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“The country chooses you”: Discourses of mobility and immobility among Iraqi refugees

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ABSTRACT

“The country chooses you, you don’t choose the country”. This aphorism implies that people affected by the bureaucratic framework of refugee resettlement experience a diminished sense of agency. This paper explores to what extent displaced people can claim a sense of agency in spite of this conventional wisdom. It draws on fieldwork undertaken with Iraqi refugees in the US and Istanbul (2011-2016) and on the migration narratives of 51 Iraqi refugees. It analyses choice points throughout the continuum of resettlement and shows various ways in which these refugees achieved mobility in difficult circumstances; it also reveals the limits that constrain human agency when migrants’ aspirations are mediated by the increasingly restrictive policies produced by nation states and international humanitarian bureaucracies. Governments’ interest in appearing “in control” of refugee movements has been heightened by the global war on terror, as is illustrated by recent shifts in US refugee policy.

Keywords: Iraqi refugees, forced migration, mobility, resettlement, social networks.

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Introduction

“The country chooses you, you don’t choose the country”. This kind of aphorism punctuates the refugee narratives of the 51 Iraqis resettled in California between 2008 and 2015 who are the subjects of this study. At best, it reflects a tension between personal agency and bureaucratic structure; at worst, it reflects a diminished sense of agency and passive resignation to the bureaucratic vagaries of refugee relocation programmes. This ethnographic study is informed by the scholarship of anthropologists such as Alessandro Monsutti who maintain that refugees can indeed become “agents of their own life in spite of all the hardship they are facing”.¹ It explores to what extent displaced people can remain agents of their own lives when they are waiting for some benevolent country to act on their behalf, and it questions how much room there is for personal and group agency within the larger institutional culture of formal refugee relocation, with its highly bureaucratic and programmatic structures.

This research focuses on the post-2003 Iraqi experience, for which out-migration peaked in 2006, though that migration continues into the present. In tracing the dialectical tension between agency and structure, it draws on life history interviews conducted with Iraqi refugees who were resettled to the US, as well as on interviews in Istanbul with NGO staff and refugees waiting for US resettlement. The interviews provide data on how various actors within the US Refugee Assistance Program (USRAP) coordinated processing and pre-departure clearances for those going to the US; it also casts light on how local NGOs dealt with refugee assistance for those people who were applying to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Turkish government for protection status. The article begins by presenting an overview of the main theoretical constructs that have been used to explain the role of human agency in migration. Those constructs are considered here not as isolated factors but as elements in group-mediated processes that facilitate migration. The article also evaluates how such processes worked in the Iraqi experience of forced migration and it pays particular attention to choice points where human agency might be exercised; the exercise of agency at this kind of choice point is understood here to take the form of human actions that emerge in response to immanent and generalized violence. The article elaborates on these choice points in Turkey, which is an understudied country of first asylum for Iraqi refugees. It then explores what “involuntary immobility”² means within a discourse of human agency as migrants confront closed pathways on their routes towards their migration goals.

Conceptualizing human agency within forced migration

Studies of the Iraqi refugee experience during the post-2003 period contradict older typologies of the forced migration experience.³ Iraqis categorically rejected the forms of humanitarian governance (UN camps) that had ordinarily prevailed in the post-WWII context, but to recognize their ability to survive outside of that structure is not to downplay the extreme hardships they faced which included gaps in education for their children,⁴ exploitation in the underground economy,⁵ and increases in the vulnerability of single women, war widows, and girls.⁶ Recognition is also important for those people whose attempts to leave danger and find permanent solutions outside the region were denied.

Within micro-theories of migration, the human capacity to move across borders is seen as largely being enabled by social ties,⁷ and over

² Carling, “Migration in the Age of Involuntary Immobility”.
⁵ Diane Amos, Eclipse of the Sunnis; Joseph Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugees.
⁶ Diane Amos, Eclipse of the Sunnis.
⁷ See Rumbaut, “Assimilation and its Discontents”; William Thomas et al., The Polish Peasant in Europe and America.
time these “group-mediated” processes create an internal momentum or “cumulative causation” which sees migration becoming progressively easier for successive migrants. This “embeddedness” of social relations within networks facilitates the mobilization of economic and informational resources, such as social capital. Social capital is thus a vital component within the expansion of migration networks and builds on internalized norms and bounded solidarity, reciprocity, and enforceable trust. Social capital provides “gateways” which make successive migration easier (though sometimes more insular) as it builds on accumulating information flows and resources, which are both economic and cultural (Ruth Gomberg-Munoz’s study of Mexican restaurant workers in Chicago offers interesting insights into this kind of process).

Of particular relevance to the Iraqi experience is the growing body of anthropological research into the ways refugees have devised ingenious methods to mobilize translocal social capital and financial resources effectively via networks, despite the seemingly desperate situations they inhabit. Translocal networks are not bounded by borders and allow resources to be mobilized both locally as well as through transnational ties between migrant communities. For example, the Hazaras of Afghanistan have circulated goods, money, and information between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan since the outbreak of war in the 1970s.

**Becoming the “chosen” in the US resettlement ecosystem**

For those who participate in US refugee resettlement programmes, the notion that “the country chooses you” seems to have a natural logic. The constellation of government agencies that co-exist within the USRAP grew out of a national response to the massive refugee crisis that emerged in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, a response that was eventually formalized by the US Refugee Act of 1980. The act mandated that the admissions mechanism should literally begin at the top, with the president establishing the ceiling number of refugees to be admitted in any given year. Determinations about who should be chosen are then made at processing centres managed by the US Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (USPRM) in liaison with the UNHCR; its “asylum officers” initially determine whether a case has been made for a legitimate and well-founded fear of persecution (after 2008, Iraqis accepted under the Special Immigrant Visa programme did not require UNHCR referral). After the USPRM accepts a person for processing, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services coordinate a series of security clearance interviews during which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and officials from the CIA and FBI weigh in. Once these hurdles are passed, medical exams follow as well as coordination both with the government offices that manage US social services and with NGO resettlement partners at the federal, state, and municipal levels. By the time refugees board a flight from Istanbul or Amman to Los Angeles, their lives will have been touched by five agencies of the US federal government, as well as the UNHCR; the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which coordinates travel arrangements; and the NGO partner resettlement agency in their destination city.

From the point when a positive recommendation is made by the UNHCR to the moment when a refugee arrives in the US, a process takes place which lasts for at least two years. It should be noted that processing procedures are different for those who apply for asylum at the US borders with Mexico and Canada and for those who already reside in the US, but, from 2013 to 2015, about 26,000 out of almost 70,000 total refugee admissions, including 766 Iraqis, applied under these protocols (DHS 2015).

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9 Portes et al., “Embeddedness and Immigration”.


11 Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz, Labor and Legality.


13 Alessandro Monsutti, War and Migration.
The aphorism that “The country chooses you” has an unintended logic in relation to the US’ overseas military and political interventions which have opened up migration pathways to the US in many of the major refugee communities, including those in Iraq, Vietnam, Cuba, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In some cases, a decision to allow entry to certain groups has grown out of a sense of responsibility for the consequences of US wars, particularly in relation to the plight of South Vietnamese allies who faced re-education camps after the victory of the North Vietnamese.

The destabilizing effects of US foreign policy do not, however, of themselves open the doors of the US to any or all of those displaced through its military interventions. During the 1980s, refugees fleeing the brutalities of right-wing dictators supported by the US during the Cold War in countries like El Salvador, for example, were denied asylum, while it was routinely granted to people fleeing communist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. In reaction to 1980s’ policies driven by the Cold War, the church-based Sanctuary Movement engaged in acts of civil disobedience by illegally housing Salvadorans threatened with deportation. The movement forced asylum policy debates into the courts and Congress, and favourable decisions on their behalf were rendered in 1987 (Supreme Court) and in Congress in 1990.

Refugees serve the “political rather than economic interests” of the state, when politics is construed broadly to include humanitarian and human rights concerns, and therefore the question of who gains entry into the US as a refugee is intrinsically political; intense lobbying can also be involved before certain groups are recognized as deserving protection. The US opened its doors to Iraqi refugees immediately following the First Gulf War (1990-1991) and accepted 29,080 Iraqi refugees for resettlement between 1991 and 1999. The Iraqis who faced mass displacement after 2003 did not receive the same treatment, and total refugee admissions for the years immediately after the terror attacks of 9/11 were reduced to 26,839 and 28,306 in 2002 and 2003 respectively. For Iraqi applicants, most of whom were staff and translators associated with the US military or the Coalition Provisional Authority, the doors to asylum remained essentially closed from 2003 to 2007. Resettlement officials in the US claim that Iraqis were not fleeing in large numbers until sectarian violence began in 2006 in response to the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest sites for Shi’as. Well before that, however, many Iraqis who worked for the US and its coalition partners had been targeted for assassination by insurgents. It took an intense lobbying effort on their behalf before any Iraqi refugees were admitted in significant numbers. At the forefront of this effort were the List Project – an organization formed by American veterans of the Iraq War – and USAID staff, who lobbied the US government to secure asylum for Iraqi allies marked for assassination. The List Project, along with other humanitarian organizations, helped lobby for the passage of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act in 2008, after which the US began admitting significant numbers of Iraqis. The Act prioritized people who had collaborated with the coalition and their families, who qualified under a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) provision. SIV status allowed those in danger to apply while they were still refugees inside Iraq, rather than after they had crossed into a neighbouring country. The Act also established processing centres in locations to which significant numbers of Iraqi refugees had already fled, including Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Istanbul.

Enabled by this legislation and by the presidency of Barack Obama, who favoured setting higher ceilings for refugee admissions, around 120,000 Iraqis were resettled in the US.

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14 David M. Reimers, Still the Golden Door; Alessandro Portes et al., Immigrant America.
15 Steven J. Gold, Refugee Communities.
16 David M. Reimers, Still the Golden Door.
17 Ibid.
18 Hein De Haas, “Mobility and Human Development”, 49.
21 List Project, “Timeline of Events”.

between 2008 and 2015. Iraqis have now become one of the largest refugee groups to be resettled in the US in the new millennium, alongside refugees from Burma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Lhotshampa of Bhutan (Krogstad and Radford 2017).

The political process via which asylum seekers are granted entry and permanent residence, as well as the social service infrastructure mandated by US law, do appear at first glance to offer proof that “the country chooses you”. However, when we map out the longer migration history of individuals, we can identify various choice points along this continuum of resettlement at which human agency mediates the structure of a seemingly hyper-managed process led by nine or ten large bureaucracies.

