Bulent Gokay*
Ukrainian sources reported that a “preliminary” agreement has been established with the US administration concerning the transfer of some crucial mineral resources to the US. Donald Trump initially presented the US proposal as a way for Ukraine to settle its military and financial support debts to Washington following Russia’s invasion in 2022. After this proposal was turned down, a revised agreement that is perceived as more favourable to Kyiv was created.
Ukraine is considered to be rich in natural resources, some of which are seen as critical for US technological progress. The recent agreement will provide the US access to these resources while ensuring that America will play a key role in the reconstruction of Ukraine.
One complication in this plan is that Russia has seized 20% of Ukraine’s mineral resources since the invasion. Moreover, it may take years before American investors see any return on their investments due to a persistent lack of funding in Ukraine’s minerals sector over the past decade.
Trump’s interest in Ukraine’s vital minerals stems from a larger geopolitical issue regarding rising demand, fluctuating price movements, and supply chain disruptions of these essential resources for the US economy. Trump’s trade conflict with China has intensified efforts to dominate the global market for essential minerals that are vital for many high-tech products. In response to Trump’s imposition of high tariffs on Chinese exports, China has reacted by tightening export controls on the rare earth elements it regulates. This has raised concerns among Western companies, particularly automakers, that rely on these crucial materials. Rare earth elements are classified as critical metals, essential for the production of mobile phones, electric vehicles, solar panels, wind turbines, drones, night-vision goggles, and a variety of electronics.
Metallic and non-metallic minerals are crucial to various industries, including electronics, renewable energy, defense, and transportation. These minerals are fundamental in the production of vital technologies like semiconductors, electric vehicles, and military systems. The ongoing geopolitical tensions between China and the United States underscore the rising competition for access to and control over essential mineral supply chains.
Historically, tin, nickel, and cobalt have been regarded as critical minerals. However, in the 21st century, the definition of critical minerals has expanded to include a broader range of elements, notably rare earth metals. This category includes 17 elements from the periodic table, such as dysprosium, terbium, and yttrium. Lithium is essential for the production of high-efficiency lithium-ion batteries, while cobalt and nickel remain crucial for energy storage and performance. Additionally, various advanced applications in the industrial, aerospace, and renewable energy sectors depend on niobium, tantalum, platinum-group elements, tungsten, titanium, and aluminium.
Contrary to their name, these elements are not rare below the surface; they are actually quite plentiful. However, the process of extracting and separating them from other minerals can be difficult and expensive before they can be used. In 2022, the US Geological Survey published a list of 50 minerals, ranging from aluminium to zirconium, that it identified as “play[ing] a significant role in our national security, economy, renewable energy development and infrastructure. ” Among the key minerals listed are arsenic, utilised in semiconductors; beryllium, an alloying agent in the aerospace and defence sectors; cobalt, lithium, and graphite, essential for battery manufacturing; indium, which allows screens to respond to touch; and tellurium, used in solar power generation.
As the global economy and technology advance, the demand for critical minerals has risen sharply, intensifying geopolitical rivalry over access to these resources. China emerges as the leading force in this field, holding substantial authority over both the extraction and refining processes. Since the 1990s, during Deng Xiaoping’s administration, China has actively pursued a strategy for market leadership, developing a robust ecosystem around these minerals over the last thirty years. Currently, it produces about two-thirds of the world’s critical minerals, with its influence still growing. Over fifty per cent of these minerals are sourced domestically, providing China with significant self-sufficiency. Additionally, Chinese state-owned enterprises and corporations have significantly invested in securing resource supplies abroad, especially in neighbouring Myanmar. Several Chinese high-tech companies have also acquired multiple critical mineral mines throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The production of many critical elements is significantly more geographically concentrated than that of fossil fuels. For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo accounts for 70% of the world’s cobalt production, while just three countries—Australia, Chile, and China—represent over 90% of global lithium output. China emerges as a global leader in the mining, refining, and manufacturing of cobalt, copper, and nickel, all of which are essential for renewable energy technologies. It is important to note that these technologies typically require more materials than fossil fuels. For example, electric vehicles (EVs) demand six times the quantity of materials compared to those powered by internal combustion engines. The International Energy Agency projects a four- to six-fold increase in the demand for transition-critical metals by 2040.
