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* The surnames are listed in alphabetical order.

INDEXING & ABSTRACTING



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The Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) provides a platform to analyse conflict transformation and security as processes for managing change in non-violent ways to produce equitable outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. A wide range of human security concerns can be tackled by both hard and soft measures, therefore the Journal's scope not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security apparatus, reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive remnants of war and cross-border management, but also the protection of human rights, justice, rule of law and governance. JCTS explores the view that by addressing conflict transformation and security holistically it is possible to achieve a high level of stability and human security, requiring interventions at both policy and practitioner level. These would include conflict management, negotiated peace agreements, peacekeeping, physical reconstruction, economic recovery, psycho-social support, rebuilding of primary services such as education and health, and enabling social cohesion. Other macro-level governance issues from constitution writing to state accountability and human resource management also need to be considered as part of this process of change.

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Editor's Note

David Curran

Editor's Note

This special edition of the *Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security* contains four articles drawn from the Istanbul Human Security Conference, and it is introduced by Professor Nergis Canefe. The four articles cover key debates in the field of human security, offering perspectives from the Middle East and East Asia.

This edition of JCTS includes another two articles which further demonstrate the breadth and depth of the contributions to the journal. The first provides an examination of negotiation commencement in civil conflicts and the second is an essay on the methodological dynamics of collaboration between academics and journalists.

After this edition, JCTS will be welcoming a new editorial team. I sincerely wish them the best in taking on JCTS and building on its reputation as a space where scholars at all levels can engage in contemporary debates in the human security field. Moreover, I would like to thank all those who have provided support over the past five years of editorship and those authors who have published in the journal's pages.

David Curran
Coventry University

Introduction

Nergis Canefe

This special issue resulted from lengthy discussions that took place during the 2017 Istanbul Human Security conference on “Human security at difficult times”. Of the many papers presented across multiple panels, four were brought together to provide a critical edge concerning the debates on dispossession, existential threats, and the refugee crisis in the Middle East within the larger context of the changing conceptualization of the human security paradigm.

The opening paper by Nergis Canefe, titled “Statelessness as a permanent state”, examines some of the key challenges that statelessness poses for traditional articulations of the human security paradigm. It provides a critical examination of the creation of “stateless peoples” to ascertain national boundaries and the transfer of wealth and possessions from targeted ethno-religious groups to others. In its conclusion, it posits that the current statelessness paradigm overlooks the long tradition in many parts of the Global South of using “cleansing” measures to create a national citizenry. Canefe also argues that the problem of statelessness is here to stay with us, and we should make the necessary adjustments to our understanding of human security accordingly.

The second paper by Pinar Uyan Semerci and Emre Erdoğan, entitled “Scapegoats to be ‘served hot’: local perceptions about Syrians in a fragile context”, sets the stage by arguing that, after decades-long global economic crises, semi-peripheral regions such as the Adana cotton plains in Turkey became the scene for increasingly tense relations among agricultural landlords, bureaucrats, industrialists, and peasants. The massive inflow of Syrians to Turkey after the Syrian Civil War is analysed in this specific context and against the backdrop of pre-existing issues linked to high youth unemployment and the perpetual need for a seasonal agricultural labour force. This paper draws conclusions about the reception of Syrian refugees based on research conducted in Adana in 2016 and it indicates that locals see Syrians as the cause of key economic problems. The authors evaluate independent variables such as demographic changes in the region, the immigrant status of the Syrians, and internal, seasonal Kurdish migration; they also consider contact between Syrian refugees and the local population as a mediating variable. Their findings indicate that contact between the local population and Syrian refugees has a positive effect

on the acceptance of Syrians' rights. When people have positive perceptions about Syrians' contributions to the labour market, this also increases support for rights to be given to them. In contradistinction, when the perception of threats from Syrians increases, support for their right to have rights decreases, and perceived threats by Syrians still matter in everyday politics.

The third paper by Enna Antea – “Mass displacement and human security in Lebanon: a risks analysis of the Syrian civil war's effects on Lebanese society” – takes this debate about the perception, adaptation, and integration of refugees one step further. The author argues that mass displacement in the Middle East has a major impact on civil society and constitutes a destabilizing factor from security, social, and economic perspectives. The massive refugee flow from Syria has repercussions in neighbouring countries, and Lebanon stands out as one of the main destinations despite the fact that it already has the world's highest proportion of refugees. In addition, Lebanon has historically been characterized by a difficult interfaith dialogue and structural political instability. In this context, mass migration from Syria to Lebanon has produced a multitude of tensions, violations, disputes, and limited conflicts that involve rival armed groups, political parties, and militants, and human security has been undermined in multiple ways on both sides. The author states that a specific Conflict Risk Reduction strategy is needed to minimize these destabilizing effects and prevent possible tensions between host community members and displaced Syrians. Unlike more traditional approaches to human security, this novel strategy is expected to consider the main destabilizing factors, identify risks, and ascertain involvement via direct, multidimensional interventions by NGOs and international organizations to enhance human security at all levels.

The fourth and last paper by Ato Muko – “Human security norms in East Asia: towards conceptual and operational innovation” – is an examination of the conceptual and operational features of human security in East Asia, and, while it removes us from the specific context of the Middle East, it is similar to the first paper on statelessness in that it employs a theoretical approach engaged with the determination of norm-complexes and norm dynamics in defining and redefining human security. The author carries out an analysis of eleven case studies conducted by local researchers and she posits that the reframed concept of human security is an international norm-complex. Furthermore, she analyses the three conceptual and operational features of the human security paradigm in East Asia: the nuances of its distribution, the wide range of perceived threats, and the role of the sovereign state as a means for securing human security. This final paper recommends further exploration of both empowerment from below and of dignity as important aspects of the human security paradigm.

Together, these four papers give us reason to reconsider the contemporary applications of the human security paradigm in the Middle East, East Asia, and elsewhere where the local dynamics are far too complex to fit into neat categories and easily formulated solutions and policy agendas. The human security paradigm arose from the ashes of the Cold War and yet we are operating in a new era marked by new forms of imperialism, colonialism, and entirely different dynamics regarding the debate about the balance of powers and the use of systemic violence. The logic behind its introduction and advocacy for the original paradigm was to counter the realist, state-centric understanding of security that championed state sanctity over the rights of the individual. Yet in a new world order, where inter-state warfare has been largely replaced by proxy wars and war on the elusive

enemy of terror, civil and ethnic wars ravage populations and thus the nature of security challenges has fundamentally changed. These new forms of conflict destroy infrastructure, worsen conditions of poverty and mass human suffering, and so give cause for increasing scepticism about the conceptual integrity of the human security paradigm. This special issue hopes to make a contribution to the ongoing debate about the uses and abuses of that paradigm by contextualizing, historicizing, and relativizing this enterprise while keeping intact its core tenet of dethroning the state as the agent and ultimate unit of security.

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Prof. Alpaslan ÖZERDEM - *Editor-in-Chief* - alpozerdem@cesran.org

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Statelessness as a Permanent State: Challenges to the Human Security Paradigm

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ABSTRACT

Statelessness is a long-overlooked and yet pervasive phenomenon that has shaped the post-independence history of states across the Global South. As a legal concept, it describes the absence of a recognized link between an individual and a legal entity authorized to grant nationality and citizenship. This paper examines the historical trajectory of the creation of “stateless peoples” to ascertain national boundaries and the transfer of wealth and possessions from targeted ethno-religious groups to others in select post-colonial/post-imperial states. It asserts that the current statelessness paradigm has ahistorical aspects and overlooks the long tradition of ethnic cleansing in many parts of the Global South. It also argues that the creation of a national citizenry which befits a dominant political and economic project of governance and post-independence sovereignty often requires the normalization of statelessness as an interim solution.

Keywords: *Statelessness, State Criminality, Forced Migration Studies, Middle Eastern States, Citizenship*

Biographical Note: *Nergis Canefe is a scholar trained in the fields of Political Philosophy, Forced Migration Studies and International Public Law whose work has a special focus on Human Rights and state-society relations. She has over twenty years of experience in carrying out in-depth, qualitative research with displaced communities and in teaching human rights and public law globally. Her areas of interest are memories of atrocities and injustice and the way they shape the notion of citizenship for marginalized groups; critical studies of human rights, genocide, and crimes against humanity; forced migration; and debates on ethics in international law pertaining to mass political violence and state criminality.*

Introduction

This paper provides insights into the existing tools, including human rights law and refugee law, that international legal regimes use to govern statelessness, and it posits that the existing legal framework does not adequately apply to the case of statelessness in post-colonial/post-imperial states across the Global South. Statelessness currently affects an estimated 10 to 12 million people globally,¹ and it occurs for a variety of reasons, the majority of which are related to forced migration;² these include structural discrimination against minority groups, state secession, and succession-producing mass displacement, as well as inadequate and conflicting domestic legislation concerning annexed territories or war zones. Suffice it to say that the current international legal framework concerning refugee protection is undermined by several shortcomings, and some of these directly affect the acknowledgement and treatment of stateless peoples.³ The two United Nations treaties specifically devoted to this enduring phenomenon, namely the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, are poorly ratified by states and hardly any endorsement mechanisms are in place.⁴ Processes for producing and then reintegrating stateless people are not routinely made use of in international case law.⁵ In this paper, I propose that other norms predominantly found in domestic public law govern state behaviour regarding statelessness. The resulting amalgam of an eclectic set of norms does not constitute a comprehensive regime.⁶ At best, one can propose a tentative frame of reference for statelessness with a view to identifying the most common practices.

All parties engaged in efforts to tackle the multifaceted challenges of statelessness need to be aware of the limitations created by available international and domestic legal frameworks, and a historical perspective on the issue is also vital. Statelessness must be examined as a detrimental condition whereby an individual is not considered a legal subject in any jurisprudence and is therefore particularly vulnerable in terms of their life, safety, and security.⁷ I would argue that, in the context of post-independence states across

¹ See Forced Migration Current Awareness, "Stateless People", <https://fm-cab.blogspot.com.tr/p/stateless-people.html> (Accessed 17 April 2018). For an earlier and much higher estimate, see UNHCR Ireland, "Q&A: The World's 15 Million Stateless People Need Help", <https://www.unhcr.org/en-ie/news/latest/2007/5/464dca3c4/qa-worlds-15-million-stateless-people-need-help.html> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

² See Black, R., "Fifty Years of Refugee Studies".

³ See Agier, M., *On the Margins of the World*.

⁴ See UN "Convention Relating to the Stateless Persons", 1954, https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/1954-Convention-relating-to-the-Status-of-Stateless-Persons_ENG.pdf (Accessed 17 April 2018), and UNHCR, "Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness", 1961, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=3ae6b39620> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

⁵ See Manly, "The Spirit of Geneva" and Massey, "UNHCR and *De Facto* Statelessness", <http://www.unhcr.org/4bc2ddeb9.html> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

⁶ For the nature of the existing legal regime on statelessness, see the following UN documents: UNHCR, "Final Report Concerning the Questionnaire on Statelessness Pursuant to the Agenda for Protection", <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/4047002e4.pdf> (Accessed 17 April 2019) and UNHCR, *Progress Report on Statelessness*. EC/60/SC/CRP.10.

⁷ See, inter alia, Batchelor, "Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status"; Batchelor, C "Transforming International Legal Principles into National Law"; Lynch, "Lives on Hold", <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LHON-69MDDZ?OpenDocument> (Accessed 17 April 2018); and Sokoloff, "Denial of Citizenship", <http://ochaonline.un.org/ochalinkclick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=1003253> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

the Global South, statelessness has become a permanent aspect of regional politics, one that casts a long shadow over both the politics of citizenship and refugee protection; this is despite the fact that nationality is neither the only legal bond between a state and an individual nor the only harbinger of rights.⁸

In this context, it is essential to revisit the edifice of human security. The concept of human security, as a paradigm that affects the discourse and practices of various academic disciplines, gained traction shortly after the publication of the United Nations' 1994 *Human Development Report*.⁹ However, numerous conflicting definitions and agendas have emerged since then, which have led to widespread scepticism about its merits and applicability.¹⁰ The 2003 Ogata-Sen Commission report *Human Security Now* proposed a redefinition of the concept and its policy agenda;¹¹ yet, in both documents, concerns with freedoms, a focus on basic needs, and concern for key aspects of human development hinge on individuals having a state and a nationality. Unfortunately, the paradigm's almost exclusive focus on individuals' lives and its insistence on basic rights for all categorically exclude individuals and people who do not have the legal right to reside within the borders of a state's territory. Its explanatory agenda is state-centric and stresses the nexus between freedom from want and indignity and freedom from fear solely in terms of state-society relations defined in a world whereby denizens, precarious labourers, asylum seekers, non-status people, and stateless people presumably do not exist. Although the paradigm shows consistency in aligning the discourses of human security, human needs, and human rights, its mobilization of attention and concern is limited by the state as a "boundary project", a fact often cited in the literature on nationalism. In the following pages, I focus on one particular category of legal subjects who possess neither effective nor ineffective nationality and make the case that, without their inclusion in the traditional human security paradigm, the concept itself is in danger of becoming hollow.

In search of a country to call home?: legal versus political realities

The United Nations High Commission on Refugees, along with other non-governmental organizations, recently started to evaluate the outcome of legislative attempts to reduce statelessness at a global level,¹² and yet these bureaucratic measures fail to take into account the fact that the production of stateless people has long provided states with a quick-fix solution to minority problems; it has also allowed for the convenient creation of new classes who have been granted land and property confiscated from recently expelled populations with no right of return.¹³ When a host of policy-driven and often state-sponsored acts have created stateless peoples and form an integral part of this picture, it is

⁸ See Sassen, "The repositioning of citizenship" and Ong, "Mutations in citizenship".

⁹ UNDP "Human Development Report 1994", http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf (Accessed 17 April 2018).

¹⁰ See Harvard Human Security Project, "Definitions of Human Security", 2002, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/list_definitions.pdf (Accessed 17 April 2018).

¹¹ See United Nations, "Ogata", <http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/annualconfs/56/ogata.pdf> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

¹² UNHCR, "Special Report: Ending Statelessness in 10 Years", <http://www.unhcr.org/stateless-people.html> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

¹³ See van Waas, L. (2008) *Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under International Law* and van Waas, L. et al., "Statelessness", *Security and Human Rights*, p.133-146.

short-sighted to an alarming degree to seek help from the very states which spearheaded the problem in the first place. These ad hoc observations will provide valuable lessons for those who are drafting legislation that seeks to reduce existing stateless populations, as well as for legal scholars studying the phenomenon. However, a detailed examination of the experience of Middle Eastern states will be more fruitful in helping interested parties to understand the strategies employed by the very states that are implicated in the upheaval of the people in question.

Statelessness is a problem with severe social, economic, and political consequences. It is particularly acute in the post-colonial and post-imperial contexts of new state creation. When this is borne in mind, it is not all that surprising that, during the last sixty years, dispossession and denationalization have been the twin policies used to deal with unwanted peoples across the Middle East. In so many respects, the non-citizen stateless person is the new “other” of populist nationalisms in the region. In popular discourse, political pronouncements, and academic research, discussion of this category of people has often been subsumed under the subjects of immigration or refugeehood.¹⁴ In other words, statelessness has been largely ignored as a unique category of non-citizenship.¹⁵ Simply looking at who is let in and what naturalization procedures should be extended to them does not absolve our responsibility to examine who has been on the inside but then forced out and who suffers from continued exclusion.

Current studies on statelessness concentrate on the need for legislation to exist in receiving states and on the need to relax and tailor documentation requirements for speedy naturalization. Steps such as these can lead to reduced fees and removal of administrative burdens to naturalization, reduced residency requirements, or moves to unconditionally naturalize those born within a state’s borders, and they can also lead to the waiving of language and knowledge requirements. However, little has been said about the total removal of the right of return or the gains made by the state from which the stateless peoples emerged in the first place. By and large, stateless populations exist at the fringes of society as legal ghosts for decades, and they remain among the world’s most vulnerable people. They lack effective nationality, and thus cannot avail themselves of the legal protections of any state. Neither are they covered by conventions that seek to support refugees, even in cases where states are signatories to those conventions, have provided adequate ratification of relevant conventions, or have accepted the involvement of the UNHCR. Stateless people often suffer severe economic, political, and social hardships and are at heightened risk for trafficking. Their plight is made more precarious as the human rights NGOs and INGOs can document very little information about their numbers and location or the circumstances facing them, especially if they reside in hiding in countries neighbouring their point of origin. As a result, they have thus far received substantially less attention than refugees and internally displaced persons.¹⁶

While the world at large remains largely silent concerning the creation and perpetuation of statelessness, individual states have enacted tailor-made legislation to address at least

¹⁴ See, inter alia, S. Benhabib, *The Rights of Others*; L. Bosniak, *The Citizens and the Alien*; and Belton, “The Neglected Non-citizen”.

¹⁵ See E. Haddad, *The Refugee in International Society*.

¹⁶ See Weissbrodt, et al., “The Human Rights of Stateless Persons”.

some of the complex issues presented by these populations and the devastating consequences that arise from their protracted predicament. In other words, responsibility for confronting statelessness and its consequences is not a matter that falls under the purview of international law alone. Indeed, studies of forced migration have been advancing arguments concerning existing international instruments with an eye, not just to reducing global numbers of stateless peoples, but also to addressing their own immediate and mid-term needs. The UNHCR, on the other hand, has been steadily engaged in critical legislative and policy debates evaluating the effectiveness of past and current attempts to reduce statelessness. For the last decade, they have been recommending frameworks that address specific legislative provisions, administrative protections, and awareness-raising activities that will hopefully be critical to the success of legislation that leads to the eradication of statelessness.¹⁷ And yet, scholarship seems to remain ten paces behind the very states that actually produce stateless populations.

We always respond *ex post facto*, trying to understand what has taken place to produce masses of stateless people. This is partly due to the fact that there are at least three important limitations that affect frameworks for addressing statelessness. Firstly, they pertain almost exclusively to legislation designed to reduce statelessness through mass naturalization and nationalization programmes; as such, they fail to address the protection or prevention of future cases of statelessness. Secondly, the overall legal/policy framework is essentially incomplete. Reliable data and reports on the outcomes of legislation designed to reduce statelessness do not and cannot take into account populations on the move or in hiding. Thirdly and lastly, our current efforts are often imprisoned within the state-centric approach to forced migration and displacement-induced human suffering, and so avoid using a regional or indeed global lens. This paper hopes to begin a new kind of conversation and to encourage scholarly debate that situates statelessness, not as a symptom to be remedied, but as a structural problem of statehood in the post-1945 world order. Statelessness is not a matter caused by a variety of defects in national and international law, rather it is a result of the wilful actions of states and societies that deliberately produce dispossessed masses. It is not something that happens as a *deus ex machina*. It is true that conflicts of citizenship law, inadequate administrative infrastructures, state succession, forced and induced migration, laws that adversely affect women and children, and systemic discrimination are a part of the problem, but they are rarely if ever the cause. Legislation to reduce statelessness as well as scholarship on statelessness will need to address these defects, with a clear understanding that, on its own, no legislation would suffice to “cure” this problem.

Definitional conundrums: de jure versus de facto statelessness and beyond

In the legal literature pertaining to the subject there are two types of statelessness: *de jure* and *de facto*. Historically, states have had the absolute right to define who is a citizen of

¹⁷ See UNHCR (2009b), “States Parties to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons”, <http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb0abc7.html> (Accessed 17 April 2018); UNHCR (2009c). “States Parties to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness”, <http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb24d54.html> (Accessed 17 April 2018); UNHCR, *Who is Stateless and Where?*, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c15e.html> (Accessed 17 April 2018); and UNHCR and the Interparliamentary Union, “Nationality and Statelessness”, <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/436774c62.pdf> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

their state, and those who supposedly fall through the cracks in the maze of citizenship laws are labeled de jure stateless. According to Article 1 of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954 Convention), a person is de jure stateless if that person is “not considered as a national by any [s]tate under the operation of its law”. As such, a person is declared stateless if he or she is not recognized as a citizen of any state. The question that is not addressed here is by whom this declaration is made. De facto statelessness, on the other hand, is posited in contrast to de jure statelessness and eludes a precise definition. As such, international law has not clarified the issue. Even the expansive scope of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness makes reference to “persons who are stateless de facto” only to note that they should be treated as stateless de jure to the extent possible. The Convention does not define the term de facto. Beyond this, reference to de facto stateless persons is absent from international legal instruments. This comes as no surprise due to the nature of the beast: in almost all cases excluding warfare, stateless peoples are created by states themselves.

If this is the case, how do we deal with de facto statelessness? The term has traditionally been couched in terms of ineffective nationality.¹⁸ These individuals are categorized as citizens of a state, or possess a legally meritorious claim to citizenship, but they are unable or, for valid reasons, unwilling to avail themselves of the protections of that very state. Valid reasons for not availing oneself of one’s citizenship can include ongoing civil disorder, fear of persecution, and inability to return to the homeland in cases of exodus and exile. As such, de facto stateless persons include those who have a nationality but do not or cannot enjoy the rights of their nationality; those who are unable to document their nationality; and those who, as a result of state succession or division, habitually reside in a state other than their original state of citizenship. In other words, while a de jure stateless person lacks legal nationality, a de facto stateless person lacks meaningful or practical nationality.¹⁹ In the meantime, both groups face similar social, economic, and political consequences as a result of their status as stateless people. As a final note, it is true that statelessness can result from oversight as well as deliberate state action. In order to craft a solution that corrects its effects, it is thus deemed critical to understand how it occurred in the first place; however, this instrumentalist approach is still blinded towards the use of stateless populations and the politics of dispossession either as a nation-building strategy or as a forced mechanism for the redistribution of land and resources.

The intricate logic involved in creating a stateless person

The international patchwork of mismatched nationality laws creates ample opportunities for creating a stateless person. A person could be rendered stateless when the national legislation of two countries differs such that the individual is left without a legal claim to citizenship in either country. If a person is born in State A, which only recognizes citizenship by descent (*jus sanguinis*), but has parents who are citizens of State B, which only recognizes citizenship by place of birth (*jus soli*), the child will have no claim to

¹⁸ On the difference between effective and ineffective nationality and how these principles play a role in the context of forced migration, see Kneebone, “The Rights of Strangers”. For an inclusive reading of nationality that challenges the legal renditions of the term, see Bosniak, “Citizenship Denationalized”, 447.

¹⁹ On the issue of legal nationality and human rights violations connection, see Jack Donnelly, *International Human Rights*.

citizenship in State A because his or her parents are nationals of State B.²⁰ The child will also not have claim to citizenship in State B because she was born in State A. The risk of conflicting laws resulting in statelessness is magnified by the fact that nationality laws are often very rigid and hard to change.²¹

More subtle conflicts between nationality laws also result in forms of statelessness. Often, in the aftermath of forced migration, the hosting state's nationality law requires a citizen to renounce his or her citizenship before acquiring, or being guaranteed the acquisition of, a new nationality. In many instances, nationality laws purposefully fail to take into account the possibility of return or dual citizenship during the nationalization process. An interesting example is Vietnam where many women were rendered stateless after they married foreigners and were required to renounce their Vietnamese citizenship prior to obtaining citizenship in their spouse's country.²² Many of these marriages dissolved before the women in question were able to secure citizenship in their spouse's country, and this impasse created thousands of stateless brides in the aftermath of America's war with Vietnam. Once rendered stateless, people remain so, often because they cannot navigate, access, or afford the burdensome administrative processes for (re)obtaining citizenship. Excessive fees, narrow deadlines, and demanding documentation requirements create real obstacles to the ending of the dubious status of being stateless. Similarly, poorly functioning or purposefully dysfunctional birth registration systems leave many without any evidence of their place of birth or parentage. For those who lack meaningful access to birth registration systems, it is impossible to provide the documents needed to prove citizenship or to acquire a new one. Children are thus rendered stateless through failed systems of registration, even though they may have been born in the "right" state or to the "right" parents. A child who is not registered lacks the official and visible evidence that a state legally recognizes his or her existence as a member of society. Suffice to say that these obstacles to registration tend to result from the marginalization of specific populations in the national polity.

Then, there is the class of stateless peoples whose citizenship has been revoked by their home state.²³ At times when crises develop in relation to minority rights, or when there is traffic back and forth across a border, states resort to revoking citizenship if an individual resides abroad for a certain period of time. The amount of time involved varies from a few months to many years, and revocation can affect both natural-born and naturalized citizens. Historically speaking, home countries intent on resolving a minority problem through revocation of citizenship do not notify individuals that they risk losing their citizenship when moving abroad.²⁴ In addition to laws that revoke citizenship based on time spent away from the state, citizenship can be automatically revoked when an

²⁰ For a critical debate on children rendered stateless, see Bhabha, "From Citizen to Migrant".

²¹ See Blitz et al., "Statelessness and the Deprivation of Nationality" and Kelly Staples, *Retheorising Statelessness*.

²² See Druss, "Foreign Marriages in the Military; Kim, "Asian Wives of U.S. Servicemen" and Saenz et al., "In Search of Asian War Brides".

²³ The Rohingya Muslims in Burma/Myanmar provide a classic example of this type of statelessness. See Ullah, "Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh" and Canefe, "Rohingya Refugee Crisis and Ethno-Religious Conflict in South Asia".

²⁴ The revocation of Macedonian ethnicity for Greek citizens is a case in point. See Hill, "Macedonians in Greece and Albania".

individual behaves in a way that is deemed inconsistent with their loyalty to the state, if, for example, they pledge a formal oath of allegiance to a foreign state, voluntarily serve in the armed forces of a foreign state, or, under certain circumstances, carry out acts that are equated with treason.

In Burma, for example, the Burmese military junta rendered as many as two million former Burmese citizens stateless after they fled Burma for Thailand.²⁵ Burma's citizenship law provides that any citizen leaving the country permanently ceases to be a citizen, and reports indicate that the Burmese government deemed individuals who left without government approval to have left the country permanently, stripping them of their citizenship. These revocations are permanent as Article 22 of Burma's Citizenship Law prevents former citizens from reapplying for citizenship. Globally speaking, this is a common strategy used by states with authoritarian tendencies to rid themselves of opposition.

Historically, another major factor leading to the creation of masses of stateless people is the dissolution of existing states and the transfer of territory from one state to another. When a state dissolves, when a colony becomes independent, or when a successor state wholly or partially succeeds a predecessor state, there may be groups of individuals or communities who are affirmatively rejected in the formation process of the successor state. There may also be a mass exodus of peoples who no longer belong to the dissolved state, a phenomenon which creates *de facto* statelessness. Similarly, when a state arbitrarily or discriminatorily denies or revokes an individual's citizenship having categorized them on the basis of ethnicity, race, language, or religion, the result is that whole groups are rendered stateless without recourse. Furthermore, this form of elimination from citizenship is not limited to explicit provisions of national legislation. It could and often does occur at the administrative level when the documents required as proof of citizenship become inaccessible to stateless persons, or when there is no meaningful avenue for appeal of the revocation. In tandem, national legislation may explicitly foreclose the possibility of becoming a citizen if the individual belongs to a certain ethnic-religious group. In other words, statelessness may occur when seemingly neutral laws are applied in a discriminatory manner or when a state unjustifiably places onerous administrative obligations on some, but not all, individuals.

