture.[40] A focus on everyday resistance unmasks a society's internal power structure, and so can make a significant contribution to efforts to explore the challenges young Palestinians face in their everyday lives. Lilja and Vinthagen point out that not all resistance succeeds, and it can instead reproduce relations of dominance.[41] Their insight raises questions about how far everyday resistance effects and restructures power relations. This article pursues David Jeffress's suggestion that resistance can alternatively be conceptualized as "transformation".[42] Jeffress understands "transformational resistance" as an effort to transform social relations, rather than as a reactive movement.[43] This raises questions, first,

about how power structures can be negotiated or resisted; second, how Palestinians in Israel use everyday resistance to construct a lifestyle of resistance; and, third, how a lifestyle of resistance is important for transformative resistance and for promoting internal change at social and personal level.

Scott's insight into the everyday resistance of infrapolitics contributes to our understanding of the alternative spaces that the powerless or weak create so that they can act safely and freely within existing power structures. However, Bayat challenges Scott's idea of powerful spaces and argues that agency is in fact the "space" which enables acts of everyday resistance. Bayat suggests understanding "resistance" through the existence of power and counter-power, not in binary opposition, but in a complex, decoupled, and ambivalent relationship.[44] This understanding is based on the Foucauldian idea that "wherever there is power, there is resistance".[45] Much of the literature of resistance is based upon Foucault's insight that power is everywhere, "circulates", and is never "localized here and there, never in anybody's hands".[46] Foucault's ideas challenged the powerlessness of ordinary people, recognizing their agency and their political role, and there is no doubt that the acknowledgment of the agency of subjects, who were previously dismissed as "the passive poor", "submissive women", "apolitical peasants", and "oppressed workers", released the weak from their powerless positions, and has contributed to the recognition of the need to attend to everyday resistance.[47] Certainly, the idea that the powerless have power and Bayat's understanding of agency offer opportunities to cast new light on the potential ability of Palestinians in Israel to transform their current power positions.

The theory of everyday resistance provides another perspective in efforts to understand political behaviour at the grassroots level. It identifies the regular practices, as well as the unrecognized, disguised, and anonymous acts that are employed by the weakest members of a society to undermine existing power structures. Yet, the value of everyday resistance theory faces a major challenge because the concept can easily be overextended. One way to tackle this challenge is to define each act of everyday resistance according to its potential to undermine hegemonic power relations, an approach that also helps draw attention to visible and more subtly expressed internal power structures. This approach can, for example, help unmask the internal challenges that prevent young Palestinians from gaining leadership positions. However, the Palestinians in Israel, including the young, are challenging the hegemonic Zionist narrative (intentionally or not) by continuing their lives, their stories, their names, their dreams, and most of all their existence and development as a people. Thus, I view everyday resistance as a theory that offers hope to powerless people, not only because it recognizes the power of the powerless, but also because it constructs the hope of change by preventing the victims from "sinking" under their victimization. In the following section, I explore the ways in which the *Nakba* persists, not just as an event, but as an actual living "context" which makes every expression of Palestinian identity a de facto act of resistance.

### The everyday life of *Nakba* and the idea of "*Mankubin*"

The defining event in Palestinian people's memories and lives is the *Nakba*, which is the disaster that befell the Palestinian people in 1948. Between 770,000 and 780,000 Palestinian inhabitants of 532 towns and villages, whose land had accounted for 92.6 per cent of the area that became Israel, were made refugees.[48] While *Nakba* has been translated into English as "catastrophe", "disaster", or "calamity", these translations do not present a full understanding of the active implications of its Arabic meaning. English also has limitations when translating *mankubin*, unless we can stretch the language a bit and call Palestinians a "catastrophed" or "disastered" people,[49] who live in ways that reflect the consequences of the *Nakba*; some as refugees, some under occupation, and some under the discriminatory Israeli regime.

The *mankubin* reality affects many aspects of Palestinian lives. Regular and simple issues such as collecting mountain herbs became patriotic symbols of the lost homeland and part of a

battle for Palestinian existence. Thus, Palestinians are resisting attempts to localize the *Nakba* in the past and describe it as a finished event rather than an ongoing reality. As Joseph Massad states, "This is not an epistemological struggle but a lively political one".[50] Mahdi 'Amil's famous claim that "you are not defeated, as long as you resist"[51] reflects the *mankubin* reality by rejecting any attempts to push the *Nakba* into the past. In these terms, each annual commemoration of the *Nakba* also marks one more year of resisting it. This explains the Israeli reaction to the *Nakba* commemorations which culminated with the Knesset approving the "Basic Budget Law" (Amendment No 40), nicknamed the "*Nakba* Law", in 2011. The law allows for the "suspension or lessening of government funding for bodies that support action against principles of the state",[52] and it targets Palestinians in Israel by delegitimizing their collective memory. In this context, the everyday life of Palestinian citizens has become a confrontation zone in which the conflict takes a variety of different forms. It is not restricted to land confiscations or house demolitions, but is also conducted via the telling of the story of the place itself. Palestinian existence and culture, including stories, dancing, literature, art, and traditions pose a challenge both to Zionist hegemony and the Israeli denial of Palestinian people's existence, and so every aspect of life that reflects a sense of Palestinian memory or belonging becomes a process of everyday resistance. Some scholars view this kind of activity as a form of cultural resistance. I suggest extending the political role of culture by viewing it as a transformative form of resistance that shapes political behaviour among the Palestinians in their everyday resistance.

As a result of the *Nakba*, Palestinians in Israel witnessed the collapse of Palestinian society and the exile of most Palestinians including the Palestinian elite. Kimmerling and Migdal view the Palestinians who remained in their homeland as powerless and traumatized.[53] These people were left as a body without a head when the people who had offered them social, commercial, and political leadership became refugees outside of Palestine. As I noted earlier, powerlessness and victimization are the dominant tropes in research which focuses on Palestinians in Israel, but if the concept of "resistance" is employed in research into the lives of Palestinians in Israel, new ways of understanding their calamity and loss start to emerge. After the *Nakba*, Palestinians in Israel adopted resistance as a lifestyle which allowed them to retain their Palestinian lifestyles and identities in the shadow of their great defeat. My grandmother Amneh, who witnessed the *Nakba*, told me, "There was no time and place to cry, the only thing that was important was how to continue from here".[54] Rather than sinking under their victimization, Palestinians in Israel started to organize themselves politically and socially. Their experience opens the door for an exploration of how forms of resistance relate to power structures in an everyday life of confrontation. The tension between minority-majority, individual-collective, and private-public identities actually shaped the development of political behaviour for the Palestinians in Israel, and, in the next section, these conflicted identities will be carefully considered to enable a deep understanding of *Sumud* and resistance.

### *Sumud* and resistance in the shadow of Israel

Before the Palestinians in Israel can be evaluated in terms of resistance research, attention must be paid to the historical contexts that shaped the development of *Sumud*. This section presents a description of Palestinian life in Israel and introduces key resistance events, including different forms of resistance that can be identified as *Sumud*, and their effects on Palestinian political behaviour.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is among the most longstanding and complicated conflicts of the modern era. It began at the end of the 19th century as a struggle between the Zionist movement and the national Palestinian movement over the same land. The battle peaked in 1948 when the Zionist movement won the war and established the State of Israel. For the Palestinians, this event, known as the *Nakba*, marked the collapse of their national dream and has become the defining event in their individual and collective lives.[55]

Before 1948, approximately 1.4 million Palestinians and nearly 620,000 Jews lived in the territory of Palestine. After the war, only 156,000 Palestinians remained in the new-born State of Israel. Israel found itself dealing with Palestinians who were, until 1948, an integral part of Palestinian and Arab resistance to the colonial project of the Zionist movement.[56] Before 1948, Palestinian resistance actors had combined elements of violent and non-violent protest, and this pattern was reflected in the 1936-1939 revolt which took the form of a national uprising against the British colonial mandate in Mandatory Palestine. However, after the 1948 war, which was an open, violent, and direct confrontation, Palestinians became minority citizens in an "enemy" State that was in conflict with them and the Arab nation with which they identified. Furthermore, they were perceived by Israeli governments and the Jewish majority as a "hostile minority", "fifth column", "security risk", and a "demographic bomb".[57] Dan Rabinowitz defines Israel's Palestinians as a "trapped minority" – part of a larger group spread across at least two States – and as citizens of a State hegemonized by others, who are unable to influence public interests. At the same time, Palestinians in Israel are marginalized within their mother nation.[58] As a result of these dramatic changes, and given the lack of political leadership, it seems that the adoption of open resistance strategies was not an option.

The early years of Israel's formation as a State had the biggest influence on the individual and collective memories of its Palestinian citizens. The period was defined by military rule, which was imposed in the areas where Palestinians lived on 21 October 1948, and was based on the Defence (Emergency) Regulations established by the British Mandate in 1945. These regulations limited Palestinians' freedom of movement and expression.[59] The governor had the rights to arrest people without a warrant and detain them without trial, control their movements, and expel them from their houses. He could also close schools, businesses, and newspapers, and prohibit demonstrations or protests.[60] Military rule was the central Israeli institutional mechanism that shaped the lives of Palestinian citizens of Israel and "Palestinians were transformed from being the owners of the place, into strangers in it".[61] This did not prevent them from perceiving themselves as an indigenous national minority that remained in its homeland, Palestine, after its great defeat and the establishment of Israel in 1948.[62] Therefore, the Palestinians' first struggle in Israel focused on the question of citizenship. Ironically, Israeli citizenship was seen to offer permanent status to those Palestinians who resisted by all means the fate of becoming refugees. *Baka'* – which translates as "remaining in Palestine despite the new owners", and a name that was given to the place in addition to the reconstructing of geography and society – is considered as a form of *Sumud*. Yet, full citizenship did not guarantee full equality in the Jewish State. Two basic laws define the status of Palestinians in Israel. First, the Law of Return guarantees automatic citizenship to all Jews who come to live in Israel, and, second, the Citizenship Law, finalized in 1953, declares that only those who lived in Mandatory Palestine and registered as citizens in the November 1948 census that took place on 21 October 1948 can be automatically recognized as full citizens (this condition is not applicable to Jews). However, closer investigation shows that in November 1948 most of the Palestinians who became citizens lived in areas not yet occupied by Israel and as a result could not participate in the census.[63] In practical terms, this means that, out of 156,000 Palestinians, 100,000 were not registered as citizens by November 1948. The struggle for *Baka'* (remaining in the homeland) as a resistance form of *Sumud* (steadfastness) cannot be mentioned without reference to Hanna Nakkarah who is known as the "People's lawyer". Nakkarah led the legal struggle against the permanent "Red IDs" that were issued to those Palestinians who remained in Palestine; in fact, the battle over citizenship and Nakkarah's efforts prevented the creation of an additional wave of Palestinian refugees.[64] Still, the threat of transfer did not disappear as a future scenario, especially in times of crisis, either from Palestinian awareness or from Israeli public debate.[65]

Open resistance during the period of military rule was risky and dangerous and so it was mostly hidden and took a variety of different forms. Hillel Cohen points out that Palestinians

listened secretly to the political speeches of the charismatic Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser as one form of resistance, and they also composed political songs to be sung at weddings.[66] Under military rule, words of resistance became a weapon, and this enabled another form of resistance that constructed the *Sumud* of the Palestinians in Israel: culture. Their inability to directly confront Israeli power structures encouraged Palestinians to turn to culture as a space of confrontation, and so they used music, literature, and art as weapons.

Following the *Nakba*, Palestinians found themselves subject to a new reality, one which set the stage for the development of a cultural movement that politicized everything. Words, such as *Portugal* (orange), *zeitun* (olives), *shajar zeitun* (olive trees), *el-hassad* (harvest), and so on, were all transformed from agricultural discourse to political discourse. Words associated with everyday life were being used to describe the *watan* (homeland) and the *sumud* (steadfastness) of *El-jamaheer* (the masses), which were presented as the cornerstones of Palestinian resistance. Because the oppression people suffered was continual, forbidding, and silencing, Palestinian culture became the agent for negotiation between the everyday and extreme;[67] it represented the continuation of normal life, but it also symbolized Palestinians' battle against the obliteration of their identities. In this scenario, resistance was not only a national duty, it was also a lifestyle.

When direct political activism is impossible, cultural activity can represent the first step towards rising up from the ashes of destruction, and it can equip a society with strength no government or regime can easily either prevent or provide.[68] Poetry was one space in which national identity survived after the *Nakba*. What political activists and leaders could not or dared not express their views, poets wrote and sang loudly. Poetry and literature served as political statements that helped to develop political awareness and consciousness, and they intertwined discourses on love, hate, death, birth, and family issues with political arguments about land confiscation and state oppression.[69] Poetry festivals became very popular and offered spaces where language could be used as a weapon with some impunity. The Israeli secret service was unable to decide if these kinds of gathering constituted subversive acts or cultural events.[70] Poets participated in these "popular meetings" side by side with politicians and read their poems to the masses. Magazines such as *Al gad* and *Al jaded*, emerged to provide a "hub" for young Palestinians as writers and readers.[71] The first study that coined the term "Literature of Resistance" in the context of Palestinians in Israel was published in 1967 by Gassan Kanafani. Since then, Kanafani's study, "Resistance Literature in Occupied Palestine 1948-1968",[72] has become a landmark for describing the Palestinians' *Sumud* in Israel. Four famous names – Tawfiq Ziad, Samih al Qassem, Rashid Houssien, and Mahmoud Darwish – laid the foundations for establishing this resistance and succeeded in challenging the "cultural ghetto" of their life in Israel.[73]

When military rule ended in 1966, a confident generation of young Palestinians went on to lead a resistance of confrontation against the Israeli authorities. In 1976, the Palestinians in Israel led one of the most important battles in the history of Palestinian resistance: Land Day. This was the first time since 1948 that the Palestinians had organized themselves collectively, calling for a general strike, and protesting against land confiscation and the Judaization of the Galilee. Palestinian workers, students, pupils, and teachers did not attend their workplaces, schools, and universities. In response, the Israeli government declared the area to be a closed military zone and used force to break the strike. By the end of the day, six Palestinians had been shot dead and hundreds had been wounded and arrested. This day is labelled as a "Pride Day" when masses of Palestinians raised their voices in front of the *Soultat* – the Israeli authorities. At the first commemoration in 1977, Tawfiq Ziad opened his speech with the claim that "last year we grew up twenty-eight years", referring to the number of years that Palestinians had been living in the State of Israel. Since 1976, Palestinians everywhere have commemorated Land Day annually on 30 March every year. Palestinians in Israel from different political backgrounds march together both to address the significant place of this

event in their collective memory and to emphasize the ongoing reality that they are part of the Palestinian people. Land Day marks, then, an important milestone in the *Sumud* of the Palestinians in Israel as a Palestinian national minority and also as citizens in Israel.

Land Day directly affected the political behaviour of Palestinians in Israel in a positive way because it showed that, despite their weakness and years of subjugation to military control, they were not powerless. For the first time since their participation in the Israeli election of 1949, the majority of Palestinians voted in 1977 for the Israeli Communist Party, the only non -Zionist party, which included Palestinian and Jewish people among its leaders and members. This marked the point at which Palestinians in Israel overcame their fear and moved toward direct political confrontation with the Israeli system, adding the words "rights" and "owners of the land" to their lexicon.