**Spaces for human agency within the resettlement continuum**

The words crisis and decision are etymologically connected. “Crisis” originates from the classical Greek verb καίρος - “to decide” - and in English it has come to mean, among other things, “a turning point”. The chaotic and violent aftermath of the US invasion in 2003 was a turning point for Iraqis as they had to assess whether to stay or flee and ask where to go and for how long. In this section, I analyse crises and turning points in life trajectories that emerge in oral histories from Iraqis who decided to leave Iraq for surrounding countries. Following the model of Chatty’s anthropological work on dispossession and displacement throughout the Middle East, I will use “the individual narratives of forced migrants and their descendants [...] to gain an understanding of their coping strategies and mechanisms”. These strategies and mechanisms will be analysed through a close assessment of the anonymized experiences of four individuals who will be referred to here as Yousef, Siham, Marwan, and Rana, and their family networks.

**Yousef**

Yousef was an engineer who managed wastewater treatment in Iraq’s oil fields. Also an entrepreneur, he opened a shop in Baghdad that sold women’s accessories, cosmetics, and jewellery. Yousef’s shop and home were in a neighbourhood of Al-A’amiya in western Baghdad near the airport, along the road heading west to Abu Graib. Sunnis had migrated here from Anbar, making it an area with a Sunni majority, but it had a mixed population of Shi’a, Kurds, and Christians. Yousef’s shop was popular and often crowded and after the invasion it attracted the attention of the US military, who routinely checked the shop for suspected insurgent activity. Over time, US soldiers began to buy souvenirs for family members back home and Yousef’s hospitality towards the Americans in turn attracted the attention of insurgents: “They questioned why the American Army would come in. They thought that it meant I was collaborating with them, and because of that I was threatened”. After receiving a series of threats, he moved his family in with his brother in a different neighbourhood for several months while he decided what to do next. Yousef and his family thought of going to Egypt where they had friends, but this option was too expensive, and the visa application process was slow and uncertain. In 2007, an Iraqi friend in Aleppo who had left two years earlier suggested that they join him in Syria where no visa was required. That year, Yousef found work in a textile factory that made children’s clothes. He described himself as a “labourer” who worked fourteen-hour days. His wife, Nuha, worked from home making jewellery.

They rented a house for only six months, thinking that they would soon be able to return to Iraq, but a year passed and the news from Iraq was still not good: “We realized that Iraq was moving towards the worst. The situations there were deteriorating. So, with this deterioration, the decision [to seek resettlement] becomes stronger”. Nuha’s mother and her brother’s family decided to leave and came to Syria as well, not to Aleppo but to Damascus where her brother, who had


23 Dawn Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Middle East, 6*.
been an art teacher in a primary school, found work at a friend’s print shop.

Two years later, the family was still in Aleppo, and Yousef’s wife delivered their youngest child. Medical care was expensive, but since they had registered with the UN in 2007 for aid and resettlement, 80 per cent of the medical costs were covered by a UN programme. Eventually, the situation in Aleppo became dangerous and Yousef and his family had to leave for Damascus where he managed to find similar factory work. It was during this time that the family considered resettlement more seriously, but from Yousef’s perspective it was unclear which country might choose them: “It is according to the stories, and according to the information that got included in the protection letter of the files of all the Iraqis, the settlement started becoming effective, to America, Germany, Australia, Canada”. Yousef and Nuha were not sure where they would end up; they had extended family in Germany, Sweden, Australia, and the US and believed that “Whatever country accepts the file of the refugee, you transfer you there. [...] So, for us, America accepted us, and they transferred us to America”. In fact, Nuha’s cousin in California, who had been in the US since 2008, had arranged with a resettlement agency in California to be their sponsors, and this had prompted the agencies involved to resettle them in California. The family arrived in Fontana, California, in the summer of 2013. Six months later, Nuha’s brother also arrived from Syria, sponsored by the same cousin.

**Siham**

Siham grew up on her father’s farm in the small village of Alanish in Kurdish northern Iraq, where she was born in 1972. Alanish is located just outside the city of Zakho, 80 kilometres north of Mosul, a few miles east of the border crossing with Turkey. It is a region where Assyrian Christians have lived for two thousand years. In 1975, Siham and her family moved to Baghdad for better work opportunities. Her father, a farmer by trade, found work as a gardener for the University of Baghdad and also worked in a restaurant. They lived in the Baghdad suburb of Al Jadeeda which was a mixed community that included Sunni, Shi’a, and Christian people. Siham’s father recalls that “They [Muslims] were very kind to us”. Siham only managed to complete third grade before the bombing raids during the Iraq-Iran War, which began in 1980, prevented her from continuing at school. Siham eventually married in Baghdad but her husband died from liver failure and to support herself she went to work in a textile factory where she stayed for seven years.

Things changed for Siham’s family in post-invasion Iraq. Her sister, who was attending a technical school, felt pressured to wear the hijab, and, during the intensification of violence from 2006 onward, it became dangerous even to travel to work due to bombings and kidnappings. Several members of the family’s St. Elias (Chaldean) parish were killed during one attack. Christian friends and relatives began to leave the area until they were the only Christian family left in the neighbourhood. In 2006, a young man came to the grocery store run by Nahith, Siham’s brother, and delivered the threat that his sisters should wear hijab and stop attending their church or face consequences. Nahith threw a can of tomato paste at him and told him to get out. The family feared that the young man would return with an armed group and felt that it was now too dangerous to stay in Iraq. In November 2007, Siham’s brother Nahith and two younger sisters drove north through Iraqi Kurdistan and crossed the border into Syria. There they met up with other Iraqi-Assyrian and Chaldean refugees living in northeastern Syria, not far from the Iraqi border. Siham, her father, mother, and older sister drove to Syria and joined them in April 2007. Even though threats of violence toward the family had been the deciding factor in their decision to leave, Siham’s father stressed that they did not run away in the middle of the night: “It was 6 in the morning. We took our time. It was normal”.

24 The term “Assyrian” is commonly used by Christians in Iraq to designate both the geographical centre for Christianity in Iraq and their origins in the Assyrian empire. The term “Chaldean” is used in a more ethnoreligious sense to describe those who adhere to the Chaldean Catholic faith (Eastern rite Catholics) and speak Aramaic. See Kald, “Contemporary Chaldeans and Assyrians”, https://kaldu.org/2015/07/contemporary-chaldeans-and-assyrians/ (Accessed 30 September 2018).
They stayed in Syria for six years, waiting to see what would happen in Iraq and they worked mostly in warehouses which Siham’s father claimed were used for storing women’s undergarments. The family also received food assistance and were granted refugee status by a UNHCR programme to which they applied for protection. Feeling that there was no future for Christians in Iraq, they applied to the UN for resettlement. All of Siham’s father’s siblings had by this time left Iraq for resettlement in Australia, Europe (France, Germany, and Finland), and the US (San Diego). They communicated with cousins who lived in a Chaldean parish in Riverside, California, who agreed to be their sponsors through the USRAP. In 2011, they travelled to the UN’s offices in the Damascus suburb of Kafr Sousa, where they were interviewed by the American “delegation”, which was made up of officials from the DHS. In September 2012, the family arrived in California, although Siham’s two brothers remained in Syria. One had begun the paperwork for resettlement along with Siham but was in a delicate phase of his marriage arrangements and decided to apply separately with his wife. Both brothers were being told that they did not qualify for resettlement because they had left Iraq from the Kurdish Autonomous Region, which, unlike Baghdad, was labelled a “safe zone” and was therefore presumed too secure to warrant any protection status being granted if its residents chose to leave Iraq.

The stories of Yousef’s and Siham’s families, Muslim and Christian, show how far post-invasion Iraq had drifted into chaos and civil war. By 2006, all ethno-religious groups were vulnerable and ethnic cleansing at the neighbourhood level accelerated. At its peak, the massive displacement of Iraqi people totalled between 1.5 and two million people within Iraq with an estimated 750,000 and two million people respectively displaced to the neighbouring countries of Jordan and Syria.25

The cases described in this paper are clearly relevant to the exploration of mobility within the constraints of forced migration, but they also illustrate what the sociologist Chatelard has characterized as migration within a “continuum of previous displacements”.26 Iraqis like Yousef and Siham were able to integrate with translocal social networks created by previous outmigration and this helped them to survive their extended exile in the countries that surround Iraq.27 Though it is generally accepted that migration networks follow the logic of bounded or group solidarity, it is important, as Chatelard has illustrated, to identify the ways in which Iraqi migration has also involved a pattern of social differentiation. Historically, Iraqi Shi’a and Christians built networks in countries like Syria, which allowed these groups relative freedom to operate openly, 28 and so when the Iraqi diaspora emerged in other countries in the new millennium they were able to operate “within socially fragmented transnational spaces”. 29 Subsequent migrations and the formation of diasporas in countries of exile followed pathways which were also characterized by ethno-religious solidarities. The following two case studies, which further illustrate this pattern, explore the stories of Iraqi people who found protection in Turkey.

Most of the media coverage and research on the Iraqi refugee crisis has, logically enough, focused on Jordan and Syria where the majority of Iraqi refugees sought either short- or long-term refuge. As a result, Turkey has been an understudied and overlooked site during the post-invasion period, up until the Syrian refugee influx into Turkey from 2011 onwards. However, it is useful to analyse the role Turkey played in the Iraqi refugee crisis. Turkey hosted one of the key Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) processing centres for Iraqis headed for the United States, under contract from the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). According to


27 Chaty et al., “Unlocking Protracted Displacement of Refugees and IDPs”.
28 Joseph Sassoon, The Iraqi Refugees.
interviews with ICMC officials at the BPRM centre, one third of all Iraqi refugees during the peak years of Iraqi resettlement to the US were handled through the regional PRM office in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{30} The majority of those individuals ended up being resettled in California.\textsuperscript{31} During this time, there were only two asylum officers at the UNHCR office in Ankara and so the office could only handle two cases per day.\textsuperscript{32} This meant that the BPRM's eligibility interviewers were essential in handling the large number of cases coming not only through Turkey but also from the BPRM satellite offices in Beirut, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Kuwait. The cases of people who had relatives in the US were referred by the UNHCR to the BPRM processing centre in Istanbul, where staff assisted them in preparing for screening interviews with US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) officials. The cases of those people who were more likely to be resettled in the EU or Australia were referred to the relevant embassies.

Having operated for centuries as a strategic land bridge between east and west, Turkey continues to be a key transit country for refugees fleeing wars in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia; for Iraqi asylum seekers attempting to reach the EU, Turkey has been the primary transit country. The Turkish demographer and sociologist Ahmet Içduygu cites 1991 as a significant year for Iraqi migrants in Turkey because it was then that Turkey granted temporary safe haven to half a million Kurdish Iraqis who were fleeing Saddam Hussein's brutal chemical weapon attacks on Kurdish civilians. While the vast majority of these Kurds returned to Iraq after a safe zone was established in Iraqi Kurdistan, a residual population remained in Turkey and subsequently constituted "a bridge-head for more Iraqis to enter Turkey, or to use the country as a transit area towards the West".\textsuperscript{33} While it was assumed that this group was an exclusively Kurdish population, Içduygu's breakdown of the displaced Iraqi population showed that it included many Arabs, Chaldeans, and Turkmans too. It should be noted that respondents confirmed Chatelard's insights about the relevance of network factors when they cited the presence of "friends" and "familiarity with the country" as reasons for choosing to either transit or remain in Turkey.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Marwan}

Marwan had lived most of his life in Mosul, in northern Iraq's Nineveh province, "the city of two springs," where "the weather is not too hot, but the politics, man, that's something else". He received a diploma in engineering before he left Iraq and his choice to leave was motivated by the 2008 Al Qaeda kidnapping and murder of the Chaldean Catholic Archbishop Paulus Rahho in Mosul. Marwan went first to Aleppo, but as the situation in Syria became more tenuous in 2011 he found his way to Istanbul where his mother and sister had gone in 2009.