Finally in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, many states have withdrawn the citizenship of large groups of minorities in a single act during or after the declaration of their independence.²⁶ This is a particularly devastating variation on the discriminatory revocation of citizenship that historically occurs during times of political restructuring and periods characterized by influential and exclusive nationalist ideologies, regime change, or internal warfare. In contexts like this, individuals, communities, or at times entire populations are at risk of becoming stateless when they voluntarily migrate, are expelled

²⁵ See Refugees International Special Report, "Stolen Futures", <https://reliefweb.int/report/thailand/stolen-futures-stateless-children-burmese-asylum-seekers> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

²⁶ See the Minorities at Risk Special Report, *Middle East Overview*, <http://minorityrights.org/minorities/overview-of-middle-east/> (Accessed 17 April 2018), and the Wilson Center Special Report "The Future of Religious Minorities in the Middle East", <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-future-religious-minorities-the-middle-east> (Accessed 17 April 2018).

from their home states, or flee from one state to another. Legal, social, and linguistic barriers keep many migrants from accessing resources that are critical to preventing their children from becoming stateless, particularly when they are unable to access birth registration systems or when parents are on the move. The children of forced migrants are often unable to prove details of parentage and place of birth, particularly in irregular migrant populations that lack access to the formal legal mechanisms which are required to become eligible for citizenship. Overall, across the region, three categories of migrants suffer statelessness more than others. Migrants (forced or voluntary) who lose their citizenship as a result of their migration to a new state without first attaining citizenship are at a heightened risk of becoming stateless. Second, children of migrants who reside in countries that link citizenship solely to parentage are particularly at risk. Third, ethno-religious minorities with brethren in a neighbouring state are directly at risk of becoming stateless should they leave their habitual country of residence.

Statelessness and bare life

The consequences of statelessness are not just severe: they pervade every aspect of a person's life and livelihood.²⁷ Stateless individuals often cannot own real property or land, face detention because of their stateless status, and are unable to access basic social services such as education and healthcare unless special provisions are made by the hosting state and, even then, gain access only for limited periods of time. However, we must also keep in mind that the protection of stateless individuals is often dealt with on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis. This approach no doubt significantly threatens stateless individuals' civil and political rights or any form of legal protection they may ask for. For instance, in most countries, secondary education is not accessible without proof of citizenship and in some this proviso also includes primary education.²⁸ Even when education is provided, the surrounding economic and social pressures tend to prevent stateless children from attending school. Similarly, households populated by stateless individuals are often unable to access, or unable to afford, basic healthcare services. In many states, even the right to marry is linked to citizenship, nationality papers, or proof of a legal permit to remain in the country. Stateless people are also precluded from seeking traditional employment or owning property. If they are at all successful in accessing employment, they often encounter dangerous working conditions, sub-standard jobs and precarious pay, in addition to verbal or physical abuse, workplace violence, racism, and other forms of institutionalized discrimination, intimidating workplace environments, and unpaid salaries or benefits. Additionally, stateless individuals typically lack access to formal credit markets and are unable to open bank accounts. The cumulative effect of these hardships produces chronic economic insecurity, which then lends itself to conditions ripe for the exploitation of stateless migrants and refugees.

Finally, these structural vulnerabilities put stateless people at a particular risk for

²⁷ The concept of "bare life" has been in circulation since the late 1990s, largely with reference to Giorgio Agamben's work and his formulation of the inhumanity of contemporary border regimes and citizenship practices. See G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer*. See also Edkins et al., "Through the Wire" and Doty, "Bare Life".

²⁸ As a recent example, see the discussion on the status of Syrian "stateless" refugee children and their lack of access to education in Turkey by Aydin et al. "The Educational Needs of and Barriers Faced by Syrian Refugee Students in Turkey"; McCarthy, "Politics of Refugee Education" and Uyan-Semerici et al., "Who Cannot Access Education?".

trafficking. This connection has been especially well-documented in the context of the Mediterranean Sea.²⁹ Since stateless individuals lack a voice in society and cannot enter into a political dialogue either with society at large or with the state within which they reside – and since they cannot assert basic civil and political rights, stand for election, or vote – they are rendered as the new outsiders of citizenship regimes. When considered as a threat, stateless people face unwarranted administrative detention and arrest by authorities, and national laws are generally ill-equipped to deal with their needs pertaining to legal representation or protection.³⁰ In this context, it is only apt that Hannah Arendt's concept of statelessness, which was developed after the Second World War, is making a comeback in the context of discussions about refugees, asylum-seekers, *sans-papiers*, and, specifically, new generations of stateless peoples.³¹ Their current predicament entails the three losses of home (exile), state protection (basic rights), and a place in the world (political rights). Even in the age of transnationalism and globalized mobilities, the application of key principles of human rights as they relate to stateless people, especially the tenets of dignity and non-discrimination and the right to family life, are null and void.

Conclusion

International law, most notably Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), establishes an individual's right to a nationality as an absolute right.³² Article 15 provides that "[e]veryone has the right to a nationality" and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality".³³ Citizenship and the right to be free from the arbitrary deprivation of citizenship are enshrined as human rights in and of themselves and are considered to be the bedrock of the legal relationship between individuals and states. However, both the scope and content of Article 15 of the UDHR is determined by state's own practices. The proliferation of human rights norms in international and regional instruments has developed substantive limitations on state sovereignty over citizenship regulation; nevertheless, gaps persist in the international legal framework on nationality and are coupled with the intentional stripping of nationality and the deprivation of citizenship by the very states purportedly responsible for individuals' wellbeing. There is also a lack of consensus on statelessness that arises from ineffective citizenship at times of civil war or state collapse,³⁴ an issue that directly affects people from Iraq and Syria.

²⁹ For an overview of the connection between human trafficking and forced migration, see Russell, "Human Trafficking".

³⁰ The literature on administrative detention has been growing exponentially during the last two decades. Both in the West and the Global South, this is now the most commonly employed practice for the containment and removal of stateless populations. See Batchelor, "Stateless Persons"; Batchelor, "Transforming International Legal Principles into National Law"; and Blitz et al., *Statelessness and the Benefits of Citizenship*, http://www.udhr60.ch/report/statelessness_paper0609.pdf (Accessed 17 April 2018).

³¹ For Arendt's conception of statelessness, see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and Bernstein, "Hannah Arendt on the Stateless".

³² For the full text of Article 15, see "Claiming Human Rights", http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/udhr_article_15.html (Accessed 17 April 2018).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ See Adjami, M. et al., "The Scope and Content of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights", and Edwards, A. et al., *Human Security and Non-Citizens*.

Furthermore, despite this normative stance, the international agreements produced subsequent to the UDHR have aimed either to protect existing stateless populations and prevent future cases of statelessness or to reduce current forms of statelessness. Largely prescriptive, they have failed to provide adequate guidance or direction concerning the criminal nature of the acts committed by states in producing scores of stateless people. This is the point at which I would like to return to the human security paradigm and underline the challenges posed by statelessness to some of its main tenets.³⁵ The most salient and starkly urgent case today is that of Syria. As the civil war progresses, more than half of the country's civilian population have not only become refugees and asylum-seekers, but have been rendered *de facto* stateless.³⁶ What would the existing human security debate offer us in terms of a comprehensive review of situations like the Syrian crisis, or the exodus of the Rohingya Muslims, or the mass crimes that affected thousands in Columbia rendering them practically stateless? Such horrifying examples are so numerous, and the processes that create stateless peoples are such a regular feature of the contemporary state system, that the utility of the paradigm in its current form for either research or policy-making purposes is becoming increasingly suspect in crisis situations, which are an essential part of "normality" in the new world order.

Proponents of the human security paradigm habitually situate as its anchor the very states that create, perpetuate, or condone the chronic conditions of violence, abuse, and insecurity the concept ostensibly exists to resolve. Perhaps one possible way out of this bind is to dislocate the conventional understanding that human security can produce "freedom from fear and want". If statelessness is examined as both a permanent state in world politics and as a marker that invites us to consider the false safety net provided by states to their citizens, it could indeed allow us to engage with a genuine practice of rethinking human security, one that would open up its scope both in ontological and epistemological terms.

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³⁵ See Acharya, "Human Security".

³⁶ See Crompton, "Could there be No One Left in Syria by 2031?".

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Scapegoats to Be “Served Hot”: Local Perceptions About Syrians in a Fragile Context

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ABSTRACT

Decades of globalization and related global economic crises have had repercussions throughout the semi-peripheries of the developing world. Adana in Turkey's Çukurova region was among the leading industrial cities after the first wave of globalization and tensions existed between agricultural landlords, bureaucrats, early industrialists, and peasants. The massive inflow of Syrians to Turkey after the Syrian Civil War produced social problems, such as xenophobia and exclusion that compounded pre-existing issues linked to high youth unemployment and a seasonal agricultural labour force. This paper draws on research conducted in Adana in 2016 to show that locals see Syrians as the cause of key economic problems. A review of anti-immigrant literature reveals the factors that lead to negative and positive perceptions of Syrians among the populace, and a range of attitudes towards Syrian immigrants are identified, namely threat perceptions, positive perceptions, and varied views on their rights. The research evaluates independent demographic variables, immigrant status, and links to internal Kurdish migration and considers contact as a mediating variable.

Keywords: Anti-Immigrant Attitude; Perception; Threat; Contact; Rights; Turkey; Syrians

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Introduction

Scapegoating, or putting the blame on "others", is a common reactionary mechanism in tense situations. The problems we face are attributed to "others", those who are not "like us". This mechanism is particularly often used to justify anti-immigrant attitudes, especially when an economic or security crisis occurs in a country. Anti-immigrant attitudes have been most frequently studied in the "developed" Western world,¹ in so-called receiving countries which provide opportunities for immigrants and where negative attitudes can prevail among the pre-existing population. However, developments over the past few decades have challenged this simple view of migration. Migration is presently viewed in diverse ways and most countries in the world both send and receive migrants.² Many migrants do not end up in the Global West or North, and "East to East" and "South to South" migration is possible.³ It is therefore important to study perceptions of foreigners within various different countries in order to understand commonalities and differences. In this article, we will elaborate on the case of Turkey which currently hosts the largest number of refugees worldwide. We focus on how locals in the province of Adana perceive Syrians and the factors that lead to positive and negative perceptions about them.

In summarizing the existing literature, we first need to note the factors that shape individuals' attitudes towards migrants. The ways in which migrants are perceived at the individual level seems to be affected by personal demographic features such as age, gender, socio-economic conditions, employment status, class, and housing conditions⁴ Perceptions at the individual level are related to trust and to collective or personal ideas about whether or not migrants represent a threat; they are also influenced by structural or contextual variables in a country, which can include economic conditions, trade structures, and institutional characteristics, such as relatively high rates of resident migrants, immigrants, and asylum seekers; high levels of unemployment; and relatively low levels of GDP allocated to social welfare.⁵

In order to explain anti-immigrant attitudes, most studies base their arguments on the kinds of "threat" that individuals ascribe to migrants. Many studies argue –mainly on the basis of one or two variables that are not always explicit– that individual conditions, perceptions, the group dimension, and contextual factors create different degrees of threat perception, which lead to varying levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. Theoretical explanations that do not explicitly name the perceived threats that lead to anti-immigrant attitudes often still implicitly assume that anti-immigrant attitudes are actually an outcome of feeling threatened. In fact, all individual and contextual factors that increase the level of anti-immigrant attitudes create a feeling of threat to the physical, economic, and symbolic status of the pre-existing population.

¹ Freeman et al., "Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies".

² Castles and Miller, *The Age of Migration*.

³ Kleemans and Klugman, "Understanding Attitudes toward Migrants".

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Coenders et al., "Majority Populations' Attitudes Toward Migrants and Minorities"; Kleemans and Klugman, "Understanding Attitudes toward Migrants".

Integrated threat theory, which is one of the most well-known socio-psychological explanations for how anti-immigrant attitudes form, suggests that these attitudes arise when a population perceives a combination of realistic economic threats and symbolic threats, which are based on perceived differences such as values, religion, and culture.⁶ Since 9/11, however, various arguments based on security and safety have also come to the fore to explain anti-immigrant feeling.⁷ A rhetoric of existential threat – read as physical threat – is used to remove migrants from the context of “normal politics” and force them into the “security” realm. The increasing number of terrorist acts that have threatened everyday life in various cosmopolitan cities, such as Paris, Istanbul, London, and Brussels, has seen this rhetoric repeatedly employed in the media.

However, one of the most frequently stated explanations for anti-immigrant attitudes is economic competition. According to this view, increasing international labour flows create insecurity and feelings of threat, which are operationalized at both the individual level, through people’s employment status and access to high- or low-skilled labour, as well as at the contextual level where it figures, for example, in public rhetoric and statistics around employment.⁸ While rational choice theory explains anti-immigrant attitudes on the basis of realistic/economic threats, group threat theory argues that, in the struggle for scarce resources, members of the majority group will show negative attitudes toward “outgroups”.⁹ Contact has also been identified as a factor that determines anti-immigrant attitudes; however, contact can work in countervailing ways: it can be positive if backed by true acquaintance and negative if acquaintance is casual.¹⁰ People are less threatened by true acquaintances, but feel more threatened and are made less secure by frequent casual contact.¹¹

This study focuses on research conducted in Adana, Turkey, to show how perceptions of Syrians are shaped in a specific context. In particular, it identifies factors that determine negative and positive perceptions about this group, and it also explores views on the approval or denial of migrant rights. Turkey hosts more than three million people, the largest number of refugees hosted by any country worldwide.¹² Work to shape people’s perceptions on the issue is crucial and the existing literature on anti-immigrant attitudes provides a good starting point.

⁶ Stephan et al., “Prejudice toward Immigrants: An Integrated Threat Theory”; Curşeu et al., “Prejudice Toward Immigrant Workers among Dutch Employees”.

⁷ Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*; Karyotis and Patrikios “Religion Securitization and Anti-Immigration Attitudes”; Chiru. and Gherghina, *Physical Insecurity and Anti-immigration Views*.

⁸ Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, “Terms of Exclusion”; Semyonov et al., “The Rise of Anti-Foreigner Sentiment”; Scheve and Slaughter, “Labor Market Competition”.

⁹ Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position”.

¹⁰ McLaren, “Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe”; Fetzer, *Public Attitudes toward Immigration*; Weber, “National and Regional Proportion of Immigrants”.

¹¹ Schneider, “Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe”; Green, “Facing Cultural Diversity”; Weber, “National and Regional Proportion of Immigrants”.

¹² Syrians in Turkey are not officially accepted as “refugees”; instead they have “temporary protection status”. See Uyan Semerci and Erdoğan, “Guest to Neighbors”.

The case of Adana

Adana, located on the south coast of Turkey, is Turkey's sixth largest city with a population of 2,165,595.¹³ According to the government's calculations, Adana is ranked 16th for socioeconomic development, which places it in the second tier of development.¹⁴ Adana has been one of the country's major industrial areas since the middle of the 19th century, when cotton production began in response to a decline in cotton imports from America during its long civil war. During the earlier period of the Turkish Republic, Adana attracted a significant amount of infrastructural investment, for projects that, for example, built large dams and irrigation systems that contributed to the productivity of the agricultural sector. Moreover, the region's geographical advantages attracted a significant amount of foreign and domestic investment in industries that were based on agricultural products such as cotton. For a couple of decades, Adana was synonymous with the rising Anatolian bourgeoisie and it was the fourth most industrial province in Turkey.¹⁵

However, this picture changed over time. The average share of manufacturing employment in the TR62 Region (where Adana and Mersin are located) was measured at 6.2 per cent between 1983 and 1985 and declined to 4.2 per cent between 1998 and 2000. By 2009, this number was 2.45 per cent, and according to the last figures this trend of deindustrialization continues. Today, the service sector accounts for more than half of all employment (53 per cent), whereas agriculture and industry are responsible for about 23 per cent each. The industrial labour force is mainly employed in textiles (17 per cent) and food production (16 per cent). However, when industrial enterprises are classified by sector, it emerges that while one fifth are involved in food production, nine per cent in plastics, and eight per cent in metal production, just seven per cent are involved in the textile industry. These figures show that textile production involves relatively low levels of labour compared to food production. Moreover, we know that 86 per cent of enterprises in Adana are micro-enterprises or small businesses employing fewer than 10 people, and these figures illustrate that the majority of employment is contained in household enterprises, which deliver 30 per cent of Adana's current employment. A further 40 per cent of employees are working in the 765 enterprises – two per cent of the overall total of businesses – that employ more than 49 employees.¹⁶ We can conclude that Adana has the characteristics of a dual economy. The majority of enterprises are small, owned by households, and work to satisfy domestic demands, while a small percentage of enterprises are relatively big and integrated with the national and global economies.¹⁷

The deindustrialization of the region, and the emergence of a dual economy, has been reflected in increased rates of unemployment. According to the most recent available statistics, the unemployment rate in the region is 10.7 per cent, slightly higher than the

¹³ TURKSTAT, Household Labor Survey.

¹⁴ Ministry of Development, "Socio-Economic Development Ranking Survey".

¹⁵ Çukurova Young Businessman Association, "Global Trends in the Manufacturing Sector and Adana".

¹⁶ Social Security Institution, "Statistical Yearbook".

¹⁷ Çukurova Young Businessman Association, "Global Trends in the Manufacturing Sector and Adana".

national average of 9.9 per cent, although there are significant differences across age and gender categories.

The unemployment rate among women is relatively high in each age bracket and it reaches 29.1 per cent between the ages of 20 and 24; almost one fifth of women between the ages of 25 and 34 are unemployed. This gender gap is also visible in terms of labour force participation.¹⁸ As these figures represent a significant unemployment problem across the RR62 region, we can assume that the situation is no better in Adana province. The official statistics do not provide provincial figures for the last five years, but previous figures show that unemployment has always been higher in Adana than in Mersin and it reached 26 per cent in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2009.¹⁹

Adana has been an attractive destination for immigrants since the mid-19th century, and rapid industrialization in the 1950s attracted people to its workforce from neighbouring provinces. During the 1990s, the city hosted a significant number of Internally Displaced Persons from the southeastern region, and during the 2000s people living in rural areas came to the city as a result of declining living conditions. Over the last decade, Adana has become a province with net emigration, and those leaving the province are relatively more qualified than its immigrants, in terms of education and other factors. This situation seems to be linked with the deindustrialization of the province and its declining attractiveness for potential white-collar workers.²⁰

As well as experiencing this demographic shift, Adana also hosts a significant number of seasonal workers who are employed in agricultural production. Although the official figures estimate this number as lower than 8000, it is significantly higher according to local observers, and this workforce is far from being "temporary" since the majority of these workers spend almost three quarters of the year in the Çukurova region.²¹ Although these workers are not directly included in Adana's labour market, their presence in the agricultural sector contributes to the intensification of job competition for locals.

In addition to deindustrialization, decreasing job opportunities, and the declining attractiveness of the province, the presence of Syrians in Adana makes the situation very complex. According to official statistics, Adana hosts 168,187 Syrians who are designated as having temporary protection status. This group makes up 7.6 per cent of the total population and, comparatively, Adana has the sixth largest Syrian population of any province in Turkey.²² However, the local government claims the population is significantly higher, at 200,000, and this difference may be a result of the existence of unregistered

¹⁸ Here, we are using the official definition of unemployment, which excludes individuals who are not looking for jobs. Labour force participation rates are significantly different between men and women (45/19 per cent between ages 15-19; 76/39 per cent between ages 20-24; and 89/42 per cent between ages 25-34).

¹⁹ Çukurova Development Agency, "A Research on Potential Investment Areas for Adana", 52.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 27.

²¹ Uyan Semerci and Erdoğan, Ben Kendim Büyüdüm Demiyorum!

²² Ministry of Interior, Directorate of Migration "Migration Statistics"/

Syrians in the province.²³ As a result of their financial problems, Syrians have to live in the province's most vulnerable neighbourhoods, in undesirable housing conditions, with what are, in relative terms, very high rental payments.

A limited number of surveys show that only a small portion of Syrians can find a decent, regular job. Unemployment rates among Syrians are very high and they tend to work in jobs for which they are not trained, such as portage, construction, and textile work. They are also employed in the agricultural sector, where they are regarded as offering an alternative to seasonal workers. Syrian women are generally excluded from the job market and deal with housework. According to experts, child labour is a common practice among Syrian families. As in other provinces, the wages of Syrians are significantly lower, at 43 TL a day, than the official minimum wage, which is double that sum, and they endure the worst working conditions. They lack job security and are not covered by the social security system. Although economic integration is stated as a necessity, the increased visibility of Arabic signboards and the growing presence of Syrians in the current labour market also leads to tension between refugees and local people.²⁴ The Syrian workforce, living with the constant fear of unemployment, is a "new precariat" and its members experience low wages, the seizure of their salaries, labour exploitation, and poor workplace conditions.²⁵ The findings of our research must be understood in this context because Adana, with its agricultural sector and current high unemployment rate, is among the cities in which the formation of this "new precariat" is evident.²⁶

Methodology

Our findings are part of a larger study that analyses Turkey's labour market, and research was conducted in Adana in February 2017. The study has employed qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. In the qualitative stage, 10 focus groups were conducted in Adana with employed women and men, unemployed women and men seeking job opportunities, and employers. Each group was composed of eight to 10 participants. All participants were recruited through the use of a database set up according to strictly defined criteria. The moderation guide prepared by our team focused on understanding how Adana's residents perceive the labour market, their previous employment/unemployment experiences, and Syrians. Focus group discussions, which were recorded with the permission of participants, were fully transcribed and analysed through the use of NVivo software.

In the quantitative stage, a face-to-face survey was conducted in 75 neighbourhoods of Adana (seven were self-representing units and 68 neighbourhoods were selected randomly according to the method of probability proportional to size). In each neighbourhood, eight interviews were conducted in four streets, selected from a Kish table, and in each street two houses were randomly selected according to a systematic

²³ Milliyet, "Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Yüzde 57'si Yoksulluk, Yüzde 31'i Açlık Sınırının Altında".

²⁴ Çetin, "Labor Force Participation of Syrian Refugees and Integration".

²⁵ Adar, "Türkiye'de Yeni Prekarya Suriyeli İşgücü mü?".

²⁶ Dedeoğlu, "Tarımsal Üretimde Göçmen İşçiler".

walk principle. Participants were selected by using the nearest birthday method. The total number of participants was 1,013.

The questionnaire was prepared by our team and included demographic questions, as well as questions about the employment status of the respondent, work search channels, and perceptions about the labour market in Adana. We also asked questions about each participant's level of contact with Syrians living in Adana, their perceptions of them, and other related issues. Interviews were controlled by field supervisors and phone calls. Data was analysed using STATA 15 software.

Scapegoating narratives

Although our focus group discussions were oriented towards collecting information about participants' relationships with the labour market, discussions about Syrians dominated the agenda in all groups. In all focus groups, participants mentioned Syrians before the issue was raised by the moderator, and almost all participants told us a story that scapegoated Syrians.

Before we report their negative perceptions, which were mainly framed in terms of various forms of threat, we note that two positive statements were made. One participant noted that some Syrians can be hard workers: "Not majority of them, but there are some. For example, that man, like a fire, works in the exterior masonry, composite, both welding and composite, when he works as if there were three workers". Another showed compassion for the experiences Syrians had had before they arrived in Adana: "However, there is another thing, ok you were born in Syria, you're a Syrian kid. You see nothing but war. How would you grow up? I think they are not to blame for the existence of those big powers being there". These two statements represented the only examples of positive perceptions. The rest of the responses can be classified as reflecting negative perceptions related to job scarcity and unfair competition, crime rate increases, and perceived lower moral standards.

Job scarcity and unfair competition

Almost all participants agreed on the lack of job opportunities in the town and stated that Syrians were to blame for job scarcity and unfair competition because their presence had lowered wages. This view is in line with the economic threat argument expressed in existing research literature. One participant talked in terms of expulsion: "I do not want to enter politics, but I believe that the Syrians should be returned to their country when problems are solved. So I do not approve that they will be working here so much. When there are so many unemployed men here, even Syrian women are working". Another talked in terms of poorer employment prospects for locals:

They cannot find a job right now, Syrian workers work very cheap. I'm not talking about business establishments, I'm talking about employees as workers. As he says now, his friend is going to get 100 liras per day and he is willing to get 30 liras per day. The employer prefers him and he does not do his insurance either. In this regard, laborers working at a minimum wage level, fewer lower classes became unemployed in Adana. It was very influential to it.

Responsibility for this situation was also attributed to the government. One participant argued that "here the government's policy made everything completely complicated. On

top of that, the Syrians became salt, pepper. Or Adana is really rich under normal conditions". Syrians are perceived to be particularly responsible for declining wages because they accept work with a very low wage rate, especially in the agricultural sector or in construction, for example. One participant painted a scene in which Syrian households absorb wages available to Adana's workers:

Something like this is normally 60 liras of orange harvest, 70 liras for the Turks. But when Syrian can work for 30 liras, 35 liras [...] what people do not understand is that the Syrians come with 10 people, 10 people come from a house, so this 30 lira becomes 300 liras actualized. They even bring their tiny kids, that's the worst.

Another noted that this kind of process "has significant bad effects. The man who works in the building has lost his wages. There are Syrians working for 20 liras. They work without insurance. Due to these reasons, men (Turkish) are not preferred in construction work".

Although participants accepted that, from the employer's perspective, hiring a Syrian is an advantage because of the "cheap labour", they insisted it was better to favour locals, since the local man "is one of us":

"From the point of view of working, some of our friends recruiting them, I say to them, when we have our own people, do not give the job from the outsiders. That man will die from hunger? But the other one, the man is one of us".

"It is not good to distinguish between Kurds and Turks, but the rights holders must not let them to work. We do not want to, for example, we say they certainly will not come".

"No, I don't have thus it can be. Maybe because I think differently. Talented Turkish youth living in Turkey for me have the priority. If they both have the same talent; I will prefer Turk. I want to help Syrians, but emotionally I will prefer Turks".

Crime and betrayal

Participants believe that employers who work with Syrians will be more profitable in the short term, but will have regrets later as Syrians will "betray" them in the long term. One explained that he had not used Syrian labour:

I did not use it at all. Even if I am a day-to-day person, I have heard so many of my friends who have been betrayed. Stealing and stuff. The guys are coming to find out two things and try to open something for themselves. It's cheaper because it's Syrian, but I said to everybody they will be trouble for us.

Thus, one of the repeated themes is also about the "insecurity" Syrians create and robbery and crime Syrians are said to have committed, as the quotations below illustrate:

"We should not classify them all in one group, but when they first came, they created an insecure environment".