The second confrontation resulted from the breakup of the second *Intifada* in 2000, which spilled over into Israel. The confrontation followed the visit of Ariel Sharon to *Haram al-Sharif*; the holiest Islamic site in Palestine and the third most sacred site after *Mecca* and the *Madina*, and young Palestinians in Israel came out to occupy the streets in an act of solidarity with the Palestinians killed in Jerusalem. As a result, 13 young Palestinian citizens of Israel were shot dead by the Israeli police. Ilan Pappé in his influential book *The Forgotten Palestinians* describes the events of 2000 as representing an "earthquake" in terms of Israeli-Palestinian relations in Israel.[74] This description might also be applied to their effects on the relationship between young Palestinians and their leadership, which are discussed further in the sections below.

It is clear that, over time, *Sumud* has taken a variety of shapes and moved between forms of hidden and open confrontation and different practices that have included legal, political, and cultural resistance. In addition to the "literature of resistance", which shaped the awareness of all Palestinians, the two main open confrontations on Land Day and during the events of 2000 constructed the resistance memory of Palestinians in Israel. This cumulative experience contributes to the development of resistance behaviour and helps to explain why Palestinian resistance in Israel can best be understood as a lifestyle. However, the impact of each event has been different. Land Day is a symbol of a successful struggle which motivated Palestinians to take action and to support their leadership, despite the loss they had endured. Meanwhile, the events of 2000 in the second *Intifada* represented the collapse of the trust that had existed between the people and their official political parties.[75] The disappointment that arose from the outcomes of the *Or* Commission (the official committee that was appointed by the Israeli government to investigate the events of 2000) reflects the trapped situation of Palestinians in Israel, when the confronted authorities also function as the judging ones. However, the closure of the investigation without charges being brought against anyone from the Israeli police remains an "open wound" in the memory of Palestinian citizens, and as a result, young Palestinians became more critical, not only toward Israel, but also toward their own leadership which was viewed as "weak". This led young Palestinians to raise their voices to demand change within their own society. Not only did they call for the replacement of their political representatives with "new" young, fresh faces, but they also called for a rethink of strategy at the national level. Some considered the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as the main struggle for Palestinians in Israel and sought the "Palestinianization of politics",[76] an approach that was first called for in the 1980s. Others wanted greater concentration on internal civic demands to improve the living standards of Palestinian citizens in Israel. Another reason for the increase in critical awareness among young Palestinians can be related to the development of Palestinian civil society. Young Palestinians found alternative channels for political and social participation, which can also be described as additional platforms of resistance, mainly through civil society organizations. The main question in this sense is "resistance to whom?" If resistance in principle was directed against the Israeli power structures, the development of internal platforms encouraged internal resistance which increased the degree of inter-social criticism.

In the shadow of this disappointment and enduring political and economic marginalization, Palestinians in Israel constructed alternative channels through which to articulate and promote their demands. Civil society organizations with international funds offered one platform, particularly for young Palestinians. Political movements and parties have also played a central role, especially after the *Nakba*, in mobilizing the new generation of educated young Palestinians in Israel through the formation of grassroots organizations. Known as *al hezb*, the Israeli Communist Party was the main source of organized political leadership in the critical years after 1948. Its leadership in the protests and political activity that took place under military rule, which focused on the daily needs of the Palestinians, contributed to its wide popularity. Through its newspaper and magazines, the party provided a platform for political expression and critical thinking.[77] As well as establishing active political debate that led to the construction of political awareness, the party established many Palestinian organizations, such as kindergartens, scholarship foundations, and workers' unions, that served not just its members but also the rest of the community.

However, Shany Payes has examined the development of Palestinian non-governmental organizations (PNGOs) in Israel and identified four distinct periods in their evolution: the initial period of formation and growth (1976-1982); a second period of consolidation and institutionalization (1983-1993); a third period characterized by growing impatience at the failure of the Arab-Israeli peace process to yield an improvement in Palestinian civil rights on the one hand, combined with an increasing number of political opportunities for PNGOs in Israel on the other (1993-2000); and a fourth period that followed the outbreak of the second Intifada during which demands grew for the protection of human rights and recognition of Palestinians in Israel as a national minority.[78] These civil society organizations provided job opportunities for young Palestinians and gave them a platform to present their ideas, raise their voices, and potentially accomplish their demands.

Non-governmental organizations tend to be more flexible and less bureaucratic than political party structures, and they also focus on immediate outcomes. They proved attractive to young Palestinians who were looking for job opportunities as well as self-satisfaction and political involvement. Still, it is important to emphasize that the struggle of the Palestinians in Israel is about recognizing and changing policy, goals that cannot be achieved through funded projects for two reasons. PNGO activism is dependent on each fund's resources and its political agenda, and these restrictions mean that they are unable to generate genuinely progressive and cumulative activism or struggle that can bring about policy change. Despite these limitations, civil society development deserves attention for the contribution it has made to efforts to empower resistance from the "inside".

Resistance from "inside" has contributed to the construction of the political behaviour of Palestinians in Israel and it has added another understanding of *Sumud* by enabling the reinvestigation and questioning of internal power structures and taboos. This questioning exists in parallel with, and might be a necessary prerequisite for, efforts to resist Israeli power structures. The definition of *Sumud* expands here, so that the term refers not only to a series of reactionary actions, such as remaining in the land, but also includes a constructivist aspect which contributes to the transformation of power relations. In order to establish a robust understanding of this observation and to locate young Palestinians in this debate, it is necessary to introduce the idea of neopatriarchy as a social structure in Arab society.

### Neopatriarchy and resistance from "inside"

Like members of any Arab society, Palestinians in Israel are subject to their own power structure, something that adds another network of power relations in addition to the Israeli one. Halim Barakat points out that Arab society is a mirror image of the family.[79] This observation about familial social structure has emerged as an analytical category for Arab society which Alaa Alazzeh considers to be "applicable on macro and microstructure".[80]

Hisham Sharabi's work on neopatriarchy, which focuses on familial social structures, points out that neopatriarchy is a theoretical formulation that "occupies the space between traditional patriarchy and modernity".[81] It refers to the link between patriarchal values and social relations that exists within the "modern" institutions in Arab society. This link is useful for identifying the analogy between family and society, where relations between ruler and ruled are understood as being based on the familiar patriarchal relations between father and child. According to this understanding, young Arab people, including Palestinians, are restricted by their "patriarchal loyalty" to leaders and hierarchical systems within Arab society, which are structured by factors such as age and rank. To create change, it is therefore necessary to challenge these elements and release young Palestinians from this kind of loyalty. This release can be achieved by adopting forms of resistance that challenge internal power relations. The power of this kind of resistance lies in its emphasis on the legitimacy of questioning, investigating, and criticizing existing hierarchies and systems of power.

Neopatriarchy is an important concept that can be used to unmask the internal power structures of generational conflict and to illustrate that resistance does not go in one direction. A famous saying suggests that "freedom cannot be divided", but we might add that "resistance also cannot be divided" because social and political struggle cannot be separated. Political resistance is associated with resistance to neopatriarchal structures too, and this has led to an ongoing redefinition of private and public spheres. The first Palestinian *Intifada* targeted not just the Israeli occupation but also the Palestinian traditional leadership and the parents' generation which had been accused of accepting the reality of the occupation instead of resisting it. Neopatriarchy can offer an explanation as to why young Palestinian are "stuck" and cannot climb up to a level where they become political decision makers. In other words, young Palestinians are subjugated like all other Palestinians to the Israeli power system, but they are further subjugated by their junior role in Palestinians' own internal social system. This situation reflects the complexity of Palestinian resistance in Israel but it also highlights the potential for young people to escape from the passive definition of *Sumud*, and its reactionary actions, if they view *Sumud* as an active form of resistance that can initiate change.

### Transformative resistance – young Palestinians between neopatriarchy and Israel

The Palestinian population in Israel in 2015 numbers nearly 1.7 million people, or 20.7 per cent of the total population of Israel, with age groups under the age of 30 years making up 62 per cent of the total Palestinian population. The 15-29 age group forms nearly 25 per cent of the whole society. Accordingly, we cannot talk about political mobilization of the Palestinians in Israel without including the reality of young people and their needs and aspirations.

The history of the Palestinian minority is rich with examples of resistance led by young people, particularly at schools and universities. Israel imposed strong control over Palestinian students and teachers, and, as a result, student councils in secondary schools worked on politicizing schools by introducing political debate that challenged the Israeli Ministry of Education. The student movement at universities introduced most of the political leadership of the Palestinian minority today, which is made up of committees for the defence of the land; local coalitions against the injustices of military rule; neighbourhood committees, and other groupings. These experiences, always accompanied by partisan political action, mobilized the masses by ensuring the participation of members from all segments of society, including the youth.

The events of the Arab spring and youth-led rebellions in a number of Arab countries affected young Palestinian people in Israel. It gave them a "push" both to revolt against their own traditional political parties and to demand involvement in the decision-making circle. Before exploring this idea further, I want to pause to reflect on the concept of "leadership". In fact,

many young men and women now lead demonstrations and stand in the forefront during the clashes against authorities; but while they are known as the "field command", they have no influence on the senior leadership level or presence at the level of the first political leaders who speak in the name of the Palestinian minority. Some of the reasons for this reflect the neopatriarchal structure which traditionally shapes the structures of political parties, yet it is very important to distinguish between two types of politics: those developed before and after the *Nakba*. Prior to 1948, the Palestinian leadership was led by a small number of principal families. Two families based in Jerusalem, *Al Husseini*, and *Al Nashashibi* competed with each other for Palestinian leadership during the British mandate, and the British used this competition to promote their interests. As a result of the *Nakba* and the collapse of the political social order, a new politics emerged among Palestinians in general but particularly among Palestinians in Israel, who were mostly peasants and subject to the same oppression as they had endured before. Israel tried to keep the old local political structure that had mainly operated in the villages – the *Al Moukhtar* system – as a tool for controlling the Palestinians, and so Israeli authorities encouraged the persistence of traditional and segmented structures among Palestinian citizens to facilitate the State's policies.[82] However the new form of political activism, which was represented both by the Israeli Communist Party and by changes in socio-economic structures and social values, succeeded in replacing the *Moukhtar* system with one based on political parties and elections, rather than on familial origins or relations with the Israeli authorities.

The switch from familial politics to party politics, as a result of the collapse of the classic and traditional social structure, opened up opportunities for young and ordinary Palestinians to form another concept of leadership. Workers, students, the poor, women, Christians, Druze, and left-wing Jews, side by side with the Muslim majority, constructed a leadership for the Palestinian minority through an election. This activism changed the internal political structure of Palestinian society and led to greater political participation, but it did not change the fact that the influence of Palestinian members on the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, has always been limited. This limitation has led to disappointment that can be registered in the increase in voices that call for boycotting participation in Israeli elections. The move from traditional to participatory politics seems not to be enough. Still, it is not easy for young Palestinians in Israel to be part of the political leadership. One explanation may lie in the neopatriarchal structure that needs to be challenged in order to bring real change. This answers the question as to why a 30-year-old activist is not a political representative.

## Conclusion

In this paper, I have explored the potential role of young Palestinians in Israel in constructing their *Sumud* by applying the theory of resistance, which leads to an understanding of the dynamics of *Sumud* beyond the conventional assumptions that it can only take the form of people remaining in their homeland. The link between everyday resistance carried out by Palestinians in Israel and social change at the internal and external level introduces us to another aspect of Palestinian's political behaviour by identifying their *Sumud* as a lifestyle of resistance.

A lifestyle of resistance works in a transformative way when resistance is understood as a set of behaviours that undermine existing power structures. On those terms, a lifestyle of resistance can contribute to the development of confident and critical young Palestinians who adopt "resistance" as a tool for change in relation to Palestinian as well as Israeli power structures. This expanded definition of *Sumud* also emphasizes the significance of understanding "particularity" as context, something that would open the door for examining the heterogenic character of the Palestinian people. As Sayigh points out, "after many decades of exile and separation, there is actually little that links Palestinians together beyond the fact that they all live and share the consequences of the Nakba".[83] This particularity of every Palestinian community opens up a variety of understandings and forms of *Sumud* in a

process that creates space for the experience of diverse Palestinians to be included. More than this, it opens the door for research into *Sumud* as an ongoing developmental process that would help to explore its dynamics and its potential for transforming power relations. For Palestinians in Israel, *Sumud* exists as more than a set of oppositional reactive acts; instead, it is understood as a very active and critical way of life. Young Palestinians have the potential to lead an internal rebellion against what they consider to be obstacles to their use of *Sumud* to challenge Israeli policies, believing that this may make their resistance more effective and productively enable criticism, questioning, and a reinvestigation of Palestinian power structures in ways that may help to free Palestinian politics from its deadlock. Internal resistance might well be a necessary step towards generating sufficient energy, hope, and motivation for continued resistance to the Israeli oppression of Palestinians both in and beyond Israel.

**Notes:**

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


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# An Imagined Unity, a Divided Reality: Identity, Perception and Coexistence Among Palestinian Youth Separated by the Green Line

By Casey Davison O'Brien*

**Abstract:** This paper focuses on the often uneasy and under-explored relationships between Palestinian youth who grow up in contrasting cultural, social, and political spaces across Israel and the West Bank. Their lives are divided by a security barrier, restrictions on movement imposed by the Israeli government, and their contrasting experiences of growing up either within a subjugated indigenous minority inside Israel or under the shadow of the occupation. However, evidence suggests that there are spaces that allow for dialogue and coexistence which can, in certain circumstances, produce tangible shifts in perception and understanding and the desire to forge lasting friendships. This article analyses the lived experience of relationship development between young Palestinian people in Israel and in the West Bank. It concludes that, although opportunities for relationship development are rare, they can allow for the identification of genuine common ground where historic and contemporary splits can be overcome.

**Key words:** Identity, Perception, Coexistence, Second Intifada, Israel, West Bank.

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# An Imagined Unity, a Divided Reality: Identity, Perception and Coexistence Among Palestinian Youth Separated by the Green Line

## Introduction

The experiences of Palestinians at the time of the *Nakba* are widely understood to have played an important role in shaping their collective identity, both inside Israel and in the West Bank, not only in the immediate aftermath of the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, but also in the 69 years since.[1] Nevertheless, contrasting political, cultural, ideological, and socio-economic realities inside Israel and the West Bank during the same period, informed by experiences of military occupation, nationalism, discrimination, and dispossession, have nurtured competing narratives among Palestinians on either side of the Green Line. While the collective identity and experiences of Palestinians in Israel and in the West Bank are well documented, this paper responds to a gap in research which has left the health and status of contemporary relations between these two groups under-explored.