By the time he arrived in Istanbul, Marwan's parents had already been resettled in the US and he fully expected to follow them there. While he was waiting for his resettlement application to be processed by the PRM office in Istanbul, he lived in Kortulus, a community to which many Iraqi Chaldeans had gravitated. He was in constant contact with his parents in the United States via internet portals such as Skype.

Iraqis fortunate enough to be granted refugee status, like Marwan, were assigned by Turkish authorities to live temporarily in about 50 "satellite cities" throughout the country. The downside to this arrangement was that many experienced isolation while they were living within a non-Arabic language community. To counter this, BPRM sponsored Turkish language classes and, until the funding ran out, it provided psycho-social support via counselling for people who either suffered during their adjustment to Turkey or who were dealing with trauma associated with their flight from Iraq. Some officials at the processing office felt that being "forced to learn Turkish" was good preparation for their adjustment in the US.

Reductions in social capital are rarely beneficial to migrants and so it is not surprising that Iraqis

\textsuperscript{30} LM [Anonymized,] Interview by Ken Crane. Istanbul, Turkey, 9 September 2011.
\textsuperscript{31} International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), \textit{Restoring Dignity, Inspiring Change.}
\textsuperscript{32} DK [Anonymized,] Interview by Ken Crane. Istanbul, Turkey, 15 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{33} Ahmet Içduygu, \textit{Irregular Migration in Turkey}, 22.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 33.
in Turkey found ways to circumvent the satellite city restriction in order to live at least part of the time in Istanbul, “a place where people find co-ethnics where they get help” according to one NGO source. Two factors converged that allowed a support network to emerge for Chaldean Iraqis like Marwan and Rana, whose case I describe below. The historical existence of a Chaldean community in Istanbul, albeit smaller than that which had existed in the past, as well as a network of NGOs that provided assistance, created an environment that helped refugees eke out an existence while they waited for placement in other countries. In addition, the presence of the PMR processing office facilitated a strong transnational linkage between the historically large Iraqi-Chaldean community in southern California and the Chaldean Iraqis who gravitated to Istanbul. Although PRM officials downplayed the significance of Iraqi communities in the US as influential in resettlement decisions, the visits made by PRM officials from Istanbul to major resettlement destination points in California seems to confirm Chatelard's findings from Jordan that networks have been built on expectations of final resettlement destinations and reflect the ongoing influence of previous policy decisions and government mechanisms.

This decision space along the resettlement continuum in Istanbul reveals important mechanisms related to the exercise of human agency. First, Iraqis exploited historically developed social networks in order to transit through or live in Turkey. Second, in line with Chatelard's observations, social differentiation has shaped Iraqis’ future migratory trends and circumstances, as is illustrated by the fact that a significant number of the Iraqis who gravitated to Istanbul were Chaldeans. Third, as in Jordan and Syria, but on a smaller scale, social networks developed over time in Turkey and social pathways expanded which connected Iraqis in Istanbul with specific communities in the US, a finding which aligns with the principle of cumulative causation.

Rana

Marwan, Siham, and Yousef were among the 120,000 Iraqis who started a new life in the US, but it is important to point out that the majority of those displaced in post-invasion Iraq did not permanently leave the country or region. Many who attempted to do so were unsuccessful, as the case of Rana, an Iraqi woman in her late 30s, makes clear. After the attack on Our Lady of Deliverance Chaldean Catholic Church in Baghdad on 31 October 2010, she felt that it was no longer safe for Christians anywhere in Iraq, even in her hometown of Mosul in the Kurdish Autonomous Region. With the help of friends in Turkey she and her husband and children made it to Istanbul. Unfortunately, she and her family were denied refugee status because the Kurdish Autonomous Region, in contrast with Baghdad, was considered a “safe zone” secure enough that people who left it would not be eligible for refugee protection. Her husband occasionally did day labour work, even though at this time even refugees with temporary protection did not have permission to work. Rana tried to support herself and her children as a hairdresser in Tarlabası, one of Istanbul’s poorest neighbourhoods, and she earned about $500 a month.

Things got worse when Rana’s husband eventually abandoned the family. At one point, she and her children were locked out of their apartment when she fell three months behind with her rent payments. Rana and her children moved in with an elderly couple and paid daily for their room and board. An NGO tried to help the eldest son to find a job as well as help Rana appeal to the UNHCR to reopen their asylum case. Eventually, Rana and her children returned to Iraq. The NGO that had helped the family in Istanbul eventually lost all contact with them, and their fate in Iraq is unknown.

Rana and her family are among those who have experienced what Carling called “involuntary immobility”.35 They are among the displaced people of the world who are unable to find ways out of conflict zones or are unable to surmount obstacles that prevent them from finding a safe place to live where a viable livelihood is available. The Iraqi narrative in the US, gathered through research for this study, was heavily

35 Carling, "Migration in the Age of Involuntary Immobility".
weighted with resettled people’s concerns about family and friends still in harm’s way, either in Iraq, where over four million remain internally displaced, or in Syria, where approximately 50,000 Iraqis still live despite that country’s deadly civil war.\(^36\)

One missing piece that would have made Rana’s position more viable was the granting of official refugee status, which would at least have given her more protection from deportation and exploitation by unscrupulous landlords. The fact that she survived the abandonment of her husband while supporting four children in the underground economy of Istanbul actually demonstrates that she had an above average set of survival skills, but without refugee status her situation remained too tenuous for her and her children to remain in Turkey. Both the cause and solution for Rana’s predicament lie somewhere in the interaction between the sovereign power of states to grant rights based on their interpretation of their own refugee policies and accepted refugee conventions, on the one hand, and the efficacy of those mobility factors (networks, personal capability, and social capital) which enable migrants to achieve their goals and “expand freedom” on the other.\(^37\)

In all of the cases described above, the exercise of agency, coping strategies, and mechanisms for survival varied widely but enabled survival and progress to a certain point along the resettlement continuum. Decisions to leave were not always made under duress; especially when such decisions were made in response to generalized violence, they could be made in deliberate and patient ways – “we did not run away”. Decisions were not necessarily linear and they sometimes involved circular movements back to Iraq which allowed people to assess the possibility of safe repatriation. For Rana, this kind of movement meant a return to an uncertain future. If she returned to Mosul, it is likely that she was forced to flee again when it was overrun by ISIS in 2014.

Rana’s story embodies a counter-narrative to any definitions of refugee mobility that characterize it as a linear process that leads to the “durable solutions” represented by asylum and permanent resettlement in the US, EU, or Australia. In fact, her story exemplifies the more dominant pattern because it involves circular movements throughout the region, multiple displacements, and serial migrations in search of protection and/or a livelihood.

**Conclusion: discourses of refugee mobility and the War on Terror**

The statement that “The country chooses you” takes on a variety of different meanings when it is examined through the lens of Iraq’s post-2003 exodus and the lived experience of people like Yousef, Siham, Marwan, and Rana. When their experiences are examined in relation to a continuum of choice points, it is clear that each individual in this study demonstrated that they were, to varying degrees, “agents of their own life”,\(^38\) even if their ultimate migration goals were not fully realized. Migrating in response to widespread insecurity and violence, they offer a different typology of displacement: rather than being the desperate masses of the refugee imaginary, so well described by Malkki,\(^39\) they represent an urban class made up of people with varied occupations and education levels who mobilize social capital to survive within informal economies, aided by ethno-religious solidarities. They refused to be confined to camps and survived largely outside such regimes of humanitarian governance, but they were still able to make selective and strategic use of aid from UN agencies and NGOs. Their eventual destinations in the US, while ostensibly determined by decisions made by resettlement agencies, the BPRM, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement, were also influenced by social networks formed by refugees already in the US.


36 Amartya Sen, *Development and Freedom*.


38 Liisa Malkki, *Purity and Exile*. 

The Syrian war and the scale of its humanitarian crisis rendered Iraqi refugees less invisible than they had been before that point, but they fully re-emerged into public view when ISIS overran Shindar and Mosul in 2014. This new wave of Iraqi refugees, along with Syrians and Afghans, formed the three largest groups who determinedly crossed the Aegean and moved through the Balkans toward Western Europe in 2015. Pundits and politicians in the US watched the migration events unfolding in Europe with great interest. Some commentators alleged it posed a “near-existential threat” to the EU. Candidate Donald Trump’s campaign manager Steve Bannon called it “civilizational jihad personified”, and Trump himself brazenly contributed to the threat narrative: “Did you ever see a migration like that ... They’re all men, and they’re all strong looking guys”. The spectre of seemingly “uncontrolled” migration facilitated by friend and kin networks was put forward as an object lesson for the American people to encourage them to protect their borders more vigilantly and enhance their scrutiny of refugees. Clearly, the ability of human agency to circumvent borders was part of what was perceived to be so threatening. America, it was argued, like the EU, needed leaders who could reassure their citizens that the government was in control of the “choosing” mechanism. An unintended consequence of the migration events of 2015 was how they were used by political interest groups in the US and Europe to argue for the increased management of migration, the tightening of borders, and enhanced security screening. Although the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, and San Bernardino, California, were not perpetrated by refugees, unmanaged migration was conflated with terrorist activity, a tactic employed to great advantage by anti-immigrant groups on both sides of the Atlantic.

The discourse which assumes that “The country chooses you” has now tilted, with regards to the implementation of US immigration and refugee policy, to the extent that it is being used to promote heightened control of migration at the state level. US President Donald Trump’s statement that national security requires the removal of “extended family chain migration” from US immigration policy grows out of multiple misperceptions, one being that family unification provisions insert an irrational and uncontrollable logic into the apparatus of decision-making about who is allowed residence in the US. Political groups like Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy, which have called for reductions in the US Refugee Admissions Program, have likewise built on perceptions that this hyper-scrutinized, multi-year path for refugees hoping to enter the US “exacerbates the terrorist threat to our nation”. The upsurge of a securitization paradigm within US refugee discourse became evident through the level of direct opposition that emerged in relation to the Obama administration’s very modest plan to increase the number of Syrian refugees to 10,000 in its 2016 resettlement programme. In the previous year, the US accepted over 70,000 total refugees, including 12,676 from Iraq and 1,682 from Syria. In direct response to President Trump’s plan, the Republican-controlled US House of Representatives passed the “American Security Against Foreign Enemies Act” (HR 4038), which

40. Hein De Haas, Mobility and Human Development, 49.
41. Alejandro Portes et al., Latin Journey; Steven J. Gold, Refugee Communities.
42. Crawley et al., “Understanding the Dynamics of Migration”.
44. Joshua Green, Devil’s Bargain, 207.
45. Finnegan, “Trump and the Refugees”.
46. Zygmunt Bauman, Strangers at our Door; Kopan, “Donald Trump”.
48. Ann Corcoran, Refugee Resettlement and the Hijra to America, 8.
required much higher levels of scrutiny for nationality groups including people from Iraq and Syria. Had HR 4038 passed the Senate and been signed into law by President Obama, it would have added years to what was already a rigorous six-year process for Yousef’s family. Most of the refugees interviewed in this study endured at least two years of waiting and some had waited for as long as eight years for resettlement.