"I cannot get on my own property without fear because of you. I cannot visit my own field after six o'clock".

"They increased the crime rate".

"For example, there is a park near our house, a very big area and a very nice cafe place in the middle. We were going for summer, for example, we could sit

comfortably there. That park, all the grass in summer and winter are full of them, they are occupied, when we are dressed up and passing through them, they look at us, disturbing. So you do not understand their language, they are talking and they may be insulting us, maybe they are swearing".

Lower moral standards

Syrians are accused of having lower moral standards and being unclean. One of the participants explained why he would not eat in a Syrian restaurant:

Let me put it in that way. Filtered us left pebbles. Our point of view is "Syrians are filthy". I saw the crap, and I saw the cleaning. I also saw them perform an ablution.

It's not about making good food. Do you know what my client? I eat this food, but is it clean?

According to participants, the presence of the Syrians in Adana also affects the locals' behavior and moral corruption becomes contagious: "It was also my own idea, but of course people living here, as beggars, doing bad things, they start to pretend that they are Syrian, behave like Arabs and start to work more comfortably". The blaming of Syrians for perceived hypocrisy and betrayal is part of ordinary language and the subject of many stories:

You go shopping at the market, most places are so it's officially Syrian here, everyone is Syrian. You are going to market, I get my essential needs. Both from the kitchen and cleaning . . . You are looking at them, they are buying chocolate, ice cream, I do not know what. I said, "Life is nice to you", beside the cashier. "Life is good for them", I said, "Look at it. We are now forcing ourselves to live, look at this shopping, how many bags are filled. Always cookies, always fun".

One participant explained that "I won't let them work, whatever happens. Even if I accept, society would not. Who would come to my shop. Syrians are dirty", while another saw Syrians displacement as proof of their unreliability: "I would not do anything with a man who left his country. He would also leave my job too".

Adana's residents regard these perceived differences as threats to "their" culture:

Money does not change your internal order. They are from another culture. They want to keep it alive. They don't adapt. They don't say it is the way we should accept. If they accept, believe me, money, then, is nothing.

This sense of threat is also linked to the persistence of the presence of Syrians in Adana's communities:

Definitely they are to blame. If water is four lira here, in Syria two lira, one lira. They were very comfortable. These sectarian divides, Shi'ite or Sunni, if they escaped from that, I can understand. However, if you left that water . . . they have a free life. They left that life and they came. They have four or five kids. It has been four years war began. They have many kids. How comfortable they are.

These negative perceptions and scapegoating narratives led us to investigate different dimensions of perceptions about Syrians in Adana using quantitative data. When we developed our questions, we drew both on the research literature and on the findings that had emerged from our qualitative research. We were seeking to note negative and positive

perceptions, but also to understand whether people thought the rights given and/or rights to be given to Syrians should be approved or denied.

Quantitative findings

In our analyses, we will focus on different dimensions of the attitudes participants expressed towards Syrian immigrants, namely negative perceptions which we conceptualize as a threat, positive perceptions, and the denial or approval of rights. Our independent variables include some demographic factors such as age, gender, level of education, household income, socio-economic status, work status, immigrant status, and Kurdish origin due to internal migration from the southeast of Turkey. In addition to these variables, we will also employ contact as a mediating variable.

Dependent variables:

Negative perceptions – threats

As the perception of threat from immigrants by individuals increases, they tend to have more hostile attitudes towards immigrants. The idea of an “economic threat” is largely based on a competitive model of society. According to this approach, increasing international labour flows result in increased feelings of insecurity. Citizens of the host country have to compete with newcomers, and this competition is vital especially for low-skilled labour. Since the traditional flow of migration brings unskilled, low-wage human capital (“Polish plumbers”) to developed countries; it is not surprising that unskilled segments of society have to compete with these immigrants. Consequently, anti-immigrant attitudes are widely observed among these citizens.²⁷ However, recent studies have shown that economic threat involves something more than citizen’s simple rational calculations about the odds of being replaced by immigrants. Economic threat is based on perceptions, rather than just crude statistical facts. Blalock distinguished actual competition (macro- or meso-level socioeconomic conditions, such as the availability of scarce resources) from perceived competition, which is founded on subjectively perceived socio-economic threats. Actual competition is largely affected by economic factors such as unemployment, inflation, economic growth, the structure of the labour market and one’s relative position in it, and it is easily operationalized. Meanwhile, perceived competition includes some intangible factors and is more difficult to measure and operationalize.²⁸

First of all, threat perceptions should not be understood in a limited way in terms of threats towards the individual. Identities are constructed within society, and social identity, in terms of social category memberships, is self-defined. Individuals try to achieve a positive social identity and they tend to perceive their own groups as superior to outgroups. Consequently, any threat to their in-group is perceived as an individual threat, especially when this threat comes from an easily identifiable outgroup of the kind represented by immigrants. This social identification process also plays an important role in the emergence of “symbolic” threats.

²⁷ Freeman, Gary P., et. al., *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*.

²⁸ Blalock, Hubert M., *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*.

Secondly, economic threat is not limited to competition in the market. If we use Blalock's definition of threat, which understands it as "competition for scarce resources", it also means competition for public goods, and especially social services provided by the welfare state. US-based research shows that citizens of wealthier societies worry about the additional demands immigrants create on social service budgets. Increased numbers of immigrants mean more pressure on welfare expenditure already limited by neoliberal economic policies.²⁹

In our questionnaire, we listed a group of threats and asked participants to what degree they agreed with them. Our list was developed using standard batteries of questions supplemented with additional arguments that had arisen during group discussions. The table below presents the percentages of those who agreed with these arguments.

According to these figures, more than 80 per cent of participants believe that Syrians are a burden to the health and education systems in Turkey. The percentage of those who perceived a threat in terms of job competition is about 83 per cent, while 79 per cent of participants agreed with the argument that Syrians are threatening Turkey's moral values. More than three quarters of participants believed that Syrians had made crime rates rise in Turkey. Using the answers given to these questions, we constructed a threat index by using a factor analysis (Cronbach $\alpha=0.88$).




Figure 1. Negative Perceptions - Threat (% of "Agree" and "Strongly Agree" Answers)

²⁹ Hainmueller, Jens et al., "Educated Preferences".

Positive perceptions

Although in the focus groups, positive perception about Syrians were very limited, we employed positive perceptions about Syrian immigrants as a variable in our analysis.

As part of our questionnaire, we asked participants three questions about their positive perceptions of Syrians. Only 10 per cent of participants agreed with the argument that Syrians recompense the economy for the health and education services provided to them by the Turkish government. A similar percentage agreed with the argument that Syrians contribute to a tolerant atmosphere in Turkey. Finally, the percentage of those who believe that Turkey needs the Syrian population to work in different economic sectors in Turkey is 7.3 per cent.

Alongside a threat index, we constructed an index of positive perception, again using the factor analysis method. The final index explains 66 per cent of the total variance (Cronbach $\alpha=0.74$).




Figure 2. Positive Perceptions (% of "Agree" and "Strongly Agree" Answers)

Denial/approval of rights

While positive and negative perceptions will clearly affect the possibility of future co-existence, it is also important to take into account views about the denial and/or approval of rights already given or which might be given to Syrians in Turkey. The dataset we produced included three different questions that investigated respondents' attitudes to immigrants' rights. The first question offered two options. First, it asked whether equal

rights should be given to legal immigrants living in the country in a move that would indicate acceptance of immigrants as part of the society and situate them as equals, or whether they should instead be given rights but not citizenship.³⁰ The second question, which is similar to the first one, focused on the specific domain of education and used Marshall's assertion that education is a socioeconomic right.³¹ Respondents were asked to state whether immigrants have a right to education or not. The third question offered a statement on citizenship and asked whether or not it might be considered as a right by immigrants.




Figure 3. Rights given to Syrians (% of "Partially Against" and "Totally Against" answers)

We asked these three questions in order to understand current trends that might indicate social approval for giving further rights to Syrians. The answers presented in Figure Four demonstrate that 92 per cent of respondents are against giving citizenship to Syrians and they also suggest that support for social rights for Syrians is relatively low: 76 per cent of respondents are against giving free access to education and 74 per cent of respondents do not support the idea of giving Syrians free health services. These figures show that people living in Adana are generally against providing citizenship status to Syrians in Turkey. The index of rights was constructed by using a factor analysis method and a single factor explaining 74 per cent of the total variation (Cronbach $\alpha=0.82$) was obtained.

³⁰ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

³¹ T. H. Marshall, *Social Class and Citizenship*.




Figure 4. Contact (% of Yes Answers)

Figure Five shows the degree of contact that residents in Adana had with Syrians. According to this figure, 65 per cent of respondents live with Syrians in their neighbourhood, and, considering the relatively high number of refugees, this situation is not surprising. On the other hand, only eight per cent of respondents have worked together with a Syrian, and the percentage of those who have Syrian friends is 11 per cent. By using the answers given to these questions, we constructed an index of contact, from 0 to three which indicates respondents who gave positive answers to this question (Cronbach $\alpha=0.64$).

Independent variables

The independent variables employed in the empirical part of this study are listed below.

Gender: According to our data, 51 per cent of participants were male and 49 per cent of them were female. We included this variable in our models in order to understand whether a gender gap existed or not.

Age: Age is another independent variable which was used in our models. Twenty per cent of participants were aged between 18 and 21, 33 per cent were between the ages of 22 and 31, and 22.4 per cent were between the ages of 32 and 41. Meanwhile, 24 per cent were over the age of 42.

Education: We included education level as an independent variable in our model. We found that 34 per cent of participants had not had a secondary education, 50 per cent had had a secondary education, and the percentage of those who had some higher education was 16 per cent.

Household income: According to our survey, the percentage of those who had an average family income less than or equal to 1500 TL (350 USD, official minimum wage) is 49 per cent, while 38 per cent of participants had an average income between 1501 and 3000 TL

(350 USD-750 USD), and only 13 per cent of participants had an average monthly income greater than 3000 TL (750 USD).

Being immigrant or not: We also included a variable indicating the respondent's immigration status. It is known that Adana is attractive for immigrants and our data shows that 15 per cent of respondents had immigrated to Adana.

Having Kurdish origin: In order to measure the ethnic status of respondents, we asked a question about which languages respondents were able to speak. We assigned the 15 per cent of participants who were able to speak Kurdish as having Kurdish origin.

Work status: Previous studies have shown that those who are most vulnerable to competition in the job market feel themselves most threatened. We asked a question about participants' employment status. According to our findings, 14 per cent of participants were unemployed, while 16 per cent of participants were students. The percentage of housewives was 25 per cent; white-collar workers made up 12 per cent of the sample, and skilled workers formed 16 per cent. The unskilled workers' share was six per cent, and 10 per cent of participants were working as craftsmen or were in other similar jobs.

Socioeconomic status: We used respondents' ownership of household items to calculate an index of socioeconomic status, from 0 to 11, with a mean of six and standard deviation of two.

Bivariate Analyses

Table 1. Bivariate Analyses

		Rights	Threat	Tolerance	Contact
Gender	Male	0.05+	-0.08**	-0.08	0.90***
	Female	-0.05+	0.08**	0.04	0.77***
Age	< 21	0.01	0.02	-0.06	0.75
	22-31	0.04	-0.02	0.05	0.87
	32-41	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.88
	> 42	-0.08	0.00	-0.06	0.83
Education	< Primary	0.02	-0.02	0.04	0.89
	Secondary	-0.01	0.05	0.02	0.82
	Tertiary	-0.02	-0.01	-0.11	0.82
Household Income	< 1500 TL	0.05**	-0.01	0.00	0.89
	1501 - 3000 TL	-0.11**	0.03	-0.04	0.80
	> 1501	0.12**	-0.05	0.10	0.78
Immigrant	Yes	0.09	-0.18**	0.15*	1.06***
	No	-0.02	0.03**	-0.03*	0.80***
Kurdish Origin	No	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.81**
	Yes	-0.09	0.04	-0.03	1.00**
Work Status	Unemployed	-0.04	0.09*	-0.01	0.89**
	Student	-0.06	-0.03*	-0.08	0.69**
	Housewife	-0.04	0.08*	0.00	0.78**
	Other	0.05	-0.11*	0.03	0.83**

White Collar	-0.08	0.02*	0.02	0.84**
Skilled	0.15	-0.17*	0.03	0.97**
Unskilled	0.00	0.21*	-0.05	0.92**

Table One presents the results of bivariate analyses or relationships between our independent and dependent variables. According to this table, the most important difference is observed between males and females. Our bivariate analyses show that men are more supportive of giving rights to Syrians and feel themselves less threatened. The same analyses show that the average level of social contact between Turkish and Syrian men is relatively and statistically high. Similarly, our bivariate analyses do not provide any evidence for differences in our dependent variables according to age groups or the levels of education of respondents. Observed differences are not statistically significant. Meanwhile, it seems that those who have an average household income of between 1501 TL and 3000 TL are relatively less supportive of giving more rights to the Syrians. Our post hoc analyses show that averages of lower and higher income categories are statistically higher (Scheffe $p < 0.1$ for both categories).

An important finding is that those who have an immigrant background have different attitudes towards the Syrians compared with other individuals. They feel themselves less threatened, they have higher positive perceptions about Syrians, and their contact score is significantly higher. The same table also shows that individuals of Kurdish origin have relatively higher contact scores. This situation is not surprising considering the fact that both Syrians and Kurdish people are living in the same neighbourhoods; nevertheless, we did not observe the same statistically significant differences in other variables.

Our bivariate analyses also show that the work status of respondents also matters in terms of threat perceptions and level of contact with the Syrians. According to our table of unqualified workers, unemployed people and housewives have relatively higher scores for threat perception; however these differences are not statistically significant. On the other hand, according to our analyses, skilled employees have significantly higher levels of contact compared to students (0.84 vs. 0.69, Scheffe $p < 0.05$).

In order to present a more accurate picture of the situation, we went on to conduct multivariate analyses to try to explain the differences in negative perception/threat, positive perception of refugees, contact with them, and views on their rights. Since we think that the approval/denial of rights is crucial to social integration, we started by using a Rights Index as a dependent variable and the variables discussed above as independent variables.

Table 2. Determinants of the Acceptance of the Rights (OLS Regression Results)

		RIGHTS		RIGHTS	
Gender	Male	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	Female	-0.037	(0.36)	-0.004	(0.90)
Age	< 21	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	22-31	-0.037	(0.49)	-0.058	(0.19)
	32-41	-0.052	(0.33)	-0.076 ⁺	(0.08)

	> 42	-0.140*	(0.02)	-0.091+	(0.06)
Education	< Primary	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	Secondary	-0.041	(0.35)	-0.005	(0.88)
	Tertiary	-0.038	(0.40)	0.001	(0.98)
Household Income	< 1500 TL	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	1501 - 3000 TL	-0.077*	(0.03)	-0.049+	(0.10)
	> 1501	0.023	(0.56)	0.005	(0.88)
Immigrant	Yes	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	No	-0.063+	(0.06)	0.026	(0.35)
Kurdish Origin	Yes	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	No	-0.048	(0.15)	-0.035	(0.20)
Work Status	Unemployed	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	Student	-0.046	(0.38)	-0.069	(0.11)
	Housewife	0.017	(0.75)	-0.004	(0.92)
	Other	0.056	(0.21)	0.017	(0.65)
	White Collar	-0.011	(0.81)	-0.017	(0.63)
	Skilled	0.068	(0.14)	0.026	(0.48)
	Unskilled	0.006	(0.88)	0.026	(0.42)
SES	SES	-0.005	(0.89)	-0.012	(0.71)
	CONTACT			0.120***	(0.00)
	THREAT			-0.479***	(0.00)
	TOLERANCE			0.278***	(0.00)
	_cons	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	N	945		913	
	R ²	0.03		0.37	

p-values in parentheses

Standardized beta coefficients; *p*-values in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table Two presents the results of a multivariate analysis where the acceptance of rights is used as the dependent variable. The first column shows the model with basic demographic and economic variables and a small number of variables have statistically significant effects after controlling for other variables. First, age matters. Respondents older than 42 are relatively less supportive of giving rights to Syrians in Adana ($\beta = -0.14$). Moreover, bivariate analyses showed that those who have a household income of between 1501 and 3000 TL are also against the granting of rights to Syrians ($\beta = -0.08$). Pre-existing populations have similarly negative scores on this issue ($\beta = -0.06$). None of the other variables have a significant effect on the independent variable. This picture may lead us to think that attitudes towards Syrians' rights are almost independent of demographic and socioeconomic variables, including gender, the level of education, or having Kurdish origins. Even work status does not matter here, a finding which runs counter to the expectations that would arise from a theoretical approach focused on threat.

When we included three other variables – contact, negative perceptions/threat, and positive perceptions – the picture changed. First of all, these three variables have significant effects on the independent variable, and including these variables suppressed the effects of other variables; in other words, they mediated their effects. As we noted earlier, contact has a positive effect on the acceptance of rights given to Syrians: as a

person's contact with Syrians increases, his support for giving rights to Syrians also increases ($\beta=0.12$). The index of positive perceptions also has a positive coefficient ($\beta=0.28$), meaning that having positive perceptions about Syrians' contributions to the labour market increases support for the rights given to them. Finally, as foreseen by the threat approach, as the perception of threat from Syrians increases, support for the rights given to them decreases ($\beta=0.28$), and this effect is the strongest in the model. It means that, despite the positive effects of contact and positive perceptions, perceived threat matters.

Table 3. Determinants of Perceptions of Threat and Positive Perceptions

		Threat		Threat		Positive P.		Positive P.	
Gender	Male	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	Female	0.088*	(0.03)	0.068+	(0.09)	0.088*	(0.03)	0.092*	(0.02)
Age	< 21	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	22-31	-0.016	(0.77)	-0.013	(0.80)	0.066	(0.22)	0.066	(0.23)
	32-41	0.015	(0.78)	0.013	(0.81)	0.049	(0.36)	0.050	(0.35)
	> 42	0.076	(0.20)	0.065	(0.26)	-0.007	(0.91)	-0.004	(0.94)
Education	< Primary	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	Secondary	0.072	(0.11)	0.071+	(0.10)	0.003	(0.95)	0.003	(0.94)
	Tertiary	0.045	(0.32)	0.047	(0.29)	-0.077+	(0.09)	-0.077+	(0.09)
Household Income	< 1500 TL	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	1501 - 3000 TL	0.015	(0.69)	-0.000	(1.00)	-0.014	(0.71)	-0.011	(0.77)
	> 1501	-0.020	(0.61)	-0.030	(0.43)	0.039	(0.32)	0.041	(0.30)
Immigrant	Yes	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	No	0.115***	(0.00)	0.089**	(0.01)	-0.065+	(0.06)	-0.060+	(0.08)
Kurdish Origin	Yes	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	No	0.042	(0.22)	0.058	(0.08)	-0.018	(0.60)	-0.021	(0.53)
Work Status	Unemployed	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)	0.000	(.)
	Student	-0.055	(0.29)	-0.077	(0.13)	-0.002	(0.97)	0.003	(0.96)
	Housewife	-0.045	(0.41)	-0.051	(0.33)	-0.052	(0.34)	-0.050	(0.35)
	Other	-0.060	(0.19)	-0.064	(0.15)	0.030	(0.52)	0.031	(0.50)
	White Collar	-0.020	(0.65)	-0.020	(0.65)	0.015	(0.74)	0.015	(0.74)
	Skilled	-0.072	(0.12)	-0.059	(0.19)	0.023	(0.62)	0.020	(0.66)
	Unskilled	0.030	(0.45)	0.027	(0.47)	-0.009	(0.83)	-0.008	(0.84)
SES	SES	0.003	(0.94)	-0.009	(0.82)	-0.004	(0.92)	-0.002	(0.97)
	CONTACT			-0.226***	(0.00)			0.047	(0.16)
<i>N</i>		924		924		924		924	
<i>R</i> ²		0.03		0.08		0.02		0.02	

p-values in parentheses

Standardized beta coefficients; *p*-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table Three presents the findings of our multivariate analyses where threat and positive perceptions are used as dependent variables. The first model is composed of demographic and socio-economic variables and shows that being female or an immigrant matters.

According to the table, female participants' threat perceptions are relatively higher than those of their male counterparts, after controlling for other variables ($\beta=0.09$). Another significant difference is observed between immigrants and locals. A person who did not immigrate to Adana has a higher threat perception compared to immigrants ($\beta=0.12$). This finding may lead us to conclude that being immigrant contributes to individuals having empathy towards newcomers, thus they feel themselves less threatened. The above table shows that neither education, income, being Kurdish, socio-economic status, or the work status of respondents matters; they feel themselves equally threatened. It shows that the realistic threat approach is not valid in Adana's context, because according to this approach, vulnerable persons – people with little education, the poor, unemployed, or unskilled – should have higher threat perceptions, and they are not evident in our case.

Our second model shows the results of our analysis after including contact as another independent variable. Including this variable suppressed the previously significant effects of gender; however, being immigrant still matters ($\beta=0.09$). Meanwhile, the contact index has a very strong significant effect ($\beta=-0.23$), meaning that those who have higher levels of contact with Syrians feel themselves less threatened.

From the perspective of positive perception, the picture is different. Among the demographic and socio-economic variables we included, only gender and education have a significant effect. Female participants have more positive perceptions about the contributions of Syrians to the job market and economy ($\beta=0.09$), whereas those who have a higher education level have more negative perceptions ($\beta=-0.08$). Locals also have more negative perceptions ($\beta=-0.07$) and these effects do not disappear after including the contact variable in the model. In this case, the contact variable does not have any statistically significant effect, meaning that having contact with Syrians does not contribute to positive perceptions.

Table 4. Determinants of Contact with Syrians

		Contact	
Gender	Male	0.000	(.)
	Female	-0.077+	(0.05)
Age	< 21	0.000	(.)
	22-31	0.006	(0.91)
	32-41	-0.001	(0.98)
	> 42	-0.055	(0.34)
Education	< Primary	0.000	(.)
	Secondary	-0.018	(0.69)
	Tertiary	-0.000	(0.99)
Household Income	< 1500 TL	0.000	(.)
	1501 - 3000 TL	-0.062+	(0.08)
	> 1501	-0.039	(0.30)
Immigrant	Yes	0.000	(.)
	No	-0.114***	(0.00)
Kurdish Origin	Yes	0.000	(.)
	No	0.069*	(0.03)
Work Status	Unemployed	0.000	(.)
	Student	-0.089+	(0.08)
	Housewife	-0.026	(0.62)
	Other	-0.012	(0.79)

	White Collar	-0.006	(0.88)
	Skilled	0.057	(0.20)
	Unskilled	0.010	(0.79)
SES	SES	-0.049	(0.20)
	<i>N</i>	924	
	<i>R</i> ²	0.03	

p-values in parentheses

Standardized beta coefficients; *p*-values in parentheses

* *p* < 0.10 * *p* < 0.05, ** *p* < 0.01, *** *p* < 0.001

Our previous models show that the contact variable has an important role as a determinant of support for rights and threat perceptions. Table Four presents the determinants of the contact variable. First, gender still matters; female respondents have significantly less contact with Syrians ($\beta=-0.07$), compared to their male counterparts. Secondly, those who are located in the middle income categories also have limited contact with the Syrians ($\beta=-0.06$). Meanwhile, the model shows that locals' contact level with Syrians is also limited ($\beta=-0.11$), and those who are not of Kurdish origin have relatively lower levels of contact ($\beta=-0.07$). The same model shows that students do not have contact with the Syrians ($\beta=-0.09$).




Figure 5. Interaction between Contact, Threat, Positive Perceptions and Denial/Approval for Rights (SEM Output, Beta Coefficients)

Figure five presents the interactions between our independent variables by using the Structural Equation Model (SEM). All of our three variables have significant effects on

support for Syrians' rights, and the most powerful one is the negative perceptions/threat variable, which has a negative coefficient. Coefficients related to contact and positive perceptions are positive. Contact's effect on the negative perceptions/threat variable is negative, and this coefficient is positive for positive perceptions, which means that having contact with Syrians decreases the negative perceptions and increases positive perceptions. Through its effect on negative and positive perceptions, contact also has indirect effects on approval for rights. The total effect of contact is 0.26 and almost half of it comes from indirect effects (0.12).

Conclusion

As most countries in the world are currently both sending and receiving migrants, it is important to study how foreigners are perceived within different countries to understand commonalities and differences. In order to live in harmony with newcomers to a city in a given country, civil society, government institutions, community leaders, and the business community must address locals' attitudes and perceptions and understand which factors play a role in negative and positive attitudes and perceptions. Within the limits of this article we have focused on the case of Adana to record scapegoating narratives there, and then we have examined those narratives through the lens of literature on anti-immigrant attitudes.

Although our bivariate analyses show that gender and immigrant background affect perceptions, we conducted three multivariate analyses and used SEM models to provide a more robust picture of perceptions towards Syrians in Adana. We began by using approval of rights as the dependent variable, and we found that age matters. Respondents older than 42 are relatively less supportive of giving rights to Syrians in Adana. This picture might lead us to conclude that attitudes to the rights given to Syrians are almost independent of demographic and socio-economic variables. Even work status does not matter, a finding which undermines expectations that perceptions about economic threat should dominate. However, when we include three other variables – contact, negative perceptions/threat, and positive perceptions – the picture changes. First of all, all three variables have significant effects on the independent variable and including these variables suppresses the effects of other variables; in other words, they mediate their effects. Contact has a positive effect on the acceptance of Syrians' rights. Having positive perceptions about Syrians' contributions to the labour market also increases support for the rights given to them. As expected, when the perception of threats from Syrians increases, support for their right to rights decreases, and this is the strongest effect in the model. It means that despite the positive effects of contact and positive perceptions, perceived threat matters.

In line with the literature, we found that perceived threat leads to varying levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. The findings of both the qualitative and quantitative study both cast doubt on the idea that the struggle for scarce resources or an increased crime rate emerge out of the realities of the field or personal experience. Instead, Syrians are blamed for economic and social problems which were there long before the arrival of the Syrians.

When we conducted another multivariate analysis which used threat and positive perceptions as dependent variables, we found that being female or immigrant matters. Female participants' threat perceptions are higher compared to their male counterparts, after controlling for other variables. Another significant difference is observed between

immigrants and locals. Immigrants have lower threat perceptions than people who did not immigrate to Adana. When we include contact as another independent variable, the previously significant effect of gender decreases; however being immigrant still matters. Controlled for other demographic factors, being an internal migrant also plays an important role that needs to be further studied as this experience leads to fewer negative perceptions despite the internal migrants being more vulnerable and insecure than many others in the population.

The contact index clearly has a very strong, highly significant effect, meaning that those who have higher levels of contact with Syrians feel themselves less threatened. According to the SEM findings, contact with Syrians decreases negative perceptions and increases positive perceptions. Contact also has indirect effects on approval for rights. Our findings show that any type of contact matters: whether contact is based on true or casual acquaintance, contact reduces people's sense of threat and this finding needs to be further analyzed as it challenges the assumptions made in earlier literature.