This article investigates the relationship between 21st-century Palestinian youth from Israel and the West Bank and positions it within the historical contexts created by the founding of the State of Israel (1948), the occupation by Israel of the West Bank (1967), and the Second Intifada (2000-2005). Coexistence as a social good and the rationale behind its desirability will be defined, and an in-depth analysis will be conducted of qualitative research carried out by the author in the West Bank in 2014. That research will be framed within the context of an earlier survey conducted into the formation of social ties between Palestinian youth across the wider region. This paper will illustrate the extent to which evidence exists of young West Bank Palestinian youth's prejudicial attitudes toward their Palestinian peers from inside Israel. It will be argued that, for Palestinian youth inside Israel and in the West Bank, their experience of coming of age in contrasting political and legal environments appears to carry greater consequences for the health of their relationship than the historical context which gives them a collective Palestinian identity. Their contemporary differences, it seems, undermine their ability to recognize all that they may hold in common.

## Parallel lives: Palestinian youth in Israel and the West Bank

The collective identity of contemporary Palestinian youth who have grown up in Israel and the West Bank has been influenced by contrasting sets of personal, lived experiences as well as by salient elements of contemporary Palestinian history, specifically the *Nakba* and its consequences.

For Palestinian youth who have grown up in the West Bank, their contemporary points of reference have been heavily informed both by the events of the Second Intifada and by Israel's continued military occupation of this territory. Theirs is a narrative dominated by a profound sense of frustration and despair caused by the extensive, complex, and multilayered network of restrictions placed on them when they move within the West Bank or seek to travel beyond the territory's borders.[2] Their lack of freedom of movement is a direct consequence of the continued occupation and is made apparent by the ongoing presence of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), an unpredictable and mobile checkpoint infrastructure, and a security barrier first erected in 2002 which now runs the length of the Green Line.[3]

Kelly asserts that the imposition of a green ID card system for Palestinians, which restricts their freedom of movement to the West Bank and denies them the right to leave in the absence of a special permit, serves to highlight their status as West Bank residents rather than as citizens; it also reinforces their sense of entitlement to the rights afforded to those who are considered to belong to a sovereign State.[4] Meanwhile, Palestinian youth inside Israel are issued with a blue Israeli ID card which allows them to travel into Jerusalem and overseas in the same ways and with the same freedom as their Jewish-Israeli peers.[5] For Khalidi, the unpredictable use by the IDF of checkpoints and identity checks across the West Bank fuels a sense of insecurity among Palestinian youth whose national identity is repeatedly being called into question: they are effectively being treated as "suspect almost by definition".[6] The ongoing occupation serves as a ubiquitous and tangible reminder for Palestinian youth and their families of their profound sense of loss and dispossession from their own land, which Hammack argues represents a significant pillar of the Palestinian master narrative. Despite the harmful consequences of the occupation for the health of the Palestinian psyche, Hammack's hypothesis also points to a second pillar, one which is characterized by more empowering sentiments of resistance, resilience, and survival.[7] The narrative for Palestinian youth who have grown up inside Israel has been heavily informed by their experiences of living as seemingly second-class citizens in a country where the government and society largely perceives the Palestinian minority as an internal threat and enemy.[8] Israel's non-Jewish minority represents a significant 20 per cent of the country's population, and yet systemic discrimination against Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCI) and the subordination of their civil rights are widespread.[9] While this non-Jewish minority consists of representatives from the Druze, Palestinian (including Arab), and other communities, this paper will focus solely on the Palestinian element within this larger minority group. Unequal resource allocation and discrimination in the areas of education, employment, and the justice system have lead Hammack to argue that the State of Israel is perceived to be, quite deliberately, endorsing a status quo whereby the country's Palestinian minority is "guaranteed a lesser social position".[10]

In contemporary Israel, PCI youth are educated separately from their Jewish-Israeli counterparts, while PCI communities live lives that are largely separate from Jewish-Israeli communities. Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis who do work together often do so in environments where Jewish-Israelis are in greater positions of authority than their PCI counterparts.[11] Despite the lack of meaningful engagement between PCI and Jewish-Israeli communities, government departments, media, and society in Israel commonly refer to Palestinian citizens of Israel as Arab-Israeli, Israeli-Arab, or Palestinian-Israeli. Hammack argues that these hyphenated forms of identification impose upon PCI communities an obligation to privately and publicly negotiate between their civic responsibilities as citizens of Israel on the one hand and their national or cultural identification as Palestinians on the other.[12] For many male and female PCI youth, this hyphenated form of identity undermines and overshadows the Palestinian nature of their identity.

Smooha argues that the alienation that these communities experience leads individuals to choose one of two paths: either radicalization or accommodation. While radicalization can take forms such as public protest, the alienation experienced by Israel's Palestinians has elsewhere resulted in the emergence of an accommodation of Palestinian and Israeli forms of collective identity. A number of members of PCI communities in Israel remain committed to the path of radicalization, as framed by Smooha, in light of their ongoing and widespread frustration at the status quo in Israel. However, in parallel, a significant number of PCI communities are broadly committed to striving for equality in terms of their status and rights. They seek full acceptance by Israel of their self-identification either as Arabs or Palestinians, and they work *with* the Israeli State and society rather than *against* it using a broad strategy of acquiescence. Smooha argues that PCI communities are, by and large, now committed to resisting overt, public association with those across the Green Line or inside Israel who are committed to radical approaches to resistance.[13]

### Coexistence across the Green Line

This paper will now address the question of the nature of the relationship between PCI communities and West Bank Palestinians, with a particular focus on the post-1967 period. In order that the experiences of coexistence between Palestinians from either side of the Green Line can be effectively critiqued and understood, it is important first to assess the value of coexistence as a concept that carries with it an implication of a desirable social good. If coexistence reflects a commitment to "exist together (in time or place) and to exist in mutual tolerance" and to "interact with a commitment to tolerance, mutual respect, and the agreement to settle conflicts without recourse to violence", its value in any context where the emergence of conflict is possible can be easily understood.[14] Khaminwa goes beyond this simple definition to assert that coexistence represents a deliberate approach to mitigating the likelihood that social differences – based on class, ethnicity, gender, and other social groupings, for example – will create, escalate, or consolidate conflict.[15] Coser's response, which also reflects on the works of Charles H. Cooley, suggests that the concepts of conflict and cooperation should in fact be considered as phases of the same process of coexistence.[16] Given that conflict can be considered to be a ubiquitous and everyday part of life and is often expressed in nonviolent ways, an escalation of conflict can be understood to generate a mutual realization not only of the differences but the commonalities that exist between two social groups; in this sense, conflict is a process that can serve to facilitate more inclusive, long-term collaboration and shared actions that can enable social change. When this possibility is considered in relation to Palestinian youth inside Israel and the West Bank, it is important to question the purpose and value of achieving a meaningful and committed form of long-term coexistence for these two groups. The Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (Badil) argues that the fostering of social ties among Palestinian youth from the West Bank and Israel, in addition to other locations, would allow them to share their perspectives on how best to achieve their common struggle for self-determination. Such experiences of coexistence would, according to Badil, allow Palestinian youth to negotiate between them a position of unity, both in relation to their articulation of a vision for a future Palestinian State and their views on whether this State should or should not only be located only within the borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[17] An important consideration from this perspective is the extent to which the interests, grievances, and future prospects of PCI communities have featured as a significant concern in the context of ongoing negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. Al Haj argues that the Oslo Accords failed to respond to the needs and experiences specific to PCI communities, whose members, in recent years, have felt that they have had no place within the wider peace process and are effectively excluded from the Palestinian nationalist movement, which itself is committed to the achievement of a Palestinian State that may or may not accommodate the needs and interests of Palestinians in Israel.[18] Given that there is some doubt concerning the existence of a common vision for the future among Palestinian youth dispersed across the region, it is important to reflect on recent history and on existing experiences of coexistence among Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank which might be used to inspire plans for the future.

Between 1948 and the Six-Day War in 1967, Palestinians on either side of the Green Line were kept entirely separate from one another, and this separation rendered communication between those who obtained a form of citizenship in Israel and those living on land annexed by Jordan in the West Bank almost non-existent.[19] Al Haj asserts that, following Israel's military occupation of the West Bank and its victory over its neighbours after the Six-Day War, the initial experience of shared encounter between Palestinians separated by the Green Line after an interval of almost 20 years was challenging.[20] PCI communities in Israel were disappointed that Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were not able to achieve a military victory over Israel, an outcome that resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Meanwhile, as thousands of West Bank Palestinians sought temporary work inside Israel owing to more

plentiful job opportunities and comparatively higher wages there, their willingness to work for a lower wage than PCI workers had a negative impact on the average wage for all Palestinian workers in Israel and created a sense of resentment among PCI labourers.[21]

The most meaningful example of coexistence between Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank between the Six-Day War and the Second Intifada can be found in the approximately 130,000 cross-border marital relationships that were initiated after the opening of the Green Line in 1967.[22] In 2003, Israel introduced amendments to the Citizenship and Entry Law that heavily restricted West Bank Palestinians from joining their PCI spouses and securing permits to enter Israel, and this resulted in the separation of many thousands of married couples and their families.[23] Although it was first announced as a temporary measure, this legislation has been renewed at regular intervals in the intervening years.[24] In a damning report published in 2004, Amnesty International argued that the Citizenship and Entry Law had a number of damaging consequences: firstly, it served to further institutionalize racial discrimination at the expense of Palestinians in Israel; secondly, it generated widespread fear and anxiety among Palestinian citizens in Israel and residents of Jerusalem whose spouses lived with them illegally; and thirdly, it resulted in these families leaving the communities where they had made their homes.[25] Amnesty argued that the legislation represented just one element of a longer-term policy by the State of Israel to restrict its Palestinian population.[26]

Commerce has also represented an important opportunity for Palestinians to interact across the Green Line. During the 1980s, significant numbers of PCI women from the Galilee visited Jenin where, despite widespread local perceptions that these women flaunted their relative wealth and wore clothing typically associated with Israeli culture, long-term friendships were formed between PCI women and West Bank Palestinian shopkeepers through encounters at local markets.[27] In the first years of the Second Intifada, these same Palestinian women inside Israel worked to maintain contact with West Bank Palestinian businesses which had lost their PCI customers due to the conflict, speaking on the telephone, and sending packages of money, food, and clothing to West Bank families. Since the period of the Second Intifada, Israeli law has explicitly prohibited the entry of citizens of Israel – both Jewish and otherwise – into the West Bank as civilians.[28] Despite these travel restrictions, PCI individuals and families continue to travel into the West Bank on a regular basis for brief family visits and shopping trips. However, over the past 15 years, the frequency of these visits has dropped. Levels of interrogation, searches, and ID checks at border crossings such as the crossing at Jalameh in the north of the West Bank fluctuate unpredictably and deter visitors while reducing opportunities for both informal and more meaningful encounters between PCI visitors and local West Bank Palestinians.[29]

### Perceptions about social ties and the lived experience of coexistence

There is a fundamental shortage of opportunities for Palestinian youth inside Israel and in the West Bank to build and sustain meaningful relationships with one another as friends, colleagues, or even as married couples.[30] It is clear that a combination of strict border controls, travel permits, and work permits has resulted in relatively few Palestinian youth crossing the Green Line. Given the relative scarcity of analysis regarding the condition and health of relationships and the challenges of coexistence between Palestinian youth in Israel and the West Bank, I took the decision to engage in a period of qualitative, primary, field-based research in May 2014. The research involved me asking a fixed set of 10 qualitative questions during the course of individual and group interviews, and the aim was to gain an in-depth understanding of the perspectives of Palestinian youth in relation to their lived experiences in the specific locations where they were growing up. The interviewees were questioned on topics that related both to their perceptions of Palestinian youth from the side of the Green Line opposite to where they grew up and to their experiences of interacting with them.

A university was chosen as the most appropriate location in which to approach potential research candidates because it offered access to educated and intellectually engaged youth.

As institutions intended to foster "the process of national integration of the Palestinian people", the university environment appeared highly appropriate.[31] The Arab American University of Jenin (AAUJ) was selected as the location for the majority of the field-based research. The university attracts 2,700 Palestinian students from Israel, more than a quarter of the entire university student body, and so, in proportional terms, it is the West Bank university that has the largest intake of Palestinian students that are normally resident in Israel.[32] A total of 13 students from the West Bank and 11 from inside Israel were interviewed; one of the interviews was conducted with a PCI student at the University of Haifa inside Israel; and a gender balance was sought and achieved. The relatively small number of students interviewed meant that the data produced should only be considered indicative as opposed to representative.

In order to be able to draw a useful comparative analysis between this period of research and a larger, more representative data set, the results of this analysis will be framed against the outcomes of a survey published in December 2012 by the Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, an independent, human rights non-profit organization committed to the protection and promotion of the rights of Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons. Based in Bethlehem in the West Bank, the organization develops campaigns and conducts advocacy in relation to the legal and civil rights of Palestinians. The aim of the 2012 study, entitled *One People United: A Deterritorialized Palestinian Identity (Survey of Palestinian Youth on Identity and Social Ties)*,[33] was to generate insight into how Palestinian youth in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon self-identify, and the significance that they attach to the fostering of social ties with Palestinian youth who have heritage different from their own. From October 2011 to March 2012, Badil and its partners conducted approximately 600 interviews in each of their seven target areas. The project resulted in the collection of up to 4,000 surveys in total, with each survey response consisting of answers to 33 questions.[34] This paper will go on to focus on the fostering of social ties and the significance attributed to it by Palestinian youth interviewed at AAUJ and elsewhere in May 2014 compared to the Palestinian youth surveyed by Badil in December 2012.