The US government’s preoccupation with securing its borders has now extended into ethnic, religious, and national selectivity practices that shape the calculus of who the country will accept as refugees, revealing the darker side of “The country chooses you” discourse. While in his first year in office, President Donald Trump reduced what had been the largest resettlement programme in the world and attempted to ban future immigration from a list of Muslim-majority countries deeply affected by war. These forms of heightened security- and identity-driven refugee policies, now writ large by many nation states, will indeed constrain the choices for those whose best option is resettlement. The Iraqi refugee experience has shown, however, that such policies, while increasing vulnerabilities, ultimately will not foreclose their exercise of human agency.

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Perspectives from the field: Self-defence groups as a force for community resilience*

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ABSTRACT

Self-defence groups in Michoacan, Mexico, emerged and reproduced rapidly in 2013 and have proved effective in fighting the drug cartels that were harming the citizens of that state. In this paper, the testimonies of some founders of the Michoacan self-defence groups will be analysed using a narrative-based methodology. Theories of human security and theories that situate the state as a provider of security will be used to model the severe insecurity in Mexico and in Michoacan caused by drug cartels and will set the context for the emergence of self-defence groups. This study’s analysis of the interviewees’ narratives suggests that the self-defence movement has arisen as a result of community resilience.

Keywords: Insecurity, self-defence groups, human security, state security, community resilience.

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Introduction

In response to the increasing threat posed by drug cartels operating in the state of Michoacan, Mexico, local farmers and inhabitants took up arms to defend their communities in 2013. These self-defence groups from the state of Michoacan, which emerged on 24 February 2013, extended their control out to other communities in the Tierra Caliente region, and successfully set themselves free from the Caballeros Templarios drug cartel which had previously dominated the region.1 This cartel and the Familia Michoacana had Michoacan’s communities under control and extorted money and resources from the inhabitants, committing crimes against them for 12 years, without any effective response from local and federal governments.

The founders of the self-defence groups and inhabitants of the communities in Michoacan had to overcome specific challenges, such as fear and lack of experience, to provide for their communities’ security and their work involved the strategic organization of defence groups, negotiating with the government, and resisting pressure from both organized crime and the government. In this essay, interviews with several Michoacan self-defence group founders are analysed along with those involving some inhabitants of the communities where these groups emerged. The narratives of the interview subjects reveal their capacity for changing their very difficult security situation, while also building community resilience. This analysis shows that Michoacan’s self-defence group founders and community inhabitants had to overcome the fear of losing their lives in order to provide security for their families; furthermore, they developed skills and agency to keep their communities safe and prosperous, displaying signs of community resilience.

The objectives of this paper are to theorize the concept of community resilience, as well as to shed light on the premises of the state as a human security provider in the case of the self-defence movement in the state of Michoacan, Mexico. Narrative analysis allows for an explanation of the circumstances that gave rise to the self-defence movement in Michoacan and for the actions it has carried out. It also reveals the meanings assigned to the self-defence movement’s actions by the people involved and shows how these actions relate to changes in their self-perception as they moved from being victims to actors.

The article will begin by explaining the theoretical basis of concepts such as human security and resilience, as well as the idea of the state as a security provider, and these will be related to the current state of insecurity in Mexico. Next, the results of the interviews conducted will be explored in relation to these concepts, and finally the findings of the study will be based on the interviewees’ shared experiences and perceptions as they relate to the characteristics of community resilience that emerge in a context of extreme insecurity.

Human security and the state as a security provider in the Mexican context

The western concept of security has traditionally been closely related to the notion of the nation-state and military power, as the phrase “national security” makes clear. From this perspective, a population is going to be secure if its state is capable of maintaining border security, and can keep it safe from other states’ attacks. According to this model, the state is the only security provider, and, for this reason, its population must accept the state’s monopoly over the use of force.2

After World War Two, the recently formed United Nations established the foundations of the concept of collective security, which suggested that nations should avoid using violence to preserve their security or to satisfy their needs. Instead, negotiation or collaboration were to become the preferred methods for resolving controversies. Later, a shift in focus from security among nations to individual security took place, widening the scope of the notion of security to include the human security concept. Individuals and populations became recognized as the main

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1 Fuentes Díaz, Antoniо, “Autodefensa y Justicia en los Márgeces del Estado”.

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beneficiaries of security, because there can be no real security, even if national borders are safe, while a population lacks the essential means to live and develop. As Manuel Fröhlich and Jan Lemanski note, the human security concept includes seven dimensions: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Fröhlich and Lemanski also recognize the state as the primary provider of security in all its dimensions, and, in its absence, the international community takes on this role.

These ideas were modified when the international community experienced difficulties in providing security in weak states where terrorism or natural disasters challenged nation's capacities in this respect, and the idea of preventing generalized poverty and enhancing development instead of strengthening border security was advanced. It is assumed that, in an ideal version of modern statehood, certain standards of human rights, democracy, and rule of law should be guaranteed by the government, which should provide common goods such as security, welfare, and a clean environment. However, Sven Chojnacki and Zeljko Branovic recognize that there are countries with limited monopoly over force where the lack of security creates suitable circumstances for groups to profit from insecurity through violent strategies. In such cases, Chojnacki and Branovic argue, "two basic forms of security without or beside the state can be ascertained: (1) security by coercion and a certain degree of institutionalization and reliability; and (2) self-organized forms of protection against internal or external threats [self-protective security]." These authors acknowledge that when a state is not capable of providing security to its citizens, two phenomena might occur. First, criminal groups fight for control of the economic, social, and political sectors in specific geographic areas. Second, self-defence groups emerge in those areas to counterattack the aggressions and violence of criminal groups. According to Chojnacki and Branovic, security is narrowed to "a situation in which means applied with the intention of maintaining protection against a defined group succeed in reducing the risk level with respect to existential threats".

Mexico provides a clear example of these two phenomena because it has experienced a rise in self-defence groups in response to the threat posed by non-state actors as well as a government lacking the capacity to provide security to its population. The World Justice Project, in its Rule of Law Index 2015, classifies Mexico in 79th place out of 102 countries and 14th among 19 in Latin America, and these ratings illustrate Mexico’s weakness on issues such as constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. Mexico has been dealing with a wave of crime and violence that began to spread throughout of all its social sectors and geographical areas when the country's war on drugs began in 2006. Mexico's National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI) has reported that, during 2013, there were 33.1 million felonies in Mexico; furthermore, the number of felonies per every 100,000 inhabitants was 41,563. The same report also noted that, during the same period, 33.9 per cent of the country’s homes were occupied by at least one victim of crime and the rate of felonies had increased by about 3 per cent every year since 2010.

These increasing crime rates are explained by Mariclaire Acosta Urquidi, who explains that drug trafficking in Mexico manifests in three key ways: firstly, it is evidenced by the existence of hitmen who carry out executions, mainly among cartel members; secondly, clandestine enterprises dedicated to drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion have emerged; and,
thirdly, informal structures that have effectively taken over the role of the government by selling protection, collecting taxes, and influencing the decisions of formal authorities have arisen. Acosta Urquidi also describes a marked increase in murder, kidnapping, extortion, theft, and rape, as well as severe human rights violations committed by the local and federal governments. Among the 86 countries observed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Mexico showed the third highest average increase in murders (33.9 per cent) between 2008 and 2010, with murders increasing from 12.7 to 22.7 per every 100,000 inhabitants. Half of these homicides were attributable to organized crime. With respect to kidnapping, there were 131,946 cases in 2013 alone.

Despite the severity of this situation, Mexico’s government has consistently demonstrated itself to be incapable of fighting crime and administering justice. The INEGI report for 2014 estimates that 93.8 per cent of reported felonies were not denounced to the proper authorities or, once they were, they did not open investigations. The report also showed that, of the investigations opened that year, 49.9 per cent were not resolved. Acosta Urquidi suggests that only three per cent of these cases yielded a sentence. The reason that 52 per cent of the population chose not to report a felony was because they considered it to be a waste of time or because of a distrust of the authorities. These statistics, drawn from the years preceding the emergence of self-defence groups in Michoacan, demonstrate the extreme level of insecurity in the country, as well as a lack of trust among the population in either the government’s ability to provide security or its capacity to respond effectively to organized crime.

The state of Michoacan is considered key to the drug trafficking system of Mexico, in geographic terms, as it has been an important producer of marijuana and the poppies used in the production of heroin. The state also holds strategic value because of its location on the Pacific route for drug traffickers. Consequently, different cartels have fought, and fight, for control of the zone. Additionally, the war between the state and the drug cartels in Michoacan has caused more violence and a diversification of felonies, which include extortion, theft on public roads, and vehicular thefts. In 2013, there were 20 murders per 100,000 inhabitants and 8,204 incidents of extortion, representing 20,002 victims of crime per 100,000 inhabitants that year. The rate of felonies increased from 15,469 in 2010 to 25,126 in 2013. In 2014, 82 per cent of the population considered their state to be unsecure. In terms of crime reporting, Michoacan reflected national patterns: only 10.3 per cent of felonies were reported and the authorities only opened a case for 58.4 per cent of those incidents according to the ENVIPE report in 2014; these facts reflect and help to explain the lack of trust in the government among the populace.

The nongovernmental organization Mexico Unido Contra la Delincuencia (Mexico United Against Delinquency) stated that, between 2011 and 2012, Michoacan reported the highest number of kidnappings nationally, despite the fact that the state only represents 3.9 per cent of the country’s population.

12 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
Persistent insecurity led to the rise of the self-defence movement in two of Michoacan’s communities on 24 February 2013.\textsuperscript{21} The first uprising occurred in La Ruana (population 10,217), a community of the municipality of Buena Vista; the second uprising occurred two hours later in Tepalcatepec (population 15,221), the main community in the municipality of the same name.\textsuperscript{22} By January 2014, the movement had spread from these two communities to 26 municipalities and it was at this point that the federal government prohibited self-defence groups from spreading their influence to other towns.\textsuperscript{23} During their first year, self-defence groups accomplished common goals and acted in a coordinated manner.