When we look to the positive perception case, among the demographic and socio-economic variables we included, only gender and education have a significant effect. Female participants have more positive perceptions about Syrians' contributions to the job market and economy, whereas those who have experienced higher education have more negative perceptions. These findings need to be studied further as they question the argument that the higher the level of a person's education, the lower their level of intolerance is likely to be. Locals also have more negative perceptions and these effects do not disappear after including contact in the model. In this case, contact does not have any statistically significant effect, which raises the question as to why this is the case. Whether strength of belonging to a locality is a powerful determinant of anti-immigrant feeling or not must be scrutinized in future studies.

Appendix

Table 5. Descriptives of Independent Variables

Gender	Male	51.40%
	Female	48.60%
Age	< 21	19.80%
	22-31	33.40%
	32-41	22.40%
	> 42	24.40%
Education	< Primary	33.90%
	Secondary	49.70%
	Tertiary	16.40%
Household Income	< 1500 TL	49.20%
	1501 - 3000 TL	37.90%
	> 1501	12.90%
Immigrant	Yes	15.70%
	No	84.30%

Kurdish Origin	Yes	85.10%
	No	14.90%
Work Status	Unemployed	14.00%
	Student	15.90%
	Housewife	25.30%
	Other	10.80%
	White Collar	11.70%
	Skilled	15.80%
	Unskilled	6.40%
SES	SES	Average=6.02, sd.=2.92
Contact	Contact	Average=0.84, sd.=0.72
Threat		Average=0, sd.=1
Positive Perceptions		Average=0, sd.=1
Rights		Average=0, sd.=1

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Mass Displacement and Human Security in Lebanon: A Risks Analysis of the Syrian Civil War's Effects on Lebanese Society

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ABSTRACT

Mass displacement in the Middle East has a major impact on civil society and constitutes a destabilizing factor from security, social, and economic perspectives. The massive refugee flow from Syria has repercussions in neighbouring countries. Lebanon is one of the main destinations for refugees and has the world's highest density of refugees, many of whom are extremely vulnerable. Meanwhile, Lebanon has historically been characterized by a difficult interfaith dialogue and structural political instability. Mass migration from Syria has produced small tensions, violations, disputes, and/or limited conflicts that involve rival armed groups, political parties, and militants, and human security has been undermined in multiple ways on both sides. A specific Conflict Risk Reduction strategy is needed to minimize these destabilizing effects and prevent possible tensions between host community members and displaced population groups. Unlike more traditional approaches, this kind of strategy considers the main destabilizing factors, identifies risks, and involves direct, multidimensional interventions by NGOs and international organizations to enhance human security at all levels.

Keywords: *Conflict Risk Reduction, Mass Displacement, Human Security, Syrian Crisis, Lebanon*

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Introduction

The Middle East region has been regarded as a potential conflict zone for the last 50 years, due to continuous conflicts, social and economic instability, and a very labile geostrategic balance. The large number of Middle Eastern countries involved in the different crisis flows that have emerged during this period highlights the weak equilibrium of the region, and it has influenced neighbouring countries at many levels as they face internal economic and social challenges and conflicts.¹

The Middle East's most recent and greatest crisis, the Syrian civil war, has had notable repercussions beyond the country's borders because of the massive exodus of Syrians to neighbouring countries. Lebanon is one of the countries most affected, and it has experienced considerable economic and social stress, as well as serious security implications related to the crisis that has resulted from the civil war's spillover.

Lebanon was already a fragile state, due to its complex, consociational and confessional political system, in which institutions are unable to assure basic state functions such as security, politics, and welfare,² and so it is necessary to approach the Syrian crisis and its impact in Lebanon from a different point of view. The Syrian crisis has produced a series of covariate risks, which arise from hazards that tend to affect entire communities and deplete livelihood levels both for host communities and refugees. Literature on the concept of human security, as it relates to refugees, tends to focus on the role of displaced populations as both the consequence and cause of conflict and instability, because their influx increases problems in host countries and undermines economic and social processes.³ Assuming that the risk of exacerbating pre-existent internal tensions and new inter-communitarian conflicts is high – and taking into account security risk areas in the political, social, and economic domains – it is possible to proceed with a comprehensive risk analysis. This article starts the development of a Conflict Risk Reduction Management strategy, the main goal of which is to ensure and enhance human security while reducing the risks of conflict.

This article uses the definition of human security developed by the United Nations,⁴ which focuses on the principle that fundamental freedoms should be protected and constitute the “essence of life”. This principle stresses attention to human life and the environment that surrounds it, and it aims to protect people from a variety of threats classified in terms of three macro-levels, which refer to economic, civil, and political wellbeing. These three spheres of human life will be taken into account in this study and will be brought together

¹ The largest example of this type of regional spillover is the Palestinian diaspora of 1948, and like the subsequent flows generated by various conflicts involving the Israeli army and Palestinian resistance groups, it impacted on the social and economic spheres of neighbouring countries. For example, it contributed to the Egyptian economic crisis which pushed many people to migrate to Jordan where they became a low-skilled labour force and destabilized the labour market, and the Iraqi presence in many Middle Eastern countries, due to Iraq's difficult socio-political circumstances.

² This article uses the definition and assessment indicators for “Fragile States” formulated by the LSE Crisis States Research Centre – see “The Crisis States Network”, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/conflict-and-civil-society/past-programmes/crisis-states-network> (Accessed 22 February 2020) – and those reported by the Fragile State Index developed by the non-profit organisation Fund for Peace at “Country Data”, <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/country-data/> (Accessed 19 May 2019).

³ Gil Loescher, Gil, *Blaming the Victim*, 46-53.

⁴ For a specific definition and a complete overview, see Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* and the Human Security Unit's *Human Security in Theory and Practice*.

through the specific framework of Conflict Risk Reduction, which treats socio-economic impacts as risks and considers possible conflict-producing variables. An approach based on human security is needed that takes into account these risk factors and adopts a “sustainable livelihood”⁵ approach concerning unstable situations where threats of violence and resultant vulnerabilities are high. From this perspective, specific action aimed both at strengthening dialogue between communities at social and economic levels and at creating less dependence on aid can generate a positive environment that can help overcome the sources of tensions and conflict.

In the light of this theoretical framework, this paper will explore three different destabilization levels and examine the impact of massive migration flow on both refugees and host communities by focusing on a Lebanese case study; it will also emphasize human security threats and analyse the risks of conflict related to individual hazards.

For the purpose of this research, a qualitative approach was used. A review of the literature on refugees was conducted, and Lebanese social, political, and economic issues, as well as human security issues, were analysed. This study compares different polls and surveys on threat perception carried out by different international organizations and NGOs from 2011 onwards, and it also considers a variety of relevant programme and project reports. The analysis includes comprehensive programmes such as the *Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2017-2018* developed in response to the Syrian crisis (3RP) by the United Nations (UN) and the *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020* (LCRP), designed by the UN and the Lebanese government. The consideration of documents and reports produced by different levels of actors, including international, national, and local stakeholders, will enhance the construction of a complete framework that encompasses the full range of threats to security and contextualizes them in terms of the perspectives of both refugees and the host community; the plan also recognizes that improvements at the political and socio-economic levels are still in progress. The theoretical model that underpins the strategy takes into consideration general theories and inter-sectoral studies on a range of relevant topics.

The roots of political destabilization

The roots and risks of political destabilization reside in both the Lebanese nation-building process and the country’s historical background, which is characterized by civil war, difficult inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue, and the effects produced by the presence of the Palestinian diaspora. Religious and ethnic pluralism shaped the Lebanese nation-building process after independence in 1943. The government operated on the assessment that its religious diversity was an asset; but religious and social disintegration have also meant that the Lebanese political landscape now features fragmented institutions. The country’s history has featured sectarian conflicts over power, involving different parties and actors who have sought a more representative political system. The current system’s complexity, the conflict it generates, and the high risk of its disintegration have brought Lebanon to a chronic level of instability, and there is no political capacity to deliver or ensure basic state functions such as security, political stability, and welfare.

⁵ For an exhaustive definition of “sustainable livelihood”, see Feinstein International Centre at Tufts University <http://famine.tufts.edu>.

There have been a number of different conflicts and crises in Lebanon's recent past, including the 1958 crisis, the civil war (1975-1990), conflicts with Israel, the Syrian occupation between 1976 and 2005, and different conflicts with the Palestinian refugee community. These crises, together with deep social divisions, prevented a real post-war reconstruction and the development of any strong and effective strategy capable of guaranteeing political stability. As a result, those political parties that gained supporters' trust over time assumed some state functions and also began to act as a reference point for the population's security concerns.⁶

The social destabilization that arose from the Palestinian migration flows that began in 1948 aggravated social fragmentation and fostered a great aversion to Palestinian refugees, which gave rise to a restrictive policy towards displaced people.⁷ The repressive line adopted by the government, an incapacity to absorb the Palestinian refugees, and their segregation in refugee camps, together with the consequent struggle between host communities and Palestinians, led to a shared resentment and negative perceptions about displaced people/refugees, who were seen as direct and indirect security threats. To this day, there are several restrictions that affect economic, social, and civilian integration for Palestinians who reside in Lebanon, and Palestinian refugees from Syria today face the same difficulties.

This socio-political background, combined with Lebanon's prior experience of diasporas, has formed the basis of the Lebanese government's approach to the contemporary Syrian crisis. At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, it seemed likely that its impact on the Lebanese political scenario would involve a short-term and contained migration phenomenon, so the open-door policy foreseen by the "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination",⁸ signed by the Lebanese and Syrian governments, was the main strategy adopted by Lebanon as part of its national dialogue framework. According to the Baadba Declaration,⁹ adopted by all Lebanese political parties in 2012, Lebanon dissociates itself from all regional and international conflicts, a decision attributed to the

⁶ An International Alert Survey on citizen's perception of security institutions reports that the fragmented and sectarian system has undermined the population's trust in Lebanese state security institutions. Carmen Geha, *Citizens' Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*.

⁷ Lebanon is not part of the 1951 Geneva Convention, and so it does not apply a legal definition of "refugee", which creates a grey area between "alien", "displaced", and "refugee" statuses. The country filled the gap by instituting an inter-institutional committee in charge of adjudicating "political asylum requests". Lebanon, alongside other non-contracting countries, also signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with UN institutions in 2003 and, though this has never been applied, it was renewed in 2016 to deal with the Syrian crisis. For full details of the renewed MOU, see Library of Congress, "Refugee Law and Policy: Lebanon", <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/lebanon.php> (Accessed 19 May 2019).

⁸ The Treaty established a free movement policy between the two countries in order to enhance economic cooperation in labour-intensive sectors such as construction and agriculture, where Syrians constituted an important and affordable source of labour. For this reason, Syrian migrants received special treatment and protected status, and this was highlighted by the 1994 Naturalisation Decree which aimed to foster social and family connections. United Nations, "Treaty Of Brotherhood, Cooperation And Coordination Between The Syrian Arab Republic And The Lebanese Republic", http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LB-SY_910522_TreatyBrotherhoodCooperationCoordination.pdf (Accessed 19 May 2019).

⁹ For the full text of the declaration, see UNGA Security Council, "The Situation in the Middle East", A/66/849-S/2012/477, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S%202012%20477.pdf> (Accessed 19 May 2019).

country's policy of dialogue, which refers specifically to the importance of the right to human solidarity and does not cite the refugee issue.

The evolution of the crisis, and the political vacuum left by the change of government, together with internal pressures, changed the political parties' positions and their perception of direct and indirect threats. The involvement of Hezbollah in 2013 in the battle of al-Qusayr alongside the Syrian Arab Army and the presence and consequent influence of the Jabhat al-Nusra Front and Daesh in the North East area of Lebanon, which caused the intervention of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Aarsal in 2014, made interior management a source of political contention within the divided Lebanese political arena. The security implications of the crisis were no longer regarded as an existential matter in political discussions but were instead seen, from a variety of different perspectives, to pose a real threat. In the view of the Sunni movement, this threat related to unsustainable social and cultural costs; from the Christian movement's position it related to unemployment, a higher cost of living, and insecurity; and, for Hezbollah, it constituted a management issue. The evident spillover of the Syrian civil war and the presence of destabilizing actors split the political arena into two groups, one of which supported the Syrian regime while the other backed the opposition forces. This division caused a sort of collapse in terms of security; in fact, suicide bombings and assassinations occurred which consistently involved civilian casualties. As Lebanon Support's "Conflictivity Index"¹⁰ has shown, conflict intensity rose not only at the political level but also in response to informal refugee camps, especially in the northeast of the country. Conflict here involved civilians from both sides and escalated threats to security.

In 2015, the transformation of perceptions of the crisis pushed the government to adopt a restrictive approach that in fact increased segregation and imposed very strict criteria for entry to, and the renewal of permissions to stay in, Lebanon. The new formulation invited the UNHCR to suspend the official registration of refugees and it also imposed more criteria and expensive fees for the renewal of permissions to stay in the country. These moves increased general hostility towards the host population. Indeed, illegal status and the lack of residency renewal documents mean that unregistered refugees are not allowed to benefit from the services and protection guaranteed by UN agencies. On one hand, the new approach pushed refugees to turn to negative coping strategies in relation to employment, shelter, and healthcare, and this generated a more complex and unstable social environment due to the changed and competitive job market and social insecurity. On the other hand, the loss of legal status puts refugees at the risk of arrest, detention and abuses, as Human Rights Watch has reported,¹¹ and this undermines basic freedoms, such as liberty of movement, which the Human Rights Committee considers to be an "indispensable condition for the free development of a person".¹²

The host communities also perceive that their local and national communities are threatened by the incapability of the State and the Lebanese economy to absorb the massive influx of migrants and to guarantee services for all the people residing in the

¹⁰ Civil Society Knowledge Centre, "Conflict Analysis Project", http://civilsociety-centre.org/cap/ci/armed_conflict (Accessed 19 May 2019).

¹¹ The Human Rights Watch report "I Just Want to be Treated Like a Person" analyses all the abuses related to lack of status and takes into account the experiences of field workers and refugees.

¹² Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of Movement (Art.12), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).

country. Host communities also perceive political risks in terms of instability, insecurity, and demographic balance, and cultural disruptions.

In addition to Syrian refugees, a considerable number of Palestinian refugees from Syria moved to Lebanon and became an added item in all the programmes and projects carried out by international and local organizations. They were recognized as a vulnerable cohort and a possible contributor to destabilization given the experience of existing tensions with Lebanese Palestinian communities.

The government's decision not to establish refugee camps was based on the tragic history of aggression against those communities, and particularly the killing of between 460 and 3,500 mostly Palestinians and Lebanese Shiite civilians by a Christian Lebanese right-wing party in Sabra and Shatila in 1982. Permanent camps are perceived as a source of insecurity for both refugees and the host community, partly because of their potential links to radicalization and armed conflict, but also because they are places where the most vulnerable individuals could be subjected to harassment, intimidation, and forced recruitment into militant groups. In addition, in the long term, refugee camps might turn into an important political base for the parties that support their construction. In this case, a decision such as the establishment of formal and recognized refugee camps can bolster the single political party which pushed for their establishment, providing them with a strong body of members to form the base of future election campaigns. Political perspectives, in a country with a very fragmented political system can be a further destabilizing factor inside the political arena and can unbalance the political representation of the population.

Furthermore, responsibility for dealing with pressure in this fragile society lies within the competencies of municipalities, and the lack of administrative capacity at the local authority level constitutes one of the main challenges for the Lebanese government, which has planned to empower local institutions by creating and reinforcing specific spaces for dialogue between key institutions and social actors. This measure is intended as a conflict prevention strategy, based on dialogue, and it seeks to involve as many social actors as possible to support municipalities in the management and mitigation of social tensions. At the same time, effective monitoring of conflicts will be carried out, taking into account categories such as policy and socio-economic indicators, power and governance conflicts, and conflicts related to social discrimination, in order to identify the most vulnerable municipalities. Specific actions can then be targeted in response to the needs identified. In every municipality, these strategies will be accompanied by work to strengthen youth participation and empowerment.

The measures provided by the UN and the Lebanese government anticipate various types of cooperation with civil society and non-governmental organizations, which often constitute a link between the different communities and local and national institutions. The involvement of actors at different levels may be difficult and risks the development of many actions with the same aim implemented by multiple entities; this might lead to overlaps that make some interventions worthless. For this reason, effective coordination is the key element for effective planning, coupled with a monitoring and evaluation phase to overcome potential challenges. Taking into account the main challenges and considering the risks in terms of social and political instability, these types of action have to be managed from the civil society to the political level. The creation of a space for

dialogue and the empowerment of communities are the long-term objectives key to reducing the risks of conflict.

Shelter, healthcare, and education: symptoms of social imbalance and instability

The number of diasporic people in Lebanon is very much higher than that suggested by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR),¹³ due to a lack of accurate information and access to registration points and the consequent unofficial entry of many Syrians, which creates a worrisome vacuum in the protection regime. The impossibility of accessing services and the weak impact of protection programmes reflects a lack of basic security, as well as of legal, physical, and psychological support. The choice not to establish camps, which was mainly adopted by the government for reasons linked to internal security, obliged up to 85 per cent of refugees to live in substandard conditions in urban and rural settings in the poorest areas of Lebanon, where dire social conditions and difficulties in accessing social services and livelihoods cause host communities and refugees to understand each other as mutual threats.

The high cost of renting appropriate accommodation, which has risen considerably in the last number of years, has complicated the situation on both sides. The lack of infrastructure and proper accommodation means that refugees are not guaranteed adequate access to water, sanitation, electricity, or waste management, and so struggle to achieve a reasonable standard of living.

Social imbalance is also evident in the healthcare system. Although UNHCR is the primary provider of healthcare for refugees, and improvements have been made, the scale of the demand has created space for other NGOs, charities, and religious organizations to provide health services or financial support. The introduction of other actors into the delivery of healthcare services has created a fragmented and bureaucratic system where access is limited only to registered refugees, and so unregistered refugees who are often in severe need are not treated. These services, which focus on guaranteeing primary healthcare, (e.g. treatment of chronic diseases and prenatal care), depend on funding, so the actions overseen by various organizations are often focused on limited and specific target groups and consequently the availability of medical intervention depends on people's specific circumstances and general care is unavailable. For example, psychiatric and psychological issues are not treated, and many women and girls who have been victims of abuse and sexual violence are not supported by any effective psychological support.

Nevertheless, the privatized, and expensive Lebanese healthcare system is stretched beyond its limits due to high demand, high costs, shortage of personnel, and the lack of effective structures. For this reason, access is also limited for vulnerable groups in Lebanese society. Considering these general difficulties, the impossibility of a great part of the Lebanese population accessing the system, and the exclusion of refugees and unregistered refugees from it altogether, the risk of epidemics and infections is very high both for refugees and host communities.

The main objectives in the health sector must be the improvement and strengthening of healthcare institutions and increased access to services to ensure health security and

¹³ The UNHCR's latest update suggests that there are 1,001,051 refugees in Lebanon. See UNHCR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response", <http://data2.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122> (Accessed 19 May 2019).

control of outbreaks. These goals, coupled with special attention to the care of the most vulnerable, could ensure, with careful and effective planning, basic security in terms of welfare and sanitation. The government, as well as international organizations and NGOs in this specific field, should work side by side to achieve these objectives and to ensure proper medical management in response to the high demands made on healthcare by both refugees and host communities. To avoid tensions emerging between communities with regard to the cost of healthcare – a phenomenon reported by the LCRP – attention should be paid to vulnerable Lebanese families, who should be guaranteed the same package of services as is available to refugees.

In the education sector, the plans that have been implemented already have created little residual impact in a situation where access to good education is fraught with difficulty. Due to the extreme poverty of many Lebanese and Syrian households, children are forced to work to supplement family income, while others are subjected to forced marriages, abuse, and other forms of exploitation in order for their families to earn some extra income. From the perspective of Syrian refugees, restrictions on movement, for those who do not have a valid residency permit, combined with their distance from schools, becomes a considerable challenge, as well as an issue in terms of security and safety because of checkpoints and other forms of bureaucratic control. Difficulties related to the education sector include poor school environments, low demand for a public education that would benefit the most vulnerable families, along with high costs. All of these challenges have been underestimated by the plans carried out until now at national and municipal levels, and head teachers have often refused to accept Syrian children into their schools; these issues create stumbling blocks in terms of access to the education sector, and, at the same time, they benefit employers who use the underpaid child labour force made available when education is not being accessed. The government's plans to open the education system to refugees have, until now, been opposed by many deans, and programmes related to education have not produced satisfactory results. In fact, the double-shift system, established to allow Syrian children to attend classes in the afternoons while the mornings are reserved for Lebanese children, has been proven to produce negative effects on the general quality of education. There are not enough teachers to respond to pupils' needs and deliver a quality education, and the prevention of Syrian teachers working in the Lebanese education system reduces the availability of teachers in an already stressed system. In this context, the new intervention plan focuses on the renewal of teaching programmes, the facilitation of access to education for the most vulnerable parts of the population, and the professionalization of teacher training in terms of both formal and informal approaches to learning.

Healthcare facilities, along with school infrastructure and shelters, play a decisive role in matters of human security. Educational opportunities can foster social inclusion and awareness, alongside conflict resolution processes, in the long term. Interventions in this direction should have the objective of protecting basic freedoms, and they should adopt a frame of reference predicated on creating sustainable livelihoods and identifying the specific needs of target groups.

These developments, and the improvements foreseen by the 3RP and the LCRP, will enhance the availability of livelihoods and therefore human security, and they will also ensure a reduction in the risk of conflict due to greater access to public services.

The destabilisation of the Lebanese economy

The economic impact of the Syrian crisis on the economy of host countries is a considerable conflict risk factor, together with the increase in population it generates. The general deterioration of social cohesion, already considered here from a political and social perspective, is aggravated by economic marginalization and by underdeveloped social services and infrastructure, which have a significant impact in terms of livelihoods. The injection of humanitarian aid expenditure into the Lebanese economy mitigates some of these effects, but does not resolve this state of affairs.¹⁴ The existing constraints on development in the country have been exacerbated by the crisis which has placed considerable strain on host communities in Lebanon's poorest areas.

From 2011, when the crisis began, Lebanon has incurred losses of 13.1 US\$ billion as a result of the economic downturn and fiscal pressures on public services; GDP has contracted by 10 per cent; growth has decreased from nine to two per cent; tourism has reduced by 23 per cent and exports by 7.5 per cent. General costs for rent, goods, and services have risen and trade with economic partners beyond the borders with Syria has diminished, causing an economic deadlock in the villages adjacent to the borders that depended on these markets. Despite the general state of the economic system and the impact on growth, the main security challenge results from lack of employment opportunities and the saturation of the job market.

Before the crisis, unemployment and informal labour levels were a serious issue in the Lebanese economy, and the presence of refugees and the macro-economic ramifications of their presence exacerbated the previous situation and created strong competition for low-skilled jobs. In fact, host communities perceive refugees as a clear threat to their own chances of employment. In 2016, the rate of employment was around 6.8 per cent, and the insertion of displaced people into the labour force drove down wages and labour conditions. Harsh competition in the labour market pushed a great number of Lebanese nationals into poverty; in particular, young people were badly affected and induced to migrate to find job opportunities. These factors slowed down Lebanon's economic growth, slightly worsened the economic grievances that are the main sources of tensions between communities, and created social instability.

On the refugees' side, the absence of work permits pushed them to work in harsh conditions without rights and with very low wages in informal and illegal businesses. The job market does not allow them to profit or benefit or work in secure and adequate environments, and so the situation remains desperate. The International Labour Organisation's reports shed light on a framework where the majority of refugees workers are either unskilled or semi-skilled, and this means that they are likely to find only the types of informal, temporary, or seasonal jobs that are most likely to expose them to exploitation in their workplaces. Due to the high prices of goods and rent, and food insecurity, child labour is widespread, and children are vulnerable to exploitation. A gender gap is also noticeable, and only 12 per cent of Syrian women are integrated into the job market, so, like children, women are highly vulnerable to wage exploitation.

¹⁴ For a complete overview of the impact of humanitarian aid on the Lebanese economy, see UNDP/UNHCR, *Impact of Humanitarian Aid on the Lebanese Economy*, 2015, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Impact%20of%20Humanitarian%20Aid-UNDP-UNHCR.PDF> (Accessed 19 May 2019).

The surplus of labour supply on both sides created increased competition, especially in the low- and semi-skilled job categories, and this led to stagnation in the job market and the consequent impoverishment of the people living in Lebanon. It is estimated that the economic impact of the crisis raised child labour levels in Lebanese communities by four per cent. To deal with these economic challenges and fight against prejudice and the threats perceived by both sides, different programmes have been implemented,¹⁵ but they have had very limited impact since the programmes have not been sustained by inter-community dialogue carried out in parallel at institutional levels.

The risks of conflict and social instability in this domain are high, and there are several human security implications related to them. In order to address the economic challenges that have emerged, it is necessary to work at the macro-economic level to address gaps through job creation policies and actions and to provide support and incentives for micro-entrepreneurs, start-ups, and cooperatives. Furthermore, actions aimed at ameliorating and improving decent working conditions need to be taken, and policies for the elimination of child labour and exploitation must also be enforced. Internal economic policies focused on job creation and growth, as well as development, could turn into an opportunity to develop social cohesion. A comprehensive and multidimensional strategy could support this process if actors at different levels including national institutions, municipalities, and international and local organizations focused on the same process but took responsibility for different aspects of it. Plans developed by the UN, agencies, and the Lebanese government in relation to livelihoods consider these challenges but there is a risk that without proper coordination actions and projects will overlap in the implementation phase in ways that limit the effectiveness of the actions themselves and create a vacuum in specific areas where intervention is needed. Moreover, the State's policies, programmes and plans in relation to economic development are likely to be impacted by the effects of Syrian refugees' insertion into the labour market and this could prove to be a difficult political challenge.

Conclusion

The risk analysis outlined and discussed in this paper illustrates that the massive migration flows into Lebanon during the Syrian civil war have had a great impact on Lebanese society and on human security for both host communities and refugees. The presence of 1.5 million Syrians and a consistent number of Palestinian refugees from Syria has amplified and exacerbated the symbiotic relationship between confessional governance and conflict which characterizes Lebanese society and politics and it has produced notable consequences at multiple levels.