Of the PCI youth surveyed by Badil, only 33 per cent stated that they felt it was important to strengthen social ties with their West Bank Palestinian counterparts.[35] Meanwhile, 45 per cent of this cohort agreed when they were asked the same question in relation to developing social ties with Palestinians in Jerusalem.[36] Among the West Bank Palestinian youth surveyed, close to 37 per cent reported that, from their perspectives, the building of social ties with PCI youth was important, with nearly 27 per cent of respondents claiming that such social ties were extremely important to them; a mere nine per cent of PCI youth shared the same sentiment in relation to their peers in the West Bank.[37] Moreover, nearly 40 per cent of the PCI youth surveyed expressed the view that the fostering of social ties with West Bank Palestinian youth is unimportant, a devastating result given that only around eight per cent of West Bank Palestinian youth surveyed felt the same way towards their PCI counterparts.[38]

How are we to rationalize and reconcile the very different ways in which Palestinian youth in Israel and the West Bank perceive the value of social ties? For Smooha, the answer can be found in the extensive sense of alienation experienced by PCI communities within Israeli society. The almost complete absence of any representation of Palestinian culture and history within symbols of the Israeli State, such as the country's national anthem and flag, has served to secure the dominance of the Zionist narrative in the teachings of the history of Israel and Palestine to both Jewish and Palestinian youth in Israel.[39] Rouhana argues that, due to their struggle to achieve equal status with Jewish-Israelis, Palestinians in Israel – while they maintain the "integrity of their national identity" – are neither fully Israeli nor fully Palestinian and are instead positioned on the margins of society, both in Israel and the West Bank.[40] It is this sense of alienation that leaves PCI communities deciding between whether to "radicalize" and publicly express their rejection of the Israeli State through public protest and

other means of resistance or "accommodate", taking every step possible to secure the best position for themselves in Israeli society, possibly at the expense of their connection and association with Palestinians in the West Bank and the wider occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). In this way the radicalization and accommodation dichotomy that PCI communities are confronted with is symptomatic of the fundamental hybridity of their collective consciousness, echoing Hammack's own hypothesis concerning the hyphenation of the public identification of PCI communities. Arguably, it is the realization among PCI youth that these are their options as a minority in Israel that has led many to disassociate themselves from their peers in the West Bank. The step represents, for many of them, an act of self-preservation and it also indicates PCI youth's realization that, in order to achieve greater acceptance and equal civic rights inside Israel, they must make clear their refusal to participate in the kinds of strikes and demonstrations that antagonize the Israeli government and lead it to threaten the expulsion of PCI communities to an eventual Palestinian State.[41]

For Palestinian youth in the West Bank, their relative eagerness to forge social ties with PCI peers can in part be explained by the fact that they have very little to lose by publicly announcing this interest. In contrast, PCI youth are not able to easily or freely express either their grievances with the State of Israel or their felt need for a clearer institutional structure through which to express their national and cultural identity.[42] In its survey report, Badil hypothesizes that a significant number of PCI youth feel that it is unimportant to foster social ties with their West Bank Palestinian counterparts because of the relative ease of access to this area of the oPt. However, this argument is premised on the assumption that, when Palestinians in Israel are able to travel to the West Bank, they do indeed do so, and on a sufficiently regular basis for them to come into regular contact with peers with whom they will then be able to forge connections. Badil also assumes that its survey respondents based their responses on current scenarios rather than future, aspirational ones. It assumes, for example, that the PCI youth respondents in this particular context are already in contact with their peers in the West Bank, and that therefore there is no reason for them to aspire to foster *further* social ties with West Bank Palestinian youth over and above those that theoretically already exist. It is unclear whether or not Badil attributes significance to the possibility that when PCI respondents reflected on the importance of fostering social ties with their West Bank counterparts their views might be based on their perception of that social group and its values with respect to their own, irrespective of the level of contact they have actually had with youth in the West Bank.

Gross Stein uses a social psychology approach to argue that processes of social differentiation, categorization, and comparison are widespread in situations in which individuals are prone to group identification, and she notes that these processes risk producing social conflict and the formation of stereotypes and enemy images.[43] Even when differentiated groups hold historical, cultural, or social characteristics in common, she argues, rival processes of group identification in contexts of social conflict can easily emerge where such groups are exposed to contrasting social, cultural, political, or economic structures organized on the basis of identity. The State of Israel's hegemonic narrative about its foundation rests on its conceptualization as a Jewish State and homeland which enables its Jewish-Israeli majority to benefit from full cultural representation and freedom. The country's indigenous Palestinian minority also seeks validation of its rights to enjoy this kind of cultural representation and freedom and, while these rights are consistently denied, PCI youth nevertheless come to maturity within social, cultural, and political structures which are very much organized on the basis of identity. This generates a commitment among many PCI youth to the pursuit of processes of group identification as a means of both challenging the status quo that they face inside Israel, and forging for themselves a meaningful form of collective identity. This pursuit of a form of group identification in response to the dominance of Israel's hegemonic narrative has arguably taken place at the expense of opportunities that might otherwise have existed for PCI youth to pursue and nurture forms of group identification shared with their peers in the West Bank.

A significant number of PCI youth feel it is unimportant to foster social ties with Palestinian youth in the West Bank, when they feel a more pressing need to develop their own forms of group identification relative to the collective identity of Jewish-Israelis. This attitude is likely to have arisen because they have only a distant sense of the values and aspirations of West Bank Palestinians as a social group with which they have little experience of interacting, rather than because they already have a good relationship with them that obviates the need to foster further social ties. This hypothesis is supported by the results of a survey conducted by Smooha in 1985 into the frequency of journeys made by Palestinians in Israel into the West Bank; as many as 60 per cent of the surveyed sample explained that they had never travelled to the West Bank.[44] Given that the period after the Second Intifada has seen Israeli legislation change in a way that makes travel between Israel and the West Bank harder rather than easier than it was when Smooha's survey was conducted, it would be reasonable to argue that just as many, if not more, youth would respond in 2016 by confirming that they have never travelled to the West Bank. Arguably then, those Palestinian youth who consider it important or extremely important to foster social ties with peers in other separate locations – regardless of those locations' accessibility – reflect how closely they see their own futures tied with the future of Palestinian youth in other places within the Middle East. For those surveyed, the reality of the physical separation of Palestinian youth means that there is in fact a great need "to forge social ties in order to nourish this [Palestinian] identity".[45]

The series of interviews I conducted with university students at AAUJ in 2014 provide a means to test some of the findings and assumptions posited by Badil within its survey. They also introduce additional avenues for exploration within the context of the often complex array of perceptions and attitudes toward coexistence held by Palestinian youth from Israel and the West Bank who study together at AAUJ. The results from the research carried out at AAUJ suggest that a slight majority of PCI students choose to attend university in the West Bank for purely pragmatic, academic reasons rather than because they are inspired by a commitment to fostering social relations with their peers in the West Bank. Six of the 11 PCI students interviewed at AAUJ explained that their main reason for coming there to study was because they did not attain the grades in their chosen subjects that would have allowed them to continue their studies inside Israel.[46] Their reasons for choosing to study in the West Bank were almost purely grounded in their need to complete their higher education, and the opportunity to forge closer connections with their West Bank contemporaries scarcely influenced their decision to study at AAUJ.

Meanwhile, among the 13 West Bank Palestinian students interviewed at AAUJ in 2014, it transpired that their geographic origin played an important factor in shaping their level of willingness to engage in shared encounters with peers from the opposite side of the Green Line. During the course of the research, a prevalent narrative emerged which saw PCI youth who had grown up in villages and towns close to the Green Line, or in the "Arab Triangle" in central Israel, expressing stronger ties with Palestinian collective identity than those who had grown up in larger towns and cities closer to the coast, such as Haifa, Acre, or Jaffa, where Jewish-Israelis and PCI communities live in closer proximity.[47] This narrative hinges on the assumption that when Palestinian youth grow up in close proximity to Jewish-Israeli communities, and the further they are located from the Green Line, the more prone they are to becoming influenced by Israeli society and culture. Four of the 13 West Bank Palestinian students interviewed at AAUJ spoke openly about this issue alongside three PCI students, with one West Bank student arguing that "Palestinians in Israeli cities forget they are Palestinians sometimes… but those in villages, they are more like traditional Palestinians".[48] When a PCI student who grew up close to the Green Line near Um el Fahem was interviewed alongside his friend from Jenin, he explained, with reference to Israel's coastal cities, that "culture in my village is not so different from the culture in Jenin… [I]n the cities it's more Jewish Israeli culture".[49] The interpretation drawn from this period of research at AAUJ was that the more PCI youth are influenced by Israeli society and culture, the less willing some

West Bank Palestinian students are to socialize with them. Meanwhile, when Palestinian students from the West Bank and towns such as Um el Fahem in Israel's Arab Triangle do share encounters, their friendships appear to flourish and allow them to interact effectively in classroom situations and as friends on and off campus. The bonds that they form are at least partly predicated on their mutual sense of appreciation for the level of disassociation they have expressed with mainstream Israeli culture and society in their young lives and on their commitment to the form of quiet conservatism prevalent in Jenin and towns nearby. It appears that the largely negative perceptions that West Bank Palestinian youth hold about their PCI counterparts who have grown up beyond the Arab Triangle and toward Israel's coast have a direct impact on the reality and health of their coexistence. In this way, according to Hammack's analysis, Palestinian youth from the West Bank have manifested a collective delegitimization of the concept of Israeli identity, framing as illegitimate the direct association of many PCI youth with Israeli culture and society.[50]

The students interviewed in 2014 made it clear that considerations of gender and culture also played an important role in the nature of the coexistence of Palestinian youth from either side of the Green Line. According to Kevorkian, the wearing of the hijab by Palestinian women in Jenin and nearby towns and villages is symbolic of women's responsibility to safeguard their sexuality against the interest of male strangers.[51] Growing up inside Israel, young PCI Muslim women face discrimination in response to public expressions of their Islamic faith,[52] yet the interviews at AAUJ suggest that in Jenin the opposite is true and an expectation prevails that Muslim women will wear the hijab when in public. Three out of the seven female PCI students interviewed at AAUJ explained that, because they dressed less conservatively than many local women in Jenin, they have received negative comments from local men. One young PCI woman explained that she only wore a hijab when in the West Bank and not in Israel out of respect for the local culture but also in recognition of the need to secure her own integration into local society. Two other female Muslim PCI students described the repercussions they faced for having decided not to wear the hijab in either Israel or the West Bank. One student explained that "if we try to go out late sometimes in Jenin, local men start to say stuff… they abuse us with words, not good for girls…. [W]e're scared to go out late".[53] The same student added that "when they see us without hijabs… they think we are more like Jewish [women]".[54]

Among the PCI youth interviewed at AAUJ in 2014, many interviewees commented on local assumptions that they come from an affluent background. A 2012 survey which focused on the ways that Palestinian communities inside Israel and those in the West Bank see each other indicated that a popular perspective among West Bank Palestinians is that, in exchange for their relative affluence, PCI communities have chosen to associate their loyalty more assertively with the Israeli State than with Palestinians in the West Bank.[55] For two PCI students, their concern was that "some West Bank students don't seem to have been educated about the history of the Palestine 1948 people… some people here see us as Jewish".[56] The experiences of another student reinforced this argument. The student noted that "I get told I'm rich by shopkeepers in Jenin because I'm from '48, but I'm not... [T]hey think we have it easy in Israel".[57] This last observation reveals an ingrained perception that West Bank Palestinian students, as well as the wider community in Jenin, hold prejudicial attitudes in relation to PCI youth and their communities, concerning their collective identity as well as their social standing and level of economic prosperity. The implication is that PCI youth are perceived, along with their wider communities, to have easily and somewhat seamlessly integrated into Israeli society, when in fact the opposite is true. Meanwhile, another student explained that he had been warned by friends that "West Bank Palestinians are jealous of Arab-Israelis because of their lifestyle", while two separate students commented that "people in Jenin and at AAUJ can tell where we're from because of our clothes, our accent".[58]

Forte's analysis of the experiences of women travelling into the West Bank from the Galilee in the 1990s to shop at markets in Jenin provides a useful context for the situations PCI youth

experience when they travel into the West Bank to continue their educations. PCI students in 2014 were reportedly perceived as having embraced liberal and Western values common in Israel because they wore fashionable clothing popular among Jewish-Israelis and Europeans and at times rejected the use of the hijab (in the case of female PCI students) and more modest, conservative clothing. These moves were considered insensitive and out of step with the more conservative local culture in Jenin, and this placed the students in a similar predicament to that faced by some of the PCI women who visited Jenin in the 1990s.[59] If PCI youth visiting or studying in the West Bank express themselves in ways that reveal aspects of their identity that bear the hallmarks of Israeli society and culture, they become exposed to the risk of discrimination by West Bank Palestinian peers, in ways that are comparable to the discrimination PCI youth normally experience inside Israel. In order for the complex nature of the collective identity of PCI youth to be broadly accepted and tolerated by their peers in the West Bank, it seems it is necessary for PCI youth to engage in a process of accommodation which resembles but essentially reverses the kind of accommodation process Smooha describes as being at work in Israel. In this sense, then, it seems that PCI youth, whether they are inside Israel or in the West Bank, are involved in a process that requires them to continually readjust their internal and external expressions of collective identity if they are to avoid or at least reduce incidences of discrimination. Their experience of what Hammack calls "double marginality" has had a significant effect on PCI students, and particularly on female students. Their willingness, confidence, and ability to engage meaningfully with West Bank Palestinians both on campus at AAUJ and in Jenin has been influenced by this kind of experience. It is notable, for example, that the three student interviewees who stated that they had not dressed as conservatively as their West Bank Palestinian peers at AAUJ and in Jenin also noted that their level of interest in spending time with West Bank Palestinian students was minimal.

During the course of the interviews, one of the most clearly communicated grievances expressed by West Bank Palestinian youth about their PCI peers was related to the use of Hebrew alongside Arabic by some PCI students at AAUJ when they engaged in conversation with their PCI peers on campus. It transpired that PCI youth have a tendency to interweave Hebrew words into their daily use of Arabic, given their exposure to the Hebrew language when in Israel. The PCI students' use of Hebrew words at AAUJ was probably an indicator of their habitual use of phrases and language that they are most familiar using with peers inside Israel. Krauss and Chiu argue that, irrespective of what we actually say, our speech – in its dialect and accent in particular – betrays both our geographic origin and socio-economic status.[60] In the context of the interviews at AAUJ, the use of Hebrew by PCI students was revealing of the environment in which they had grown up and the influence of Israeli culture on their lives. A significant majority of the West Bank Palestinian students interviewed appeared somewhat offended due to the perceived insensitivity shown by PCI students in their use of Hebrew while in the West Bank, a factor that was serving to drive a wedge between these PCI and West Bank Palestinian youth.[61]

The attitudes and perceptions of Palestinian youth towards their peers inside Israel are clearly shaped by the military occupation of the West Bank. Gross Stein's application of social psychology theory offers significant insights that help to explain the impact of contrasting environmental factors on youth's sense of identity and their perceptions of their own groups and of other Palestinian youth. It holds therefore that in practical terms, a process of de-categorization of one social group by another initially requires the re-framing of a group member on the basis of individual, rather than social group characteristics. This represents a necessary precursor to the members of prescribed social groups – whether from the West Bank and Israel or elsewhere – being positioned to engage in meaningful dialogue that might allow them to identify common ground and to establish a platform from which positive relationships can be established, based on values of mutual respect, tolerance, and empathy. The de-categorization of Palestinian youth, would, in this context, represent an important first

step in reconciling the differences between PCI and West Bank Palestinian youth, irrespective of their use of Hebrew or their decision to wear clothing considered fashionable among Jewish-Israeli peers.