This paper argues that the self-defence movement was effective in its primary objective of fighting the drug cartels and of securing the communities in which it developed. Furthermore, the self-defence movement in Michoacan destabilized the system of fear and passivity that had previously overwhelmed Michoacan’s society. This paper poses a number of questions in order to examine these achievements: it asks if the self-defence movement in Michoacan represents a case of community resilience; it asks how the movement’s participants made sense of their actions and accomplishments at the beginning of the movement and at later stages; and it considers whether or not they achieved more than merely ejecting criminals from their towns.

### Community resilience and human security

Resilience is a versatile term that is used in a variety of sciences, from material sciences and ecology to education and social studies. This paper focuses on the concept of community resilience as defined by Martin-Been and Anderies, who identify it as “the ability of systems – households, people, communities, ecosystems, nations – to generate new ways of operating, new systemic relationships”.\textsuperscript{24} On these terms, resilience and community resilience theories help us to understand successful community cases that are apparently unexplainable due to the hazardous environments from which they emerge. For Martin-Been and Anderies, novelty and innovation are essential features within the process of self-organization, and therefore the functions of organizations may be maintained despite structural changes. The authors agree that structural change is generated by the confluence of different people’s ideas and backgrounds, which can produce constant novel and unpredictable actions.\textsuperscript{25} With respect to community, Robert J. Chaskin states that a community can be seen both as a context and as an agent of change, serving as both a foundation and a method for the resilience of the population.\textsuperscript{26} Chaskin includes within his definition of a community’s capacity aspects such as the interaction among human capital resources, organizational resources, and social capital. He also suggests that a community can be seen as a unit of belonging and identity; as a unit of production and exchange; as a network of relations; and as a political unit that

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\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Murders & Kidnappings & Extortion \\
\hline
2006 & 666 & 16 & 114 \\
2007 & 527 & 35 & 183 \\
2008 & 565 & 88 & 293 \\
2009 & 728 & 98 & 358 \\
2010 & 661 & 136 & 172 \\
2011 & 773 & 130 & 184 \\
2012 & 755 & 135 & 342 \\
2013 & 902 & 194 & 261 \\
2014 (Jan - July) & 624 & 92 & 234 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Most Common Felonies in Michoacán 2006-2014}
\end{table}

\textit{SESNSP (Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security)}


\textsuperscript{24}Martin-Been et al., “Resilience: A Literature Review”, 7.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26}Chaskin, “Resilience, Community and Resilient Communities”.
structures democracy. Finally, Chaskin recognizes that, when there are high levels of violence and crime within a community, these are impediments which restrict its capacity to protect the population.27 Sonn and Fisher argue that not all communities are capable of providing the goods aforementioned, because they may lack competence or are disorganized, damaged, and unable to provide adequate social and psychological resources to help their members cope with adversity.28

Maclean, Cuthill, and Ross distinguish six social resilience attributes: knowledge, skills and learning; community networks; people-place connections; community infrastructure; a diverse and innovative economy; and engaged governance.29 To these six attributes of resilient communities, Berkes and Ross add three more: values and beliefs; leadership; and a positive outlook, which includes readiness for change. These additional attributes were added after Berkes and Ross integrated approaches to resilience which understand it either in terms of a social-ecological system or a process of psychological/mental health and personal development. Berkes and Ross believe that resilient leaders are capable of contributing to community and even to regional resilience, and this belief assigns a central role to people’s adaptive capacity, since humans are capable of anticipating change and using social, political, and cultural means to influence resilience. The authors also believe that two more components can build an individual’s inclination to be resilient: agency, understood as the capacity to act independently and to make free choices, and self-efficacy, the belief in one’s own ability to perform a task and to manage situations that might emerge in the future.30

Using a wider perspective, Ola Dahlman argues that the emergence of resilience may facilitate an understanding of the stability and security of a nation or any large-scale social-economic-political system. These systems have a dynamic with four principal phases: a growth or entrepreneurial exploitation phase; a conservation or organizational phase; a destruction or release phase; and a restructuring or reorganizational phase. Between the first two and the latter two phases, a rapid and unpredictable process of creative or destructive transformation takes place, which depends on persons and groups. For Dahlman, a society or system has stability landscapes which are compounded by various subsystems that may fail, potentially causing the failure of the whole system. Therefore, it is important to define what functions or elements of the system are resilient to what changes in order to understand how much change a system can undergo and still resist disturbance. Dahlman argues that, after a major disturbance, human actors are critical drivers in bringing a system back to normal functionality or creating a new stability landscape, even when individual stakeholders carry out irrational actions. Furthermore, Dahlman stresses the value of creating a new approach to managing systems, one that involves learning to live within rather than control systems. Resilient management has to be flexible and open to learning, enabling stakeholders to compare maps of various pathways to the future; Dahlman suggests that rigid control mechanisms worsen the condition of social-economic-political systems and produce their collapse.31 These theoretical perspectives on resilience and community resilience provide a lens to illuminate how communities, such as those in Michoacan, respond to violence and threats and it also casts light on how they make sense of their actions.

Community resilience and narrative analysis: a useful pair

This paper analyses the results of research based on the perspectives of four Michoacan self-defence group founders and three people from the communities where these groups emerged. This kind of detailed first-hand information, based on the irreplaceable perspectives of the actors involved, is key to any understanding of this phenomenon. This study’s interviews were conducted in 2015 and reflect on the participants’ experiences within the self-defence movement from its inception on 24 February 2013. The interviews therefore reveal information about the self-defence groups’ stages of emergence, as well as the

27 Ibid.
28 Sonn et al., “Sense of Community”, 457.
30 Berkes et al., “Community Resilience: Toward an Integrated Approach”.
31 Dahlman, “Security and Resilience”.

Interviewees’ perceptions of the future role they might play in maintaining security in the region.

A snowball sampling technique was used to gather the participants. This technique helps to encourage interviewees’ readiness to share their experiences, as people are contacted through someone they already know and trust.\textsuperscript{32} In this case, the technique was effective, since the first participants from Michoacan were contacted while they were in the United States and they helped contact the other participants who were living in Michoacan. All interviewees agreed to participate after they knew their testimonies were going to provide the basis for an academic article, and they all agreed to be identified if necessary. George Mason University’s ethic guidelines were followed in this research.

Semi-structured interviews were used as they allow the interviewer to elicit information about the same topics from all the respondents while allowing enough flexibility for the respondents to define the content of their answers.\textsuperscript{33} Narrative analysis offered the means to interpret their testimonies as well as other sources, such as videos available on the internet or news items about the uprising. Narrative analysis allows the researcher to observe the positions that narrators assign themselves within a plot, and, in this case, it sheds light on how participants in self-defence groups situate themselves either as actors with agency or as victims incapable of changing their security issues. Sara Cobb has used this approach to show how women victims of rape make sense of their experience through the way they narrate it.\textsuperscript{34} Catherine Riessman has also argued that narrative analysis provides people with a useful way to make sense of their own experience with the assistance of an interviewer.\textsuperscript{35}

One of this study’s challenges involved distance, as the author was living in the US during the interview period. Therefore, most of the interviews were conducted through telephone and Skype conversations, which produced some technical and logistical issues. It is also necessary to acknowledge that this research has methodological limitations, such as weak representation of the studied population, and this may have affected the validity and reliability of the study.

**Perspectives from Michoacan’s self-defence group founders and inhabitants**

Ola Dahlman has described some phases that are necessary for the creation of resilience, arguing that only change can build a system’s resilience. The phases Dahlman identifies as necessary to the development of any social, economic, and political system are: a growth or entrepreneurial exploitation phase, a conservation or organizational phase, a destruction or release phase, and a restructuring or reorganization phase.\textsuperscript{36} Additionally, Roderick J. Watts distinguishes five stages that contribute towards socio-political development. The first is the critical stage in which people perceive themselves as powerless and inferior. The next is the adaptive stage, where people lose their ability to make choices, accept others’ prescriptions, and in this manner adapt to oppression. There is a point where people become aware of the resource asymmetry caused by the control of some people over others. This is the pre-critical stage and it is characterized by a strong motivation to acquire the critical skills needed to overcome asymmetry. During the critical stage, personal political ideology is built, provoking awareness about individual and group oppression. The next stage is the liberation stage, and it is characterized by an understanding that warrior energy can be used for personal and social transformation. In this stage, people use newfound skills and a feeling of self-efficacy to improve their community’s situation. A sense of solidarity is a basic element of this stage.\textsuperscript{37} In order to explore the narrative that emerged from this study’s interviews, four narrative stages will be elucidated: these phases involved overcoming fear, improvising and learning to fight, fighting on two flanks, and the evolution of the self-defence movement.

\textsuperscript{32} Sierra Caballero, “Función y Sentido de la Entrevista”, 313.
\textsuperscript{33} Vela, “Un Acto Metodológico Básico”.
\textsuperscript{34} Cobb, “Transcribing the Body and Materializing the Subject”.
\textsuperscript{35} Catherine Kohler Riessman et al., *Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences*.
\textsuperscript{36} Dahlman, “Security and Resilience”, 44.
Overcoming fear

The first stage of the self-defence movement recognized by this study’s interviewees was the period of 12 years of fear that preceded the uprising in 2013. During this period, inhabitants suffered quietly from the offenses of Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana, and Los Caballeros Templarios, the main organized criminal groups operating in the area. The members of these drug cartels operated within their communities, where they ruled life. Most of the participants explained that citizens could not be outside their homes in the late afternoon and could not walk or talk in pairs in the street because criminals living inside the community would see this as an attempt to plot against them. Another alarming sign of abuse was the high amount of pregnancies among school-aged girls as described by one of the participants who explained that these pregnancies were the result of rapes.

Wealthy people in these communities were afraid of being kidnapped, tortured, and killed if they did not pay the fees demanded by the criminals. Many had to abandon and legally grant their properties to the criminals to avoid fatal punishments. The owners of any productive enterprises were directed to buy and sell only to people approved of by cartel members’ orders. This state of affairs could be compared with the critical stage described by Watts, as communities felt disempowered or inferior. Even the municipal authorities had to pay the fees established by Los Caballeros Templarios; other authorities were allies of the drug cartels, as was demonstrated when these authorities were incarcerated by the federal forces after the self-defence groups formed. From these examples, it is noticeable that in the communities of Tierra Caliente, human security was completely absent. The personal, economic, health, community, and political components of human security were missing, and could not be protected by the municipal, local, and national authorities, or by the international community in the manner Fröhlich and Lemanski suggest is possible.

The social groups that were most vulnerable to criminal activities were the more marginalized ones, which included people such as day labourers. These people, whose only income was the wage they could make from a day’s work, were prevented from collecting limes or any other fruit so that the cartels could control the prices of the products. This study’s interviewees recognized that the self-defence groups were mainly made up of poor people, such as farmers, harvesters, or people in modest occupations, who had to work to obtain enough money to eat every day. These facts correlate with Chaskin’s insight that communities suffering from high levels of violence and crime are incapable of protecting their populations, since members of the community are prevented from making a living and lack support from other community members or authorities.