Political, social, and economic challenges, as well as challenges in terms of human security, were already present in the country, mainly due to the religious and social disintegration

¹⁵ Save the Children's Casual Labour Initiative, a programme which aims to alleviate tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals has been implemented in Bekaa and Akkar. The research background of the project was provided by the American University of Beirut and the survey analysis, which focused on threat perception, showed the difficulties both sides had in cooperating in workplaces. It also identified that Lebanese people had leadership and responsibility in those workplaces. Although there are limits and challenges to programmes like this which encourage dialogue, and there is room to identify gaps, strengths, and potential improvements in certain areas, they can be important for the construction of social cohesion and intergroup relations and can also constitute an economic intervention with the potential to open up a saturated job market.

that affected the Lebanese political landscape, along with chronic socio-economic instability, but these problems were all exacerbated. In light of the internal challenges Lebanon faces, as well as individual covariate risks, it is necessary to minimize the risks of conflict and to approach the crisis from a new perspective. The approaches usually used, such as peacebuilding and conflict prevention, are unsuitable and have produced limited results from both theoretical and practical points of view. A risk-oriented and risk-based theoretical framework, together with a strategy of intervention linked to needs/risk assessment, is more suitable. Taking into account Lebanon's socio-economic and political background, along with the impact of Syrian refugees on the country's situation, a conflict risk reduction approach is capable of both tackling the range of issues detailed in this article and identifying the practical actions which can be inserted into a specific Conflict Risk Management strategy.

The Syrian civil war's effects clearly impacted negatively on the human security sphere, both for host communities and refugees, and its spillovers affected basic freedoms including freedom of movement, security, social stability and security, and livelihoods, exposing the most vulnerable cohorts of the population resident in Lebanon to exploitation and abuse.

Considering these insights and the specific approach identified here, human security is vitally important in any risk and needs analysis and can help identify specific outcomes, indicators, and targets for practical implementation. It is evident that programmes with limited aims and the problems caused by poor coordination and overlapping projects need to be avoided: a compartmentalized approach to Lebanon's issues interferes with any effective action. The exclusion of Syrian actors from these processes is also problematic. A multi-level and comprehensive strategy based on the assessment of need and risks will provide a strong substructure for an effective Conflict Risk Management strategy. The assessment and the individuation of clear objectives needs to be accompanied by an ongoing monitoring and evaluation process to ensure continual improvement, and the main aim must be to ensure human security as this approach will support the delivery of basic freedoms and concrete opportunities that will in turn help to deliver human rights. A shared development path, involving refugees, will allow Lebanon to enter upon a new path with the purpose of creating social cohesion and a resilient society.

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Human Security Norms in East Asia: Towards Conceptual and Operational Innovation

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ABSTRACT

This paper elaborates the conceptual and operational features of human security in East Asia, employing theory related to norm-complexes and norm dynamics. It carries out an analysis of eleven case studies conducted by local researchers and it draws on the theory of norm dynamics to show that the reframed concept of human security is an international norm-complex. It also analyses the three conceptual and operational features of human security in East Asia: the nuances of its distribution, the wide range of perceived threats, and the role of the sovereign state as a means for securing human security. This paper recommends further exploration of empowerment from below and of dignity as an aspect of human security.

Keywords: East Asia, Human Security, International Norm-Complex, Norm Dynamics, Threat, Sovereign State, Protection

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Introduction¹⁻²

Although more than twenty years have now passed since the introduction of human security in the 1993 and 1994 UNDP Reports (HDR),³ both the concept and operation of human security remain controversial.⁴ The core message of human security is very simple: it seeks to shift the objective of security from “states” to “individuals”. In the international arena, a consensus-based resolution defining human security was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2012.⁵ However, intellectual debates about the concept of human security have continued in multiple academic fields such as security studies and theories of international development, and its relationships with human rights has also been widely discussed.⁶ Research on operationalizing human security has tended to deliberate on the particular threats that cause human insecurity while there are fewer studies that focus on its conceptual and operational localization.⁷

Based on this awareness, the Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI) initiated a research project on how the concept of human security and its operation are localized in East Asia, with the author of this paper being involved as one of the project managers.⁸ In this paper, East Asia refers to the eleven countries discussed in the project’s Working Papers (WPs): Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. This paper draws on these eleven working papers written by local researchers and practitioners.⁹ Throughout the research project, these local researchers conducted qualitative literature reviews and interviews to build each of the case studies. There were three main areas of focus for the research: first, the (selective) acceptance of the concept of human security; second, local perceptions of threats and ideas about whether foreign actors should operate within a country in cases of natural disaster and violent conflict; and third, the question of national sovereignty and the acceptance of foreign actors when threats occur.

In the following two sections, this paper attempts to elucidate the concept of human security as a norm-complex and it also assesses the localization of human security through

¹ I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the authors of the eleven Working Papers and to others who strongly supported me in preparing this paper: Professor Yoichi Mine, Dr. Oscar A. Gómez, and Dr. Rui Saraiva.

² The analysis and suggestions offered in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Japan International Cooperation Agency.

³ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1993*, 1-13 and *Human Development Report 1994*, 22-37.

⁴ Tadjbakhsh, “Human Security Twenty Years On”, June 2014, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/181368/540cb240aa84ac7133bce008adcde01f.pdf> (Accessed 21 August 2018).

⁵ United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 6 September 2012, A/66L.55/Rev.1.

⁶ Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, *Human Security*; Tow et al. (eds.), *Asia’s Emerging Regional Order*, 13-19.

⁷ Concerning the region on which this paper focuses, see, for example, Guan, *Human Security*, Hernandez and Kraft, *Mainstreaming Human Security*; Nishikawa, *Human Security Southeast Asia*; Umegaki, *Human Insecurity*; and Wu, *China’s Challenge*.

⁸ JICA, “Human Security in Practice”, https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/research/peace/peace_20131001-20180331.html (Accessed 26 August 2018).

⁹ Authors and abbreviated titles of the WPs are as follows: Alexandra, “Perception on Human Security”; Atienza, “Human Security in Practice”; Chng and Jamil, “Human Security in Singapore”; Dung and Lan, “Human Security in Vietnam”; Guan and Tien, “Human Security in Malaysia”; Jumnianpol and Nuangjamnong, “Human Security in Thailand”; Kim et al., “Human Security in South Korea”; Kurusu, “Analysis of Japanese Perceptions”; Ren, “Human Security: Chinese Experience”; Sovachana and Beban, “Human Security in Cambodia”; Thuzar, “Human Security in Myanmar”.

norm dynamics. As this article will show, the formation process and components of the human security concept can be traced along the pathway of norm dynamics – through initiation, diffusion, and regeneration. Based on this analytical framework of norm-complexes and norm dynamics, the following sections examine the characteristics of East Asian human security in relation to the above three areas of focus. There are various ways that human security norms are accepted and localized in East Asia; they can, for example, be implemented by the state or civil society and as foreign policy or domestic activities. This wide variation arises because threat perception in its broadest sense, can encompass, among other things, natural disasters, food crises, or violent conflicts. Diverse threats require different responses, and this generates the question as to who should be involved in ensuring the security of individual persons through interdisciplinary collaboration and international cooperation. The final section of this article summarizes the overall discussion and suggests some areas for further research, which include empowerment from below and the need to consider dignity as an aspect of human security.

Human security as an international norm-complex

Human security has become an international norm along with human rights, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),¹⁰ and corporate social responsibility (CSR). In international relations studies, norms are defined as “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors”¹¹ or “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”.¹² Sen criticizes the proposition that human rights make sense only when they are legally guaranteed and argues that strong moral imperatives that concern what to do and what not to do make up human rights. These imperatives may require legislation, but legal provision is not a prerequisite for human rights.¹³ As in the case of human rights, a set of moral judgements often precedes the formalization of norms.

Human security is understandable as a “norm-complex” that consists of pre-existing norms encompassing related issue-areas and other new norm elements”.¹⁴ This perception is based on Miura’s argument that

A “norm-complex” can have a distinctive property: internal contradiction among its sub-norms. This unique character of a norm-complex presents an actor with a challenge: how to “comply” with conflicting directives. If a hierarchy among sub-norms cannot be established at the outset, then proponents of a new norm-complex will release it as a “beta” version which will likely be developed jointly by its proponents and “users”.¹⁵

These ideas critique the widely accepted approach that “norms are decomposable and should be analysed on a one-by-one basis; norm change refers to the replacement of an

¹⁰ United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goals”, <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/> (Accessed 22 August 2018).

¹¹ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests*, 22-24.

¹² Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives”, 1-32.

¹³ Sen, “Development, Rights, Human Security”.

¹⁴ Kurusu, “Development of Human Security”, 11.

¹⁵ Miura, “Distributed Innovation Norm-Complex”, 12.

existing norm by a new one; an actor is persuaded to accept a new norm; [and] norm internalization will lead to the taken-for-grantedness of a norm".¹⁶

Human security has incorporated some norms which are evident in the documents produced by the United Nations. When human security was introduced as a new concept in the 1994 *Human Development Report* (HDR), "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" were the major norms underpinning the concept.¹⁷ Subsequently, after discussions undertaken by the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (CHS)¹⁸ established a broader concept of human security which incorporated additional norms: the freedom to live with dignity, protection from above, and empowerment from below.

CHS elaborated the wider concept of human security as an international norm-complex, with the overall framework including three freedoms along with two key approaches: protection and empowerment. It contributed to the articulation of an international norm based on comprehensive human security, and it also presented a framework on which it was easy to form a rough consensus.¹⁹ Intense arguments for humanitarian interventions derived from the norm of "freedom from fear" subsequently became separated from the complex norm of human security, and resulted in another norm, the responsibility to protect (R2P).²⁰ The World Summit Outcome defined a possible way for international society to intervene in a sovereign state through military and/or non-military measures in order to directly protect citizens from the horror of "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity".²¹

The hybrid nature of human security as an international norm-complex is observable in the consensus-based resolution on the definition of human security adopted by the 2012 UNGA resolution.²² It stipulates that human security is "an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people". According to the resolution, a common understanding of the notion of human security includes:

- (a) The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential;
- (b) Human security calls for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities;
- (c) Human security recognizes the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and equally considers civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;
- (d) The notion of human security is distinct from the responsibility to protect and its implementation;

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, 3.

¹⁸ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, 1-13.

¹⁹ Kurusu, *Development of Human Security*, 84.

²⁰ United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 15 September 2005, A/60/L.1.

²¹ Ibid., paras. 138-9.

²² United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 6 September 2012, A/66/L.55/Rev.1.

(e) Human security does not entail the threat or the use of force or coercive measures. Human Security does not replace State security;

(f) Human security is based on national ownership. Since the political, economic, social and cultural conditions for human security vary significantly across and within countries, and at different points in time, human security strengthens national solutions which are compatible to local realities;

(g) Governments retain the primary role and responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their request, so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society;

(h) Human security must be implemented with full respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, including the full respect for sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Human security does not entail additional legal obligations on the part of States.²³

This definition encompasses the original combination of norms and adds two new elements. Firstly, “dignity” was added to the concept of “freedom from fear and want”. Realizing a world free from “fear and want” is the ideal of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and these two freedoms can be represented by civil liberties and socio-economic rights. Dignity also corresponds to the moral attitude necessary to realize these freedoms, one which involves respect for humanity and recognizes that every human being has intrinsic worth.²⁴ Secondly, while human security does not deny the importance of protection, the definition incorporates a focus on “empowering” people from below as a complement to protecting them from above. Empowerment is a process that enables people to become the masters of their own lives and may require the redistribution of power and resources between the powerful and the powerless. In the context of social development, Friedman developed a theory of empowerment that focuses on community development and livelihood support.²⁵ In human security, it is important to focus on empowerment at the community level, and at the level of the individual, as well as at national or subnational levels.

This added value provided by the concepts of dignity and empowerment deserves attention in East Asia. In a region where social hierarchy is relatively strongly rooted, the concept of dignity based on the premise that individuals are embedded in society can be accepted more easily than the concept of empowerment, which might evoke “internal contradiction among its [human security] sub-norms”,²⁶ which include, for example, protection from above.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Michael Rosen, *Dignity: History and Meaning*.

²⁵ John Friedmann, *Empowerment: Alternative Development*.

²⁶ Miura, “Distributed Innovation Norm-Complex”, 12.

Norm dynamics in East Asia

The international norms of human security have gradually assimilated several sub-norms during the past several decades of discussions. Modern international norms involving many and diverse stakeholders tend to be complex, because of the ways in which a norm is established. There is a desirable, standard process for setting new norms, and it assumes that for an idea to be established as a norm, it must be internalized in the minds of the members of a society, irrespective of whether it is legally enforced or not. For this purpose, it is desirable for as many parties as possible, at the centre and at the periphery, to actively participate in the process of norm-making, instead of passively waiting for the advent of a new norm. In this process, both universal and local values tend to slot into a new norm, thereby making it hybrid, composite, or complex.

International norms are said to have life cycles. At the beginning, “norm entrepreneurs” propose a new norm, which is accepted by several states (the norm emergence stage). Then, after a certain “tipping point”, the norm diffuses quickly and prevails throughout international society (the norm cascade stage). Finally, the norm is internalized in every country and becomes “taken for granted” (the internalization stage).²⁷ If a norm is established by idealistic “norm entrepreneurs”, a different group of pragmatic actors called “message entrepreneurs” start negotiating a consensus to give a concrete shape to the norm,²⁸ and this was the role taken by the drafters of the 2012 UNGA resolution.²⁹ However, as Acharya has clarified, in the case of the security regime in Southeast Asia, foreign norms may be opposed, modified, or displaced by existing local norms in local spaces. Norms are not simply accepted or rejected but are also localized.³⁰ Conversely, new norms that are (re)created by local actors on the periphery may eventually reach core nations and/or challenge global powers.³¹

The process involved in the initiation, diffusion, and regeneration of a norm is called “norm dynamics”. As has been noted, the concept of human security was first advocated by a group of norm entrepreneurs at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). After that, several countries, including Canada, reinterpreted the human security concept and this gave rise to “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) as an offshoot norm.³² Meanwhile, countries including Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines understood the nature of threats in broader and more comprehensive ways and tried to redefine human security to avoid confrontation between state sovereignty and humanitarian imperatives by emphasizing prevention and sensitivity to local contexts. It should be noted that the comprehensive human security initiative of the latter group, maintaining the universality of UN-based messages, has passed through the process of localization in Asia.

A radical change in international norms is often triggered by a dispute or a grave event.³³ The Prime Minister of Japan, Keizo Obuchi, who was then Japan’s Foreign Minister,

²⁷ Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”.

²⁸ Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, “International Norm Dynamics”.

²⁹ United Nations General Assembly, Follow-up to Paragraph 143 on Human Security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, 6 September 2012, A/66L.55/Rev.1.

³⁰ Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter?*

³¹ Acharya, “Norm Subsidiarity” and Towns, “Norms and Social Hierarchies”.

³² United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 15 September 2005, A/60/L.1, paras. 138-9.

³³ Wayne Sandholtz et al., *International Norms*.

officially advocated human security for the first time in Singapore in 1998 after the Asian financial crisis.³⁴ CHS was co-chaired by the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Sadako Ogata and the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen, a combination of East Asian and South Asian globally recognized figures.³⁵

Proposed norms are intended to diffuse or fade out while being transformed vertically from the UN's headquarters to a small village, and they are expected to spread horizontally across diverse world regions and nations. Pitsuwan and Caballero-Anthony describe the effects of the financial crises – as well as the multiple humanitarian crises that arose from them which made evident the significance of human security – as a “compelling normative framework”.³⁶ Still, they argue “that as far as institutionalizing human security in its security practices [has progressed, ...] ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] still has a long way to go,” particularly because of gaps in economic security, as well as in protection from disasters and the protection of minorities and migrants, among other vulnerable groups.

The following three sections elaborate the norm dynamics of human security in East Asia as a norm-complex. Though the region is considered to enjoy relative peace and prosperity,³⁷ the local East Asian researchers and practitioners interviewed for this project reveal here that various threats to human security continue to spread. In this region, human security is combined with local norms and the acceptance of international norms is complicated, sometimes contradictory, and unevenly diffused. The main focus of the next three sections is on localized perceptions of human security, diversified threats and preferred responses, and the compatibility of state security and human security.

Understanding human security from the perspective of norm localization

Focusing on the question of what norms of human security the eleven states accept, reject, or remodel, local East Asian researchers and practitioners first analysed how human security as a term and a concept was understood in their respective local contexts. Their analysis was based on a literature review and interviews with government officials, academics, civil society members, community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), farmers, students, and so on. It emerged that, although the term “human security” itself is not always utilized, most interviewees regard the principles of the concept as important in relation to the diverse threats confronting this region.

The concept of human security has been incorporated into foreign policy in Japan and South Korea,³⁸ but has not yet been diffused domestically, and it has been adapted to reflect each country's diplomatic policies without any processes of localization. Japan has actively facilitated the promotion of human security and supported the United Nations by joining the Friends of Human Security and contributing to the UN Trust Fund for Human Security.³⁹ It also integrated the concept into its revised Development Cooperation Charter

³⁴ Kurusu, “Japan as an Active Agent”.

³⁵ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*.

³⁶ Pitsuwan and Caballero-Anthony, “Human Security in Southeast Asia”.

³⁷ World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*.

³⁸ Kurusu, “Analysis of Japanese Perceptions” and Kim et al., “Human Security in South Korea”.

³⁹ Japan (MOFA), “Human Security”, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html (Accessed 24 August 2018).

in 2015.⁴⁰ South Korea has also embraced the concept of human security in its overseas development aid policies, and “the term ‘human security’ has been explicitly used by President Geun-hye Park and Minister Yoon of the MOFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] in their speeches”.⁴¹

In China, Myanmar, and Singapore,⁴² the state is responsible for human security. The complex international norm of human security has been developed under the umbrella of state security. The state itself has promoted national, welfare, or development policies in line with the human security concept without specifically using the term itself. Through these approaches, the state has enabled its people to escape from fear and want. Thailand is the only country among the eleven considered here that has established a ministry with a name that incorporates the term “human security” – the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security.⁴³

The situation in Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam is complex.⁴⁴ In these countries, the human security concept has not been introduced as positively or thoroughly as in the above-mentioned countries, although aspects of it have been adapted to suit intrinsic norms. Instead of shifting local norms to conform to the “foreign”⁴⁵ concept of human security, human security has become an approach used to respond to various threats. The considerable threats that these countries face include natural disasters, health issues, lack of basic foods, poverty, economic and political instability, and excessive development.

This diverse range of threats largely overlaps with so-called non-traditional security (NTS) issues. While military threats from foreign states are considered “traditional”, many threats that simultaneously affect multiple countries are of a non-military nature and fall into the category of “non-traditional” threats. There is growing interest in NTS among policymakers and researchers in China and South Korea, as well as in Southeast Asian countries, and this seems to have contributed to the acceptance of the concept of human security in the region.⁴⁶

Substantial differences remain between approaches which focus on NTS and the human security approach: while actors who address these kinds of diverse threats still concentrate on national governments in the former framework, greater emphasis is placed on peer collaboration between states and other actors in the latter. For example, an Indonesian military officer argues that the term “security” should not be used until the hunger level or the impact of infectious disease has exceeded a certain threshold and

⁴⁰ Cabinet Decision, “Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter”, Cabinet Decision, 10 February 2015, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000067701.pdf> (Accessed 22 August 2018).

⁴¹ Kim et al., “Human Security in South Korea”, 1.

⁴² See Chng and Jamil, “Human Security in Singapore”; Dung and Lan, “Human Security in Vietnam”; Ren, “Human Security: Chinese Experience”; and Thuzar, “Human Security in Myanmar”.

⁴³ Jumnianpol and Nuangjamnong, “Human Security in Thailand”, 11.

⁴⁴ Sovachana and Beban, “Human Security in Cambodia”; Atienza, “Human Security in Practice”; Alexandra, “Perception on Human Security”; Guan and Tien, “Human Security in Malaysia”; and Dung and Lan, “Human Security in Vietnam”.

⁴⁵ Alexandra, “Perception on Human Security”, 30.

⁴⁶ Ren, “Human Security: Chinese Experience”; Alexandra, “Perception on Human Security”; Guan and Tien, “Human Security in Malaysia”; Atienza, “Human Security in Practice”; Kim et al., “Human Security in South Korea”; Dung and Lan, “Human Security in Vietnam”; Caballero-Anthony et al., *Non-Traditional Security in Asia*; Caballero-Anthony et al., *Dilemmas in Securitization*, and Li, *China and Non-Traditional Security*.

becomes a real threat to the survival of all citizens.⁴⁷ The role of national armies in coping with human security challenges should be limited according to this approach because, if every threat were to be considered a security challenge, the military would be overwhelmed by the resulting deluge of duties.

In summary, most countries throughout East Asia have accepted and adapted the principles behind the human security concept, even if they do not use the term directly. Foreign norms have entered this region and have been combined with local norms. Elements of the human security concept, particularly freedom from fear and want, are now familiar and important sub-norms in many states. Prior acceptance of the idea of non-traditional security has made it easier to diffuse this new norm of human security in East Asian countries, and the complex norms of human security have been modified and localized.⁴⁸

Diversified threats and preferred responses

The previous section analysed variations in the localized acceptance of human security norms. The wide range of these variations can be attributed to the breadth of ways in which threats are understood. This section identifies the range of threats that are perceived to be significant in East Asia and it assesses how international cooperation can respond to those threats. The case studies identified the following threats: climate change; typhoons/cyclones; floods; volcano eruptions; earthquakes; tsunamis; infectious diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian influenza, and HIV/AIDS; food crises; lack of basic health and education; environmental pollution; urbanization; extreme poverty; unemployment; migration; human trafficking; violent conflicts; interstate military conflicts; religious intolerance; organized crime; oppression from the government, and so forth. The ranking of these threats in terms of priority varies from country to country.

The order and classification of the sources of threats to human security derive from their links to and effects on the physical system (the earth), the living system (animals and plants), and the social system (human beings). Tanaka has called for a clearer understanding of the mechanisms by which these threats bring about human insecurities and that approach will require close collaboration between different academic disciplines including the natural sciences and engineering, the biological and ecological sciences, and the social sciences and the humanities.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, HDR 1994 listed seven main categories of human security, linked to economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security.⁵⁰ These areas correspond not only to divisions of the UN's specialized agencies but also to government ministries, and so the classification can generally be accepted at national level as familiar and practical.

International cooperation is becoming a norm in responses to these threats. The case studies' interviews examined whether foreign support should be accepted in situations where a country suffers an uncontrollable crisis due to a natural disaster or violent conflict; they also assessed whether a country should support neighbouring countries in similar situations. The common pattern of responses to these hypothetical situations

⁴⁷ Alexandra, "Perception on Human Security", 20.

⁴⁸ Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter?*

⁴⁹ Tanaka, "Toward a Theory of Human Security".

⁵⁰ United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, 22-37.

suggested that foreign support is undesirable during political unrest but welcome when a natural disaster occurs. It is also preferred if, in either case, the support is provided via multilateral rather than unilateral frameworks because UN- or ASEAN-led assistance is neutral and incorporates a wide network of partners and a broad range of experience.⁵¹

Natural disasters are a characteristic threat – especially in Asia – and in many cases they require international cooperation. From 1987 to 2016, natural disasters occurring in Asia accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the world's total, resulting in over 60 per cent of worldwide deaths and more than 80 per cent of the people affected.⁵² In 2004, the Indian Ocean earthquake caused a tsunami that hit India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and other countries, and more than 220,000 people died.⁵³ In the same year, the death toll in the world from violent conflict was 31,000.⁵⁴ With the exception of 1994, annual death tolls in the world due to conflict did not exceed 100,000 before 2012.⁵⁵ The magnitude of the damage caused by natural disasters may make it easier for people in affected countries to accept foreign norms and international cooperation.

In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals, and, over the next 15 years, the signatory states will mobilize efforts to achieve these universally applied goals while ensuring that no one is left behind. This resonates with the

people-centered response of the human security norm. People can just as easily be left behind by a natural disaster or violent conflict. It is easier to accept international cooperation in case of natural disasters than violent conflict. Humanitarian assistance in conflict-affected areas is, in some cases, considered to be part of an intervention. An interviewee in Vietnam argued that assistance in situations of violent conflict “should only be called for (...) from those who are either allies, or have had traditional and long-term relationships with Vietnam”.⁵⁶

In summary, while the considerable threats in East Asia are diverse, their sources can be classified in terms of physical systems, living systems, and social systems. Both interdisciplinary collaboration and international cooperation are required for effective responses, and international cooperation has been accepted more easily in cases of natural disasters than violent conflict. The international cooperation norm has been accepted, rejected, and remodelled, just as the norm-complex of human security was.

State security and human security

The previous two sections demonstrated the diverse threats that affect East Asia. Due to the region's broad interpretation of what constitutes a threat, the concept of human security has been accepted as a norm-complex. As international cooperation is required to respond to these threats, this section discusses which actors are necessary to secure human security in East Asia when threats occur. All the case studies unequivocally

⁵¹ Atienza, “Human Security in Practice”, 37-39.

⁵² Asian Disaster Reduction Center, *Natural Disaster Data Book*, http://www.adrc.asia/publications/databook/ORG/databook_2016/pdf/DataBook2016_e.pdf (Accessed 24 August 2018).

⁵³ Adu Aletha, “Killer Waves”, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6803480/what-happened-boxing-day-tsunami-2004-countries-hit-indian-ocean-earthquake-death/> (Accessed 22 August 2018).

⁵⁴ Department of Peace and Conflict Research, “Uppsala Conflict Data Program”, <http://ucdp.uu.se/> (Accessed 22 August 2018)

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Dung and Lan, “Human Security in Vietnam”, 25.

identified the main actor for securing human security as the affected sovereign state and its government. In regard to the role of states in realizing human security, a loose consensus, as well as subtle disagreements, existed between interviewees from East Asian countries.

The case study from China suggests that state security has a causal link with human security. The idea that people should not be easily sacrificed for national objectives is absolutely correct, because human beings are not the means to an end but are rather ends in themselves. Nevertheless, national security and personal security can be compatible. The perception that states are a “necessary evil” is not a Chinese but a Western idea. East Asians naturally expect a great deal from their governments, anticipating that governments will protect them just as parents protect their children.⁵⁷ This view of states as benevolent and “paternalistic”, and the acceptance of a relationship in which a stable state guarantees people’s security, is also expressed in the case study that focuses on Vietnam.⁵⁸

Elsewhere in East Asia, there is another understanding that human security is part of state security, which is to say that state security subordinates human security, not vice versa. This type of view was expressed by government officers from Indonesia; however, some interviewees from the government’s side added that the role of the military in human security should be strictly limited. Indonesian interviewees opined that military operations should be firmly placed under civilian control, even though the military responded effectively to the earthquake and tsunami in 2004.⁵⁹ This is because they believe, firstly, that the military is not trained to respond to non-military threats and, secondly, that it is often better to entrust the duty of maintaining public order to police forces in disaster situations.

There are countries with impressive traditions of civil society activism such as the Philippines and Thailand which have strongly influenced the trajectory of the acceptance of human security.⁶⁰ In the case studies of Malaysia and Singapore,⁶¹ dynamic and strained relationships between the government and civil society were vividly depicted. Malaysia is relying on being able to consolidate human security through the empowerment of local governments, more active dialogues between the government and civil society, and regional cooperation through the networks of ASEAN and NGOs against the backdrop of the government’s repression of free speech, and its religious intolerance. In the responses recorded in the Cambodian case study, the biggest threats to human security were expressed as fear of government authorities and/or powerful people, but people nevertheless expected the state to play the role of protecting them and even empowering them.⁶²

When severe threats to human security are actualized, the relationship between state sovereignty and human security may become extremely tense. The Myanmar case study notes that when Cyclone Nargis hit the country in 2008, the military government refused

⁵⁷ Ren, “Human Security: Chinese Experience”, 13-14.