China plays a significant role as the world’s leading producer of rare earth elements, which are essential for wind turbine production. Additionally, it maintains a prominent position in the mining and refining of several key battery minerals, including aluminium, cobalt, graphite, lithium, magnesium, manganese, nickel, tantalum, tin, and vanadium.
A recent report from AidData at the College of William & Mary highlights China’s increasingly strategic involvement in securing essential minerals that are critical to the global energy transition and achieving net-zero objectives. This influence is bolstered through the support of 26 state-backed financial institutions, allowing Beijing to effectively oversee important mineral reserves, such as copper from the Democratic Republic of Congo, nickel from Indonesia, and lithium from Argentina.
Additionally, China is strategically redirecting resources from its Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) to bolster exploration and mining activities in mineral-rich partner nations. Last year, China’s overseas mining investments linked to the BRI reached a new high of $21.4 billion, reflecting the government’s strong focus on securing raw materials necessary for the energy transition. So far, China has invested over $1 trillion in the BRI, channelling funds into critical sectors like mining, energy, and transportation alongside 149 partner countries. The shift toward green energy significantly influences China’s demand for essential minerals, highlighting its importance in China-Africa diplomatic relations.
State-owned enterprises such as China Molybdenum, Chinalco, and CNOOC play a crucial role in the responsible acquisition of overseas mineral resources. Once they establish a presence in these markets, Chinese state-owned banks typically provide financing to strengthen and expand operations. From 2000 to 2021, 66% of Beijing’s official loans for transition minerals were allocated to 14 major mining sites across eight countries, many of which received multiple rounds of funding. This strategy allows China to influence global prices, control supply, and implement export restrictions when necessary. Recent export restrictions imposed by China on critical materials such as antimony, gallium, graphite, and rare-earth metals—vital for defense and clean energy—have led to significant disruptions in global markets.
The intricate and essential role of critical minerals in U.S.-China relations underscores their ongoing geopolitical and economic rivalry. China’s dominance in the mining, refining, and processing of these minerals poses significant concerns for U.S. policymakers. These materials are vital for the development of advanced technologies such as quantum computing, 5G networks, electric vehicles, and artificial intelligence. Thus, securing a stable supply of these resources is imperative for maintaining a technological advantage in these areas. Given that technological supremacy is a central component of global power, the competition for these resources is intricately linked to broader geopolitical tensions.
Many American companies rely significantly on Chinese suppliers, which has led to heightened anxiety and escalating tensions between the two nations. This predicament stems from the stringent export restrictions that China implemented on essential “dual-use” technologies starting December 3, 2024. These measures have limited the sale of several critical materials, including graphite, gallium, germanium, and antimony, which are indispensable for chip manufacturing and electric vehicle battery production. In January 2025, China further tightened its export controls on tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium—key materials for defense and clean technology applications. The increasing strategic competition for control over these vital minerals is poised to shape U.S.-China relations in the foreseeable future, with this rivalry becoming a central aspect of great-power dynamics. As geopolitical tensions escalate, the need for a reliable supply of essential minerals intensifies, underscoring their geopolitical significance and the overall scarcity of viable alternatives.
Just as coal was essential for the British Empire’s dominance and fossil fuels for that of the United States, control over key materials appears to be becoming the new battleground in the quest for global power. Expertise in these minerals is set to significantly influence economic and military superiority on the international stage.
Bulent Gokay is Professor of International Relations at Keele University, UK. He is the author (and co-author) of many books on global politics and human security, including 11 September 2001: War, Terror and Judgement (with R.B.J. Walker, 2003), The New American Imperialism: Bush’s War on Terror and Blood for Oil (with Vassilis Fouskas, 2005), Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey (2006) and Human Costs of War (with Lily Hamourtziadou, 2024).
