Callum Gaskell and Bulent Gokay [1]
International relations, particularly negotiations for a ceasefire and peace, should not be based solely on trust. It is vital to provide incentives to both sides, showing that halting the fighting benefits them mutually. One wishes to remind Keir Starmer of the words of an earlier British prime minister, Lord Palmerston, from the mid-19th century: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Only our interests are eternal and perpetual.”
So far, all debate about the Trump-Putin ceasefire negotiations revolves around whether Ukraine should sacrifice land for peace or keep fighting until the last Russian soldier is expelled from Ukraine. This binary argument is too simple and unhelpful. It should now be clear that defeating the Russian army on the battlefield is nearly impossible without increased and sustained Western support. So-called “red lines” set by the Kremlin have been continually crossed by Western military aid, including the provision of anti-armour weapons, main battle tanks, fighter jets and deep strike missiles. However, the looming nuclear escalatory risk will likely cause the West to continue being hesitant about providing too much support at a rapid pace. Sufficient support to achieve a quick and decisive Ukrainian victory, as Lord Palmerston would agree, is not in the West’s interests. Preventing Russia from attaining its strategic goals takes priority, but not if it pushes Putin into a corner where he feels the limited use of nuclear weapons is necessary to avoid total defeat. Moreover, the extensive resources Russia devotes to Ukraine diminish what it can allocate elsewhere. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria exemplifies this. Therefore, a prolonged and expensive war in Ukraine may ultimately serve to shield the rest of Europe from any potential Russian threat.
Despite a notable increase in the speed and scale of military aid to Ukraine, a Russian defeat remains unlikely. Russian casualties are rising, but this does not put pressure on Putin. He still has a large reserve of fighting-age men who can be mobilised if the war continues. Every day that this deadly conflict persists, Russia gains more Ukrainian territory. Economic sanctions have so far caused financial costs for Russia but have not compelled Putin to end the war. After two years under sanctions, Russia’s economy has recovered, with factories running smoothly, strong oil and gas sales, and a workforce embedded in a war-oriented system. Despite expectations that Russia’s elite might oppose him as economic pressure grew, Vladimir Putin remains firmly in control of the Kremlin.
The swapping land argument is pointless or irrelevant because Ukraine doesn’t control any Russian territory. They attempted to take the Kursk region, but this led to a high number of Ukrainian casualties, and, ultimately, the remaining troops had to withdraw.
It is also understandable that ceding some Ukrainian land in the east of the country is unacceptable to Ukrainians, as it breaches the country’s territorial integrity and would constitute a gross violation of all international laws and agreements. The external borders of the nation must not be transgressed.
In that case, what other alternatives can be considered at the negotiation table? Well, one suggestion comes to mind that no one has mentioned so far: one of the initial complaints of the Russian side before the 2022 invasion was that in the eastern parts of Ukraine, a significant number of Russians live. Their fundamental cultural and linguistic rights were being violated by the government in Kyiv. So, a referendum, under the direct observation of international bodies like the UN and the EU, could be offered in these regions to determine whether the majority desires to have an autonomous status within Ukraine, with the country’s borders remaining the same. Such a federal status could serve as the basis for the Western and Eastern parts of the country to stay united. Otherwise, whichever party or government is in charge, one side will be seriously unhappy.
The same principle could be applied to Crimea, where the majority of the population is clearly Russian. A 1997 treaty with Ukraine permitted Russia to keep its Black Sea Fleet largely intact and lease the base at Sevastopol, with the lease extended to expire in 2042. Sevastopol has been a crucial hub for projecting Russia’s naval influence globally. Ukraine’s success in pushing back the Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk is noteworthy, yet in the event of a peace agreement, maintaining control of Sevastopol would remain attractive to Russian Naval Commanders. As long as the Kiev government allows the Russian navy to use the peninsula freely, as it did prior to 2014, the status of Crimea should not pose a significant issue. It would resemble returning to the pre-2014 situation—tense but at least peaceful.
Regarding Ukraine’s desire for NATO membership, which was the pretext for Putin’s invasion, even NATO clearly stated that this is not possible in the near future, so removing it from the negotiation table is acceptable, and this does not mean that Ukraine and NATO will not consider membership in the future.
The urgent priority for Ukraine and its people is peace—ending the senseless killing and restoring some degree of normality. The country needs rebuilding, which requires significant aid, both financial and economic, from its Western allies and international organisations, especially from the so-called coalition of the willing. Concerning security guarantees, a substantial and long-term peacekeeping force, under the clear and strong protection of the US army, will be enough to prevent any further Russian aggression.
[1] Callum Gaskell is a PhD candidate, and Bulent Gokay is a professor of International Relations, both at Keele University