⁵⁸ Dung and Lan, “Human Security in Vietnam”.

⁵⁹ Alexandra, “Perception on Human Security”, 28-30.

⁶⁰ Atienza, “Human Security in Practice” and Jumnianpol and Nuangjamnong, “Human Security in Thailand”.

⁶¹ Guan and Tien, “Human Security in Malaysia” and Chng and Jamil, “Human Security in Singapore”.

⁶² Sovachana and Beban, “Human Security in Cambodia”.

to accept foreign aid, even while lowland residents were caught in the flooding. The number of dead and missing persons is estimated at nearly 140,000. Though Western countries such as France threatened to make an R2P-type humanitarian intervention, the government of Myanmar rejected these moves and instead decided to accept coordinated assistance from organizations such as ASEAN and the UN.⁶³ This approach, based on multilateral collaboration, has become a model for humanitarian operations in East Asia.

The case study of Japan demonstrates that the concept of human security can be “politicized” in the contexts of domestic debates on security and securitization.⁶⁴ In contrast, the study of Thailand indicates concerns that human security is now too “depoliticized” – the concept has been reduced to the practice of social welfare and is now rarely discussed in Thai diplomatic contexts.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the Buddhist concept of mercy seems to lie behind the activities of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security which seeks to improve the well-being of the socially vulnerable. This suggests an attempt to integrate human security with the concept of a sufficiency economy advocated by King Rama IX in the 19th century. These dynamics of politicization, depoliticization, and local reinterpretation are interesting in terms of the “norm localization” discussed in the previous section.

In short, in East Asia, it is primarily the sovereign state that fulfils human security. However, the confidence people have in the states they inhabit varies. The government is basically expected to implement favourable policies and carry out good deeds for its people, but governments have also at times functioned as a threat. Despite this, the recognition of the state’s role in protecting its people is unshakeable in East Asia.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated flexibility in the concept and operation of human security as a localized norm-complex in East Asia. Eleven countries have accepted the UN-based international norms of human security in their respective ways, either through government or civil society, as foreign policy, or in the form of domestic activities. We can conclude, firstly, that the elements comprising the international norm-complex of human security are accepted in East Asia in a localized way. Even though the use of the term human security is not pervasive, a localized norm of human security which involves a measure of non-traditional security appears in many states.

Secondly, the contradictions between various different sub-norms of human security might be overcome through the cooperative mechanisms involved in responding to the huge natural disasters that are common threats in East Asia. Some states, however, reject international cooperation because they are concerned about its negative impact on sovereignty. Interdisciplinary collaboration to tackle the broad range of threats to human security derived from the physical system (the earth), from the living system (animals and plants), and from the social system (human beings)⁶⁶ requires close international cooperation. Thirdly, in East Asia, human security is considered to supplement state security, especially in cases of natural disaster, and both are compatible. It is primarily the

⁶³ Thuzar, “Human Security in Myanmar”.

⁶⁴ Kurusu, “Analysis of Japanese Perceptions”.

⁶⁵ Jumnianpol and Nuangjamnong, “Human Security in Thailand”.

⁶⁶ Tanaka, “Toward a Theory of Human Security”.

sovereign state that fulfils human security and the recognition of the role of the state in protecting people is unshakeable.

Following on from these three main findings, further exploration is needed in the areas of dignity and empowerment. In terms of empowerment, the interviewees expect the state not only to protect its people but also to empower them. When human security supplements state security and both are compatible, the question of how people can empower themselves from below in East Asia will require further research. The theoretical framework of norm-complexes and norm dynamics will be of help since it may help to resolve the internal contradictions of another component of the human security norm: “protection from above”.

With regards to dignity, the third component of human security, “freedom to live with dignity” also needs further study. The case study of Japan included an expert’s opinion that this element could generate added value from the human security approach because “dignity is an idea of waiting and caring”.⁶⁷ The survey in the Philippines also found that the concept of dignity had the potential to raise human security to a higher dimension and emphasized the importance of local contexts.⁶⁸ Moreover, people in Cambodia said that having dignity is associated with “having a moral character; with notions of respect, pride, and having value and independence; and of helping others and having an honest character”.⁶⁹ A rural resident remarked candidly that “Dignity is most important because it is about no discrimination, having rights to do what we want, not being looked down upon by wealthy people”.⁷⁰ A specifically East Asian understanding of dignity may be recognized in these arguments. The component of dignity in the norm-complex of human security must be open to flexible adaptation, and this is something that will require further deep analysis.

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⁶⁷ See Kurusu, “Analysis of Japanese Perceptions” and Ren, “Human Security: Chinese Experience”, 40.

⁶⁸ Atienza, “Human Security in Practice”.

⁶⁹ Sovachana and Beban, “Human Security in Cambodia”, 17.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

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The Determinants of Negotiation Commencement in Civil Conflicts

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ABSTRACT

Although the world has witnessed more negotiated settlements in civil conflicts since the end of Cold War than in previous eras, scholars still question what brings the parties of civil conflicts to the negotiation table in the first place. Previous scholarship has neglected significant variables concerning the potential costs and benefits of negotiation, such as reputation, legitimacy, relationships to the status quo, and the reliability of the actors involved, as well as the presence and role of third parties in the conflict. In doing so, studies have failed to grasp that negotiation is a process and a costly choice in itself. This article investigates the determinants that affect negotiation commencement in civil conflicts in terms of costs and benefits to the warring parties. It shows that the odds of negotiation occurring become higher when existing conditions or the characteristics of parties mean that involvement is cost-cutting rather than cost-increasing.

Keywords: Civil Conflicts, Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution, Negotiation, The Costs/Benefits of Negotiation

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Introduction

While political scientists have investigated why peace processes fail, civil conflicts arise, and negotiations succeed or fail, they have not sufficiently examined the predictors of negotiation use in civil wars.¹ Constructing an adequate model for the initiation of negotiations has a plethora of advantages including saving lives, time, and resources and encouraging peacebuilding, reconciliation, and the restoration of justice.² The study of negotiations commencement in wars (civil or interstate) lags behind other areas of research in world politics, which focus on issues such as war and peace, foreign policy, leadership in conflict, and terrorism. Few analysts have attempted to delineate the conditions under which negotiations become more probable in civil conflicts.³

Bargaining theory and ripeness theory have been proposed to explain when, why, and where negotiations are most likely to happen in interstate and civil wars. Both paradigms concentrate on the cost of war as the main independent outcome driving changes in negotiations. On the one hand, using bargaining theory, Blainey and Pillar have suggested that parties to a conflict view their participation as a bargaining process that enables them to achieve their proclaimed outcomes.⁴ Fearon concluded that parties' perceptions of the different outcomes involved in the bargain, as well as monetary cost, casualties, loss/gain of territorial control, and other factors determine whether a party will initiate negotiations.⁵ On the other hand, Zartman posited what has become known as "ripeness theory" to explain why and when the parties to a conflict prefer negotiations over warring.⁶ He argued that parties are more likely to negotiate when they are in a rough and costly situation.⁷ Two factors facilitate the initiation of negotiation: one is "mutually hurting stalemate" and the other is a desire to seek a "way out". Mutually hurting stalemate refers to a situation where both parties have come to believe that they cannot practically or successfully escalate the conflict to achieve their goals at an acceptable cost;⁸ therefore, they seek "a way out" of the conflict.⁹ The literature informed by the two theories noted here concludes that negotiations begin once the cost of war exceeds the expected value to be gained from fighting.

Ghosn observed that negotiation in international wars may be associated with some costs and benefits,¹⁰ but his idea gained little purchase and most other researchers continued to regard negotiation as a costless decision. Kaplow was the first to mention that negotiation itself might inflict costs on, or produce benefits for, parties engaged in civil conflicts.¹¹ He

¹ Hartzell et al., "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables"; Hartzell et al., "Institutionalizing Peace"; Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?"; Cunningham, "Veto Players and Civil War Duration".

² Bercovitch et al., "Negotiation or Mediation"; Pearson et al., "The Challenge of Operationalizing Key Concepts"; Pearson et al., "Steps toward Peace in Civil Wars in the Asia-Pacific Region".

³ Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*; Bapat, "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes"; Findley, "Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution".

⁴ Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*; Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace*.

⁵ Fearon, "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War".

⁶ I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*.

⁷ I. William Zartman, *The Unfinished Agenda*.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Zartman, "Ripeness".

¹⁰ Ghosn, "Getting to the Table and Getting to Yes".

¹¹ Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus".

argued that parties involved in civil wars often do not negotiate when they perceive negotiation as being costly, and he went on to identify several measurements to quantify the costs and benefits derived during negotiation, including the fear of losing external and/or internal support, the risk of granting legitimacy to the other side, and the difficulty of finding a reliable partner with whom to negotiate. Building on Kaplow's insights, as well as other theoretical premises, this current study identifies several additional measurements related to the costs and benefits of negotiations, including terrorism, the role of third parties, the characteristics of the governments or insurgent groups involved, and the government's respect or lack thereof for human rights. It then uses these measures to capture the costs and benefits of negotiation in civil conflict contexts, using a large dataset to ensure an inclusive sample size and a broad time frame.

The findings of this research do not directly contradict other existing approaches which focus on the "cost" or "type" of wars; rather, they suggest that the "cost of war" logic is especially relevant to negotiation decisions made in civil wars. Military stalemate and the insurgent's control over a territory, which are accepted measurements of the costs of conflicts, seem to be important determinants of the initiations of negotiation as a result. However, the findings also show that the cost of war is not the sole determinant of negotiations, and the study finds support for indicators that relate to the costs and benefits of negotiations. Findings show that third parties may play both positive and negative roles in shaping parties' perceptions about whether the decision to negotiate is a cost or a benefit to them. Moreover, it is found that the parties to a civil conflict are often concerned about the legitimacy and reliability of the other side as a negotiation partner and about their own reputation if negotiations carry a risk that they might be perceived by their constituency as being concession-prone or weak.

This study's contribution to the understanding of negotiation in civil conflicts is threefold. First, it extends Kaplow's insight by adding new measures and variables, as well as providing a study based on wider geographic coverage; it also improves the existing understanding of the conditions that lead to negotiation during civil conflicts by focusing on difficult negotiation issues in particular.¹² Second, the study draws on an extensive review of literature about the commencement of negotiations; this has enabled us to assess many previously tested and newly suggested hypotheses together under the "costs/benefits of negotiation" framework. Third, the study utilizes five reliable datasets – namely the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict (NSA) Dataset, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the International Military Intervention (IMI) Dataset, and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project – merging them to establish the conditions that ripen the ground for negotiation.¹³

Overall, this research attempts to conceptualize possible indicators for the occurrence of negotiation during civil conflicts at a theoretical level, so that researchers and analysts can give meaning to the correlation between these indicators and the practical occurrences of negotiation. It understands negotiation as a process, and it takes all negotiation attempts in civil conflicts between 1989 and 2008 into consideration without regard for their

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001"; Cunningham et al., "Non-State Actors in Civil Wars"; START, "Global Terrorism Database"; Pearson et al., "International Military Interventions"; Pickering et al., "The International Military Intervention Dataset"; Cingranelli et al., "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset".

successes or failures. The study assumes that any negotiation attempt at any stage of a conflict may indicate the willingness of the parties involved to discuss the conflict's issues further.

The determinants of negotiation commencement

It is vital to conceptualize negotiations in civil conflict before delving into a detailed survey of their commencement factors. Bercovitch and Jackson define negotiation as "a process by which states and other actors communicate and exchange proposals in an attempt to agree about the dimensions of conflict termination and their future relationship".¹⁴ In line with the Uppsala Armed Conflict Database (UCDP), this study defines negotiation as talks between warring parties concerning conflict-related issues, such as ceasefires, exchange of war prisoners, and the creation of humanitarian zones.¹⁵ This generally accepted definition has been supported by a range of studies.¹⁶

The conventional wisdom in world politics is that negotiations in civil wars are a complicated puzzle.¹⁷ Civil wars last longer than interstate wars due to the lower probability of reaching a negotiated settlement.¹⁸ This "delayed negotiations" phenomenon has been linked to numerous factors, which include parties' failure or unwillingness to recognize each other as credible and legitimate negotiating partners;¹⁹ issues at stake that are unsuited to compromise;²⁰ parties' optimism in the early years of a conflict that victory is a probable outcome;²¹ and parties' perceptions that losses will be more salient than any gains that might result from any prospective negotiation.²² These factors shape the negotiation puzzle in civil wars, and they raise a number of questions: firstly about why negotiations take place in certain conflicts while not in others, and, secondly, about whether or not the timing of negotiations can be predicted or sped up by increasing the impact of ancillary factors that lead to their commencement. Thirdly, we might ask, what role is played by the costs and benefits associated with the actors' perceptions of a possible negotiation? Such questions have given rise to the emerging literature on the determinants of negotiations; those determinants are reviewed below.

The cost of conflict

Scholars of conflict resolution have translated both the bargaining theory of war and Zartman's ripeness theory into a unified framework for analysing international and civil conflict in order to focus on the cost of conflict.²³ An understanding that relies on this framework proposes that the higher the costs of conflict are for involved parties, the higher chances are that negotiations will commence and succeed, assuming that all parties to the conflict are rational. As for the operationalization of costs associated with conflicts,

¹⁴ Jacob Bercovitch et al., *International Conflict*, 25-26.

¹⁵ Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001".

¹⁶ Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus"; Findley, "Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution".

¹⁷ Fred Iklé, *Every War Must End*; Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace*; I. William Zartman, *The Unfinished Agenda*.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Fred Iklé, *Every War Must End*; Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace*.

²⁰ Ibid.; Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace*.

²¹ Bapat, "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes".

²² McDermott, "Prospect Theory and Negotiation".

²³ Rubinstein, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model"; Powell, "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict"; Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution*.

studies have suggested that various factors have an effect including military stalemate, a deteriorating economy, casualties of conflicts, war weariness, the conflict's intensity, and dynastic survival.²⁴

Dukalskis argues for the importance of "war weariness" as a factor, whereby parties in a long-lasting conflict come to realize that there is a low probability of victory and decide to settle by negotiation without necessarily achieving their goals in full.²⁵ Pursuing a similar vein of enquiry, Collier and Hoeffler find that the probability of peace increases every year after a seven-year conflict period.²⁶ Doyle and Sambanis support this argument when they note that long wars are more likely to be settled by negotiation because of parties' increasing perception that their likelihood of victory is low.²⁷ Recent studies, however, have been taking different approaches and have provided new conditions to consider, such as the number of potential claimants, the intensity of the conflict, the relationship between the disputants, and services provided by the insurgent groups.²⁸

The type of conflict

It is important to note that not all civil conflicts are the same. While some are fought over territorial disputes, others primarily focus on control of governance.²⁹ Some scholars have suggested that the indivisibility of the issues at stake in civil conflicts make them difficult to resolve.³⁰ Iklé, for example, argues that, in civil wars where the sides are not geographically separable, partition is difficult and therefore "one side has to get all, or nearly so".³¹ Pillar sees negotiation during a civil conflict as less practical than in an interstate conflict due to this same problem of indivisibility.³²

The divisibility of territorial and governmental control issues seems to make the likelihood of a negotiation quite difficult for the parties involved. On the one hand, it could be argued that an insurgency fought over a territory might be easier to resolve through negotiation because, while the political elite can make concessions on territory, they can still hold on to power.³³ On the other hand, Walter has found that insurgent groups fighting over territory are not more likely to initiate negotiations, and this has a negative effect on the insurgent's willingness to sign a treaty.³⁴ Moreover, Walter has found that territorial goals, as opposed to goals associated with gaining a share of governing power, have a negative effect on the willingness of insurgents to come to an agreement.

²⁴ De Mesquita et al., "War and the Survival of Political Leaders"; Collier et al., "Greed and Grievance in Civil War"; Dukalskis, "Why do Some Insurgent Groups agree to Cease-fires While Others Do Not?".

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Collier et al., "Greed and Grievance in Civil War".

²⁷ Sambanis, "Terrorism and Civil War".

²⁸ Findley, "Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution"; Heger et al., "Negotiating with Rebels".

²⁹ Walter, *Committing to Peace*.

³⁰ Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993"; Mason et al., "How Civil Wars End".

³¹ Fred Iklé, *Every War Must End*, 95.

³² Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace*.

³³ Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes".

³⁴ Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace*.

The costs and benefits of negotiation

The existing scholarship on conflict negotiation suffers from scholars' lack of understanding about how negotiations incur costs or benefits for the respective parties in civil and international conflicts. Only a few academics have raised the question of the costs and benefits of negotiation,³⁵ and, before Kaplow's study,³⁶ many scholars treated negotiation as a costless choice, on the assumption that parties to civil conflict were deciding to negotiate based on the cost of war or some other characteristic of the conflict. However, Kaplow argued that the commencement of negotiations in civil wars brings a number of potential benefits and costs to parties.

The construction of hypotheses

This study builds on Kaplow's insight and uses several additional measurements (such as terrorism, the role of third parties, characteristics of the insurgent groups involved, and the government's respect or lack thereof for human rights) in its analysis of a large dataset to thoroughly capture the costs and benefits of negotiation in civil conflict contexts.³⁷ On the basis of this analysis, we suggest the following hypotheses to account for the commencement of negotiations in civil conflicts:

Table 1. Suggested hypotheses

Variables	Hypotheses
The number of actors	<u>Reputation Hypothesis</u> : Negotiation becomes less likely to happen if the government perceives potential fights with additional insurgent groups.
The insurgent's political link	<u>Legitimacy Hypothesis</u> : Negotiation is more likely to happen if the insurgent group is connected to a legal political party or faction.
The insurgent's leadership structure	<u>Valid Spokesman Hypothesis</u> : Negotiation is more likely to occur if the insurgent group has a known representative who speaks for them.
	<u>External Pressure Hypothesis</u>
The insurgent's transnational constituency	<u>Hypothesis a</u> : Governments are more likely to negotiate if the insurgent group has a transnational constituency or actually receives foreign assistance.
External military support for the insurgent	<u>Hypothesis b</u> : Insurgents are less likely to negotiate when they receive external military support.
Terrorism-oriented groups v others	<u>Terrorism Hypothesis</u> : Negotiation is less likely if the insurgent group is terrorism-oriented.

³⁵ Ghosn, "Getting to the Table and Getting to Yes"; Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus".

³⁶ Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus".

³⁷ Ibid.

Physical integrity rights and empowerment rights indexes	<u>Human Rights Hypothesis:</u> Negotiation is less likely to happen if the government breaches human rights.
	<u>Foreign Military Intervention Hypothesis</u>
Foreign military intervention	<u>Hypothesis a:</u> Negotiation is more likely to happen in the presence of a third-party intervention.
Neutral intervention vs. biased interventions	<u>Hypothesis b:</u> Neutral foreign military intervention will increase the likelihood of negotiation compared to biased foreign military intervention.

The reputation hypothesis derives from the idea that governments do not want to be perceived as concession-prone.³⁸ A government may therefore understand negotiation with an insurgent or a terrorist group as a loss of popular support (loss of reputation). Given that governments are not generally willing to grant legitimacy to any insurgent group,³⁹ a possible negotiation already represents a cost for the government. Moreover, the involvement of every additional insurgent group increases the perceived cost of negotiation in the government's eyes. This is because governments may be concerned that other insurgent groups will demand privileges that are the same as, or similar to, those granted to the first insurgents with whom the government comes to terms. Therefore, governments may perceive negotiation as being costly when they are fighting with multiple actors.

Questions about the legitimacy of the actors involved in civil conflicts have been pointed to as the biggest impediments to negotiation.⁴⁰ Most of the time, governments do not recognize insurgent groups as having enough legitimacy to justify the initiation of talks, and they often label insurgent actors as terrorists, traitors, and criminals.⁴¹ It is safe to assume that negotiation with an insurgent group poses a cost to governments due to these legitimacy issues, but legitimacy is a variable factor: some groups may appear more legitimate than others, and this, in turn, can decrease the costs that governments perceive to be attached to negotiation in certain cases. Under some conditions, an insurgent group can be considered as somewhat legitimate or at least to have de facto credibility. For instance, if the insurgent group is linked to a legal or proto-legal political party, the group can represent its goals and demands clearly through nonviolent means rather than through resort to the use of arms.

It is a prerequisite for any sort of negotiation that it must be possible to find a representative of the group(s) involved in the conflict in order to initiate talks.⁴² By definition, negotiation requires at least two parties to consider the issues involved in a

³⁸ Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace*.

³⁹ Bapat, "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes".

⁴⁰ I. William Zartman, *The Unfinished Agenda*; Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace*.

⁴¹ Bapat, "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes".

⁴² I. William Zartman, *Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts*.

confrontation. While, on the government's side, there will always be one official or more who can speak with authority, it is not always easy to identify a representative for an insurgent group, even if the government is eager to settle a conflict through negotiation.⁴³ As we have noted, not all insurgent groups are the same and some are more structured than others, and it is easier for governments to initiate peace talks with an insurgent group when that group has a leader or some sort of hierarchical structure. Therefore, governments perceive negotiation to be less costly when the insurgent group has a valid spokesperson to speak on its behalf.

Zartman argues that very few intrastate wars are purely internal.⁴⁴ This is to say that the government, the insurgent group, or both, receive external support during the conflict. This support might encompass military assistance, financial support, or even diplomatic influence. For the purpose of this study, the insurgents' external support is of particular concern because civil conflicts are often seen as asymmetric conflicts where, without the help of outside support, the insurgents may be weaker than the government in terms of factors such as military capability, financial power, and legitimacy.

External support in the context of negotiation can be interpreted differently and external pressure on negotiations can go either of two ways. First, those insurgent groups which have a transnational constituency can bring international pressure to bear, leveraging the influence of diaspora groups in order to encourage a government to negotiate or make concessions. When outside pressure to solve a conflict's issues is directed towards a government, the regime may want to meet the demands of the outsiders and so it may come to see negotiation or the making of some concessions as being less costly than fighting. Second, the presence of outside support for insurgent groups can affect the decisions made in negotiations. Insurgent groups desire maintenance of their outside support and therefore cannot make a decision against an external group's wishes.⁴⁵ In such cases, the insurgent groups perceive negotiation as a cost which may cause them to lose their external support. It is notable that, while the first hypothesis looks at the negotiation cost from the perspective of the government, the second takes the insurgents' assessment of the cost into account. Both situations represent the effects of external pressure, even though that pressure affects perceptions of the negotiation calculation in different ways.

In the literature on conflict resolution, there are no clear distinctions between insurgents and terrorist groups when it comes to negotiation practices, and although the general position of governments is that they neither concede to terrorists nor negotiate with them, Neumann argues that they do often negotiate in relation to various issues.⁴⁶ Fortna finds that rebels who use terrorism are less likely to experience a negotiated settlement than those who avoid terrorism.⁴⁷ Fortna also asserts that terrorism only causes the conflict to last longer and is not useful for rebels as a means of achieving their political goals. On the other hand, Thomas draws on an examination of civil wars in African countries to argue that governments are more likely to offer concessions to rebels who execute large-scale

⁴³ Cunningham et al., "Non-state Actors in Civil Wars"; Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus".

⁴⁴ I. William Zartman, *Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts*.

⁴⁵ Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus".

⁴⁶ Neumann, "Negotiating with Terrorists".

⁴⁷ Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win?".

terrorism during civil wars than those who eschew terrorism.⁴⁸ She argues that the use of terror not only displays the insurgent's "power to hurt" but puts governments at a disadvantage when they are forced into the passive position of responding to terrorism. This study suggests that governments will be less likely to negotiate with those who rely on terrorism if the public perceive negotiation as an act that concedes to violence; any such perception may damage a government's reputation and credibility and so the government might therefore perceive negotiation with a group that uses violence as a cost.

The human rights hypothesis also considers the costs-benefits calculation from the perspective of the insurgent group, bearing in mind that it is not always the government which is not willing to negotiate. There have been few, if any, attempts in the literature to include the government's respect for human rights as an indicator of the prospect for negotiation in civil conflicts, yet it is a factor that is clearly in play for insurgents. Just as governments insist that they will not acquiesce to the violent actions of insurgents or terrorists, insurgent groups insist that they will not ignore the violent and disrespectful actions of a government, and there are cases where the government accedes to negotiation demands and the insurgents forego the chance to negotiate, as has been seen in Sri Lanka, Eritrea, and the Western Sahara.⁴⁹ Insurgents tend to perceive negotiation as less costly if a government has a reasonably good reputation for respecting human rights than if it has little or no respect for those rights. The logic here is that the insurgent groups are concerned about the effects of a potential negotiation on their internal cohesion and appeal to their constituents if they engage without human rights being safeguarded to some extent. If insurgent groups do initiate any form of negotiation with a government disrespectful of human rights, disagreements might arise among their group members that would pose risks to both internal cohesion and external credibility. By the same token, Kahneman and Tversky argue that, when legitimate rights are violated or moral outrage is incurred, the anticipated loss from a potential negotiation may be perceived as more unacceptable to the parties.⁵⁰ Although it is not right to expect that all insurgent groups will be equally concerned about liberal values, such as human rights, the hypothesis still holds value because governments' observation of human rights can at least be interpreted as a sign of a partners' reliability during negotiations and can produce other benefits or safeguards. For example, if a negotiation fails and fights begin anew, the members of insurgent groups may expect fair trials and justice in the future rather than torture and political killings. In essence, insurgent groups feel they at least have better chances when negotiating with a respectful government rather than a disrespectful one.

Third-party states regularly practise foreign military intervention in order to influence the evolution of civil wars. While some scholars have argued that military interventions increase the duration of the wars, others have asserted that the direction of military intervention plays a major role in determining the probability of negotiation.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Thomas, "Rewarding Bad Behavior".

⁴⁹ I. William Zartman, *Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts*.

⁵⁰ Kahneman et al., "Conflict Resolution".

⁵¹ Pickering et al., "Political, Economic, and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention"; Patrick M. Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers*; Pearson et al., "International Military Interventions".