Although the evidence suggests that coexistence between PCI and West Bank Palestinian youth at AAUJ is riddled with experiences of marginalization and categorization on the basis of cultural expression, a small group of students interviewed at the university (four out of 13 West Bank Palestinian students and one PCI student from 11) reached a consensus on the broad notion that, regardless of where they are from, they considered each student at AAUJ to be Palestinian. They identified this element of their collective identity, alongside the conceptualization of Israel as the common enemy to overcome, as a means of facilitating a sense of unity and common ground. One West Bank Palestinian student explained that "students from Palestine 1948 are happier in the West Bank, because they are among Palestinians and where they belong – we feel better too because we are meeting our Palestinian brothers and sisters from different areas too".[62] Moreover, as many as 13 out of 24 of the students interviewed at AAUJ openly spoke of having friends there from the opposite side of the Green Line to their own. Only a small number of students felt inclined to speak to the merits of coexistence in the context of their comments regarding the importance of facilitating unity and common ground. Far more students seemed happy to refer more generally to their experiences of friendship with their peers from across the Green Line, perhaps indicating that these friendships were considered as pleasant short-term arrangements rather than as the first steps toward longer-term interaction and relationship development. One student from near Um el Fahem explained that, for West Bank Palestinian students, "once they get to know us, and realize we're not as bad as they thought, it gets easier.... Their attitudes change".[63] As cited in Hammack's "Narrative and the Politics of Identity", Allport's Contact Theory suggests that contact between individuals who belong to contrasting social groups can play a transformative role in situations of conflict that are defined by physical segregation and can contribute toward a mutual reduction in the prejudices that shape people's perceptions of each other.[64] Allport argues that this contact produces a process of "decategorisation and personalisation" whereby face-to-face interaction with the other for the first time leads to personal acquaintances being developed; common needs, grievances, and interests being realized; and the gradual disconfirmation of prejudices.[65] Grievances and negative perceptions held by parties to a conflict can be mitigated through the experience of contact which can help to enable the elimination of stereotypes and negative categories.[66]

## Conclusion

One of the ongoing effects of the Second Intifada is that travel by Palestinians into Israel has become increasingly restricted; meanwhile, there exists a more loosely administered prohibition on travel by PCI civilians into the West Bank. Given that movement into Israel is more heavily regulated than the journey for PCI youth into the West Bank, universities in the West Bank, such as AAUJ, represent one of the few known spaces where West Bank Palestinian and PCI youth can interact over a meaningful period of time. However, the outcome of Badil's survey and the research conducted at AAUJ suggest that the restrictions on movement associated with formal citizenship status are less important in informing young Palestinians' willingness and ability to interact with one another than are their perceptions about collective national and cultural identity. PCI youth study not just at AAUJ, but also at Bir Zeit University near Ramallah, and probably at other universities in the West Bank. However, their time spent at AAUJ yields relatively few case studies that would indicate a meeting of hearts and minds has occurred when West Bank and PCI youth have come together in the classroom. Parallel, justified grievances with the Israeli State expressed by youth from either side of the Green Line would suggest that a high degree of empathy and mutual understanding could be easily achieved between both parties. This is on the understanding that as Palestinian youth suffering the long-term repercussions of the Second Intifada, their

perceived and common enemy is the State of Israel. Instead, for some West Bank Palestinian youth, their sense of frustration at the restrictions imposed on them by Israel's military occupation has transformed into a feeling of resentment which is redirected towards young PCI youth from Israel's coast who they perceive to have benefited materially from their Israeli citizenship. The post-Second Intifada reality of heightened separation between Israel and the West Bank has served to accentuate such feelings of resentment. Many of the West Bank Palestinian youth interviewed seemed to lack insight into and understanding of the challenges and discrimination faced by their PCI peers in Israel and subscribed instead to a victimhood narrative informed by their own experiences of Israeli occupation and IDF incursions.

PCI youth seem to have a broad understanding that their peers in the West Bank have suffered as a result of the Second Intifada and continued occupation. However, the alien environment in which PCI youth find themselves when they spend time in the West Bank drives them, and PCI women and those from coastal Israel in particular, to interpret their West Bank Palestinian peers and their communities as embittered, conservative, and prejudiced. There is a telling contradiction between the viewpoints of the West Bank Palestinian youth surveyed by Badil, who are seemingly eager to foster social ties with their peers in Israel, and those interviewed at AAUJ, for whom their frustration with their circumstances obscures their ability to look beyond social categories and to embrace the lived experience of fostering these social ties. For the West Bank Palestinian youth surveyed by Badil, the hypothetical prospect of meeting with people who, on the surface, share national, cultural, ethnic, and social characteristics with you, but who have come of age in a very different political and legal climate to your own, is seen as highly appealing. In practice however, as the research at AAUJ demonstrates, for many West Bank Palestinian youth, the reality of these encounters involves very real, very immediate forms of interaction and coexistence that implicitly require those in attendance to confront a painful history, a challenging present, and an uncertain future.

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# The Role of Young Palestinian People in the Nonviolent "Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions" Movement

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**Abstract:** Young Palestinian people serve on the frontline of resistance to the Israeli occupation, and the multiple strategies they have used in the past have reflected the varied agendas of different political parties. In recent years, there has been a shift in young people's interest towards nonviolent resistance as an approach which proves effective at both national and international levels. Young Palestinians who have lost faith in the efficacy of the peace process have, for example, been increasingly engaged in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS). This article examines the move away from violent struggle towards nonviolent resistance by young Palestinian people who have used BDS strategies and tools. It draws on testimonials from young Palestinians living in the diaspora, assesses the internal factors that have pushed young Palestinian people to take this direction, and considers this transformation's potential impact on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the future.

**Key words:** BDS, Palestinian youth, Conflict transformation, Nonviolent resistance.

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# The Role of Young Palestinian People in the Nonviolent "Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions" Movement



## Introduction to Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions

The history of Arabs boycotting Jewish migrants and merchants can be traced back one hundred years or more, but the call to boycott Israel resurfaced on 9 July 2005, a year after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the wall built by Israel in the West Bank was illegal.[2] Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) located both inside and outside Palestine issued the call to boycott Israeli products, divest from companies that support Israel's occupation of Palestine, and impose sanctions on companies and others profiting from Israel's occupation.[3] The Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement was born and its proponents called on their counterparts worldwide to pressure their governments to support the BDS movement and hold the State of Israel accountable for its policies against Palestinians. They called for the dismantling of the wall and illegal settlements, the end of the occupation of Arab lands occupied in 1967, and permission for Palestinian refugees to return to their towns and villages in present-day Israel.[4]

Many Palestinians regard the BDS call as a response to the failure of the official negotiations to achieve a just solution. Those negotiations, coordinated by traditional State actors and dominated by elite members of Palestinian society, had been sputtering on and off since 1991. The role of non-State actors and particularly grassroots organizations was vividly clear in the BDS call which made demands for Israel to:

1) End Israel's military occupation of Arab lands occupied in 1967, and dismantle the wall separating Israel from the Palestinian territory.
2) Recognize the right of Palestinian citizens of Israel to be treated equally with its non-Palestinian citizens.
3) Respect, protect and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties, as stipulated in United Nations Resolution 194.[5]

The BDS movement provides Palestinians with an alternative path towards achieving their goals in light of Israel's continued confiscation of Palestinian lands, its long-term siege on Gaza, and lack of progress in the negotiations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israeli leaders. Advocates of BDS argue that the negotiations only offer the possibility of creating a Palestinian State on the 1967 borders while the BDS movement addresses the needs of all Palestinians, not only those who might live in a future Palestinian State. As a movement which is gaining international legitimacy and efficacy, BDS provides Palestinians with an enhanced opportunity to accomplish their strategic goals which involve ending the illegal Israeli occupation and solving the issue of the Palestinian refugees' right of return.

The interest of young Palestinian people in nonviolent resistance as a means of achieving these goals must be examined in the context of the major historical events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically the first Intifada, the second Intifada, and the subsequent period, which has been marked by the internal division between Hamas and Fatah.

### The impact of the two Intifadas on the BDS movement

The first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993) represented an important milestone because it significantly influenced how the conflict, as well as the relationship between the two sides, evolved and contributed to the formal negotiations which led to the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993.[6] The goals of the first Intifada were to limit economic ties with Israel's occupation; to confront the Israeli Civil Administration by challenging its military laws; expand Palestinian national institutions so that they could provide services to Palestinians as an alternative to Israeli services; and, most importantly, promote international solidarity with Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt).[7]

The most salient feature of the first Intifada, and probably the key factor in its success, was the wide participation by all sectors of Palestinian society, including ordinary people of all ages, both men and women, businesses and trade unions, civil society and local organizations. Palestinians were mobilized as one nation for the first time since the Nakba in 1948 in a fight for their collective liberation.[8] Palestinians living in the oPt began to assume a leading role in confronting the Israeli occupation after having been nearly completely absent from any such roles in the two or three decades before the Intifada broke out. In that intervening period, the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO's) leadership in exile had served as the only representative body for Palestinians. The affiliate parties of the PLO, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Fatah, had had their own members operating in the oPt, but most of the resistance activities before the first Intifada were carried out externally by guerrilla groups (*Fedayeen*) which were primarily violent in nature; their members took part in activities such as the hijacking of the Air France plane in Uganda in 1976 and the killing of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich in 1972.[9]

The young men and women who participated in the first Intifada chose a different approach than that of guerrilla attacks and their nonviolent tactics proved to be far more successful than the violence used by the guerrillas. When young Palestinian people appeared in front of the international media with rocks and stones rather than military weapons, they succeeded in disrupting the stereotype associated with those Palestinian groups that adopted violent tactics; thus, they managed to change that stereotype and broaden the range of Palestinian identities on view. They drew the media's attention to the root causes of the conflict and to the high level of frustration felt by young Palestinian people, many of whom had their lives uprooted or were injured or killed when Israeli troops responded to protests with intense violence.

Throughout the first Intifada, young Palestinian people refrained from getting dragged into the cycle of violence except for rare instances that occurred during the last two years (1991-1993), when their involvement formed part of the leadership's tactical attempt to enhance its negotiating position. The first Intifada largely operated under the leadership of grassroots organizations and of local committees which were rooted in civil society, and they had different interests to the political parties in exile. Young Palestinian people began to feel that they could exert their own power and influence and take back control over their own political destiny. They believed they could pressure both Israel and the Palestinian leadership to follow the will of the people. Souad Dajani, a Palestinian scholar who specializes in nonviolence, suggests that "the Intifada taught Palestinians that their greatest source of strength lies in the power of the people themselves, in their ability to organize and participate in resistance on a mass scale".[10]

While the nonviolent nature of the first Intifada brought more legitimacy to the Palestinian struggle, it also strengthened the Palestinian leadership's negotiating position. Furthermore, it changed the way Israelis perceived the viability of the occupation, since the "terrorist" image associated with Palestinians was challenged and that stereotype could easily be turned around and applied to the brutal occupation itself.[11] Fear was beginning to grow within Israeli

society that the arbitrary and repressive measures used as collective punishment by Israeli authorities against the Palestinians might backfire and lead to a resumption of violent approaches.

Following the first Intifada and the signing of the Oslo Agreement, the role of young Palestinian people in political life in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip changed. Prior to the first Intifada, young people had been the main pillar in establishing Palestine's political parties, but the influence of those parties diminished after the Oslo Agreement was signed. During the second Intifada, young people were mobilized by those parties to go out into the streets and chant and cry for what they were made to believe were "right, patriotic and absolute rights, for the ideas that were invented by party leaders".[12]

The mobilization of young people in service of the PA's agenda, following the failure at Camp David in 2000, reflected a patriarchal relationship between those young people and their political leaders. Young Palestinians were expected to follow the leadership in pursuit of whatever course of action the PA thought might serve its agenda; in other words, they were mobilized to support the peace process in times of peace and to confront the occupation when the peace process failed. This form of political patriarchy had a significant influence on young people's political ideology, as well as on their perception of Israel's occupation and their opinions about internal Palestinian politics.

Those young Palestinian people who had played a substantial role during the first Intifada shifted their struggle onto an existential level. They witnessed Palestinians who had been in exile assuming senior positions within the PA while they themselves, having contributed to the establishment of the PA, were marginalized. As the national struggle for independence became restricted to the PA's negotiators and senior politicians, young people gradually became more involved in the internal party conflict between Fatah and the PLO parties in order to achieve material and political gains. Young people had to focus their energies on pledging their loyalty to political parties and supporting their party's leadership against any opposing political ideologies such as those promoted by Hamas or Islamic Jihad, groups that originally opposed the Oslo peace process.

Young people's participation in political life was limited to their participation as voters in two parliamentary elections in Palestine (in 1996 and 2006), and Fatah was almost guaranteed to win the first election and maintain its dominance within the (PLO) and the PA.[13] This dominance was necessary both in order to secure the pursuit of the political agenda that supports peace with Israel and to control any opposition to it. The PA, under Fatah's leadership, continued to seize power by marginalizing other groups, restricting political pluralism, and using police power to suppress opposition.[14]

Yet while young Palestinian leaders were largely being marginalized from any executive positions within the PA, they were being granted these kinds of leadership opportunities within the security forces. Their security roles were quite problematic and often put young people at odds with others in Palestinian society for a number of reasons. Firstly, these young security leaders and officers came to represent the frontline in the work of cooperating with Israel on security. They were responsible, on different occasions, for passing on security information about Palestinian resistance fighters and about groups to which they had previously belonged. Secondly, they were responsible for arresting and sometimes torturing political activists and members of groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad (both of which use violent tactics to resist the occupation). Accordingly, the legacy that young people had created through their work in resisting Israel's occupation during the first Intifada was quickly overshadowed; instead they became associated with their role in fueling internal political divisions and power struggles over which party's political agenda best served the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.

When the negotiations at Camp David failed in 2000, the Palestinian leadership mobilized Palestinians, and especially young people, to publicly demonstrate support for its political

position, for the benefit of Israel and the peace sponsors.[15] The eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada after Ariel Sharon's visit to Al-Aqsa Mosque in September 2000 represented a great opportunity for young people to take the lead once again and recall the success they achieved during the first Intifada. It can be argued that the second Intifada lacked the spontaneity of the first. If the PA had achieved any political gains, even partial gains, from the Camp David negotiations, its position in relation to the second Intifada would have been different.[16] Arafat saw an opportunity to take advantage of the Palestinians' anger and channel it in an attempt to put more pressure on Israeli negotiators and the peace process sponsors (particularly the United States). Meanwhile, with the passage of the Interim Period negotiated in the Oslo Agreement, and while the State of Israel continued to change the status quo on the ground by expanding its illegal settlements in the West Bank, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which had originally opposed the peace process, saw the second Intifada as an opportunity to mobilize their supporters in this direction.

### The second Palestinian Intifada (2000)

The nonviolent nature of the second Intifada was difficult to maintain given both the internal political discord that existed between the Palestinian political parties about any clear goals for the conflict and the high level of militarization within Palestinian society. The grassroots and civil society organizations that had played a major role in the first Intifada assumed a different role in the second conflict because they were tied to a funding agenda that put limitations on their political involvement.[17] In the absence of their leadership, a few months into the second Intifada, the military wings of most of the Palestinian parties, including Fatah, began to lead the conflict's direction.