In Michoacan, the self-defence movement was started by lime producers and cattle ranchers. One respondent, referred to here as P6, explained how his son was prevented from selling limes to one of the packing companies in La Ruana and how that event triggered P6’s actions to organize the self-defence movement. P6 had already been trying to organize people to fight the drug cartels for four years before the uprising with no success. Finally, he convinced five of his friends from La Ruana, and a friend from Tepalcatepec, to organize brave people there to fight Los Caballeros Templarios. P6 demonstrated what Maclean, Cuthill, and Ross would consider to be social resilience attributes because he made use of connections with people and places; he showed leadership and had a positive outlook; and overall, he demonstrated personal resilience.

The uprising took place in La Ruana’s plaza on 24 February 2013 and two hours later in Tepalcatepec. P6 exhorted people gathered in the main plaza of La Ruana to take action, saying: “You know how Los Caballeros Templarios do not allow us to work, and they are taking the food from our tables. The ones with the courage to fight for their rights and to kick Los Templarios out of town, jump up here with me, please!” He added: “They almost ran over me”. P6 gathered about 250 people who

38 Ibid.
40 Chaskin, “Resilience, Community and Resilient Communities”.
41 Maclean et al., “Six Attributes of Social Resilience”.

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brought any arms they had. Later, they established monitoring points at the entrances of the town. These actions, fostered by individuals, offer evidence for Dahlman's argument that human actors are a critical key driver for the creation of any new stability landscape.\footnote{Dahlman, "Security and Resilience".}

In the case of Tepalcatepec, P7 explained that, even though he used to join every week with eight other members of the local founding families, it took about two years to make a decision to take action against Los Caballeros Templarios and he attributed this hesitancy to a lack of courage. Their goal for the uprising was to get at least one man from every family to join. Apparently, fear dominated the will of all the inhabitants of Tierra Caliente, but once the first sign of bravery and liberation was displayed in Tepalcatepec, it was inevitable that they would join the uprising, and, by late in the night of 24 February, 3,000 well-armed men had enrolled in the movement. Their sudden changes of mind and actions represent the kind of instability that Dahlman describes as part of the release phase that leads to structural change. Certainly, the system's weakened control creates opportunities for the transformation of the rules that guide relationships within it.\footnote{Ibid.} In Watts' terms, the phase when the respondents were subject to other people's choices represented the adaptive stage. The pre-critical stage corresponded to the actions the respondents took, since they demonstrated awareness of asymmetry in the distribution of resources and people found the motivation to take a new path. At the critical stage, a personal political ideology was built in Michoacan's inhabitants as they understood themselves to be part of an oppressed group.\footnote{Watts, "Oppression and Sociopolitical Development", 24.}

**Improvising and learning to fight**

In the beginning, it seemed easy to expel Los Caballeros Templarios from La Ruana and Tepalcatepec. Nevertheless, cartel members remained in the neighbouring towns. The criminals' strategy was to prevent any communication between La Ruana and Tepalcatepec and the communities around them by sealing off the roads. These two communities could not receive food, medicines, natural gas, or gasoline, and the inhabitants could not sell their products outside their towns. They were safe but locked inside their communities and their participation in the movement exposed them to danger. In April, a caravan formed by men, women, children, elderly people, and indigenous migrants from La Ruana was ambushed despite the fact that they were being escorted by federal police patrols. Their goal was to ask the state governor to liberate the roads and eliminate the cartels' economic interruptions. Approximately 40 people died and several more were wounded. In this ambush, P5 lost her father.

In the same month, Tepalcatepec and La Ruana suffered simultaneous attacks at the towns' key entry points. Nevertheless, the self-defence group members resisted the criminal contingent. P6 explained how a group of approximately 300 criminals carrying AK-47 rifles and grenade launchers attacked the barricade positioned at the entrance of the town. There were only about 50 self-defence group members present, but they fought with courage and were able to expel the criminals. The self-defence groups received help from the federal police and the army during these skirmishes. Those two organizations opened the roads on 21 May and free transit was re-established.\footnote{Maerker, "Autodefensas Michoacan 21 1 2014 Segunda Parte", https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1j9ES3o--nM (Accessed 12 January 2016).}

At this point, another stage in the self-defence groups' development can be distinguished. This period was characterized by the expansion of the movement and the execution of several strategies that allowed the self-defence members to effectively fight crime and build their self-confidence. One of the participants explained that he rang the bells of the town's church on the day of the uprising and it is clear that this sign was recognized as an act of resistance by the community as it was communicated through a local radio station.

P4 acknowledged that fighting with enthusiasm was another strategy used by self-defence group members. He explained that they could repel a Templario attack with only seven men at
the entrance of the town. The criminals could not enter, and that fact encouraged the self-defence group members to continue fighting and organizing. This positive perception of one's achievements is referred to by Berkes and Ross as self-efficacy, or a person's belief in their own ability to perform and manage situations that might emerge. Berkes and Ross also consider agency to be an element of resilience because it represents people's capacity to act independently and to make free choices. This was the case when the self-defence group from Tepalcatepec helped the Aguililla community to kick out Los Templarios and organize the first structures needed to establish security. At some point, people from Aguililla began to establish their own independent decision-making process. Once this happened, more complex crime-fighting strategies were used in Aguililla. P3 explained how people in the community created a Citizen Council for Development to prevent the self-defence groups from abusing their power. This council was formed by a representative from every neighbourhood and it became the organization in charge of deciding the actions of Aguililla's self-defence group. The community's agency was displayed through these efforts to control the direction of the self-defence movement in their community.

According to P3, the Citizen Council was necessary because the emergence of the self-defence groups was very suspicious. He suspected that the groups coming from Tepalcatepec could be being directed by the federal government to establish an organization loyal to the government's interests. This predisposition to distrust the government may reveal what Berkes and Ross call the human capacity to anticipate change, since self-defence members were attentive to any sign of threat to their community's security and stability. P3 explained that his suspicion grew when he heard that a commission from the government of the Mexican president, Peña Nieto, maintained talks with the leaders of Los Caballeros Templarios. Supposedly, the commission demanded that the criminal group not enter, and that fact encouraged the self-defence group members to continue fighting and organizing. This positive perception of one's achievements is referred to by Berkes and Ross as self-efficacy, or a person's belief in their own ability to perform and manage situations that might emerge. Berkes and Ross also consider agency to be an element of resilience because it represents people's capacity to act independently and to make free choices. This was the case when the self-defence group from Tepalcatepec helped the Aguililla community to kick out Los Templarios and organize the first structures needed to establish security. At some point, people from Aguililla began to establish their own independent decision-making process. Once this happened, more complex crime-fighting strategies were used in Aguililla. P3 explained how people in the community created a Citizen Council for Development to prevent the self-defence groups from abusing their power. This council was formed by a representative from every neighbourhood and it became the organization in charge of deciding the actions of Aguililla's self-defence group. The community's agency was displayed through these efforts to control the direction of the self-defence movement in their community.

Self-defence groups received help from the federal police and the army to expand their zone of influence. Members of the founding groups travelled to their neighbouring towns from June to December of 2013 and asked people if they wanted them to stay to help them organize their own community groups. These communities regularly received the self-defence groups with joy and hope, and new groups formed. In some other cases, people did not join because cartel members were from those communities and the community's livelihood depended on the cartel's revenues.

The self-defence groups maintained the security of their territories by communicating with neighbouring communities when they knew that cartel members were going near their borders. In this manner, the self-defence groups secured their territory and prevented criminals from coming close to their borders. There was also coordination between the self-defence groups in different communities. For example, one of the participants was designated as the spokesman of the self-defence groups in Michoacan. Sometimes self-defence groups coordinated with members of the army and the federal police. This cooperation proved to be advantageous for the authorities as well because members of the local communities already knew who the drug cartel members were, whereas policemen or soldiers unfamiliar with the area could run into criminals on the roads without realising that they were cartel members. This situation, in addition to the furious attacks against unarmed civilians, spurred joint action by the self-defence groups and the federal forces. P7 mentioned that sometimes one of the colonels who fought along with him agreed to share some of the arms confiscated from the criminals. Still, the support of governmental organizations was not always consistent and clear. This participant believes that the military was divided because, while

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47 Ibid.
some generals supported the self-defence groups' advances in different ways and even gave them strategic advice, other members of the army simply did not appear during attacks by Los Caballeros Templarios, even when they were close by. All seven participants suggested that perhaps the government had never truly fought the different drug cartels in the state: "Maybe it is because they cannot beat the criminals, or maybe it is because they do not want to", said P4.

With respect to resources, participants said that, early on, the self-defence movement had very few and outdated arms. Furthermore, P6 commented that it was, and still is, very difficult to maintain the movement because of a lack of economic resources, though he added that, in the cases of Tepalcatepec and other communities, entrepreneurs were happy to support the self-defence groups because the financial impact on them involved only a small portion of the amount of money they had had to pay every month to Los Caballeros Templarios. In any case, the fact that self-defence groups kept fighting, even though they lacked resources, represents what Watts identifies as true warriorship in his liberation stage.49

Finally, self-defence groups, jointly with the federal forces, were able to impact on human security in terms of personal, community, economic, food, health, and political outcomes.

**Fighting on two flanks**

On 13 January 2014, the federal government launched a strategy to control Michoacán’s self-defence groups. They were asked to leave their arms and go back to their homes because the government was going to take charge of security and fighting criminals. For self-defence groups, giving up arms was a life or death issue. P7 said that they could not give up arms until they could see that criminals were incarcerated and that security conditions for them and for their families would be maintained.

Finally, on 11 May 2014, the Fuerzas Rurales del Estado (a community police group) was formalized through a presidential order and the government and the self-defence groups agreed to integrate the groups into that organization.

People who were not part of the state rural forces could carry arms, but these arms had to be registered in the army's files. In theory, this agreement was acceptable to both parties; however, during the formation of the state rural forces, the government carried out a number of actions that the participants considered detrimental to their effectiveness as self-defence groups.

P5 explained that, to be registered as a member of the state rural forces, candidates had to go through physical, psychological, and criminal record tests. Not all of the members of the founding self-defence groups were accepted into the organization. However, the real problem, P3 and P4 suggest, was that some people, particularly in Aguililla, who were designated by the local government as leaders of the Fuerzas Rurales del Estado were more likely to support the government’s interests than those of the self-defence groups, and some were even former members of drug cartels. For this reason, P4 said, the entire community denounced the situation by all means available. The public outcry eventually led to the revocation by the government of those designations. However, people supporting the government inside the community, as well as those designated by the government to be part of Aguililla’s Fuerzas Rurales del Estado, dismantled the Citizen Council for Development. Participants also said the government stopped a development project for an iron mine that the community tried to carry out.