Accordingly, Pearson and Baumann categorize foreign military interventions into three types: neutral, supportive, and hostile.⁵²

The parties' lack of trust in each other and the absence of commitment and goodwill are the main obstacles that stand in the way of a possible negotiation, and therefore parties perceive these problems as part of the cost of negotiating. However, the presence of a neutral third party can lower the cost of negotiation by offering at least a guarantee of security in the case of a failed negotiation. In these cases, although a cost of negotiation is initially perceived as unavoidable by the parties involved, that cost can be mitigated, or become a benefit, when a third party offers to provide commitment and trust in certain forms during negotiations. In other words, intangible factors, such as goodwill and trust, which are perceived as certain costs by the parties at the beginning can appear as certain benefits in the presence of a third party, and this will increase the likelihood of a negotiation.⁵³

Methodology and data

Since this study's dependent variable was a binary measure of negotiation, the statistical technique of Logistic Regression was used to test our hypotheses. The unit of analysis was structured in "dyad-year" form, which stood for a government group and an insurgent group being in conflict with one another in a given year. Dyadic form is important to this study since its main goal is to understand the negotiation calculation from the perspective of both warring parties. The study is informed by the notion put forward by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, that "it takes two" to negotiate.⁵⁴ It is interested neither in understanding changes in conditions over time, nor in how the negotiation has affected the outcome, partly because most of the variables do not show much variance over time. Therefore, it takes every dyad-year as an independent case, without assessing the factor of time, and this research strategy is in line with those of most of the other studies which have focused on similar research questions.⁵⁵

In order to explain the relationship between the costs and benefits of negotiation and the occurrences of negotiation, all civil conflicts occurring from 1989 to 2008 were identified by using the Armed Conflict Database UCDP/PRIO; its definition asserts that a civil conflict is "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year".⁵⁶ These years were chosen since the dependent variable (negotiation) acquired from the UCDP Database Categorical Variables is only available for the conflicts occurring in this time period. For the dyadic form, we relied upon the UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset.⁵⁷ The data were combined with datasets from Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict (NSA),⁵⁸ Global Terrorism Database

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ McDermott, "Prospect Theory and Negotiation".

⁵⁴ Cunningham et al., "It Takes Two".

⁵⁵ Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace*; Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus"; Findley, "Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution".

⁵⁶ Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946-2001".

⁵⁷ Harbom, "Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007".

⁵⁸ Cunningham et al., "Non-State Actors in Civil Wars".

(GTD),⁵⁹ International Military Intervention (IMI),⁶⁰ and CIRI Human Rights Data Project to accommodate, respectively, factors such as the characteristics of insurgent groups, terrorist events, foreign military intervention variables, and governments' respect or lack of it for human rights.⁶¹

The main dataset utilized in this study, the UCDP/PRIO, offers several advantages over alternatives. First, since its threshold for a dyad to be considered to be in a "civil conflict" is 25 battle-related death in a given year, it provides a broader sample than other datasets of armed conflicts which use different thresholds (i.e. 250, 500, and 1,000 battle-related deaths). It allows more cases to be included in the study, but it also enables analysis of the differences between low-level and major conflicts. Second, it allows for dyadic analysis and is compatible with the NSA dataset from which the study derives variables regarding the characteristics of insurgent groups. Third, the broad definition of negotiation used in the construction of the database means that it includes not only successfully implemented negotiations, but also any talks between warring parties concerning conflicts and conflict-related issues. In the end, our study was able to analyse 991 dyad-years on the basis of the collected data, and it was able to include low-level and major internal armed conflicts taking place around the world between 1989 and 2008.

The dependent variable

The dependent variable was a dichotomous measure of negotiation, which assigned a value of one if there were any negotiations in the dyad year and zero otherwise. In the analysis, any talks involving both parties to the conflict and concerning conflict-related issues such as ceasefires, exchanges of prisoners, or the creation of humanitarian zones, were considered to be negotiations.

Independent variables

The costs and benefits of negotiation were measured by several indicators. To test the reputation hypothesis, a simple measure of the number of insurgent groups fighting with the government was created by simply counting the number of insurgent groups fighting with the same government in a given year. To test the legitimacy hypothesis, a measure adopted from the NSA dataset was utilized. Accordingly, a dichotomous measure was used which takes a value of one if the insurgent group has a political link but otherwise assigns a zero. To test the valid spokesman hypothesis, an ordinal measure was constructed, relying on the NSA dataset, which indicates the strength of central leadership in the insurgent group as low, moderate, or high. As for the effect of outside actors on talks between governments and insurgent groups, two hypotheses were proposed and these focused on transnational constituency and outside support.

To test outside support, two dichotomous variables were included which indicate whether or not the insurgent group received military support from an external state and/or non-state actor. By taking this approach, the study helps to differentiate between the effects of different sources of support for insurgent groups on the occurrence of negotiation. The external state support variable took the value of one if the insurgent group received

⁵⁹ START, Global Terrorism Database.

⁶⁰ Pearson et al., "International Military Interventions"; Pickering et al., The International Military Intervention Dataset.

⁶¹ Cingranelli et al., The CIRI Human Rights Dataset.

military support from at least one external state. To test the transnational constituency hypothesis, a dichotomous variable created by the NSA dataset was adopted. The measure for the transnational constituency of an insurgent group took the value of one if the insurgent group had a transnational link to, and/or was supported in a non-military manner by, another non-state actor in other states; otherwise it took the value of zero. To test the terrorism hypothesis, a dichotomous measure was used to distinguish insurgents from terrorists. Accordingly, if the insurgent group was coded in the GTD dataset, it was coded as a terrorist group; otherwise it was coded as an insurgent group.

For the third-party intervention variable, use was made of the IMI dataset in order to code third-party military intervention(s) for the given year. The IMI dataset codes all foreign military intervention in civil conflicts and provides information about the intentions of these interventions, labelling them as neutral, supporting the government, supporting rebels, opposing the government, and/or opposing rebels. Accordingly, two dichotomous variables were created. One dichotomous variable was included to measure whether there was a foreign military intervention in the country regardless of the intervener's intention. Another dichotomous variable was created to indicate whether the intervention was biased or unbiased. The interventions made by opposing governments or insurgents and the ones supporting either parties were coded as biased interventions, while neutral interventions, which did not support either party, were coded as unbiased interventions.

As for the human rights hypothesis, Physical Integrity Rights and Empowerment Rights indexes from the CIRI Project index were adopted. The Physical Integrity Right index includes four indicators (torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance) and ranges from zero, which represents no respect for these four rights, to eight, which represents full respect. The latter index consists of the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly & Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from zero (no respect for these rights) to 14 (full respect for these rights).

Control variables

Since the literature places a heavy emphasis on the cost of conflict, this study used it as a control variable. Drawing on the extant literature, four indicators were used to measure the cost of each conflict. The first indicator was the number of battle-related deaths in a given year. A logarithmic value of this variable was included in the analysis to produce more meaningful interpretation. Second, the duration of conflict, measured by how many years have passed since the conflict first began, was included. Third, the most pronounced stalemate hypothesis was controlled for. To measure stalemate, an ordinal variable drawn from the NSA dataset (which measures the relative strength of insurgent group against the government as "much weaker", "weaker", "at parity", "stronger", and "much stronger") was recoded into a dummy which took the value of one if the military strength of the insurgent group was at parity with the government; otherwise it took a value of zero. Lastly, the NSA dataset's measure of whether or not the insurgent group controlled a territory within the country was adopted.

Due to the focus in previous scholarship on types of conflicts, another series of control variables was included in order to rule out any biased assessment of negotiations during civil conflicts. To decide which issue was at the root of the conflict, a one-dummy variable (called territorial conflicts) was created. While this variable took a value of one if the

conflict was fought over a territory, the territorial conflict variable took a value of zero if the conflict was over government control. In addition, another dummy variable was integrated to differentiate internal conflicts from internationalized conflicts. The UCDP dataset defines an internationalized internal conflict as “armed conflict [which] occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups, with intervention from other states in the form of troops”.⁶² Another dummy was included to differentiate between high-intensity and low-intensity conflicts. Accordingly, while conflicts with more than 1,000 deaths were coded as major conflicts, those with fewer than 1,000 deaths were coded as minor conflicts.

Results

In this study, which relied on the extant literature, two sets of control variables were used, namely cost of war (conflict) and type of war (conflict) variables. Before we employed these variables in the logistic regression, they were separately put into chi-square tests to identify their association with the dependent variable (negotiation). This was necessary because these variables reflect the characteristics of conflicts, and they do not show much variation across time. Thus, it is crucial to determine whether there is a significant association between various characteristics of conflicts and negotiation outcomes. Accordingly, the following tables describe the significance of suggested associations and the percentages for each outcome.

First, the association between the variables of type of conflicts (issues of incompatibility, type of conflict, and intensity of conflict) and the occurrence of negotiation were considered. Accordingly, **Error! Reference source not found.** 2 shows the association between the issues of incompatibility and negotiation. As seen from the table, territorial issues somewhat dominated over governmental issues in the occurrence of negotiation. These numbers suggest, though they do not prove, that it may be easier for parties to negotiate when the issue at stake concerns territorial issues rather than control, or sharing, of governance. This preliminary finding seems to be in line with previous studies.⁶³ Accordingly, the numbers show that while about one-third of territorial conflicts-years have contained negotiations, this is true of one fifth of governmental conflicts-years. From another point of view, almost two thirds of total observed negotiation (66 per cent, 185/280) across dyad-years have occurred in disputes fought over territory, while about one third (34 per cent, 95/280) of those have emerged from conflicts over the control of governance.

Table 2. Issues of Incompatibility and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	Government	Territory	Total
No (negotiation=0)	338 (78.1%)	373 (66.8%)	711 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	95 (21.9%)	185 (33.2%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	433 (100%)	558 (100%)	991 (100%)

$\chi^2 (1) = 15.125, P = .000$

⁶² Pettersson et al., “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014”.

⁶³ Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”; Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace*.

Table 3 illustrates the association that exists between type of conflict and occurrence of negotiation. The study categorizes civil conflicts into two types in terms of the actors involved, namely internationalized and internal conflicts. The table suggests that the association between type of conflict and negotiation is significant. This is to say that the type of conflict may involve some factors which influence parties' perception of negotiation. It is easily noticed that the number of internationalized conflicts is much lower than internal ones. However, it seems that while almost 39 per cent (44/113) of internationalized conflicts have involved negotiations, the figure is about 27 per cent (236/642) for internal conflicts. Although this illustration suggests that actors in internationalized conflicts may be keener on negotiation than those in internal conflicts, the argument cannot be proved unless other factors are controlled. However, since there is a lack of understanding on how internationalized conflicts differ from other civil conflicts in the likelihood of negotiation, this could be a significant starting point for future research on the topic.

Table 3. Type of Conflict and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	Internal	Internationalized	Total
No (negotiation=0)	642 (73.1%)	69 (61.1%)	711 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	236 (26.9%)	44 (38.9%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	878 (100%)	113 (100%)	991 (100%)

$\chi^2 (1) = 7.182, P = .007$

Table 4 demonstrates the association between the intensity of conflicts and negotiation. In the literature, some notional, if arbitrary, thresholds are employed to distinguish the intensity of conflict. In this study, a 25 battle-related deaths threshold was selected to decide whether there was a civil conflict and a 1,000 battle-related deaths threshold was used to decide whether the scale of conflict reached a high level or became a major conflict. Table 4 suggests that the association between the intensity of conflict and negotiation is significant. It seems that the negotiation talks are slightly easier to initiate for dyads in major conflicts than those in minor conflicts. This suggestion is in line with the cost of war argument which suggests that, as the costs of fighting increase, the parties will become increasingly likely to prefer negotiation. Presumably, the cost of war would be higher in major conflicts than minor ones given the time, money, and people invested.

Table 4. Intensity of Conflict and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	Minor	Major	Total
No (negotiation=0)	601 (73.7%)	110 (62.5%)	711 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	214 (26.3%)	66 (37.5%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	815 (100%)	176 (100%)	991 (100%)

$\chi^2 (1) = 9.025, P = .003$

Tables 5 and 6 show further associations between cost of war variables and the occurrence of negotiation. Table 4 illustrates that there is a statistically significant

association between insurgents' territorial control and negotiation outcomes. On the face of it, of the total 384 conflict-years where the insurgent group held a territory within a country, a full 43 per cent (165/384), seem to have encompassed some sorts of negotiations, but, of the total 605 conflict-years in which the insurgent group did not occupy a territory, a full 81 per cent (490/605) had not held any negotiations. As another illustration, in about 59 per cent (165/280) of negotiations observed in dyad-years, the insurgent group had control over a territory within the country. Overall, Table 5 suggests that a negotiation outcome is more likely if the insurgent group controls a territory in the given country.

Table 5. Insurgents' Territorial Control and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	No Control	Control	Total
No (negotiation=0)	490 (81.0%)	219 (57.0%)	709 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	115 (19.0%)	165 (43.0%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	605 (100%)	384 (100%)	989 (100%)

$\chi^2 (1) = 66.446, P = .000$

Lastly, as Table 5 further illustrates, in line with Zartman's prediction, the association between parties' stalemate situation and negotiation is also significant. The suggestion here would be that negotiation might be easier to form in dyads where military power is at parity than in those in which one side is stronger than the other. Also, it is obvious from the table that stalemate situations are very rare events. Indeed, in only 7.2 per cent of 991 dyad-years (71/991) are insurgent groups and governments observed to have equal military power. However, parties to civil conflicts have initiated talks with each other in a full 50.7 per cent (36/71) of such stalemate situations, whereas only 26.6 per cent (244/920) of non-stalemate situations featured negotiations. These results appear to emphatically verify the much-advocated hurting stalemate argument in the literature, though only the "military stalemate" aspect of the concept was tested. This indicates that when parties to civil conflicts are basically unable to escalate the conflict further, they somewhat prefer to step outside of it, although the data indicates that this is still a proposition with roughly 50-50 probability.

Table 6. Insurgents' Relative Strength to Governments and Occurrence of Negotiation

Negotiation	No Stalemate	Stalemate	Total
No (negotiation=0)	676 (73.5%)	35 (49.3%)	711 (71.7%)
Yes (negotiation=1)	244 (26.5%)	36 (50.7%)	280 (28.3%)
Total	920 (100%)	71 (100%)	991 (100%)

$\chi^2 (1) = 19.015, P = .000$

The suggestions above, derived from the results of chi-square analyses, provide insight into the association between various characteristics of conflicts and the occurrence of negotiation. All of the tables present statistically significant associations between the suggested variables and negotiation. Although the suggestions are valuable to examine, it is too early to reach some conclusions before conducting more comprehensive analysis and without controlling for various factors and other variables.

Table 7 shows the results of logistic analyses, examining each hypothesis in the last model separately and together. Overall, the tables demonstrate that the negotiation calculation applies to civil conflicts. Specifically, they demonstrate that parties to civil conflicts are more likely to negotiate when they perceive negotiation as less costly, or more strategically beneficial. It should be noted, given that the observations are clustered by dyads, that the study uses bootstrap corrected standard errors to obtain unbiased inferential tests. In the table, each row stands for a variable, and each column represents a model. A total of nine models are presented separately in the table's columns. Each model tests one hypothesis, and in the last model all variables are tested. The variables for cost of war and type of conflict arguments are treated as control variables.

Table 7. Logistic analysis of the costs-benefits of negotiation in civil conflicts

Hypothesis	Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Cost of War	Logged – Number of Deaths	1.097	1.102	1.115**	1.125†
	Duration of Conflict	.992	.998	.994	.997
	Military Stalemate	1.638†	1.660†	1.603*	1.437
	Territorial Control	3.027***	3.461***	3.385***	3.252***
Reputation	Number of Actors	.869***			
Legitimacy	Political Link		.585**		
Valid	Low Level Leadership			.681†	
Spokesman	Moderate Level Leadership			.909	
External	Transnational Link				1.950***
Pressure	State Military Support				1.430*
	Non-State Military Support				.469***
Terrorism	Terrorism-oriented Group				
Military	Intervention				
Interven.	Unbiased Intervention				
Human Rights	Physical Integrity Index				
	Empowerment Index				
Type of Conflict	Territorial Conflict	.655*	.572***	.551***	.508***
	Minor Conflict	1.048	1.085	1.068	1.122
	Internationalized Conflict	1.204	1.288	1.259	1.421
Constant		-1.406	-1.713	-1.760	-2.161
MODEL SUMMARY					
Chi-Square (Change in – 2 log likelihood)***		114.243	111.542	103.980	124.802
Cox-Snell R-Square		.109	.107	.100	.119
Nagelkerke R-Square		.157	.154	.144	.171
N (Number of Observations)		988	988	988	988

Table 7. Logistic analysis of the costs-benefits of negotiation in civil conflicts (continued)

Hypothesis	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Consistent
Cost of War	1.123† .994	1.132† .994	1.139* .993	1.151† .994	1.087 .996	Yes No
	1.684† 3.266***	1.380 3.196***	1.475 3.205***	2.035† 3.347***	1.121 3.511***	Yes Yes
Reputation					.861**	Yes
Legitimacy					.866	No
Valid					.605	Yes
Spokesman					.926	Yes
External Pressure					1.998**	Yes
					1.802**	No
					.410***	Yes
Terrorism	.943				1.089	NO
Military		1.968***	1.583*		1.602*	Yes
Interven.			1.953*		2.257**	Yes
Human Rights				1.054	.975	Yes
				1.033	1.101**	Yes
Type of Conflict	.581***	.600**	.621**	.539***	.500***	Yes
	1.045	1.039	1.029	1.016	.965	Yes
	1.239	1.043	1.105	1.116	1.210	Yes
Constant	-1.879	-2.135	-2.172	-2.296	-2.233	
MODEL SUMMARY						
Chi-Square (Change in -2 log likelihood)***	101.302	117.908	123.521	89.991	167.850	
Cox-Snell R-Square	.097	.112	.118	.096	.172	
Nagelkerke R-Square	.140	.162	.169	.140	.251	
N (Number of Observations)	988	988	988	892	892	

The odds ratio – Exp (B) – values are presented in the table so that readers can interpret the results easily. Accordingly, the interpretation of these values is as follows: values less than one indicate that the odds of negotiation decrease as the independent variables increase; an odds ratio equal to one means that the odds of negotiation do not change as the independent variables change, meaning that there is no relationship; and the values greater than one show that the odds of negotiation increase as the independent variables increase. However, one should be more careful interpreting the dichotomous variables. With these variables, any interpretation should be made by referencing the control group, rather than considering the unit of increase or decrease in the independent variables since

this would cause meaningless interpretations. Also, the percentage change in odds can be calculated easily by the equation $[Exp(B)-1]*100$.

Model 1 illustrates that the likelihood of negotiation decreases by 13 per cent for every additional increase in the number of insurgent groups that the government is fighting. The finding is significant at the .001 level and supports the reputation hypothesis that negotiation is less likely to happen if the government perceives that there may be potential fights with additional insurgent groups.

In Model 2, the legitimacy hypothesis is tested. The model's result runs counter to the suggested legitimacy hypothesis that the likelihood of negotiation is higher if the insurgent group has political links. On the contrary, the model suggests that the odds of negotiation taking place are more likely if insurgent groups are not linked to a political party. Indeed, the model's results reveal that the odds of negotiation are 50 per cent lower for insurgents with political connections than for those who do not have those connections.

Model 3 shows that insurgent groups that have low levels of leadership are 10 per cent less likely to experience negotiation than those with a highly structured leadership, and this finding is significant at the .10 level. Also, the model does not point to moderate-level leadership having a significant effect on negotiation compared to high-level leadership. However, although the significance is weak, the direction of variables operates in the expected way. When the three levels of strength of leadership in insurgent groups are compared, the results suggest that negotiations are more likely in the presence of highly structured insurgent leadership.

Model 4 tests the effects of external pressure on the occurrence of negotiation. The first variable, transnational links, confirms the suggested hypothesis that negotiation is more likely if the insurgent group has a transnational link. This study argued that an existing transnational link would bring pressure on the government, and that the government would want to respond on the assumption that negotiation would be beneficial rather than costly. As for the effect of external support for insurgents, the model suggests conflicting results for the external pressure hypothesis. The hypothesis assumed that the insurgent group would see negotiation as costly and be unwilling to negotiate if there was a potential risk that it might lose existing support. However, the model makes two suggestions. First, the model indicates that the odds of negotiation increase by 43 per cent when there is external state support for the insurgents compared to cases with no support. Second, the odds of negotiation seem to decrease by 47 per cent in the presence of a non-state support for insurgents as opposed to the cases where no support exists. While the former result is not in the opposite direction of the suggested hypothesis, the latter confirms it. Moreover, regardless of the direction of variables, they all are statistically significant at the .001 level.

Model 5 does not lend significant support to the study's expectation that negotiation is less likely if the insurgent group is terrorism-oriented. However, when the odds of negotiation are considered, it still seems that the likelihood of negotiation is slightly lower, though not significantly so, for the terrorism-oriented insurgents as compared to the others.

The finding of Model 6 is consistent with the foreign military intervention hypothesis and it produces a .001 level of significance. This suggests that the odds of negotiation are higher if there is a military intervention in the conflict, as compared to conflicts without

foreign interventions. It is argued that foreign military intervention, especially neutral interventions, would decrease the cost of negotiating for parties to civil conflicts, and, in turn, the likelihood of negotiation would increase. Accordingly, Model 7 confirms that when the intervention is unbiased (neutral) instead of biased, the likelihood of negotiation is much higher.

Model 8 indicates that, on its own, the government's respect for human rights has no significant effect on the prospect of negotiation prospect. Although, at first glance, the finding seems to run contrary to the human rights hypothesis, it would be naïve to expect human rights variables to produce a significant effect on negotiation without controlling for more variables.

Model 9 presents the results of the combination of all variables. The model lends strong support for the reputation, external pressure, and foreign military intervention hypotheses. However, the model calls into question the legitimacy, valid spokesman, and terrorism hypotheses. It is also important to take a closer look at the human rights hypothesis because in Model 9 one variable of the hypothesis (the empowerment index) become significant at the .01 level and is in the expected direction. Similarly, in Model 9, the effects of suggested indicators on negotiation become more significant, and all variables except one (external state support for insurgents) are in the expected direction. Therefore, the model confirms the costs and benefits of negotiation argument. Accordingly, the odds of having negotiation become higher if the existing conditions or characteristics of parties or the conflict itself are cost cutting rather than cost increasing.

Figure 1 presents the marginal significance of the most significant findings of this research on the probability of negotiations. Since the independent variables, except the "number of actors" variable, are categorical, the best way to plot their effects is to use bar charts with each bar representing the predicted probability of observing negotiations in that situation. The estimates are calculated using the coefficient of Model 9. While the continuous variables are kept at their means, categorical variables are shifted from absence (value of zero) to presence (value of one). As such, the figures show how the predicted probability of negotiations shifts based on the absence and presence of suggested indicators for specific conditions.




Figure 1A: Negotiations by Insurgents' Transnational Link




Figure 1B. Negotiations by Non-State Military Support for Insurgents




Figure 1C. Negotiations by Foreign Military Intervention




Figure 1D. Negotiations by Neutral Foreign Military Intervention




Figure 1E. Negotiations by Number of Insurgent Groups

Discussion and Conclusion

This research investigated the magnitude of costs associated with entering into negotiations in civil wars. The question is central to the conceptualization of negotiations, since many models cast doubt on the significant costs of negotiations and conclude that participation is in fact costless. On the other hand, a number of political scientists have noted that negotiations incur concerns about reputation, communication and legitimacy, as well as political costs.⁶⁴ This study has extended the understanding of the costs and benefits of negotiation during civil wars, building on knowledge established in prior research.⁶⁵ In doing so, it has extended the consideration of negotiation costs to include new measures such as a government's respect for human rights, terrorism, foreign military intervention, insurgents' political links, and insurgents' transnational constituency, and these measures can be used in future to gauge parties' negotiation calculations more thoroughly.

The determinants of negotiation in civil conflicts were examined in relation to three concepts: the cost of conflict, the type of conflict, and the costs and benefits of negotiation. In relation to the costs of war logic, the findings showed that insurgents' territorial control significantly influenced negotiation decisions: the probability of negotiation substantially decreases when the insurgent group controls a territory within a country. As for the type of conflict, the findings implied that territorial wars are less likely to feature negotiation than are conflicts fought over the control of government; this is in line with

⁶⁴ Ghosn, "Getting to the Table and Getting to Yes"; Bercovitch et al., "Negotiation or Mediation?"; Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus".

⁶⁵ Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus".

earlier research and confirms that parties are less likely to sign a treaty that concerns sharing a territory than they are to agree on gaining a share of governing power.⁶⁶

The chief finding of this work is that our understanding of contemporary civil conflicts and peace is inadequate without a thorough knowledge of the costs and benefits of negotiation. Very few studies provide an empirical consideration of the costs associated with the decision to negotiate. We have attempted to verify previously tested hypotheses, and we have conducted, at a theoretical level, an investigation of newly proposed relationships concerning the occurrence of negotiations during civil conflicts. The results of this study confirm Kaplow's findings and provide further insight into the perceived costs and benefits of negotiation for parties in those conflicts.⁶⁷ This research suggests that the decision to negotiate carries some costs and benefits for the parties to civil conflicts, and these costs are often associated with the parties' concerns about the other side's legitimacy and reliability as a negotiation partner and the reputational costs of appearing to be concession-prone if negotiation is attempted. Therefore, governments become less willing to negotiate as the number of potential claimants in the conflict increases. Third parties, on the other hand, seem to play a major role overcoming these barriers to negotiation in several ways. First, foreign military interventions increase the likelihood of negotiation occurring during civil conflicts. It can be argued that the parties more confidently negotiate under the supervision of a third party. Moreover, they prefer a neutral foreign intervention which does not support either of the parties to the conflict. Second, it is believed that the involvement of a transnational constituency might increase the international community's awareness of the conflict and exert international pressure on the government, persuading it to listen to the demands of the insurgency. In such cases, the government might seek to secure more recognition in the international arena by meeting the demand, and consequently, it can perceive initiating talks with the insurgent group as less costly, or even beneficial. On the other hand, the fear of losing external support seems to matter for the insurgent group. However, it should be noted that the fear of losing external support holds true when the group receives military support from a non-state actor but has a different effect on the probability of negotiation if the support comes from a state actor. One possible explanation might be that a state's sponsorship increases the insurgent's military capacity more than support from a non-state actor does. Furthermore, the human rights hypothesis suggested in this study seems to provide a new understanding of how negotiation calculations appear from the perspective of insurgent groups. Human rights indicators included in this study, such as freedom of movement, freedom of speech, political participation, and freedom of religion, seem to influence the ways that an insurgent group perceives the government involved in their conflict, and this, in turn, shapes the group's understanding of the gains and losses that might result from a potential negotiation with the government.

This study contributes to the extant literature on conflict resolution by laying out the factors that influence the decision to negotiate in civil conflicts, given the fact that only a limited number of studies have systematically analysed this question.⁶⁸ It has uncovered

⁶⁶ Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*.

⁶⁷ Kaplow, "The Negotiation Calculus".

⁶⁸ Paul Pillar, *Negotiating Peace*; Bapat, "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes"; Thomas, "Rewarding Bad Behavior".

the set of conditions under which negotiations occur during civil conflicts, with a special focus on how parties might perceive the costs and benefits of negotiation. However, there remains a need for future research to secure a better understanding of conflict resolution in civil conflicts. This study was designed to explain the factors that affect the initiation of negotiations, and it does not provide any insight into the ways that the durability and success of negotiations are linked to their costs and benefits. This gap should be filled in future research to provide policymakers and scholars with a better sense of the practical implications of costs and benefits throughout conflict resolution processes. Also, the study relied on dichotomous variables to measure the suggested hypotheses. This leads to much information being omitted and an underestimation of the extent of variation in outcomes between groups. Future studies should use interval/ratio measures to see whether the effects on negotiations vary across the levels of suggested indicators.