It was not difficult to mobilize young Palestinian people to engage in acts of violent resistance, given their experience of the failed peace process and the economic deprivation they had experienced as a result of power being held in the hands of a few PLO political elites.[18] Members of the traditional PLO leadership (often referred to as the old guard) who had previously adopted tactics of violent resistance and had remained in exile during the first Intifada took the lead again and influenced young people to adopt violent means of resistance against Israel. For these reasons, in addition to the political uncertainty that surrounded a final resolution with Israel and the overwhelming despair felt by so many Palestinians, support for violent resistance within Palestinian society increased. By 2002, more than 70 per cent of Palestinians supported violent resistance and believed that a violent approach would help them achieve liberation from Israel's occupation more readily than a strategy based on negotiations.[19]

### The impact of Hamas' electoral victory in 2006 on the BDS movement

The internal political division that occurred after Hamas' electoral victory in 2006 influenced how Palestinian young people regarded violent and nonviolent resistance strategies. Hamas views armed resistance as the only strategy that will help to achieve Palestinian liberation,[20] and, following its takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, very strict economic and political embargoes put in place by the international community helped it to tighten its control over the area's political and economic spheres. Young Palestinian people living in the Gaza Strip have been subjected to an unprecedented level of militarization, not only by Hamas but also by other factions. Israel's three major military operations, in 2008, 2012, and 2014, left extensive destruction in the Gaza Strip and further contributed to this militarization process. Additionally, while political and economic uncertainty has had an impact on the whole population, its impact on young people has been particularly devastating and they have experienced one of the world's highest unemployment rates. In 2013, youth unemployment stood at 44 per cent in the Gaza Strip.[21]

The PA in the West Bank, under the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad, was promoting the idea that its plan to build State institutions

offered the most successful strategy for helping to obtain recognition for a Palestinian State at the United Nations. Meanwhile, the Israeli government continued to confiscate more land in the West Bank and routinely announced the construction of tens of thousands of new housing units. Hundreds of new military checkpoints divided the already-fragmented Palestinian territory, contributing to the deterioration of the Palestinian economy as well as turning Palestinian cities and villages in the West Bank into Bantustans.[22] All of these factors contributed to young people and others in Palestine losing hope that a solution could be found for the conflict in the near future.

The "peace process" paradigm adopted by the PA under Fatah's leadership and the "violent resistance" paradigm adopted by Hamas created further painful realities for young Palestinian people, who were portrayed in the media once again as "terrorists" while, behind the stereotype, they were suffering from political and economic deprivation. Young people demonstrated their anger and despair at their leaders on several occasions, and they used strategies including marches to urge their leaders to end the political split between the West Bank and Gaza and to focus the national agenda on more serious issues, such as Jerusalem, settlements, and the freeing of political prisoners.[23]

An increasing number of Palestinian young people now believe it is important to reclaim the initiative for national liberation from their leaders, and this view is evidenced by the growth of popular resistance groups in the West Bank that have mobilized against the construction of the separation wall in protests such as the frequent confrontations around Bil'in village. Although very few successes have been achieved on the ground, young people have managed to gain wider support and solidarity for their cause both within Palestine and on the global stage. They have succeeded in utilizing new media as a nonviolent form of resistance, and a growing number of young Palestinians are also writing and sharing their personal stories about living under Israeli occupation. For example, the short story collection *Gaza Writes Back* (2014)[24] and *Gaza Unsilenced* (2015)[25] – a collection of detailed accounts, poetry, and other writings about young people's experiences surviving Israel's military assaults – bring together the work of young Palestinian people in Gaza. Young people have begun to explore new and creative means of bringing attention to their fight against Israel's occupation.

### Expanding the BDS movement beyond Palestine – young people's testimonials

The BDS movement is very active in North America and Europe where young Palestinian people living in the diaspora play a major role in expanding public awareness. Many young people get involved in the BDS movement as a way of reclaiming their Palestinian identity, and the movement also gives them a way to play a role in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict after years of exclusion by the PA.

The role of diasporic Palestinians in the BDS movement takes several forms. Firstly, young Palestinians in the West are able to raise awareness and educate the public about the occupation, especially since some of them grew up in Palestine or have spent some time visiting their families in the oPt. Secondly, they engage directly in the BDS movement's efforts against Israel by working with organizations in their local communities, such as churches, student unions, and academic bodies. Thirdly, they are able to lead their own independent BDS efforts by undertaking tasks such as organizing conferences or leading campaigns that call on people to adopt the BDS call.

Speaking at the Sabeel Conference of Palestinian Christian in North America,[26] Rami Khoury, a Palestinian-Lebanese researcher, noted the change in the roles being played by Palestinians abroad when he commented that "The growing BDS movement pressures the US government. The third Palestinian generation in exile is involved in BDS and rights action. The first generation went to work; the second generation went to education and the third generation will go into action".[27]

Many Palestinians began a journey to explore their roots and identity through direct engagement with the Palestinian cause while in exile. Amal Ali, interviewed by Barrows-Friedman in her book *In Our Power: US Students Organize for Justice in Palestine,*[28] says that

> At one point, I asked, "So, Dad we're Jordanian, right?" Because someone at school asked, and he said, "No, we're Palestinian." And he sat me in his lap and told me the whole story of our identity and our existence…. So using whatever limited internet [access] I had at the time, I tried to do my homework, tried to figure out what I could read at the grand old age of eight years old. So those are the very early beginnings [of my interest in activism].[29]

Ali, a student at the University of California Riverside and a member of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), engages in pro-Palestine activism as a way to reclaim a national identity that was scattered in exile "until I attended the National Students for Justice in Palestine conference in 2012, which I happened to hear about by chance over Twitter or something… It was a huge eye-opener and I can honestly say it changed my life in a very real way".[30] Learning about the occupation of Palestine and how to take constructive action to end it influenced Ali's decision to become involved in "a two-year long push to have the university pull its investment from US companies that profit from Israel's human rights violations".[31] Ghassan Hussein, who lived in Palestine until he graduated from high school, tells a similar story: "I realized I had to dig deeper and find out more about what was going on [in Palestine]. I needed to educate myself more and also start spreading awareness about the situation".[32]

Ali Abunimah, author of *The Battle for Justice in Palestine*,[33] believes that Palestinians are winning the battle between pro-Palestine and pro-Israel activists in the United States. After examining a number of US campuses, he concluded that they are experiencing an increasing level of solidarity with Palestine. The importance he ascribes to activism around young people is evident in his claim that "If we lose campuses, we lose the US".[34] The David Project,[35] which focuses on pro-Israeli campus activism, has, Abunimah notes, claimed that many US campuses have gained "financial support from Arab autocrats"[36] and can therefore be understood to be dangerous for Israel's interests. Abunimah's views on the growing Palestinian solidarity movement on US campuses are also shared by Israeli officials, such as Ehud Barak.[37] In the section that follows, this article allows Palestinian students in the United States to explain their BDS activism and why they became involved in BDS in their own words.

### Why young Palestinians join BDS

Leila Abdelrazzaq led the Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) group at DePaul University in Chicago where a divestment proposal passed in May 2014 in favour of divesting from four Israeli companies. Adeeba Mabrouk, a Palestinian student at DePaul University, joined many other Palestinian and non-Palestinian activists to convince fellow students to vote in favour of the bill: "We educated the campus about BDS and on human rights violations that these companies help fund and profit off of. I think it's most important to educate the public on what BDS is and what they can do to help".[38]

Shirien Damra was actively engaged in establishing an SJP chapter in Chicago and was instrumental in the 2011 DePaul University campaign to boycott Sabra hummus.[39] More recently, she participated in the national SJP conference in Boston at Tufts University. Damra explains that her initial aspirations for Students for Justice in Palestine have been exceeded: "So, we got together, started emailing each other, had conference calls, and it started growing from there…. It really is kind of shocking to me still to see how much it [SJP] has grown".[40] Damra, and many other Palestinians living in the diaspora, have travelled to Palestine and experienced the occupation first-hand. Their travel solidifies their involvement in the BDS movement back in the US. For instance, on her return from her visit, Damra organized a campaign against Sabra hummus, an Israeli product produced in the illegal West Bank settlements, which she observed when she travelled to Palestine. She also took note of

the fact that Hewlett-Packard runs the IT system at Israel's checkpoints which racially profiles Palestinians.

Ahlam Muhtaseb, an academic working with several pro-Palestinian groups including Al-Awda,[41] the Palestine Right to Return Coalition, and the Hewlett-Packard Boycott campaign, believes that the BDS movement has achieved many successes. Historically, Muhtaseb argues, Palestinians in the diaspora had been politically marginalized and "under-represented [in the pro-Palestine movement] or not represented at all".[42] When "white males from the US represent our cause, sometimes issues at the core of the Palestinian cause are either twisted or watered down for Americans".[43] Muhtaseb believes that Palestinians in the US know more about Palestine and the impacts of the Israeli occupation, so they should be leading the movement and delivering the message to the American audience.[44]

Ramah Kudaimi, a staff member at the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation,[45] believes that Palestinians living in the diaspora are playing a major role in changing mainstream narratives about Palestine by sharing their stories in exile, after previously having been denied access to mainstream media:

> For so long [the] U.S. media has been dominated by Israeli propaganda, with little attention paid to facts or Palestinian narratives. This is changing, and a big reason for this change is Palestinians organizing to tell their own stories and connect with other communities in the struggle to build relationships centered around fighting for freedom and justice for all oppressed people.[46]

Andrew Dalack, an active participant in the "National Students for Justice in Palestine" movement in the US, explains that, when the BDS movement was first launched by representatives of Palestine's civil society in 2005, it was "very much on the fringe of American society. Today, it has become an acronym with which everyone is familiar and it receives widespread mainstream support and attention".[47] Dalack highlights the specific risks that Palestinians in the diaspora must confront when they support the BDS movement, over and above what other actors might face. He notes that a Palestinian may be the target of reprisal by pro-Israel groups and even governmental authorities:

> The only question is the extent to which Palestinians in the diaspora feel comfortable putting their support behind BDS given the antagonistic political climate, especially in the United States. The stakes are much higher for Palestinians who support BDS and other pro-Palestine actions than they are for allies from other communities, and Palestinians sometimes feel anxious about the legal and social implications of publicly mobilizing around BDS.[48]

This was evidenced, for instance, when Northeastern University suspended a student group that distributed mock eviction notices on campus to raise awareness about Israel's home demolition policy in the occupied West Bank, although university officials later reversed their decision after public criticism from community and legal groups.[49] Nerdeen Kiswani claimed she was assaulted by police when she queued to register for an event at her university that was reserved exclusively for people with Jewish birthright. She later said that "(b)eing the only visibly Muslim woman in the arena with a scarf apparently warranted the assault".[50]

### The role of young North American Palestinians in the BDS movement

Huda El-Haj of the SJP chapter at the University of Houston stresses the role that Palestinians in the US have played in creating awareness about the BDS movement. She asserts that their "role in the West [involves] much more than creating awareness and battling ignorance",[51] and she highlights in particular the role that student campaigns are capable of playing: "they are able to attain votes from their student governments to divest from products funding the occupation. While in some cases, this movement may only prove to be symbolic, it gets students talking about it and examining how a collection of individual decisions can create a

large impact in the long run".[52] According to El-Haj, this also "gets us to start contacting our local companies. Many sell products such as dates that are harvested in illegal settlements. We can educate our local communities to avoid these products in their business and personal decisions".[53]

Noor Fawzy founded the SJP chapter at Florida Atlantic University. While many students drew a lot of their passion and strength from Fawzy's early guidance and groundwork, she noted the difficulties that her group still faces on campus:

> When students organized a mock "eviction notices" action on campus [to mimic the eviction notices that Israel issues to Palestinian families before demolishing their homes in the West Bank], that's when members started to feel discrimination and antipathy from the university administration. The repression SJP members have faced on campus has a lot to do with the very hostile, anti-Palestinian community in which they live.[54]

Following the eviction notices action on campus, the Jewish group Hillel issued a statement jointly with the university administration which condemned the action, explained that approval should not have been given for it, and stated that the university was going to work with Hillel in the future to ensure that such an incident does not occur again.[55]

Boycotting Israeli products is one strategy that Palestinians who live in the diaspora can use to support Palestinian rights and put pressure on the State of Israel. Salma Awad from Washington State claims that she "stay(s) involved with the BDS movement by boycotting products that are listed".[56] Awad explains that

> young people are more exposed to what's happening and are more in touch with social media. A lot of Palestinian activism is taking place on college campuses and thus young students are being exposed to what's happening there. Speaking from personal experience, when I give lectures on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, I always speak to either high-school-level students or college students. The younger age group is the group more in the learning environment and I think that plays a big role as well.[57]

Not all BDS campaigns in the West have been focused on college campuses. Sandra Tamari, a member of the US Palestinian Community Network, sits on the steering committee of the St. Louis Palestine Solidarity Committee which proposed a divestment bill against the French company Veolia over its role in the colonization of the West Bank. Tamari explains how the campaign succeeded in convincing the city council to divest from the company:

> We formed an alliance with other groups that hated Veolia, like city water workers and environmental groups. During the course of the campaign, we educated these progressive allies about Veolia's role in the oppression of the Palestinians. Even now that we have ended our campaign and won a major victory against Veolia in St. Louis, these allies cooperate with us on Palestinians' issues and understand our positions.[58]

She highlights the importance of Palestinian voices in securing the campaign's success: "It was Palestinian stories at the public hearing about Veolia that city lawmakers remember. Black lawmakers were especially moved by stories of bus segregation".[59]

### Young Palestinian people and BDS in Europe

Along with their counterparts in the US, young Palestinian people in the UK, Canada, and other parts of the world are engaged in nonviolent resistance focused on BDS. Emily Haimeed, a member of the Palestine Society at the London School of Economics, describes her participation in BDS initiatives:

> I attended the "Confronting Israeli Apartheid" BDS conference in Sheffield [England] a few weeks ago and there were over 100 committed BDS student activists. We were taught workshops on BDS by Rafeef Ziadeh (Palestinian poet), Michael Deas (European

> coordinator of BDS), and many others on how to go about [organizing] corporate, academic boycotts etc. at our universities. I was amazed to see how many students from so many different universities had already passed BDS resolutions on campus, and how many were working on or planning to do so in the future.[60]

Haimeed highlights the institutional resistance that pro-Palestinian activists face on campus: "The resistance within institutions, especially universities, happens when Jewish and Israeli societies mobilize to block BDS movements, and call on universities not to support BDS".[61] Haimeed points out that

> [t]here are so many dedicated Palestinian students involved in BDS, for them it is their biggest hope of reaching a solution. Many enthusiastic and inspiring Palestinians are active in the BDS movement. Palestinians like Rafeef Ziadeh, who is very active in the BDS movement, are important because, without Palestinian support, BDS would not have as much legitimacy. Activists should try not to do things that the Palestinians themselves do not call for, but BDS seems to be something that many Palestinians in the diaspora believe in and advocate for.[62]

The BDS movement in Canada, unlike that in the US and the UK, has very little support. This may be due to the small number of Palestinians living in Canada compared to the US, as well as to the existence of Canada's powerful Zionist lobby and strong ties with Israel, which weaken support for the BDS movement. Reem Skiek, a Palestinian-Canadian, stresses that Palestinians in Canada are aware of the BDS call, although they are not actively engaged in it,[63] and she argues that "more work needs to be done, and many more dedicated volunteers are required to continue the work".[64]

Andrew Dalack believes that Palestinians living in the diaspora have been instrumental in the BDS movement. He argues that

> The Palestinian diaspora plays a strong role in helping to mainstream the BDS movement. The Palestinian diaspora in the U.S. and Europe are a diverse group who have reached prominence in a variety of fields: medical, legal, academic, business, etc. Therefore, Palestinians in the diaspora are in a unique position to leverage their social clout and credibility to bring BDS into the mainstream, into their offices, neighborhoods, and diverse social circles.[65]

## Conclusion

Young Palestinian people have been actively involved in nonviolent resistance since the formation of the BDS movement in 2005. Over the years of the conflict, young Palestinian people have used multiple strategies to end the Israeli occupation under the umbrella of various Palestinian political parties. Most notably, following the beginning of the Second Palestinian Intifada, young Palestinians played a major role in political factions which resorted to armed resistance. Yet, with no light at the end of the tunnel and with the collapse of peace talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel and the failure of the two-state solution, more young Palestinians, including those in the diaspora, have become actively engaged in the growing Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel.