P4 said that it was not uncommon for the police to arrest inhabitants who were carrying weapons, and he said that people in town preferred to be arrested for carrying a gun than to be killed by criminals. Although P3 and P4 were very concerned about their community’s security situation, they still got involved with the Fuerzas Rurales del Estado, the federal police, and the army when there were red alerts, issued by anyone, due to forthcoming drug cartel attacks.

All seven participants agree that criminals have infiltrated the Fuerzas Rurales del Estado. Some of them recognize criminals in that organization, despite the fact that the records of

the candidates were well investigated. Others recognize among police officers the criminals who kidnapped or killed one of their relatives. Additionally, P3 said that the federal forces try to provoke local citizens and former self-defence group members to violence so that they can be imprisoned for their actions.

These conflicts of interest have created divisions among the self-defence groups. There are some groups that openly support the government and continually state that there is less violence and crime in Michoacan. Currently, there are two segments among the Fuerzas Rurales del Estado: Las Autodefensas de Michoacan and Las Autodefensas Legítimas de Michoacan (all of the participants in this study belong to the latter group and it was not possible to reach anyone from the former group). Participants mentioned that in some communities the drug cartels have established a self-defence group only to prevent Las Autodefensas Legítimas from going to those communities to expel criminals. One of the most well-known cases of confrontation between self-defence groups was that at La Ruana on 16 December 2014. Self-defence leader Luis Antonio Torres, also known as “El Americano”, attacked La Ruana’s group. After this attack, all the members of both groups were put in jail. Nevertheless, weeks later, the members of both groups were released because nobody was found guilty by the judiciary.

In this scenario, one can agree with Dahlman, who grants to resilient systems the capacity to cope with irrational actions by individual stakeholders.50 Certainly, self-defence groups resisted the aggression of local and federal governments in order to secure a greater prize, their security. They were reinforcing the notion of struggle and even cooperating with others, in line with the behaviours Watts assigns to his liberation stage.51 Self-defence groups also found new ways to operate in order to maintain their organizations’ function despite structural change.52

**Evolution of the self-defence movement**

Participants from La Ruana consider that their community has changed since the self-defence movement. They mentioned that they have adjusted their way of life and they have survived in a struggle that has taken their years and effort. Self-defence groups are doing their best to maintain security for all people and will continue with their movement without succumbing to provocations. She added that she is stronger since she lost her father and she is not going to stay quiet about the offences committed by criminal organizations. She also considers that her community has changed since the self-

50 Dahlman, “Security and Resilience”.

It is clear, from this narrative, that the interviewees have changed their perspective on crime and violent threats from the stage when they were fearful of organized crime. A sense of agency and adaptive capacity is noticeable in the participants’ words.53 Another example of the same phenomena can be found in P5’s testimony when she notes that self-defence group members are trying to be united in order to be strong and are following all the orders of the commander in La Ruana. She said that self-defence groups are doing their best to maintain security for all people and will continue with their movement without succumbing to provocations. She added that she is stronger since she lost her father and she is not going to stay quiet about the offences committed by criminal organizations. She also considers that her community has changed since the self-
defence uprising because people are able to work more and with more security, without fear of extortion. Confirming this sense at a personal level, P4 said that he does not fear for his children when they are out. He said that at least the criminals cannot act openly and without any consequence any more. He added that, even though his community’s self-defence group has lost full control of its security, its members continue to collaborate with the state’s rural forces when they know that there is an attack forthcoming. He added that he was sure that, if necessary, people would continue to rise up against any threat.

As for the situation in Aguililla, P3 said that the government was trying to show that Michoacán was secure, that economic development was fostered in the state, and that crime was controlled. With respect to the efficacy of the self-defence groups, he stated that in other communities Las Autodefensas Legítimas de Michoacán continued with their security activities with very good results, but he said there was no positive change in the community’s thinking and people continued acting the same way as before. He believed that, in order to strengthen the community’s positive values, their economic situation would have to improve. In contrast, P1 said that after the self-defence uprising everyone in Michoacán learned that they could suffer consequences from acting in a dishonest way. Furthermore, he believed that the strength of Las Autodefensas Legítimas de Michoacán lay in maintaining their honesty instead of yielding to bribery from the drug cartels. According to P2, the main achievement of the self-defence groups was to regain freedom and peace, although he could not condone the armed actions they had to take since he is a pacifist. These words demonstrate the knowledge, skills, learning capacity, and engagement with governance acquired during the self-defence uprising, all attributes linked to community resilience by Maclean, Cuthill, and Ross. In the last stage of the self-defence movement delineated here, most of the participants feel a sense of betrayal or abandonment by the federal government, since this institution has not allowed them to accomplish their objective to expel the criminals from their communities. Moreover, the participants believe that the government is protecting criminals as they rebuild their positions inside Michoacán’s communities.

Clearly, every participant perceived the uprising and development of the self-defence groups in a different manner, according to their ideology and their roles in their respective communities and self-defence groups; however, many commonalities also exist. All participants considered the emergence of the self-defence groups as necessary to counter the abuses and attacks from drug cartel members, and all described how they effectively fought criminals. They also elaborated on how that fight involved social communication, coordination, creativity, and negotiation, aspects that Robert Chaskin equates with human and social capital, as well as organizational resources, and their interaction generates community capacity. The participants also agreed that, historically, the government has not protected Michoacán society from the aggressions and abuses of the drug cartels. The seven participants agreed that criminals infiltrated the Fuerzas Rurales del Estado and that there was corruption inside the local and federal governments.

Despite of all these obstacles, interviewees continued participating in the strengthening of Michoacán society through the discipline and cooperation that Watts sees as characteristic of a liberation stage in which people channel warrior energy for personal and social transformation. One of the participants was part of an organization devoted to generating economic development. He travelled to several cities in the US and visited universities, members of Congress, and embassies in Washington, DC, to share the difficult conditions Michoacán was dealing with. This participant was supported by P2, still an activist, who did not believe in the suitability of the current voting system for electing representatives. He was also supporting P3’s efforts to spread the idea among Mexicans in the US that citizen councils for development should be created to rule communities. P3 believed that these councils could help citizens have more control

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54 Maclean et al., “Six Attributes of Social Resilience”.
55 Chaskin, “Resilience, Community and Resilient Communities”.
over the public decision-making process and that they could prevent corruption at all government levels. He promoted his ideas through several social media platforms. Taking a different approach, P6 participated in a political campaign to become a federal representative. He declared that the people from Michoacan need a voice within governmental organizations, and he intended to propose a law to legitimize self-defence groups.

In summary, this study's participants described where they were coming from during the initial uprising and the different developmental stages that the self-defence groups went through. First, they positioned themselves as victims of fear and of the drug cartels; they then took control over their fears as well as over the physical security of their communities. During this stage, the participants built coping skills to fight the drug cartel members through social organization. Later, the participants showed, to a greater or lesser extent, that they were victims of the ambiguous actions of the government that continues attacking them and protecting drug cartel members. None of the participants demonstrated a passive attitude toward the circumstances that are affecting their communities. On the contrary, they acted to overcome those circumstances by applying different strategies such as denouncing criminal infiltration even though they live with the enemy inside their communities. In other cases, there are self-defence groups that fully maintain their function of protection over their communities and control their actions and members.

**Gains in Michoacan's communities**

The transformation of the self-defence groups from victims of both drug cartels and the government to fighters, and even winners of the fight, against impunity and violence is a process yet unfinished, and this process, according to Judith Rodin, is the resilience dividend. Rodin argues that awareness, diversity, integration, self-regulation, and adaptation are characteristics of community resilience. The self-defence groups of Michoacan have clearly demonstrated these characteristics, depending on the particularities of each community. Their self-defence movement had the capacity to harness people's qualities and skills to create organizations that effectively take care of their communities and are capable of adapting to new challenges. Therefore, these groups self-regulate and take advantage of their

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57 Judith Rodin, *The Resilience Dividend*. 
populations' diversity, integrating it effectively into their fight against crime. Self-defence groups tried to return to the security and peace they had decades ago using a support structure that is not based on the drug economy. These groups are aware both of the consequences of Martin-Been and Anderies similarly state that the capacity to transform, or "the ability of a part of a complex adaptive system to assume a new function" is an essential feature of resilience.\textsuperscript{58} Michoacán's self-defence groups assumed the function of the government by providing effective security to their communities; however, their actions were different from those of the federal forces. Self-defence groups started moving out of their communities to help other communities establish their own groups. The strategies they used were different from those used by the government because they initially had neither powerful arms nor vehicles. They started using the arms and vehicles taken from the criminals and then used social networks inside communities to obtain economic and human resources. In addition, the functions of people changed. They moved from being workers, harvesters, and farmers to being polcers of their communities, using arms, designing combat strategies, and fighting criminals. They acted as witnesses too when they recognized and identified organized crime members. Self-defence groups became functional entities that contested crime and combatted the government's incapability, negligence, and corruption.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The elements that fostered resilience in Las Autodefensas Legítimas de Michoacán were not conditions implanted in a community from outside; instead they have arisen through meaningful life lessons that shaped people's characters within their community. In this case, resilience is a mixture of strong motivation and individuals' skills and knowledge that led to social gains being obtained during a development lifecycle. In the cases of these research subjects, resilience was triggered by an event, but it was not caused by an event. Resilience was the result of the oppression that Michoacán communities endured even as they were figuring out how to fight drug cartels in the past errors and of the risks they still have to confront. Their skills and adaptation mechanisms could be easily equated to those considered as components of community resilience by Judith Rodin.

fear stage. Self-defence groups applied the skills and knowledge they already had, and they also acquired new skills through fighting drug cartels which enabled them to act and improvise effectively. At the same time, they also gained self-esteem and a sense of their capacity for self-determination. They were able to overcome their fear of being killed by the cartels and then they innovated strategies to successfully fight back. They were able to adapt to the new schemas established by local and federal governments, including incarceration and disarmament. They were also aware of the future challenges that might arise in their context and they were looking forward, attempting to find neutralizing strategies.

Michoacán was full of different actors with different interests that directly affected the original self-defence movement. Members of drug cartels infiltrated the self-defence groups to fight other drug cartels. The government joined or attacked the self-defence groups at its own convenience. Some people did not like the self-defence groups because they directly affected their livelihoods. Moreover, the government and other critics have claimed that the solution provided by self-defence groups to counter violence was illegal because it involves the irregular use of force. However, the uprising of Michoacán's original self-defence movement was a response to the Mexican government abandoning the function of security provider at federal, local, and municipal levels. The intervention of the self-defence groups allowed Michoacán communities to improve their political, economic, health, food, community, and personal security through organization, creativity, innovation, and adaptation. In this way, Las Autodefensas Legítimas de Michoacán were able to improve the state of human security, in all of its aspects, for their communities.