Finally, the understanding of the costs and benefits of negotiation to the parties in civil conflicts might provide a useful framework for diplomats, policymakers, mediators, and peace seekers who are seeking to determine ripe moments and conditions for initiating talks and encouraging negotiations. The most important recommendation of this research for members of the international community would be that they pay attention, not only to the cost of war, but also to the costs and benefits that parties relate to the prospect of negotiation in civil conflicts: they should aim to decrease the parties' perceptions of the costs while making the benefits more salient. Future researchers are also encouraged to reappraise what does and does not constitute a cost to the parties in civil conflicts.

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Collaboration Between Academics and Journalists: Methodological Considerations, Challenges and Ethics

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ABSTRACT

This essay sheds light on the benefits and challenges produced by collaborations between academics and journalists, focusing specifically on the methodological considerations and ethics that arise during collaborations on sensitive fieldwork. Drawing on our experience of working together for a research project, we highlight the intricacies involved in building bridges between two professions while working towards a joint project outcome. Our reflections are based on our experiences during fieldwork conducted in London and Glasgow in August 2018 as we researched foreign fighters – mostly members of the Kurdish diaspora – who joined the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel/ People's Protection Units) to fight against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in the Middle East. We suggest that while working together can produce significant benefits for academic and journalistic collaborators, there are certainly challenges that arise, especially when risky topics are being researched.

Keywords: Journalism, Academics, Research Ethics, Sensitive Research, YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel/People's Protection Units)

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Introduction¹

Academics are increasingly expected to step out of their comfort zones and strive to make a larger impact on society, rather than simply exchanging research findings with their colleagues in the ivory tower. This new expectation – often explicitly endorsed by research funders – demands that academics look for new ways to make their research available to non-experts, policymakers, and other stakeholders. In their search for wider audiences, scholars increasingly direct their efforts toward semi-academic or non-academic media outlets.² Universities have started encouraging academics to engage with local, national, and international media, and many now provide media training to prepare academics for live appearances on TV and radio.³ Of course, one way or another, academics have been engaging with the media for a long time, mostly by giving interviews about their area of expertise; what's new is that they are now being encouraged to work with non-academics to co-produce outputs that might reach an audience beyond academia.

While researching this phenomenon, we observed that many academics are wary of requests for interviews, as they think their words may be edited to convey unintended meanings.⁴ For their part, many journalists might think that academics simply do not know how to speak to their readers; where they use academic opinion in their articles, they usually do so to add an “authoritative” voice and provide context and analysis in a brief, quotable way. Academics, on the other hand, use journalistic resources widely, especially if they are working on contemporary topics that have not yet become the subject of much academic literature. Both sides, to some extent, implicitly depend on each other, and the power relations between them are yet to be fully explored.

In recent years, the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) – in collaboration with the BBC – has developed a special scheme called “New Generation Thinkers” for early career researchers (ERCs), which helps ERCs to disseminate their research findings by turning them into programmes for BBC radio. Elsewhere, many new media outlets have been set up to make academic research visible by adding a journalistic touch. One example is *The Conversation* which features articles, written by academics at PhD-candidate level and above, that are edited by professional journalists to make them more accessible to a broader audience. Forums have also been specifically created to bring journalists and academics together, among them the Journalism Knowledge Exchange.⁵

¹ This article was written as part of the Uncovering Security, a media skills development programme run by the Thomson Reuters Foundation, Stanley Foundation, and Gerda Henkel Stiftung. We thank these institutions for funding our research. Dr. Bahar Baser would also like to thank the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, for hosting her during the completion of this article.

² Weir, “Dealing with the Press”, Inside Higher Ed, 5 November 2014, <https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2014/11/05/essay-how-academics-can-deal-reporters> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

³ For instance, see University of Nottingham, “Media Training”, <https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/communicationsmarketing/services/service-details/media-training.aspx> (Accessed 8 June 2019), or University of Birmingham, “Media Training”, <https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/external/creative-media/media-centre/Media-Training.aspx> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

⁴ See for example DiSalvo, “Why Scientists and Journalists Don’t Always Play Well Together”, 8 August 2011, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddisalvo/2011/08/08/why-scientists-and-journalists-dont-always-play-well-together/#192978f61fd4> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

⁵ Hold the Front Page, “How Working Journalists and Academics can Help Each Other”, 31 May 2018, <https://www.holdthefrontpage.co.uk/2018/news/guest-blog-how-working-journalists-and-academics-can-help-each-other/> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

Our own collaboration started with a similar initiative organized by the Thomson Reuters Foundation, the Stanley Foundation, and the Gerda Henkel Stiftung. These foundations – one focused on media, one on academia, and the third on facilitating collaboration in relation to peace and conflict issues – came together in 2016 to encourage the sharing of skills and knowledge between the two fields on under-covered security issues. Launched under the name “Story Lab”, the project brought members of two professions together to discuss possible avenues for collaboration, both on specific projects and in general. This report’s authors were paired because of overlapping interests and encouraged to apply for a grant designated for participants. In the remainder of the report, we will use a plural first-person voice to make identification of our separate roles clearer.

In this short essay, we try to shed light on the benefits and pitfalls that reveal themselves when academics and journalists collaborate. Our reflections are based on our experience of working together during our fieldwork in London and Glasgow in August 2018, during which we researched the foreign fighters – mostly members of the Kurdish diaspora – who joined the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel/People’s Protection Units) to fight against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) in the Middle East. Since our fieldwork findings have already been published by *Open Democracy*,⁶ our aim in this article is to reflect on our fieldwork as a collaborative methodological experience. We argue that, while academics are increasingly encouraged to collaborate with non-academics such as journalists and practitioners, there is little advice to help them resolve practical problems and complexities that can arise in the process, especially when they are researching sensitive topics such as terrorism and security. Sinduja Rangarajan and Laura Laderman of *RevealNews* claim that “Academics bring deep knowledge and expertise in their area of study, and journalists have mastered the art of telling stories. When academics and journalists collaborate, they can combine their skills to tackle complex questions and communicate the answers in ways that can have a huge impact on society”.⁷ We agree, but we also caution that collaboration between these two professions comes with challenges and limitations. In particular, we want to draw attention to two crucial and potentially problematic areas we identified while working together: matters of research ethics and methodology, and the complexities of conducting sensitive and/or risky research. While there is an emerging body of work explaining how journalists and academics can work together to produce better quality outputs for both sides’ purposes,⁸ it mostly addresses the basic issues involved in penning articles together or benefiting from each other’s work. This grant gave us the opportunity to scrutinize the methodological and ethical intricacies involved in conducting research together in order to create joint work. Our experience can therefore help to shed light on the challenges ahead and contribute to the debate about how academics and practitioners can collaborate in new ways.

Uncovering security: European Kurds joining the YPG/YPJ (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin/Women’s Protection Unit)

Our joint project has focused on Kurdish diaspora members who joined the Kurdish forces in Syria to fight against ISIS. Bahar is an academic who has been working on Kurdish

⁶ Martin, “Terrorism Policing”.

⁷ Rangarajan and Laderman, “Working Together 101”, 27 August 2018, <https://www.revealnews.org/blog/how-academics-and-journalists-can-collaborate/> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

⁸ Wen, “Two Sides of the Story”; Rensberger, “Why Scientists Should Cooperate with Journalists”.

diaspora activism for the last ten years, and she has extensive experience of researching Kurdish nationalism among diaspora youth.⁹ Nora, meanwhile, is a journalist who has lived in Turkey for some time and has reported on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, as well as security and counter-terrorism policy, for media outlets such as the *Middle East Eye*. Both of us speak Turkish and English. We are both interested in understanding the dynamics of the ways in which European-Kurdish young people are mobilized towards the conflict in Syria, as well as in how they are treated in their host states, especially in the context of expanding counter-terrorism prerogatives. This issue is academically and journalistically under-researched and under-reported; the only published information on these individuals is to be found either in short news articles that mention a handful of names or quick TV interviews. We were interested in combining Bahar's expertise and Nora's reporting to better understand these fighters and their relationships with the diaspora community, their expectations versus the realities on the ground, and details of their trips to Syria, including any legal battles or diplomatic issues they had encountered on the way.

It did not take us long to understand how sensitive this topic was in the case of the countries we had selected. Bahar immediately categorized this research as "risky and sensitive" and mentioned this in discussions with Nora, who was aware of the issues but used a different vetting process. Bahar obtained ethics approval from her university in order to conduct this research. The aim of the project was to help Nora to produce journalistic articles informed by existing academic debates. She was responsible for leading interviews with lawyers who represented foreign former fighters, as well as with Kurdish association leaders and members, journalists, and scholars who have studied similar topics, as well as former members of police forces responsible for counter-terrorism, and political advisors. Extensive fieldwork was undertaken in other countries, but for a short period we worked in the field together; Bahar accompanied Nora for a number of interviews in London and Glasgow in August 2018, and there we had the chance to observe our differing approaches to conducting research.

Ethics when conducting sensitive research

Research ethics for academics and journalists

Most researchers are trained to protect themselves and their interviewees before they embark on fieldwork. For example, the protection of respondent confidentiality through the anonymization of interviews and observations is a highly important task that higher education institutions take extremely seriously. A mistake on the researcher's part regarding this topic might make the interviewees identifiable, which might put them and the researcher at risk, and the importance of confidentiality is heightened when research is being conducted on highly sensitive issues.¹⁰

Universities address this risk, not just by requiring training in research methods, but also by operating ethics committees, which head off future problems by examining each research project closely before it begins. In many countries, researchers, from PhD candidate to professor, need to apply to an ethics committee for approval and cannot embark on fieldwork without it. As part of their application for approval, researchers who plan to conduct interviews must prepare various additional documents such as consent

⁹ Bahar Baser, *Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts*.

¹⁰ Marlies Glasius et al., *Research, Ethics and Risk in the Authoritarian Field*.

forms, project information sheets, translator confidentiality agreements, and data management plans. These documents must be handed to interviewees before an interview takes place to inform them about the particularities of the interview and the motivations behind it, as well as to explain how data will be used after the project is completed. Participant information sheets need to clearly state that participants can drop out of the interview at any time and can withdraw their participation within a given timeframe (usually a couple of months). Ethics applications require researchers and committees alike to think several steps ahead to minimize any risks to both researchers and participants. Researchers may need to wait some time for approval and may also be obliged to revise and resubmit their proposals before approval is granted.

Iron-clad as the ethical imperative is in modern academia, it creates a dilemma that immediately reveals itself to any researcher who embarks on an ethnographic study that involves interviews. As Karen Kaiser puts it, “Qualitative researchers face a conflict between conveying detailed, accurate accounts of the social world and protecting the identities of the individuals who participated in their research”.¹¹ There are broader disciplinary implications too; many academics, such as Hedgecoe, argue that “prior ethics review of research – originating as it does in the biomedical sciences – is unsuited for the oversight of social science (particularly qualitative social science), harming and impeding research especially that conducted on sensitive topics and populations”.¹² Other scholars show that ethics governance can inhibit methodological dynamism in the social sciences. Carey for one argues that rigid ethics approval procedures “often lead to researchers avoiding important topics of investigation, co-production or methodologies identified as sensitive or too difficult to navigate through overzealous committees”.¹³ Nonetheless, the need for ethical approval is non-negotiable as far as researchers are concerned, and the time it takes to secure is simply to be accepted.

Journalists work very differently. Time, for one thing, is a luxury they cannot afford. They need to act on leads quite quickly to get to a story before anyone else; for freelancers, this pressure is heightened if they want to be published via a well-paying or widely read outlet. This mismatch between academic and journalistic practice was one of the most challenging issues we faced, and we noticed it almost as soon as our collaboration started. Bahar had to go through an ethical approval process before our work together even began. This process started a few months before the fieldwork, and Bahar’s role had to be clearly identified from the outset. Considering the sensitive nature of the research, she limited her role to that of a consultant: in this role, she constantly discussed with Nora which questions could be asked, which details could be taken into account, and who could be identified as a potential interviewee. The outputs arising from the project would then belong to Nora, who was also responsible for the storage of the data.

For Nora, it was good practice to plan ahead of time in this way and to consider in detail the risks to both our interviewees and ourselves, something journalists should of course do, but which freelancers, without staff lawyers or editors to evaluate the risks for them, must do on their own. Professional practice, while not universally upheld, asks that journalists go through safety evaluations and training before carrying out reporting in a

¹¹ Karen Kaiser, “Protecting Respondent Confidentiality”.

¹² Hedgecoe, “Reputational Risk”, 486.

¹³ Carey, “The Tyranny of Ethics”.

risky field, but this training usually emphasizes the journalist's personal safety rather than that of their interviewees and fixers.¹⁴ Journalistic ethical standards also separately ask that a journalist working on sensitive topics take certain precautions when dealing with interviewees who could face harm from an interview; however, these codes of conduct are not codified across the industry,¹⁵ and while certain newsrooms publicly adhere to best practices, no mechanism exists to enforce them. Like universities, newsrooms avoid taking on liability for sensitive fieldwork, so if something goes wrong, the freelancer is held responsible. It was therefore a very new process for Nora to consult a university board so far in advance. While she was not responsible for filling out the application, Bahar had to ask her what she expected from the interviews during the application process. Because of the extended timescale on which they work, academics have room for forethought and control over their interviews that journalists usually do not, so, to them, setting out clear conditions beforehand might seem like just another conventional part of preparing and framing their research. However, journalists might tend towards more spontaneous interviews, depending on the subject matter, where one comment might derail the rest of the planned interview and set them on a whole new trail. To compound all this, our application was evaluated by a university panel according to standards of ethics and good practice which might be very different from those used by a journalist.

In the end, this all meant it was tough for Nora to predict how our interviews would go and respond to all of the ethical considerations raised at this advanced stage. Conversely, during the fieldwork, Bahar tried to act according to the ethics application submitted, which in some cases killed the spontaneous nature of the research and limited our actions in the field.

How do we protect our interviewees? How do we ensure anonymity?

Depending on the nature of the research, and in the UK in particular, the strict ethics obligations to which academics are subject occasionally include the obligation to disclose interview data that might benefit national security. While the boundaries of this requirement are not always clear, academics are generally fully aware that it might apply to them. Even the possession of certain documents might incur disciplinary action; moreover, simply downloading certain documents that concern terrorism or other security threats might require special permissions from their host institution.¹⁶ These problems are generally questions that journalists only worry about within internal ethical discussions. We were indeed working precisely on this question, trying to understand whether Kurdish diaspora members and other British citizens who join the YPG are fall under the jurisdiction of the counterterrorism police in the UK. There was significant media interest in foreign fighters, and it transpired that the British policy towards returning fighters was less than clear. When we started our project, these kinds of issues had never been reported on.

With all this pressure on the subject matter, we took pains to balance our approach, a process that revealed a clear boundary between academic and journalistic research practices. Sure enough, from the start of our project, we noticed that, while Bahar felt

¹⁴ Acos Alliance, "The Principles", <https://www.acosalliance.org/the-principles> (Accessed 10 June 2019).

¹⁵ Mediawise, "Codes of Conduct Archive", <http://www.mediawise.org.uk/codes-of-conduct/codes/> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

¹⁶ For more information and exemplary cases, see Hedgecoe, "Reputational Risk", 491-92.

uneasy with certain interviews and the information that the research participants might reveal, Nora felt much more confident about gathering information. While we will elaborate on this process below, we first discuss university-based approaches to the conduct of sensitive research which involves sampling that might include interviewees who conduct “illegal” activities, such as picking up arms for a foreign non-state armed group.

A note on researching illegal activities, which forms part of a British university’s research ethics policy, states that:

Researchers have the same legal obligations that they would have in any other context, as citizens or legal residents. As a private member of society, there is, however, no general legal obligation in the United Kingdom to report to the relevant authorities all illegal activity that one observes or learns about. However, there may be moral obligations to report in the following circumstances: 1. It may be a requirement of access, imposed by any relevant gatekeeper; 2. It may be a condition of research funding; 3. It may be a tradition within the specific discipline and/or research context (for example, in criminology there is a tradition of warning convicted offenders that confidentiality will be breached should the participant reveal a previously undetected offence); and, perhaps most importantly, 4. The researcher might see certain circumstances as requiring disclosure as a matter of personal morality and/or professional ethics.¹⁷

Researchers are thus encouraged to tell their participants that, in certain cases, they might need to reveal information to the authorities. The previously mentioned ethics policy continues:

The definite obligations to disclose that exist in United Kingdom law relate to child protection offences such as the physical or sexual abuse of minors, the physical abuse of vulnerable adults, money laundering and other crimes covered by *prevention of terrorism legislation* [italics added]. These obligations are concerned primarily with serious and immediate harm to others. These obligations aside, research is not covered by any legal privilege. Although there has been a long tradition of academic research into illegal activities, the courts have never considered whether or not one might lawfully refuse to disclose confidential information on “public interest” grounds – i.e. on the basis that the benefits of completion of the research to society at large outweighs any harm caused by the failure to report individual offences.¹⁸

These professional responsibilities might put researchers in a difficult situation. Explaining the risks of disclosing confidential data might deter participants from giving consent to interviews and similarly might disincline researchers from developing projects on what might be considered illegal activities.

¹⁷ University of Sheffield, “The University of Sheffield Research Ethics Policy Note No. 12”, https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.112762!/file/Research-Ethics-Policy-Note-12.pdf (Accessed 8 June 2019). See also University of Salford, “Ethics”, <https://www.salford.ac.uk/ethics> (Accessed 8 June 2019). Roehampton University, “Ethics Forms”, <https://www.roehampton.ac.uk/research/ethics/ethics-forms/> (Accessed 8 June 2019), and Manchester Metropolitan University, “Ethics”, <https://www2.mmu.ac.uk/research/staff/ethics-and-governance/ethics/> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

¹⁸ Ibid.

Besides following the ethical standards outlined in the university application, we mostly followed journalistic ethics codes when it came to gathering data. Journalists handling sensitive information have their own methods, which sometimes overlap with academic practices. First, they ensure that they have informed consent from their interviewees, which entails describing the full scope of the article and conveying the possible risks of publishing the interviewee's name or anonymous words. Throughout the interview, the journalist must clearly establish whether the information is either "on the record", meaning that it can be published and quoted; "on background", meaning it can be used but not attributed; or "off the record", meaning it should not appear in the article. Nora remarks that, when eliciting sensitive information, she prefers to turn off her recorder and refrain from writing anything down lest her materials make it into the hands of a third party. After the interview, she herself evaluates whether the information shared could harm the interviewee if published (if, for example, it could contribute to identifying the anonymous interviewee or be used criminally against them). If any of these issues arises, she would choose not to publish the material, or at least discuss the possibility of publishing it with the interviewee before deciding what to do.

Beyond the public product, journalists must be careful with the details of their work behind the scenes, from beginning to end. They must ensure that the interview and all materials relating to it remain confidential and within their hands. While academics can store their data on password-protected university servers – which are by no means immune to hacking and information-sharing – freelance journalists rely on non-institutionalized mechanisms of data storage, which means that they are obligated to research and stay up-to-date with the best available digital security tools. Journalists also rely on their editor's discretion when it comes to publishing and sometimes shaping their piece on a specific topic. The ethics of eliciting and using certain information can be discussed by reporter and editor – as opposed to by a formal university panel – because the information remains in their hands and they are the ones most familiar with the interviewee and story. However, newsrooms have changed significantly in the past decade and cannot always devote the resources and time they once could to ensuring full protection and ethical compliance. The burden, then, often falls on the shoulders of freelancers, who may or may not have adequate training.

Much like academics, journalists share a few tricks of the trade that are essential to keeping interviews confidential: all correspondence must be, if possible, encrypted or established by non-digital means; interviews must be conducted in private, in a place where the interviewee is comfortable; no notes and/or recordings (if the interviewee consents to be recorded) can be uploaded to a cloud server or any easily hackable system; and data should be stored in a safe place, encrypted if possible, and even deleted once no longer necessary. Since technologies constantly evolve, journalists have a duty to inform themselves about new tools and precautions to ensure that information remains protected at every point in the pipeline. Just one lapse can jeopardize the protection of the entire chain.

Even after these steps are followed, it is possible that state authorities will demand information on a journalist's sources. Journalists are typically discouraged from handing over this information. Each country has different laws on the rights of the press, but ethics that are becoming internationalized demand that the safety of interviewees, and the trust established with sources, must come first. This issue came up when we interviewed two

retired police officers in the UK who had worked for counter-terrorism units in the past. They warned us that journalists are in fact more protected than academics when it comes to revealing information to the authorities, as well as when putting themselves at risk researching sensitive topics.

Is sensitive research more attractive for journalists?

A story is not attractive merely because reporting it is risky – or at least, it shouldn't be. However, stories based on risky reporting often appeal to certain media outlets because risk carries an aura of marginality, popular fascination, taboo, and lawlessness. For freelancers working in today's media economy, a risky story may be an easier sell than a more prosaic one. Budget-strapped newsrooms are now hesitant to pay for the expensive safety measures involved in sending staff on these risky assignments, so independent journalists might be able to secure "exclusive" access that full-time employees would never get.

In our case, however, the risk we were dealing with was associated less with our fieldwork itself than with the consequences of publishing. The topic is clearly a red line if we are ever to work in Turkey, and publishing work on it could even pose problems elsewhere abroad. Still, having weighed the value of investigating the subject against the potential yet avoidable issues that could arise once it was published, we nonetheless decided to proceed. This is, however, the main reason why Nora decided to publish her articles under a pseudonym. Publishing under her own name might have jeopardized her potential reporting in the future, considering the fact that many foreign journalists in Turkey were arrested or deported as a result of publishing articles on the Kurdish question.

What made this work sensitive was that we were researching matters that clearly fall within the realm of counter-terrorism. For instance, we followed the case of James Matthews, a former British soldier who volunteered with the YPG to fight against ISIS and, upon his return, faced terrorism charges.¹⁹ While charges against him were ultimately dropped, Aidan James, another fighter facing the same charges, was awaiting trial at the time of our fieldwork.²⁰ We were trying to understand, firstly, how fighters such as these left the UK for Syria, and secondly, how the UK government and police responded to their cases. Our findings might have been of interest to state intelligence agencies, who could have asked us to share some of our material, which could then be used against the people whose cases we were studying. Much of this information has already been covered by certain newspaper articles, meaning Nora needed to dig deeper to find original material.²¹ This in turn meant expanding our interviewee pool to find people who could supply original information. At this point, we noticed how much our approaches to the fieldwork differed.

¹⁹ Dearden, "James Matthews", 7 February 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/isis-fighters-anti-british-uk-ypg-charged-terror-offence-james-jim-matthews-kurds-training-camp-a8199796.html> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

²⁰ Blake, "British Man who Fought Isis in Syria Charged with Terror Offences", 16 February 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/feb/16/british-man-aidan-james-fought-isis-syria-charged-terror-offences> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

²¹ Vardy, "British Men Prepare", 24 January 2018, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42799284> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

As an academic, Bahar is used to collaborating with participants and interviewees on a long-term basis: she works on protracted research projects rather than quick-turnaround, one-off news stories. For her, maintaining trust and good relations with what she calls “gatekeepers” or “stakeholders” in the field is a priority. Therefore, she was extremely careful not to risk breaching their trust and was not insistent when it came to arranging interviews. Initially, we believed that her previous research networks would be an asset for this project; however, this topic was an extremely sensitive one, and we quickly realized that the people we contacted either found excuses not to comment or specifically mentioned that they did not feel comfortable. In particular, academics who work on the Kurdish issue mentioned that they did not want to give interviews to journalists. When Bahar met with this distrust and insecurity, she would not email interviewees again or insist on arranging interviews.

By contrast, as a journalist, Nora was very keen on meeting as many people as she could, especially in the limited amount of time afforded by the grant. When working in unfamiliar territory, journalists often work with fixers who help them;²² for this particular study, we did not have the benefit of a fixer and instead we relied on Bahar’s networks alone. When finding interviewees started to become challenging, Nora used her journalistic skills to reach people. In the beginning, Bahar felt uncomfortable sending multiple emails to potential participants and calling them directly when they did not answer, yet it quickly turned out to be a successful way to get this research done, whether because interviewees react to journalists differently or because Nora’s determination made the interviewees trust her. Nora also very quickly helped Bahar familiarize herself with how journalists operate in the field:

Our reputations as journalists rely not only on our final products, but also in the way we treat our interviewees. If we want to continue treating sensitive subjects, we must have a good work ethic, and if we want to conduct meaningful interviews, we must establish trust. If anything, we owe these to our interviewees and readers, as people.

Conclusion

This article has aimed to address the practical methodological and ethical problems that can confront academics and journalists when they collaborate. Our experience contributes to existing debates on ethics governance in social sciences with regards to sensitive topics, and it opens a new debate on the merits of academic/non-academic collaborations. We would argue that, while this collaboration was a fruitful exercise, working together came with its limitations and challenges, largely due to the sensitive nature of the topic under scrutiny.

Yet despite certain frictions between our different ways of working, we both learned a great deal from the experience. Academic work and journalistic work each have their own

²² Al Jazeera defines a fixer as “the local man or woman on the ground who secures that critical interview, gets access to that all-important location, who reads between the lines when the situation is rife with local complexity. They know the local news terrain and open doors few foreign correspondents ever can on their own. They’re multi-skilled – part translator, part researcher, part editorial consultant, part security specialist”, “Fixers: The Unsung Heroes of Journalism”, 17 June 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2015/03/fixers-unsung-heroes-journalism-150307111219380.html> (Accessed 8 June 2019).

uses and visions, so each methodology is necessarily different. Working together encouraged us to reflect on how we work in our own fields and why and to consider other styles that might enhance our work: Bahar saw how a little bit of insistence can go a long way, and Nora engaged with a systematic way of posing ethical questions.

Our choice of a sensitive and politically charged topic only amplified the contrasts between our professions. Journalists are in the habit of handling potentially compromising topics from which academics often shy away, and there are plausible possible reasons for these differences: journalists, with little job security, are encouraged to step over a line that others would not, while academics are wary of upsetting their superiors, who themselves want to avoid anything that might tarnish the reputation of their university as a whole.²³ There are risks for both: journalists chasing a story might overlook ethical considerations, while academics might avoid opportunities to dig deeper on important issues simply because they are sensitive. The two professions can complement each other well, then, and a bit of encouragement and guidance from both sides would facilitate future collaborations. Moreover, ethical guidelines could be revised to allow these kinds of collaborations to proceed, not least by leaving researchers room to make spontaneous decisions and offer full confidentiality to their interviewees.

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²³ Hedgecoe, "Reputational Risk".

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