The interviews cited here make clear that many of the young Palestinians in the diaspora who had lost faith in the peace process have identified BDS an effective tactic for pressuring Israel, and the BDS movement has provided an alternative way for young Palestinians to become politically engaged in the cause. For many young people, BDS has provided them with a platform that has enabled them to challenge the previous order in which elite members of Palestinian society controlled the political spectrum. BDS has also provided them with an opportunity to reconcile their identity and look for their roots after long years living abroad.

This transformation may potentially shape the future trajectory of the conflict. The new approach based on the use of nonviolent resistance focuses on boycotts, divestment

motions, and calls for the imposition of sanctions on Israel, and, according to BDS advocates, it will lead to the ending of the military occupation of lands occupied in 1967; it is also designed to ensure that Palestinians who hold Israeli passports will be treated as the equals of their Jewish counterparts and that Palestinian refugees will be allowed to return to their homes in present-day Israel.

Yet, this approach faces some challenges, most notably the legal warfare waged by Israel and its supporters across the world against the BDS movement. The continuing support for a two-state solution by major powers presents yet another obstacle, and, although the BDS movement is officially supported by political parties, it still lacks the support of large sectors of young people in Palestine.

The movement has achieved major successes in the last few years, with the French company Veolia announcing its decision to end its contract with its Israeli partner G4S by the end of 2016. Sodastream and AHAVA decided to relocate their West Bank factories to avoid BDS. Companies such as Hewlett-Packard, Elbit Systems, and Mekorot have suffered considerable losses estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars. The more the movement gains momentum and achieves successes, the more young Palestinian people, inside and outside Palestine, will be engaged in the BDS movement in the near future. Israel is making efforts to stop the movement through, for example, its application of an effective travel ban on its co-founder Omar Al-Barghouti; however, these kinds of steps are only likely to push more young Palestinians to join the BDS movement.

**Notes**

1. Both authors have made equal contributions to this article.
2. Abdulminem Hassan, Qarar Majlis Altaoun Alkhaliji w Maseer Moqataet Israel [Decision of Gulf Cooperation Council and Future of Gulf Boycott of Israel].
3. Palestinian BDS National Committee, "Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS", http://BDSmovement.net/call (Accessed 20 May 2016).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Intifada is the Arabic word for uprising and it is commonly used in Palestine to refer to the 1987, 2000, and 2015 uprisings against the Israeli occupation.
7. Alimi, "The Israeli Political Arena", 433-453.
8. Nakba is the Arabic word for "catastrophe" that Palestinians use to describe what happened to them following the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.
9. Steelman, "International Terrorism Vis-a-Vis Air-Hijacking", 85; Klein, Aaron J., *Striking Back*.
10. Dajani, Souad, *Eyes Without Country*, cited in Stephan, "People Power in the Holy Land", 9.
11. Ibid.
12. Ahmad, "Young Palestinian People: Between Patriarchy and Politics", 18 September 2013, http://icsr.info/2013/09/palestinian-youth-between-patriarchy-and-politics/ (Accessed 20 May 2016).
13. PLO refers to the Palestinian Liberation Organization which was founded in 1964 to liberate Palestine. PA refers to the Palestinian Authority, which was founded in the West Bank and Gaza following an agreement, known as the Oslo Accords, between the PLO and Israel in 1993.
14. Ahmad, "Young Palestinian People", 18 September 2013, http://icsr.info/2013/09/palestinian-youth-between-patriarchy-and-politics/ (Accessed 20 May 2016).
15. Helmick, Raymond G., *Negotiating Outside the Law*.
16. Weiner, "Wye River Memorandum", 1.
17. Roy, Sara, *Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza*.
18. Brynen, Rex, "The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation", 31-43.
19. Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided".
20. Abu-Amr, "Hamas", 5-19.
21. Balousha, "Young Palestinian People", 5 March 2013, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/Palestinian-youth-unemloyment.html# (Accessed 20 May 2016).
22. Halper, Jeff, *An Israeli in Palestine*.
23. Jerusalem represents one of the final status quo issues in the Palestinian-Israeli talks. It is the holiest city for the Jewish faith and the third holiest city in Islam. Israel claims it is the eternal capital of Israel and Palestinians claim it to be their future capital city. The ongoing Palestinian uprising is named after the city in honour of its status.
24. Alareer, Refaat (ed.), *Gaza Writes Back*.

25. Alareer, Refaat et al. (eds.), *Gaza Unsilenced*.
26. Friends of Sabeel – North America (FOSNA) is dedicated to the support of Sabeel, an ecumenical liberation theology movement founded by Palestinian Christians in the Holy Land. See http://www.fosna.org/ (Accessed 19 August 2017).
27. Khoury, Rami, "Palestinian Diaspora and the BDS".
28. Barrows-Friedman, Nora, *In Our Power*, 10.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 58.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 14.
33. Abunimah, "Future of BDS".
34. Ibid.
35. The David Project is a pro-Israel advocacy project that promotes support for Israel on US campuses. See http://www.davidproject.org/ (Accessed 19 August 2017).
36. Abunimah, Ali, *The Battle for Justice in Palestine*, p. 55.
37. Weitz, "Former PM Barak: Netanyahu Leading Israel to Disaster".
38. Mabrouk, Adeeba, email interview with author, 19 November 2014.
39. Barrows-Friedman, Nora, *In Our Power*, 15.
40. Ibid.
41. Al-Awda, http://al-awda.org/ (Accessed 22 August 2017).
42. Muhtaseb, Ahlam, email interview with author, 11 November 2014.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. See US Campaign for Palestinian Rights, endtheoccupation.org (Accessed 22 August 2017).
46. Kudaimi, Ramah, email interview with author, 12 November 2014.
47. Dalack, Andrew, email interview with author, 21 November 2014.
48. Ibid.
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51. El-Haj, Huda, email interview with author, 14 November 2014.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Barrows-Friedman, Nora, *In Our Power*, 105.

55. Ibid.
56. Awad, Salma, email interview with author, 6 November 2014.
57. Ibid.
58. Tamari, Sandra, email interview with author, 8 November 2014.
59. Ibid.
60. Haimeed, Emily, email interview with author, 8 November 2014.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Skiek, Reem, email interview with author, 13 November 2014.
64. Ibid.
65. Dalack, Andrew, email interview with author, 21 November 2014.

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# BOOK REVIEW

Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Stewart Tristan Webb (Eds.)
**Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War**
Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2015,ISBN: 9781482247657, 288p.

Romaniuk and Webb's edited collection on *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War*makes a valuable contribution to the study of those phenomena for anyone who already has an adequate theoretical grounding in that field. However, it might not be suggested to the newcomers to the topic would benefit from beginning their studies with works such as Bruce Hoffman's *Inside Terrorism* (2006, 2nd Ed.) which would equip them with an understanding of its fundamentals. This detailed study, which is highly specific in its treatment of the concept of insurgency, is aimed at the specialist reader. The book would benefit more the ones who start the book with an adequate theoretical background. In this manner Bruce Hoffman's *Inside Terrorism* (2006 2nd Edition) would provide the fundamentals to the readers in terms of being able to read a study on insurgency with such detail. The aim of Romaniuk and Webb's edited collection is to elaborate on the complexity of the term "insurgency" and to try to shed light upon the issue of how insurgencies are formed and prolonged. Essays in the collection assess the full spectrum of insurgency tactics and strategies and discuss specific insurgent groups from every part of the world except the Americas. The editors set out to provide an insight into insurgencies worldwide, and the book illustrates very capably the fact that insurgencies have roots in deep historical and unresolved struggles. By looking beyond the major counterinsurgency (COIN) actors to explore the aims, beliefs and motivations that shape COIN's formation, recruitment, leadership, planning, and execution, it also confirms the need for alternative approaches to counterinsurgency to be developed.

The first two chapters of the book, by Olivier Lewis and Shane Drennan, are some of the most intriguing ones and establish the theoretical debate behind the concepts of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. The remainder of the book hinges on these debates, and unless the reader is able to keep pace with the first two chapters, this collection is unlikely to be beneficial to them. In the third chapter, Daniela Irrera links crime, terror, and insurgency and examines whether they pose a threat to international security; she suggests that multilateralism provides the most suitable lens for analyzing this phenomenon. In the fourth chapter, Roger P. Warren shares findings from his research into the literature that discusses foreign fighters. Warren uses Social Movement Theory to powerful effect, carefully distinguishing between the contexts in which those fighters operate and their character as a cohort. Warren's chapter offers readers an impressive body of data as well as significant theoretical insights and should be read by anyone interested in understanding the motivations of *mujahedeen* who wage war against States on foreign soil. Warren concludes his chapter by emphasizing the fact that the solution lies under a Muslim-led campaign. Michael F. Morris bases the fifth chapter on the concept of social antimovement to analyse Al -Qaeda as a global threat, and the sixth chapter by Colin Maclachlan emphasizes the threat that international terrorism poses to critical infrastructure throughout Europe. In the last chapter before the direct case studies by Oren Magen provides a detailed understanding of

the domestic-political costs of deterring violence conducted by non-State organizations. The schematic visuals used in this chapter, by Magen, are exceptional.

The second part of the book focuses on more specific case studies about Indonesia, Mali, Caucasus, India, Afghanistan, China, Burma, the United Nations, and the Balkans. This section provides a useful source of information about specific insurgent and terrorist groups in various areas of the world. For example, the chapter on Afghanistan by Romaniuk and Webb, focuses on the Haqqani Network, while giving readers opportunities to gain substantial insights into the terrorism issue in Afghanistan. Marinko Bobic's use of Moral Hazard Theory in the analysis of insurgency movements in the Balkans is remarkable and it provides this collection of insightful essays with a positive and complex ending.

Romaniuk and Webb have brought together 17 chapters which cover a range of issues and contexts, and their book is prone to the problems which affect any attempt to create a comprehensive context out of diverse studies, some of which are theoretical and others of which are context-specific. The complex and multi-dimensional analysis method they employ makes a valuable contribution to the field of security studies; their up-to-date examinations provide insights that help us to understand the original character of insurgents and terrorists and encourage us to look beyond conventional COIN actors. Still, there are a number of minor mistakes that might have been corrected, and the editors could have done more to reduce the quality differences between the chapters presented in this volume. In the second part of the study, each chapter offers its own context, methodological choices, and type of analysis and this makes it difficult for the reader to draw any general conclusions that encompass all of the insights offered by individual authors. Meanwhile, the last three chapters of the book include some repetition of ideas about insurgency and terrorism debates and definitions of terms that are already well-established.

Romaniuk and Webb's book proves to be a highly relevant study of the key questions it sets out to consider in relation to insurgency and counterinsurgency. However, it would be beneficial to compensate the absence of discussion about insurgent and terrorist activities in South and Central America, which have played a pivotal role in state-building and consolidation processes related to insurgency. In order for the book to offer a complete analysis of the broad spectrum of insurgent tactics, it might have been useful to include the discussions of motivations, contexts and other factors relating to the cases of FARC and the ELN in Colombia, for example. Nevertheless, the book is quite modern, both in terms of the resources it utilizes and some of the newer concepts, such as terrorism, that it explores. For readers who want to build on a general understanding of international relations theories, state-building concepts, Social Movement Theory, insurgency, and terrorism, this book provides a very detailed analysis of significant cases, and the inclusion of case studies from Asia is welcome,as it is often neglected in more Eurocentric studies.

The book is satisfactorily organized and differences in methodology, perspectives, and typologies are to be expected in an edited volume. The adoption of a more comprehensive methodological unity in future research would provide a platform for analysing insurgent and terrorist groups in different parts of the world that fall into in similar categories. Romaniuk and Webb's study represents a strong contribution to debates around insurgency and counterinsurgency and builds on Social Movement Theory and the terrorism-insurgency debate in constructive ways that create avenues for future research on these topics.

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Dennys Christian,
**Military Intervention, Stabilisation and Peace: The Search for Stability**
London: Routledge, 2014, ISBN 978-0415732642, 214p.

Stabilisation is a term that is increasingly widely use by researchers who focus on the problem of military interventions and their consequences in the 21st century. It also occurs frequently in political discourse where, for example, the term has been employed as an adjective in political statements and policy analyses that concern international military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps because "stabilization" sounded more neutral, if not more positive, than the previously utilized terms such as intervention and occupation, it was quickly adopted and widely accepted in the 21st century public discourse.

The introduction of the term to the public discourse improved communication between citizens of the countries actively participating in endless stabilizing missions far from home. It boosted public debates on the legitimacy of "stabilisation" activities. For instance, when field reports began to reveal the true number of civilian/military casualties produced during stabilising missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, many people began questioning the legitimacy of the claims that such military engagements were being carried out for the purposes of "stabilisation". As a result, in the recent discourse in both public and academic domains, the concept of stabilisation (which used to be equated with peacekeeping) tends to carry more negative connotations than it first did.

Another area of contention in recent academic debates in relation to military intervention and stabilisation, focuses on the question of why militarily and economically powerful countries are not able either to bring peace and balance to the territories they occupy or to collaborate with the local population to win, or at least not to lose, their acceptance. Anthony Shadid's 2005 book – *Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War* (Henry Holt & Co.) – provided the kind of nuanced reporting that helped to boost extensive discussion on this topic. Indeed, Shadid's account and the discussions it provoked inspired efforts to examine and understand the reasons behind the failure of stabilisation operations from a scholarly perspective.

Christian Dennys takes on this challenge in his 2014 book, *Military Intervention, Stabilisation and Peace: The Search for Stability*. Currently working at the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office as the Deputy Head of the National Security Secretariat, Dennys provides a solid piece of academic work recognised by other scholars, such as Chiyuki Aoi and Cedric de Coning. His volume is named in the list of research devoted to stabilization missions in Afghanistan, which was published by RAND Corporation in 2017 (*Lesson Learned from Stabilisation Initiatives in Afghanistan: A Systematic Review of Existing Research*). Dennys' book emerges from academic work which began when he examined the topic of stabilisation in his dissertation at Cranfield University.

While Dennys went on to turn, his thesis into a peer-reviewed publication, this published version is written in a style that will be attractive to non-academic readers. In fact, the book will be of interest to anyone who is interested in contemporary issues related to security, and especially the problems that concern military interventions and stabilisation, and peacebuilding in the areas they affect. When the lack of peace threatens to jeopardise the stability of the entire international security system, every attempt to research and analyse this problem from an academic standpoint is vitally important.

Dennys' contribution to this debate is invaluable. His book, which is well-structured and has a clear and logical research methodology, sets out to answer two main research questions. It assesses what stabilisation means to the people who personally experience it, and it considers which actions of the stabilization forces influence the way stabilisation is perceived

by the affected community. Dennys focuses on people's perceptions, using them to generate much broader conclusions about the meaning and effects of stabilisation missions than he could produce using more formal kinds of research. Such responses can be examined, not only to help improve the concepts and doctrines that concern stabilization operations, but also to shape strategies to ensure they are implemented successfully.