Although each Michoacán community that experienced a self-defence movement had different organizational processes, and even

\textsuperscript{58}Martin-Been et al., "Resilience: A Literature Review".
though the participants in this research have diverging and often opposing views about the best way to obtain more independence to secure their communities, self-defence groups took joint actions and had shared needs and desires. Consequently, these groups have become a source of renovating energy. They have disrupted the synergy of violence, corruption, and impunity imposed in Michoacan by the drug cartels’ hegemony and the absence of security guarantees by the Mexican government, and they have become, in this way, a force of community resilience.

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What is the role that pop culture plays in creating positive peace? In *Peace and Resistance in Youth Cultures*, Siobhán McEvoy-Levy defends the idea that popular culture has much to teach us about positive peace and peacebuilding. To explore this idea, she focuses her study on two hugely popular series: the Harry Potter novels and *The Hunger Games*.

McEvoy-Levy’s core argument is that pop culture, and in particular young adult (YA) fiction, operates at several different levels in our societies. Focusing particularly on the work of Gloria Anzaldua and her idea of ambiguity, McEvoy-Levy tries to show the benefits and dangers of pop culture. Ambiguity is presented as necessary for a positive peace because it enables actors to understand themselves and the other and challenge the status quo. Unless people have an appreciation of ambiguity and its importance, it is, McEvoy-Levy argues, difficult for them to navigate and accept conflict.

The author expands her study of this concept to include the world of fan fiction. Fan fiction is presented as an example of the kind of space where humans are able to explore the desires they have to challenge ideas, bring about change, and accept themselves within the consumerist and liberal capitalist societies in which they live. However, the book does not forget that YA and the cultural spaces and ideas created and shared around it can also have negative aspects and effects. The book raises interesting questions about the sharing of imagery and symbols from YA in popular movements. It considers whether these books and the products that appear based on them can become sites for a new kind of colonialism, one where only works created within hegemonic discourses can be used and reproduced if a message is expected to be recognized globally.

The book is divided into three sections. In the first one, McEvoy-Levy describes how the Harry Potter and *Hunger Games* narratives represent war, conflict, and peace and how events from the real world cross into their pages. She illustrates how, from a young age, we learn to recognize some kinds of violence as legitimate or just. The book dedicates various chapters to showing how YA literature sends messages that help to educate readers about ideas relating to peace or militainment, in particular around the idea of a just war. McEvoy-Levy also investigates how these books, even if they challenge some ideas, also conform in many ways to the institutionalized order.

McEvoy-Levy goes on to use discourse analysis and theories from post-structural, gender and youth studies to analyse how governments, the media, and NGOs have taken to using elements from these works for their own purposes. In fact, the book focuses on a case study which considers how the American government and media shared, analysed, and interpreted the fact that prisoners at Guantanamo Bay were reading the Harry Potter series. The book provides an intriguing discussion of the realities that were created around this and how the prisoners were presented in different lights depending on who told their story.

In the third section, the book shifts its focus to consider how the YA novels in question are reinterpreted in online fan fiction environments, and how readers change their beloved works to create new stories that help them to understand and cope with various complex aspects of their own realities, such as
those that concern sexual or gender identity or bullying. In analysing the work produced by fans, McEvoy-Levy studies the way personal safe spaces and new kinds of peacebuilding can be created in this digital era.

*Peace and Resistance in Youth Cultures* offers to bridge the gaps between different fields of academic knowledge to interrelate studies of pop culture, peace, and youth culture. Advancing on ideas developed in these separate fields, and connecting theories around peace, international relations, and art, McEvoy-Levy tries to explain the ways in which pop culture impacts our lives, how it can become a tool to criticize and challenge the status quo, and how it can inspire social justice movements as a way to disrupt dominant discourses. In the process, the author enables a new understanding of the ways peace can be created, in particular through art. The book makes possible a better understanding of the connections between our everyday lives, our societies and the world of the internet, where the local and the global mingle. McEvoy-Levy presents her theories in an effective way, and the book's ideas are clearly explained, even if there is some overlap between topics and in particular between the study of both series.

The analysis the book provides is quite exhaustive. The case studies section in particular is clear and fully developed. The section dedicated to fan fiction, is more complex to assess, however. While the analysis of the works selected is extensive and far-reaching, the field is hard to map when so much fan work is created and shared daily. Even though the use of keywords to select material is explained, the selection criteria for such a shifting body of material may seem limited. The narrow focus on two series might also be considered a limitation. The author cites other YA works, but does not dwell on them or analyse their impact in detail. Of course, the book leaves open the possibility that other works can be considered in future research. Any such studies might usefully consider how other YA and fan fiction oeuvres impact our everyday peace. It would also be valuable for future research to consider YA works and fan fictions produced in different languages and cultures.

Some of the ideas the book introduces might have been explored more fully. It would have been useful for McEvoy-Levy to assess the way in which the works she studies play into romantic ideas of self-sacrifice and death. Messages of self-sacrifice for the greater good are pervasive in pop culture and it is worth asking if there is a relationship between those ideas and nationalism or militarism. Further, the works in question tend to romanticize the local and low tech. Ideas around the importance of family and blood and about living in small communities are ubiquitous. Are those ideas counterproductive when it comes to creating open communities and positive peace?

*Peace and Resistance in Youth Cultures* does a great job of bridging gaps between understandings of pop culture, IR, and peace, and in doing so it brings many interesting ideas to the fore. McEvoy-Levy makes it clear that we cannot forget pop culture if we want to understand peace and the relationship between youth and peace in particular. The book will be of deep interest to researchers of pop culture, youth studies, and peace studies. In particular it will be helpful to undergraduate students who want to learn more about the role art plays in our societies and to researchers of peace studies who want to expand the scope of their research. The book accomplishes its mission which is to show that the study of the relationship between pop culture and peace is necessary. It demonstrates the relevance of canonical and fan fiction as a source of research data, and it certainly raises questions which can be fruitfully explored in future research.

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BOOK REVIEW

Coleen Murphy

_The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice_


What is transitional justice, what are its roles in post-conflict societies, and, more importantly, how can these roles be morally justified? Coleen Murphy’s book, _The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice_, attempts to answer these questions and to provide a substantial exploration of the concept of transitional justice. In order to carry out this enquiry, Murphy focuses on moral perspectives on transitional justice and on an exploration of what the aim of this kind of justice ought to be. Throughout her book, Murphy asserts that the core concern of transitional justice is societal transformation which, she asserts, can be brought about by relational changes that defend the just pursuit of transformation.

The author begins her discussion by paying attention to the particularity of transitional justice which, unlike other types of justice, deals with legacies of violent past in transitional societies. Murphy argues that transitional communities are marked by four unique social circumstances resulting from political violence: pervasive structural inequality, normalized collective and political wrongdoing, serious existential uncertainty, and fundamental uncertainty about authority (p. 75). These, Murphy argues, harm the ecology of a society because they threaten the kinds of mutual respect and trust among citizens, and between citizens and officials, which might otherwise have been maintained. Their presence makes the future of transitional societies volatile.

Societies afflicted with the circumstances require a mechanism that allows them to deal with their violent pasts in a way to facilitate societal transformation. Murphy emphasizes that societal transformation must consist of relational changes, which explains why transitional justice is intrinsically connected to reconciliation (p. 120). Past violence erodes the principle of the rule of law and contributes to ongoing injustice and inequality in society, and so reconciliation must entail equal citizenship and mutual respect (Moellendorf 2007; Verdeja 2009). Relational change is a positive indication of political commitments to the rule of law among citizens and between citizens and officials and it also signals respect for the moral agency of others. This kind of change not only amends legal flaws but also generates hope and indicates acknowledgement of social transformation. Thus, the core point of transitional justice is to ensure that a society meets two requirements: it must foster adherence both to the rule of law and to political respect. And, these principles as two pillars of transitional justice for the transformation are expected to restore broken political relationships between and mistrust.

Murphy elaborates this point by correlating both _jus ad bellum_ and _jus in bello_ analogues in just war theory with transitional justice and the just pursuit. Transitional justice and societal transformation can be morally justified when they contribute to social change for its own sake (_jus ad bellum_) and when they lead to perpetrators and victims being dealt with ‘justly’ (_jus in bello_). The ‘just’ criteria for this task, as Murphy notes, might involve acknowledging what has happened to victims and their lived reality and recognizing them as equal citizens. Reparations may also be involved. Justice might also involve holding accountable wrongdoers whose actions are in some ways justifiable, while at the same time repudiating the permissibility of the type of wrong they have been involved in perpetrating. When there is a competitive culture of victimhood, it is, Murphy notes, vital to repudiate past actions, institute reparations, and commit to deterrence, but Murphy recognizes the
limitations of individual trials which can obscure the existence of structural injustices. She suggests that instead, this kind of work must be conducted in a holistic way that understands social transformation as a just pursuit analogue.

Murphy’s book promotes the correlation of the concepts of transitional justice and social transformation and it contributes to the existing discourse in International Relations in two general ways. Firstly, as she observes, the circumstances of transitional societies make the core direction of transitional justice clear and shed light on both structural injustice and the existential crises experienced by communities and individuals. Although her study would repay fuller attention to individuals, this analysis is meaningful: it has the capacity not only to challenge rigid legalist or elite-centred discourse (McEvoy, 2008; Lundy & McGovern, 2008) but also to suggest an actual goal for their alternatives, something that has been poorly addressed in theoretical discussions to date and which would enable theorists and practitioners to gain a deeper understanding of people’s struggles. Secondly, her emphasis on societal transformation orients transitional justice as a means of political reconciliation. The relationship between these two concepts has been somewhat ambiguously examined in the conventional literature, yet Murphy clearly indicates the extent to which relational transformation is inextricably linked to reconciliation by underscoring what defenders of transitional justice ought to seek. Her work establishes the conceptual cornerstone of transitional justice and proceeds to link it with political reconciliation theory.

While Murphy’s book makes significant theoretical advances, there are two points that need further discussions. Firstly, in concentrating on defending her arguments, Murphy rarely engages with recent reflections on ‘localized’ practices of transitional justice. Whereas she brings relational changes in her discussion as a morally justified virtue, she also has to reflect other perspectives on in. So, it would be interesting to see what conclusions she would draw about localized transitional justice and the cultural variables that affect accountability, trust, equality and so on when they are based on customary law. The making of a general theory should not mean having to cut off the insights provided by diverse local voices. Secondly, the holistic approach Murphy advocates seems unlikely to be able to fully ameliorate the limitation of single trials she identifies. It is also worth asking how realistic it is to believe that a holistic approach can be achieved in deeply divided societies where competitive victimhood is pervasive.

This book will be very useful to those who are interested in post-conflict rebuilding, conflict transformation, and reconciliation. The author asks us to reconsider conventional ideas about transitional justice and to focus on the role that relational change can play in it. Although Murphy’s research needs to be fully contextualized to establish its relationship with ideas explored in other relevant literature, this book will help theorists and practitioners to comprehend the complex yet unsolved relation between “doing justice” and “social transformation” in transitional societies.

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References
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