Since the end of the Cold War in the late 20th century, the number of interstate wars has decreased dramatically, while internal conflicts have claimed the main stage. It might be the consequence of secessionist movements in many post-colonial states or the domestic frictions that were largely restrained for the sake of national security during the Cold War, but domestic conflicts have, in most cases, had adverse spillover effects on neighboring states. Thus, the result is that a nation’s internal conflict matters not only within its borders, but also regionally and globally.

UN-mandated peacekeeping operations have so far incorporated many responsibilities to its mandate to stop tragedies from degenerating as well as reoccurring and have adopted new strategies to achieve such aims. Now as peacebuilding, it needs help from a wide array of actors and has to utilize various sorts of policy tools and campaigns at every level of political, economic, and social human interaction. Discussions in Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding are based on these grounds, and the primary focus of the contributors is the reciprocal relationship between peacebuilding and corruption: how and to what extent can corruption distort peacebuilding efforts, and in what manner can peacebuilding affect corrupt actors and their behaviours?

The volume consists of three parts. The first part attempts to refine the definition of corruption while briefly going over the literature on corruption in post-conflict states, and to answer whether corruption hinders peacebuilding, or rather it is peacebuilding measures that provide an environment conducive to corruption. The second part illustrates the relationship between the two in different post-conflict settings using case studies. And the last section discusses the potentials and limits of several anti-corruption measures and suggests ways that could improve their performance in future implementations.

In general, corruption has meant the abuse of office and misuse of entrusted power for personal profit. Philp, however, claims that the term ‘abuse’ and ‘misuse’ can be used by different standards across disparate cultures and customs. A broader and perhaps more practical, version of the word’s definition suggested here, applied by other contributors as well, explains it as a public official violating the rules and norms of the office in light of his or her personal, partisan or sectional gain, consequently harming the interest of the public and being rewarded by the beneficiaries in consideration of the illegal access to goods or services provided.

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1. For an overview of the patterns of internal conflicts after the Cold War, chapter two of Ted R. Gurr’s book, as well as the other chapters, is a fine read. Gurr, Ted R., People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, Washington D.C, USIP Press, 2000.
4. Philp 34
What is concerning in post-conflict settings is that these initial forms of authorities, alternatives to complete chaos, are an easy prey to corruption. Post-conflict authorities tend to lack not only the ability to monitor and penalize perpetrators of law and social norms but also checks and balances to constrain their own behavior. Virtually nothing would prevent them from being penetrated by patronage and clientelistic networks and once they are overwhelmed, the authorities would themselves become predators, forming joint extraction regimes which centralises the means of coercion and predation and being avaricious of vast illegal incentives.

The result would be systematic corruption, which transcends the deleterious impacts of administrative corruption that happens on a daily basis between civil servants and citizens. It would not only cost public trust, or extended trust towards the government and the pertinent use of aid money and investments. It would ultimately entrench wartime power structures well into the post-conflict state and sow the seed for a renewed internal conflict. Peacebuilding, needless to say, would end up earning nothing it had desired at the start.

As already mentioned, the contributors claim that it also happens the other way around. According to the volume, peacebuilding, predominantly focused on establishing a stable environment rather hastily, tends to talk the conflict-ridden state into implementing the so-called liberal peacebuilding models after mediating the related parties to agree on a negotiated peace settlement. However, with only weak domestic institutions and an incomplete social contract barely in place, this brand of peacebuilding formula, characterized by decentralization of political authority and economic privatization, can bring about severe “destabilizing effects through increased societal competition.”

Local elites within consociational coalitions will exploit this chance to seize state assets, reconstruction aid and foreign direct investments for their personal benefit, empowering loyal crony networks and retaining stability and popular support in return. Overriding local authority, “securitising” aid, or channeling aid through NGOs and private contractors to avoid these unfortunate outcomes would only further subvert the already low government legitimacy and public trust. Such was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where ever strengthening international supervision and constant ad hoc intervention only weakened the administrative capability to eliminate corruption and create the much needed liberal social contract.

It is hard to say that peacebuilding definitely increases corruption, as the absolute amount of data is insufficient as well as imperfect and there is no way to directly observe the impact of corruption on post-conflict nations. Nonetheless, the relationship between corruption and peacebuilding seems to have a dark side to itself. As Billerbeck points out, breaking the vicious

5. Belloni 226
6. Goodhand 147
7. Looney 170-174; Belloni 220-221
8. Philp 37; Rose-Ackerman 54-56
9. Le Billon 69-72
10. Rose-Ackerman 50-57; Belloni 224-227
11. Billerbeck 92
12. Pugh and Divjak, 99-112
13. Le Billon 65-68
cycle and safely "building state capacity to peacefully manage and prevent conflict"\textsuperscript{14} will only be possible when all the related entities stop regarding corruption as merely a technical problem and aid disbursement as politically neutral issues.

Two arguments stand out from this volume. One is underlining the importance of context-based peacebuilding. While the volume introduces three anti-corruption measures, namely establishing independent anti-corruption commissions, strengthening civil societies, and participating in international campaigns, the contributors insist that their implementation have so far been concentrated excessively on yielding quantitative results. Thus, the authors claim that it is time to reconsider their qualitative aspect and incorporate local contexts, demands, norms and rules of conduct into the designs. The other notable argument is that corruption might actually have to be tolerated, at least in the short-term, for the sake of stability, and in some cases the livelihood of the populace. Facing urgent calls from the international community to stop humanitarian crises unfolding, overlooking petty corruption at the onset of any peacebuilding process becomes a necessary evil for the activists.

It would have been more constructive if the contributors had scrutinized ways to improve the quality of peacebuilding with further detail, rather than adumbrating it. They do note that donors and investors should use greater leverage to help build state capacity needed to combat corruption in post-conflict states. Nevertheless, suggestions on how to balance strengthening state apparatuses with liberal peacebuilding formulas which prefer limited states are missing. Furthermore, ways to prevent the 'disbursement culture' and a 'state of exception' were not given sufficient attention despite their significance.\textsuperscript{15} The Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign, the UN Global Compact, and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are a few examples that can insist on more responsibility from donors and investors and it is clear that these mechanisms should be built into future peacebuilding mechanisms.

Also, it remains rather ambiguous to what extent corruption should be condoned. It would turn out to be horrendously complicated and arduous to differentiate administrative corruption from systemic corruption and warn related actors when the former is at the verge of developing into the latter. Phasing in aid and phasing out corruption is easier said than done. While they probably should be part of a tailored response, fine-tuning the timing of transition would be no easy task. The volume leaves the question as future agendas, leaving it to the readers to find out whether a balance between consequentialism and a categorical imperative approach could be struck to foster positive governance outcomes.

Overall, with its appeal of identifying the interactive relationship between peacebuilding and corruption in a post-conflict setting and advocating feasible anti-corruption measures, this book would serve best as an introduction to the difficulties with peacebuilding activities on the ground. Thereby, this book would be a fine reference for those who seek to add some sense of reality to their practice of theory vis-à-vis conflict resolution and peacebuilding, as well as those seeking to develop practical policies on these issues.

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\textsuperscript{14} Billerbeck 80
\textsuperscript{15} Billerbeck 93, 71