The book is divided into eight chapters, and the first two introduce the topic and explain its basic terms in an approachable manner, carefully synthesising the subject matter and the research framework. The history of military interventions in Afghanistan and Nepal is then set out, providing a strong context for the analysis that follows and which takes up four chapters. Dennys introduces his readers to the specific places where he conducted his research during 2010-2012 and to the views he encountered there. Interviewing became one of his main field methods in both countries; he carried out 61 conversations at local and national levels in Afghanistan and a further 79 in Nepal. Naturally, the populations he interacted with were not identical to each other, and this affected the distribution of his research; for instance, it was possible to interview more women in Nepal than in Afghanistan. However, these differences shaped by local cultural norms do not undermine the final results, but rather reflect the reality of the problems that exist in each location. Each of the four chapters is divided into seven corresponding parts and this design allows Dennys to draw systematic and careful comparisons between the two situations he considers. The book's discussion mostly focuses on the local level, in a bid to ensure a better understanding of stabilisation and military interventions related to it. The last two chapters include summary remarks, conclusions, and attempts to theorise about the topic in question.

Dennys' discussion of the situation in the Nahr-i Sarraj district in Afghanistan offers a good example of the approach the book takes (60-77). The section on "Exogenous Stabilisation" allows readers to understand the difficulties involved in stabilisation efforts more deeply. In order for a stabilisation project to succeed, either the existing authorities have to be accepted as legitimate or a new government must be created, supported by the majority of the population. The success of either option ultimately depends on that local population. However, in the Afghan case, efforts to win their support were made virtually impossible because of the ongoing rivalry between various agents interested in securing power. In the case of the Nahr-I Sarrai district, the engaged parties were the Afghan central authorities, the Taliban, local leaders, and the International Security Action Force and the complicated dynamics that shaped their relationships impeded a successful resolution. Without local support and broad acceptance of the credibility of local authorities, all nation-building attempts remain futile. This is especially clear when competing agents resort to constantly undermining their rivals' positions. Doubtless, this is the main challenge in any process that works to achieve effective stabilisation, and the situation in Afghanistan is another case in point. A similar situation in Iraq eventually led to the success of the Islamic State.

An additional example that comes to mind when looking into local political strategies behind stabilising operations is the post-World War II power dynamics in Middle-Eastern Europe. In that situation, communist governments were imposed from outside after a series of brutal pacifications and forged elections. People were suppressed and forced to accept the outside rule for the sake of "stabilization". While the USSR's leaders and their superintendents were able to implement this strategy, it is by no means available to leaders of Western countries in the 21st century. Furthermore, even if such measures were possible, which Dennys also discusses, participation in international stabilisation missions must also answer to national interests and capabilities of engaging countries. International organisations must also consider their own interests and Dennys could usefully elaborate on this issue, using Bosnia, Herzegovina, or Kosovo as examples. Such broad view would allow to see different reasons behind stabilization missions and different forms they have taken.

In summary, I highly recommend this field-based book which sheds new light on the discussion around how military interventions and stabilisation are perceived. The book helps

to shed light on the faults of ongoing operations and to identify possible solutions that might make future interventions more effective. Stabilisation and hybrid warfare constitute new terminology rather than new phenomena; nevertheless, Dennys careful reflections, which draw on his thoughtful analysis of documents, qualitative interviews, and relevant academic studies, provide important insights into their contemporary meaning. I would strongly encourage students of international relations, security specialists, the military, contractors, and staff within international governmental and non-governmental organisations to reach for this work and benefit from it.

**Marcin Lasoń**

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Edwin Jurriëns & Ross Tapsell (Eds.)
**Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and Divergence**
Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute: 2017, ISBN: 978-981-47-6299-1, 304p.

It is inevitable that attention is being given to digital technology when it is increasingly dominating various sectors of modern life. Technological advancement relies on digital technology, and therefore a society which is able to harness digital technology will gain benefits from it in the future. However, if digital technology is not used properly, it can create negative impacts too.

Indonesia is one of the nations in the process of maximising the use of digital technology for its development. Since the internet came to Indonesia in the second half of the 1990s, digital technology has contributed to shaping the country's culture and identity, as well as its living and working practices. Its role can be seen in the growth of Indonesia's promising digital economy and digital platforms which are now commonly used in the political sphere as places where freedom of expression can be exercised and opinions can be voiced on various issues. Nevertheless, there are challenges which have to be solved since the country's developing digital technology network still only reaches a small part of Indonesia, focused around Java and Sumatra. Many regions still have no infrastructure for digital communication and information while other communities can only access underdeveloped resources in this area.

Edwin Jurriëns and Ross Tapsell's edited collection *Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and Divergence* is based on papers presented at the thirty-fourth annual Indonesia Update conference held at Australia National University (ANU), on 16-17 September 2016. Indonesia Update is an initiative which gives a comprehensive overview of developments in Indonesia and offers opportunities for broad discussions about different topics related to it. The 2016 conference focused on the ways that digital technologies are making an impact on different disciplines and fields in Indonesia.

Jurriëns and Tapsell set out to explain the opportunities and challenges created by the impact of digital technology on Indonesian society. Their explanation is delivered through a number of case studies which show the relationships between digital technology and different sectors of life in Indonesia, and the studies are clustered into five sections which, the editors claim, represent "closely interrelated aspects of digital Indonesia" (p. 5). These sections focus on connectivity, divergence, identity, knowledge, and commerce; however, insufficient space is allocated to explaining the reason behind this clustering. A clearer explanation about how the editors chose those different aspects and how they interrelate with each other would have helped the reader to navigate their way through the book more easily.

The collection contains 14 papers written both from macro- as well as from micro-perspectives. In Chapter Three, Emma Baulch offers a broad view of the social and political impacts of changes in Indonesian people's mobile phone usage while, in Chapter Nine, Martin Slama provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between social media and Islamic practice through an explanation of the ways in which "Indonesian Muslims are using social media for religious purposes" (p. 147).

A number of insightful chapters are written by digital technology practitioners who offer insights from the field. For instance, in Chapter Two, Yanuar Nugroho and Agung Hikmat offer "An insider's view of e-governance under Jokowi" and assess that governance in terms of its political promise and vision. The co-authors, who work in the Executive Office of the President, explain the e-governance strategy President Joko Widodo's government has developed to facilitate communication between citizens and their government in a bid to deliver more efficient and transparent governance. In Chapter 14, Bede Moore, who is the co-founder and former Managing Director of Lazada Indonesia (an e-commerce company) gives his perspective on the development of Indonesia's e-commerce industry, with a particular focus on the period from 2011 to 2016.

The edited collection gives readers a thorough understanding of the current digital technology situation in Indonesia, and it addresses the key opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. For instance, in Chapter Five, Onno W. Purbo discusses the efforts that government and communities have made to provide better internet access, particularly for villages and rural areas. Purbo believes there is an opportunity to close the "digital divide" through the use of top-down and bottom-up strategies. Top-down strategies can be implemented by the government through "information technology" programmes, while bottom-up strategies can be developed by communities themselves through projects such as the development of community-based rural internet networks. In Chapter Ten, Nava Nuraniyah addresses a quite different challenge when she examine the issues involved in responding to online extremism. She examines the use of Telegram, a mobile chat application, by the pro-ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) group in Indonesia.

The book succeeds to a great extent in its bid to map out the opportunities and challenges created by the development of digital technology in Indonesian society. The collection's biggest strength comes from the diversity of its authors. The book's researchers and academics provide varied perspectives and new insights into how digitalisation is shaping Indonesian society, while digital technology practitioners offer key insights into how digital technology is being implemented across Indonesia. The combination of these two perspectives makes this book an excellent reference point for students of digital information studies and for those involved in decision-making processes related to digitalisation.

The scope of this book is somewhat limited, however. When a collection draws on conference proceedings, it cannot always offer cover the full range of possible perspectives. It would, for example, have been valuable to have had more information on the links between digital technology and "fake news", particularly in relation to political issues where misinformation can spread through social media quickly with powerful effects. Nevertheless, this book, which can be recommended to researchers and those involved in the development of digital technology and policy, can play an important role in encouraging further research and discussion about the impact of digital technology on society in Indonesia and other places as well in relation to a wider set of issues and sectors, such as small businesses, the role of youth, and education practice.

All in all, the organization and presentation of this book itself are satisfactory. The writing structure of each chapter helps the reader to follow the arguments that the writers want to explain. This book is much recommended to any individuals, such as students, lecturers, researchers, and practitioners, who are interested in digital technology issues. However, individuals who have interest in different issues, such as social, political, economy, law, and peace studies can benefit from it as well. This book also provides a good reference for the decision makers.

**Dody Wibowo**

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**Helen Young, Lisa Goldman (Eds.)**
**Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding**
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015, ISBN 978 1 84971 233 0, 518p.

Links between livelihood insecurity, resource scarcity, and warfare have been the subject of academic controversy for several decades. By comparison, little attention has been paid to the role of livelihoods and natural resources in sustaining and strengthening post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. *Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* is a new volume which fills this gap by examining the opportunities and challenges created by post-conflict livelihood and natural resource management worldwide.

The book, edited by Helen Young and Lisa Goldman, is one of a series of six published by Earthscan on issues related to post-conflict peacebuilding and natural resource management. It is an outcome of a joint research programme by the Environmental Law Institute, the UN Environment Programme, the University of Tokyo, and McGill University. The book brings together case studies from an impressive group of contributors in order to explore the opportunities and challenges for peacebuilding that emerge from the use of natural resource-based livelihoods. The case studies, written by over 30 highly diverse practitioners, academics, and experts, cover a geographically wide range of over 20 post-conflict regions worldwide.

In the introductory chapter, the editors argue that a range of factors make it increasingly important for policy debates to focus on the sustainable management of livelihoods. These factors, which are explored in the case studies that follow, include worldwide population growth, the projected consequences of global climate changes, and the growing proportion of rural and even urban populations that are currently dependent on natural resources. The authors argue that livelihoods, which are essential to human needs, can be leveraged to enhance economic recovery and promote peace. The book is divided into four parts with each section contributing to an understanding of the topic's importance from a different perspective.

The chapters in Part One reflect on peacebuilding activities that connect natural resources and livelihoods in conflict-torn regions. Across the case studies in this section, authors argue for the importance of addressing the needs of the most vulnerable populations (often rural) in peacebuilding processes. Post-war situations offer a window of opportunity in which structural inequalities can be addressed as new sustainable livelihoods are created and supported. Different authors show how the neglect of sustainable livelihoods for rural populations has helped to foster contemporary and future conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Colombia, as well as in the Karimojong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda.

Innovative approaches to livelihoods are the subject of Part Two which reflects on the opportunities and challenges that emerge from approaches that include the development of transboundary protected areas, ecotourism, youth programmes, and alternative trade chains among other initiatives. Every case study here exemplifies an attempt to recover lost livelihoods after a conflict in order to avoid its endurance or prolongation. The case studies make clear that the re-integration of ex-combatants into society after a conflict represents a key opportunity. War-time skills, such as tracking and remaining self-sufficient in the bush, can be translated into the skills needed for surveying park resources and controlling poaching, for example. When ex-combatants are given work opportunities, they can be incentivised to integrate into a peaceful economy and so contribute to fostering national economic development. The problem of consent-building emerges as the major challenge to the development of innovative livelihood approaches because it is very difficult to persuade stakeholders with different priorities to act jointly on projects. Once a bridge of understanding is built, however, it can prevent a re-occurrence of conflict.

The five chapters in Part Three demonstrate that the development of new governmental structures that focus on natural resources can promote livelihoods, strengthen local economies, and hence contribute to lasting peace. In the aftermath of a conflict, effective institutions and policies are mostly absent. The authors argue that policies and laws on sustainable resource management should be incorporated into governmental structures if a society is to successfully transition from a conflict economy to a peaceful one. Examples of post-conflict reconstruction from Japan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mindanao, and Somalia show how effective strategies can encourage economic growth and livelihood creation through institution- and capacity-building, as well as through policy development.

In the book's final chapter, the editors focus on lessons learnt, and their concluding analysis sketches ideas that can be used across the globe in the future. In particular, they address the use of livelihood analyses as a step towards developing a country's specific reconstruction strategy after a conflict is settled. They also consider whether this kind of an assessment can help the wider national economy to profit from livelihood production systems. The editors claim that livelihood approaches should be central to the discourses of development and poverty reduction, which look set to remain prominent in contemporary and future global politics.

The book contributes to the current debate on why and how the natural environment needs to be included in efforts to restore and sustain peace in war-torn areas. The diversity of the case studies in this volume gives readers opportunities to gain a global overview of the topic as well as to focus on one post-conflict region in particular. There is no core argument that connects each chapter. Instead, the book bundles case studies that relate to similar topics, and the remarkably wide range of case studies it offers allow readers to trace similarities between them. For example, it becomes clear that pastoralists in Kenya and Uganda face similar challenges to pastoralists in Afghanistan: all are being forced to move to foreign lands, and this mobility fosters regional conflict that harms local livelihoods substantially. The collection of these diverse case studies gives the reader the opportunity to enhance their understanding of worldwide problems concerning livelihoods, and the book looks set to become a valuable starting point for further research.

Controversy arises in the book's various discussions about both the prominent place that institution-building has in peacebuilding initiatives and the problematic nature of liberal institutionalism itself. Institution-building in post-conflict states is often encouraged or even accomplished by interventions from the countries of the Global North which justify the rationality of their interventions through recourse to their own understanding of state formation. To reproduce this understanding is to emphasise governmental structures and de-emphasise the importance of local actors in the institution-building process. If the critical discussion of institutionalism was embedded in peacebuilding processes, this could help to ward off misunderstandings that generate negative consequences. The book reveals the highly interesting finding that livelihood approaches have been used for decades but have only more recently been adapted to a wide range of humanitarian, conflict, and post-conflict settings thanks to an increasing awareness of the issues surrounding sustainable development and the management of natural resources. Even where livelihood approaches were not an explicit intervention's goal, they have often contributed substantially to peacebuilding efforts.

In the book's final pages, Young and Goldman focus on conflict analysis and assessment technologies. They argue for a comprehensive strategy that will incorporate livelihood approaches from the beginning of the process. The book would have benefitted from more thoughts on how such a strategy could work and how it might best be developed, monitored, and evaluated. Insights on these key issues are necessary if effective policy is to be formulated. Despite the book's many insights, the book does not resolve the problematic

question that dogs this field of research, that is the question as to why certain initiatives or projects work in some regions but fail in others. More research is needed into the transferability of livelihood peacebuilding initiatives so that they can be successfully implemented elsewhere. A clear understanding of the broader nexus of environment and peace would help in the formulation of this kind of work at governmental or policy level. The book's multifaceted case studies, which shape each of the book's chapters, are nevertheless beneficial in that they enable readers to gain a basic understanding of key issues and can serve as key points of departure for future research.

This edited collection can be highly recommended to anyone who is interested in learning about examples of livelihood and environmental approaches to peacebuilding worldwide. *Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* fills a gap in the literature and deserves to be read by academics and practitioners alike.

**Christina Koch**
*Roskilde University and Leipzig University*

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